This landmark volume in the Teachings of the Buddha series translates the Suttanipata, a text that matches the Dhammapada in its concise power and its centrality to the Buddhist tradition. Celebrated translator Bhikkhu Bodhi illuminates this text and its classical commentaries with elegant renderings and authoritative annotations. The Suttanipata, or “Group of Discourses” is a collection of discourses ascribed to the Buddha that includes some of the most popular suttas of the Pali Canon, among them the Discourse on Loving-Kindness Sutta. (...) The suttas are primarily in verse, though several are in mixed prose and verse. The Suttanipata contains discourses that extol the figure of the muni, the illumined sage, who wanders homeless completely detached from the world. Other suttas, such as the Discourse on Downfall and the Discourse on Blessings, establish the foundations of Buddhist lay ethics. The last two chapters—the Atthakavagga (Chapter of Octads) and the Parayanavagga (The Way to the Beyond)—are considered to be among the most ancient parts of the Pali Canon. The Atthakavagga advocates a critical attitude toward views and doctrines. The Parayanavagga is a beautiful poem in which sixteen spiritual seekers travel across India to meet the Buddha and ask him profound questions pertaining to the highest goal. The commentary, the Paramatthajotika, relates the background story to each sutta and explains each verse in detail. The volume includes numerous excerpts from the Niddesa, an ancient commentary already included in the Pali Canon, which offers detailed expositions of each verse in the Atthakavagga, the Parayanavagga, and the Rhinoceros Horn Sutta. Translator Bhikkhu Bodhi provides an insightful, in-depth introduction, a guide to the individual suttas, extensive notes, a list of parallels to the discourses of the Suttanipata, and a list of the numerical sets mentioned in the commentaries. (shrink)

This landmark volume in the Teachings of the Buddha series translates the Suttanipata, a text that matches the Dhammapada in its concise power and its centrality to the Buddhist tradition. Celebrated translator Bhikkhu Bodhi illuminates this text and its classical commentaries with elegant renderings and authoritative annotations. The Suttanipata, or “Group of Discourses” is a collection of discourses ascribed to the Buddha that includes some of the most popular suttas of the Pali Canon, among them the Discourse on Loving-Kindness Sutta. (...) The suttas are primarily in verse, though several are in mixed prose and verse. The Suttanipata contains discourses that extol the figure of the muni, the illumined sage, who wanders homeless completely detached from the world. Other suttas, such as the Discourse on Downfall and the Discourse on Blessings, establish the foundations of Buddhist lay ethics. The last two chapters—the Atthakavagga (Chapter of Octads) and the Parayanavagga (The Way to the Beyond)—are considered to be among the most ancient parts of the Pali Canon. The Atthakavagga advocates a critical attitude toward views and doctrines. The Parayanavagga is a beautiful poem in which sixteen spiritual seekers travel across India to meet the Buddha and ask him profound questions pertaining to the highest goal. The commentary, the Paramatthajotika, relates the background story to each sutta and explains each verse in detail. The volume includes numerous excerpts from the Niddesa, an ancient commentary already included in the Pali Canon, which offers detailed expositions of each verse in the Atthakavagga, the Parayanavagga, and the Rhinoceros Horn Sutta. Translator Bhikkhu Bodhi provides an insightful, in-depth introduction, a guide to the individual suttas, extensive notes, a list of parallels to the discourses of the Suttanipata, and a list of the numerical sets mentioned in the commentaries. (shrink)

The need to find clarity concerning (1) the relationship between scientific and religious cosmological discourses and (2) the imagining of a space where various religions could meet in fruitful conciliation as far as (1) is concerned, formed the basis of the article. The aim of the article was to investigate the relevance of Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga (5th CE, Pali compendium of Theravāda Buddhism) with regard to the above problems. The methodology employed involved clarifying the historical context of the Visuddhimagga ; (...) understanding the subjective intentions of Buddhaghosa and extrapolating non-emphasised but promising underlying tendencies in his magnum opus, conducive to a perspective of ultimate, universal peace as far as Cosmos, all of humanity and its various religious discourses are concerned. The reading of the Visuddhimagga revealed a mythology of many deities, tolerated but demoted to a status lower than that of enlightened humans; the denial of a Creator God; no notion of an analogia entis between humans and a living Cosmos, nor any tendency towards pantheism and a commitment to the ideal of universal happiness for all beings. The main conclusion was that Theravāda Buddhism (and, to a lesser extent, Christian theology) could be extended towards the notion of a living, evolving Cosmos, appearing from and disappearing into non-substantial silence. It is not claimed that Buddhaghosa succeeded in achieving a great cosmology. It remains an unrealised possibility, latently possible as an extension of Theravāda. Contribution: The contribution of the article is that it uncovers deeply hidden lines in Buddhism (and Christianity) that are emerging and converging. ‘Theo-logy’, re-interpreted as mystical ‘cosmo-sophy’, would not amount to a cynical debunking or irresponsible annexation of Buddhaghosa for utterly unthinkable ends, but as a topic worthy of investigation. The article is part of work in progress. (shrink)

Abstract: According to Iris Murdoch, one of our central moral capacities is to direct our attention in a way that is just and loving. In Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, Murdoch explores the prospects for strengthening this capacity through engaging in Zen Buddhist practices, particularly zazen meditation as Katsuki Sekida describes it in Zen Training: Methods and Philosophy. Murdoch has a mixed view of whether zazen could really contribute to our moral development, expressing both some optimism and some reservations. (...) I argue that a stronger version of Murdoch's project, by her own lights, would have looked to the Theravāda Buddhist philosopher Buddhaghosa's instructions for taking up loving-kindness, compassion, gladness, and equanimity as meditation subjects. (shrink)

This paper is about whether consciousness flows. Evan Thompson (2014) has recently claimed that the study of binocular rivalry shows that there are some moments where consciousness does not flow, contra William James (1890). Moreover, he’s claimed that Abhidharma philosophers reject James’s claim that consciousness flows. I argue that binocular rivalry poses no special challenge to James. Second, I argue that because Thompson did not take up the question of how James and Abhidharma philosophers analyse or define flow, he under-described (...) their disagreement in a way that obscures an important conceptual contribution that Abhidharma philosophers make to the study of flow. They reject James’s claim that there are only two conceivable ways for consciousness to fail to flow, and suggest that there is a third way for consciousness to fail to flow – a way that James’s imagination did not reveal to be possible. (shrink)

Despite more than two hundred years of modern academic study of the Pali literature, Pali commentaries still remain understudied. We know very little about the reading practices of the traditional Pali commentators and philosophers themselves. Maria Heim is one of the very few scholars invested in filling this major lacuna in Buddhist studies. Heim’s 2014 publication, The Forerunner of All Things: Buddhaghosa on Mind, Intention, and Agency, already illuminated the philosophical acumen of Buddhaghosa, the foremost Pali commentator of (...) the fifth century CE, whose name is intertwined with Theravada Buddhism itself. In her recent publication, the Voice of the Buddha: Buddhaghosa on the Immeasurable Words, Heim continues... (shrink)

Kankhavitarani by Bhadantacariya Buddhaghosa. Edited by K. R. Norman and William Pruitt. Pali Text Society, Oxford 2003. xix, 596 pp. £30.00. ISBN 0 86013 413 X.

According to Iris Murdoch, one of our central moral capacities is the capacity to direct our attention in a way that is just and loving. In Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, Murdoch explores the prospects for strengthening this capacity through engaging in Zen Buddhist practices, particularly zazen meditation as Katsuki Sekida describes it in Zen Training: Methods and Philosophy. Murdoch has a mixed view of whether zazen could really contribute to our moral development, expressing both some optimism and some (...) reservations. I argue that a stronger version of Murdoch’s project, by her own lights, would have looked to the Theravāda Buddhist philosopher Buddhaghosa’s instructions for taking up loving-kindness, compassion, gladness, and equanimity as meditation subjects. (shrink)

Scholars have long been intrigued by the Buddha's defining action (karma) as intention. This book explores systematically how intention, agency, and moral psychology were interpreted in all branches of early Theravada thought, paying special attention to the thought of the 5th-century commentator Buddhaghosa.

The value of Jonardon Ganeri's work to cross-cultural philosophy is beyond comparison. He has been and continues to be a singular and unrepeatable force of philosophical creativity. His new monograph Attention, Not Self is another deep contribution. AnS is of special importance because it engages so seriously with the work of Buddhaghosa, a much-neglected fifth-century Buddhist philosopher whose commentarial works form the intellectual backbone of the Pāli tipiṭaka of Theravāda Buddhism.1I cannot hope to treat all the nuance and depth (...) of Ganeri's newest offering here. The book is, quite frankly, dizzying in the density and extensiveness of its argument, even for an expert. Nevertheless, I shall try to comment... (shrink)

Thus one should define, in a double way, name and form in all phenomena of the three realms. …In this essay, we want to bring together two issues for their mutual illumination: the particular use of that hoary Indian dyad, "nāma-rūpa," literally, "name-and-form," by Buddhaghosa, the influential fifth-century Theravāda writer, to organize the categories of the abhidhamma, the canonical classification of phenomenal factors and their formulaic ordering;1 and an interpretation of phenomenology as a methodology. We argue that Buddhaghosa (...) does not use abhidhamma as a reductive ontological division of the human being into mind and body, but rather as the contemplative structuring of human phenomenology.... (shrink)

Maria Heim’s The Forerunner of All Things: Buddhaghosa on Mind, Intention, and Agency is a valuable contribution to the study of Buddhist philosophy and in certain respects signals a new stage in the field. This is especially true regarding the study of Theravāda Buddhist thought or the philosophy that is rooted in the Pāli Buddhist tradition. Clearly, leading Buddhist philosophers that history has chanced to include in the Mahāyāna camp, such as Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu, Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti, Candrakīrti and Tsongkhapa, have (...) received considerable scholarly attention, and detailed studies of their work and ideas are available, including philosophical analyses from both historical or philological and theoretical or.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Christianity Looks East: Comparing the Spiritualities of John of the Cross and BuddhaghosaAmos YongChristianity Looks East: Comparing the Spiritualities of John of the Cross and Buddhaghosa. By Peter Feldmeier. New York: Paulist, 2006. 166 + v pp.This book has a history that goes back at least fifteen years. The author, who has been on the faculty at the University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota, for (...) the last few years, originally wrote a much longer manuscript, "Interrelatedness: A Comparison of the Spiritualities of St. John of the Cross and Buddhaghosa for the Purpose of Examining the Christian use of Buddhist Practices," which was approved for the PhD degree at the Graduate Theological Union in 1996. Christianity Looks East is [End Page 216] almost half the length of the dissertation and written in nontechnical terms accessible to the interested layperson (although there is a very helpful "Glossary of Terms" in the back of the book).Feldmeier's primary question concerns the possibility of taking the interreligious dialogue to the next level of spiritual practice. Succinctly put, his hypothesis is that, yes, this next level of dialogue and exploration is possible, but the complexities involved need to be approached cautiously. Five chapters structure the development of this line of thought.Chapter 1 summarizes the state of the interreligious dialogue and introduces the book's thesis and dialogue partners, the sixteenth-century Christian mystic St. John of the Cross and the fifth-century monk-scholar Bhadantacariya Buddhaghosa, especially his classic commentary The Path of Purification (Vissudhimagga). Chapters 2–4 comprise the main comparative chapters, focused respectively on St. John of the Cross's and Buddhaghosa's anthropologies, their views of the spiritual life, and their understandings of the goals of spiritual disciplines and practices. Each of these middle chapters is divided into three parts: on St. John of the Cross, on Buddhaghosa, and on comparing where their views converge and diverge. Anthropological convergences include a constantly craving human nature, a delusional human consciousness, a desire-driven will, and the remedy of asceticism. Predictably, St. John of the Cross and Buddhaghosa diverge on the nature of the self: as a substantive soul on the one hand, and as impermanent on the other. Their spiritual paths feature detachment from cravings and deconstruction of the self's egotistical desires, but part ways in terms of St. John's emphasis on divine initiative and the practice of self-emptying love versus Buddhaghosa's emphasis on self-cultivation and the practice of analyzing phenomena. "Final bliss" (the title of chapter 4) presents convergent goals of absolute freedom and perfect peace, but different views of loving identification with a personal God (St. John of the Cross) and impersonal entrance into Nirvana (for Buddhaghosa, the cessation of suffering, negatively described as unconditioned).The fifth chapter asks about the future of the Buddhist-Christian dialogue, particularly with regard to interreligious practice. Drawing especially from John Dunne's theory of passing over and then coming back, Feldmeier defends the possibility of Christian use of Buddhist practices. While clearly identifying the problematic aspects of interreligious practice, he also carefully delineates when Buddhist practices cooperate with and complement the Christian paths, and when the former might critique the latter. A short epilogue addresses the various limitations of the book's main proposals with regard to the complicated methodological, theoretical/conceptual, and practical issues that confront interreligious practice.At one level, Christianity Looks East is similar to a number of other books familiar to readers of this journal that have compared and contrasted Christian and Buddhist meditation or their respective monastic traditions.1 At another level, however, the perennial questions pertaining to comparative studies of meditation and spirituality are explored through juxtaposing two specific voices: St. John of the Cross and Buddhaghosa. Hence, the striking structural similarities (what Feldmeier calls convergences) separated by geographical and temporal distance beg not only for historical [End Page 217] analysis but also for further theological explication. Since my training is primarily in theology rather than history, I cannot adequately address the genealogical questions surrounding the possible intertwining of the mystical traditions of East and West. I can, however, make a few observations about how... (shrink)

Extant discussions of Buddhist mereology give minimal attention to the soteriological significance of denying the reality of wholes. This is unfortunate, because the connection between mereology and soteriological is both significant and problematic. The connection is significant, because it supports an argument for the unreality of composite wholes that does not depend upon any claim about the nature of wholes. The connection is also problematic, because some Buddhists endorse the soteriological relevance of mereology despite admitting that composite wholes are real. (...) I address these issues by reviewing early Pāli Buddhist attitudes toward the soteriological significance of mereology, developing an argument for the unreality of wholes from the work of Buddhaghosa, and explicating an alternative approach from the Chinese tradition of Huayan 華嚴 Buddhism that calls into question some common assumptions about parts and wholes. (shrink)

Philosophers interested in what Buddhist ethics has to offer contemporary debates have largely focused on finding distinctively Buddhist reasons to choose to act ethically. But this may be to miss the point. Maria Heim’s recent study illustrates vividly how a very different conception of intention, agency, and ethics emerges from the canonical Pāli texts and the extensive commentaries on these attributed to the fifth-century author Buddhaghosa. She finds in this textual tradition a sophisticated moral anthropology and moral phenomenology, one (...) that focuses not on providing reasons against acting in ways we should not, but instead on providing tools for constructing ourselves such that the question of whether to act in an unwholesome way simply would not occur to us.In the first chapter, Heim engages with the approach to intention and agency found in the Suttas, by bringing in the complex distinctions and textual connections that Buddhaghosa adds to these discussions. To note just one hi .. (shrink)

This review details Jonardon Ganeri’s laudable attempt to move Buddhist philosophy further into the center of contemporary philosophical debates about self, personhood, agency, action, perception, attention, and kinds of mental content. This book is a must read for any contemporary philosopher interested in these debates. My only concern is that Ganeri is reading too much of P.F. Strawson into Buddhghosa’s philosophy.

Comparing Buddhist and contemporary analytic views about mereological composition reveals significant dissimilarities about the purposes that constrain successful answers to mereological questions, the kinds of considerations taken to be probative in justifying those answers, and the value of mereological inquiry. I develop these dissimilarities by examining three questions relevant to those who deny the existence of composite wholes. The first is a question of justification: What justifies denying the existence of composite wholes as more reasonable than affirming their existence? The (...) second is a question of ontology: Under what conditions are many partless individuals arranged composite-wise? The third is a question of reasonableness: Why, if there are no composites available to experience, do “the folk” find it reasonable to believe there are? I motivate each question, sketch some analytic answers for each, develop in more detail answers from the Theravādin Buddhist scholar Buddhaghosa, and extract comparative lessons. (shrink)

A natural way to think of epistemic virtue is by analogy with an archer. Just as a skilled archer is able to take aim and hit a target, a skilled epistemic agent will aim at truth and, if things go well, get things right. Here we highlight aspects of epistemic virtue that do not fit this model, particularly ways in which epistemic virtues can be non-voluntary and not goal-directed. In doing so, we draw on two important figures in the history (...) of philosophy: the 6th-century Indian Buddhist Buddhaghosa and the 20th-century French philosopher Simone Weil. Despite many differences, both thinkers emphasize the importance of attention in moral and epistemic virtue. Their work highlights ways in which attention that is neither voluntary nor goal-directed can nevertheless play an important role in moral and epistemic life. (shrink)

Buddhist philosophy of mind is fascinating because it denies that there is a self in one of the ways that has traditionally seemed best able to make sense of that idea: the idea that the self is the agent of actions including the thinking of thoughts. In the Buddhist philosophy of mind of the fifth century thinker Buddhaghosa what does the explanatory work is instead attention. Attention replaces self in the explanation of cognition’s grounding in perception and action; it (...) does this because it performs two functions at once, a function of placing and a function of focussing. A comparison between the thought of Buddhaghosa and Brian O’Shaughnessy helps to clarify what is at stake in the residual employment of the concept self as a derived rather than a primitive notion. (shrink)

Classical presentations of the Buddhist path prescribe the cultivation of various good qualities that are necessary for spiritual progress, from mindfulness and loving-kindness to faith and wisdom. Examining the way in which such qualities are described and classified in early Buddhism—with special reference to their treatment in the Visuddhimagga by the fifth-century Buddhist thinker Buddhaghosa—the present article employs a comparative method in order to identify the Buddhist catalog of virtues. The first part sketches the characteristics of virtue as analyzed (...) by neo-Aristotelian theories. Relying on these accounts, the second part considers three lists from early Buddhism as possible catalogs of virtue: the components of ethical conduct, the 37 factors that contribute to awakening, and the wholesome or beautiful mental factors. I then raise the question of why the Buddhist tradition developed several classifications of virtue, whereas the Western tradition of virtue ethics used a single category. Appealing to the connection between the virtues and living well in the eudaimonistic version of virtue ethics, I propose that one of the reasons why Buddhism developed multiple lists of virtues is its pluralistic acceptance of different modalities of living well and associated practices, in MacIntyre’s sense of the term. These modalities and practices are not equal, but are ordered hierarchically. Accordingly, I conclude that Buddhist ethics ought to be seen as a pluralist-gradualist system rather than a universalist theory. (shrink)

Saṃvega is a morally motivating state of shock that -- according to Buddhaghosa -- should be evoked by meditating on death. What kind of mental state it is exactly, and how it is morally motivating is unclear, however. This article presents a theory of saṃvega -- what it is and how it works -- based on recent insights in psychology. According to dual process theories there are two kinds of mental processes organized in two" systems" : the experiential, automatic (...) system 1, and the rational, controlled system 2. In normal circumstances, system 1 does not believe in its own mortality. Saṃvega occurs when system 1 suddenly realizes that the "subjective self" will inevitably die (while system 2 is already disposed to affirm the subject's mortality). This results in a state of shock that is morally motivating under certain conditions. Saṃvega increases mortality salience and produces insight in suffering, and in combination with a strengthened sense of loving-kindness or empathic concern both mortality salience and insight in suffering produce moral motivation. (shrink)

In the Visuddhimagga, there is movement from an early Buddhist phenominalist epistemology towards essentialist ontology based in rationality and abstraction. The reductionist methodology of the Abhidhamma and reactions to it brought forth a theory of momentariness not found in early Buddhism. Abhidhamma reductionism and the concept of phenomenal dhammas led to a conception of momentary time-points and the incorporation of a cinematic model of temporal consciousness as a direct consequence of momentariness. Essentialism was incorporated into the Visuddhimagga precisely because of (...) Buddhaghosa’s commitment to momentariness. This is seen in Buddhaghosa’s treatment of karma and rebirth. Karma, particularly death-threshold karma, receives more emphasis in the Visuddhimagga than was previously found in the Suttas. This is due to the need to explain the continuity of the process of karmic rebirth in light of the theory of momentariness, making it necessary for Buddhaghosa to synthesise momentariness with the tri-temporal existence of the Sarvāstivādins. (shrink)

In the development of Indian Buddhism we begin to see a shift away from the early Buddhist epistemology based in phenomenology and process metaphysics toward a type of event-based metaphysics. This shift began in the reductionist methodology of the Abhidhamma and culminated in a theory of momentariness based in rationalism and abstraction, rather than early Buddhist empiricism. While early Buddhism followed an extensional model of temporal consciousness, when methodological reductionism was applied to the concept of time, it necessarily resulted in (...) a cinematic model of temporal consciousness like that of the Sautrāntikas or in an idea of the tri-temporal existence of dhammas, like that of the Sarvāstivādins. It is in the accounting of the process of karmic rebirth that we can most clearly see the effects of this shift. -/- The development of a theory of momentariness was incorporated into the Visuddhimagga by Buddhaghosa. In Buddhaghosa’s treatment of karmic rebirth, karma, particularly death-threshold karma, receives more emphasis in the process of rebirth than was previously found in the Suttas. The incorporation of “duration-less duration” via tritemporal existence by Buddhaghosa became necessary in order to explain karmic continuity in the rebirth process while retaining the concept of momentariness. (shrink)

Maria Heim’s Voice of the Buddha: Buddhaghosa on the Immeasurable Words is a rare example of sustained scholarly engagement with commentarial literature. The book introduces the reader to the literary world of the Theravāda Buddhist exegete Buddhaghosa, with the stated goal of learning to read as he did. Heim shows with a series of close readings how Buddhaghosa read scripture with a high degree of attention to context, and how he understood both the Buddhist canon and the (...) Buddha’s knowledge to be infinitely expansive. Heim’s thorough and accessible treatment makes her presentation an approachable case study of commentarial literature. (shrink)

Asl. Atthasalinl of Buddhaghosa, ed. PTS. 1897. BB. Bibliotheca Buddhica, Petrograd. BC. Buddhacarita, ed. Cowell, Oxford, 1893. BCA. ...

Attention has a long history in philosophy, despite its near absence in the twentieth century. This chapter provides an overview of philosophical research on attention. It begins by explaining the concept of "selection from limitation," contrasting it with the more recent "selection for action." It reviews historical texts that discuss attention, focusing on those in the Western canon whose understanding of "attention" aligns with contemporary usage. It then describes the differential treatment of attention in phenomenology and behaviorism in the last (...) century. Finally, it discusses contemporary research by topic: attention, perception, and knowledge; attention and consciousness; attention and action; and attention and the self. It includes work by Allport,Aristotle, Astell, Augustine, Bergson, Berkeley, Block, Bradley, Buddhaghosa, Campbell, Cherry, De Brigard, Dehaene and Naccache, Descartes, Dickie, Du Bois, Ganeri, Hegel, Heidegger, James, Kant, Koch and Tsuchiya, LaBerge, Locke, Mack and Rock, Malebranche, Merleau-Ponty, Mole, Montemayor and Haladjian, Neumann, Pashler, Posner, Prinz, Reid, Rensink, Reynolds and Heeger, Treisman, Watzl, Wittgenstein, Wollstonecraft, and Wu. (shrink)

ABSTRACTGaneri [2018] explores three Buddhist approaches to episodic memory and concludes in favor of Buddhaghosa's attentional account. When comparing it to Vasubandhu's, Ganeri argues that Buddhaghosa's is preferable because it does not over-intellectualize episodic memory. In my commentary, I argue that the intellectualism of Vasubandhu's approach makes it both a more plausible account of episodic memory and a more successful strategy for addressing the precarious role of the self in this form of memory.

Para las tradiciones escolásticas budistas, el universo es inseparable de la vida mental de los seres que lo habitan, siendo las acciones de los seres, con sus estados mentales asociados, las que trazan el mapa y calendario cósmico. Algunos investigadores han visto en estas asociaciones entre mente y universo la «contraparte imaginativa, mítica y poética de los estados meditativos». Este artículo intenta mostrar cómo la propia escolástica mantiene cierta ambigüedad sobre si el cosmos debe entenderse como una metáfora de la (...) mente o debe identificarse literalmente con ella. Algunos pasajes establecen una complementariedad que parece afirmar la existencia independiente de ambos. Sea como fuere, contrastar las descripciones de estados mentales con relatos cosmogónicos nos permitirá comprender mejor la idea del cosmos en el budismo antiguo. (shrink)

The Vibhaṅga Mūlaṭīkā, attributed to Ānanda, is a sub-commentary of one of the seven books of the Pāli Abhidhamma-piṭaka, the Vibhaṅga, and the direct commentary of its commentary, Buddhaghosa’s Sammohavinodanī. In the section on the _satipaṭṭhāna_ method, Ānanda proposes exegetical strategies to solve some seeming contradiction between Buddhaghosa’s interpretation of the Vibhaṅga and the Sutta’s framework that the Satipaṭṭhānavibhaṅga refers to. An examination of exemplary passages from the Satipaṭṭhānavibhaṅga of the Vibhaṅga Mūlaṭīkā will shed light upon the originality (...) of Ānanda’s thought and its influence on Dhammapāla’s commentaries. (shrink)

The Mahāsamghika is known as a sect which includes several Mahāyānic elements. Several scholars have pointed out that people belonging to it insist that the physical body of a Buddha is anāsrava (undefiled) and his existence in this world is lokottara (transcendental). In the Mahāvastu, a representative text inMahāsamghika literature, we find the word lokānuvartanā (conforming to the world), which is related closely to the anāsrava and lokottara theory on the physical body of a Buddha. However, though the Theravāda and (...) Sarvāstivāda, both of which are generally believed as having a more “realistic” understanding regarding the image of a Buddha, basically criticize the Mahāsamghika’s view, we can find descriptions similar to the concept of lokānuvartanā in their own literature. This implies that the problem of understanding a Buddha’s physical body in sectarian Buddhism is not as simple as was previously thought. For example, Buddhaghosa stated that all (past and future) Buddhas originally have asankheyya (immensely long period) lifespans. However, in reality, the duration of each lifebecomes longer or shorter, depending on the lifespan of human beings which cyclically increases and decreases due to cosmological conditions and hence, each Buddha is also subject to this principle when appearing in this world. This explanation is indeed analogous to the concept of lokānuvartanā in the Mahāvastu, and we can find several other descriptions by Buddhaghosa, which bear close resemblance to this idea. In the first place, the image of a Buddha,which is depicted in Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda literature, is also full of mythical and miraculous characteristics. Moreover, with respect to using the “two‐bodies theory” (dharmakāya and rūpakāya) to explain the essence and the appearance of a Buddha, it is the Sarvāstivāda rather than the Mahāsamghika that is closer toearly Mahāyāna. In the dispute between these two sects as to whether the physical body of a Buddha is āsrava or anāsrava, we can see that according to the Ta p’i-p’o-sha lun 大毘婆沙論, both of them acknowledge their legitimacy based on one sentence in a sutra, namely “The Tathāgata is living in this world but he is not stained by any worldly elements.” Thus, their dispute merely arose from a discrepancy in the interpretation of this sentence. In conclusion, two things should be stated. First, though it is true that we can find several Mahāyānic elements in Mahāsamghika literature, at least in terms of regarding a Buddha’s physical body as part of this world, both the Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda rather than the Mahāsamghika are closer to early Mahāyāna. Second, the dispute between theSarvāstivāda, which regards the physical body of a Buddha as āsrava, and the Mahāsamghika, which explains his appearance by the concept of lokānuvartanā, certainly reflects an important difference of opinion. We should not, however, accept that this difference means a total disagreement between the two concerning the understanding of a Buddha’s appearance in this world. At least, their differing view does not imply that “while the former basically had a ‘realistic’ image of a Buddha, the latter had a ‘deified’ one which was closer to that of the Mahāyāna.”. (shrink)

The traditional view in Theravada Buddhism of the heart (hadaya) as the 'seat of consciousness' is explored. Evidence is sought in the Nikayas, the Abhidhamma and commentaries, Buddhaghosa's "Visuddhimagga" (5th century), and Kassapa's "Mohavicchedani" (12th century). Some possible sources of error are identified. The view is challenged on the basis of the early teachings of the Buddha and the alternative view, that it is the whole body that is the seat of consciousness, is reconstructed. Some possible future comparative research (...) and applications are suggested. (shrink)

Study of Buddhist ethics as reflected in the Visuddhimagga, philosophical work, by Buddhaghosa.

Ganeri's [2018] discussion of mental time travel and the self focuses on remembering the past, but has less to say with respect to the status of future-oriented mental time travel. This paper aims to disambiguate the relation between prospection and the self from the framework of Ganeri's interpretation of three Buddhist views—by Buddhaghosa, Vasubandhu, and Dignaga. Is the scope of Ganeri's discussion confined to the past, or is there a stronger assumption that future thought always entails self-representation? I argue (...) that if mental time travel towards the past and towards the future are continuous, both past and future thought should be possible independently of self-representation. An assumption of discontinuity however would enable the employment of the self as one of the defining differences between remembering the past and imagining the future. The two options can be further contrasted on the basis of distinct ways of constructing past/future scenarios (field vs. observer perspective), modes of experiencing time (known vs. lived), and the origin of mental time travel (episodic vs. semantic memory). I further assess the compatibility of future-oriented thought with the three Buddhist views on the basis of these coordinates. (shrink)

In Thailand the pre-reform Therav?da meditation system, bor?n kamma??h?na, is now practised only by small and isolated groups. To promote detailed comparative study of bor?n kamma??h?na, the tradition of it taught at Wat Ratchasittharam, Thonburi, is explored through a translation of a text on?n?p?nasati attributed to Suk Kaitheun, the head of its lineage. This is followed by a detailed discussion and comparison with the description of the same technique in the Visuddhimagga. Some close connections between these two sources are identified (...) and it is speculated that, despite features concerning nimitta, bodily location, terminology etc. that are diagnostically distinctive for bor?n kamma??h?na, its method for?n?p?nasati can be seen as a rational development of earlier techniques advocated by Buddhaghosa. (shrink)

'Ethics' was not developed as a separate branch of philosophy in Buddhist traditions until the modern period, though Buddhist philosophers have always been concerned with the moral significance of thoughts, emotions, intentions, actions, virtues, and precepts. Their most penetrating forms of moral reflection have been developed within disciplines of practice aimed at achieving freedom and peace. This Element first offers a brief overview of Buddhist thought and modern scholarly approaches to its diverse forms of moral reflection. It then explores two (...) of the most prominent philosophers from the main strands of the Indian Buddhist tradition – Buddhaghosa and Śāntideva – in a comparative fashion. (shrink)

Bruce Janz, Jessica Locke, and Cynthia Willett interact in this exchange with different aspects of Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad’s book Human Being, Bodily Being. Through “constructive inter-cultural thinking”, they seek to engage with Ram-Prasad’s “lower-case p” phenomenology, which exemplifies “how to think otherwise about the nature and role of bodiliness in human experience”. This exchange, which includes Ram-Prasad’s reply to their interventions, pushes the reader to reflect more about different aspects of bodiliness.

Crossing the Stream, Leaving the Cave brings philosophers from two of the world's great philosophical traditions--Platonic and Indian Buddhist--into joint inquiry on topics in metaphysics, epistemology, mind, language, and ethics. An international team of scholars address selected questions of mutual concern to Buddhist and Platonist: How can knowledge of reality transform us? Will such transformation leave us speechless, or disinterested in the world around us? What is cause? What is self-knowledge? And how can dreams shed light on waking cognition? What (...) do the paradoxes thrown up by abstract thought about fundamental notions such as being and unity reveal? Is it possible to attain unity in ourselves, and should we even try? Would doing so make us happy--and is such happiness consistent with both contemplation of reality and action in the world? With close readings of texts by Buddhaghosa, Nagarjuna, Vasubandhu, Dignaga, Bhaviveka, Santideva; by Plato, Plotinus, Porphyry, Olympiodorus, and Damascius (among others), these studies consider not just the different answers Buddhists and Platonists might give to these questions, but also the criticisms they might bring to each other's positions, the sort of arguments they use, and the use they put these arguments to. Bringing Platonic and the Buddhist perspectives jointly to bear creates a cosmopolitan philosophical exchange which yields greater conceptual clarity on the questions and the terms in which they are cast, reveals unnoticed conceptual connections, and opens up new possibilities for addressing central philosophical concerns. (shrink)

I thank Sean Smith and Monima Chadha for their reviews of Attention, Not Self and for their commentary. It has been rewarding to think through the issues they have raised, and I am grateful to both.Let me begin with the methodological principle that Sean Smith endorses at the beginning of his review. Smith says this: "My main argument is that Ganeri attributes views to Buddhaghosa that the latter does not hold. Embedded in this complaint is the assumption that we (...) should try to get a thinker right and on their own terms as a precursor to seeing how their views interface with those of others. It is an assumption I will rely on throughout." Let me call this the Exegesis First assumption. The assumption takes the form... (shrink)

HATRED IS A PHENOMENON OF TREMENDOUS ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE, YET it is poorly understood today. This essay explores some of the ways in which hatred is conceptualized and evaluated within different philosophical and religious traditions. Attention is focused on the Hebrew Bible and on the writings of Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Aquinas, and Buddhaghosa. Subtle differences mark various tradition-rooted accounts of the nature, causes, and effects of hatred. These differences yield different judgments about hatred's value and imply different methods for addressing (...) the problem of hatred. (shrink)

Moral Struggle and Religious Ethics offers a comparative discussion of the challenges of living a moral religious life. This is illustrated with a study of two key thinkers, Bonaventure and Buddhaghosa, who influenced the development of moral thinking in Christianity and Buddhism respectively. Provides an important and original contribution to the comparative study and practice of religious ethics Moves away from a comparison of theories by discussing the shared human problem of moral weakness Offers an fresh approach with a (...) comparison of the understanding of the problem of moral weakness between the two key thinkers, Bonaventure and Buddhaghosa Written by a highly respected academic in the dynamic and fast-growing field of comparative religious ethics. (shrink)

We offer a framework for assessing what the structure of episodic memory might be, if one accepts the Buddhist denial of persisting selves. This paper is a response to Jonardon Ganeri's paper "Mental time travel and attention", which explores Buddhaghosa's ideas about memory. (It will eventually be published with a reply by Ganeri).

Comparative study of Yogasūtra, aphoristic work on the Yoga school in Indic philosophy by Patāñjali and Visuddhimagga, treatise on Buddhist philosophy by Buddhaghosa.

In this paper, I provide a philosophical analysis of Pāli texts that treat of a special kind of mental event called bhavaṅga citta. This mental event is a primal sentient consciousness, a passive form of basal awareness that individuates sentient beings as the type of being that they are. My aims with this analysis are twofold, one genealogical and reconstructive, the other systematic. On the genealogical and reconstructive side, I argue for a distinction between two kinds of continuity that are (...) at work in explaining the temporal structure of experience in Pāli Buddhist philosophy. Call these two forms of continuity ‘diachronic’ and ‘affective-motivational’ continuity, respectively. In my analysis of these two forms of continuity, I will focus on the coherence of bhavaṅga citta in its Abhidhammic context. My contention is that the commentarial account of bhavaṅga citta has the resources to explain diachronic continuity but struggles to give a fully workable account of affective-motivational continuity. I argue that the novel view of mental continuity offered by the early twentieth century Burmese monastic exegete Ledi Sayadaw offers another intriguing account of mental continuity, one that can help to explain affective-motivational continuity. Systematically speaking, in spelling out the dynamics of this distinction between types of mental continuity in connection with bhavaṅga, I offer a cross-cultural philosophical analysis of the deep structure of the mind and how affective processes below the threshold of ordinary habits of attention have a profound conditioning effect on our conscious relationship with the world. (shrink)

Buddhist ethics generally favour attention over action, and mental cultivation as the means of ethical transformation. Buddhaghosa’s treatment of samādhi – meditation – in the Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga) exemplifies this view that practices of attention are morally transforming. His detailed discussion of which forms of attentional exercises are transformative to whom reveal that edifying attention is directed to impersonal reality rather than persons – even when the Buddha is our object of attention. In successful meditation, we do not (...) just recognise reality and ourselves as devoid of essence; we experience it as such – and in the experiencing, become so ourselves. (shrink)