Después de un breve excursus histórico, absolutamente no exhaustivo, pero dirigido a entender el significado del término hipocresía dentro de algunos autores, me concentro en su defensa paradójica. Paradójica porque, a pesar de ser moralmente reprochable, la actitud hipócrita preserva la integridad ..

Después de un breve excursus histórico, absolutamente no exhaustivo, pero dirigido a entender el significado del término hipocresía dentro de algunos autores, me concentro en su defensa paradójica. Paradójica porque, a pesar de ser moralmente reprochable, la actitud hipócrita preserva la integridad del valor ético, que se respeta aparentemente y que, sin embargo, se viola en secreto. After a short historical excursus, that doesn't pretend to be complete, but is only directed to understand the meaning of the term hypocrisy in (...) some authors. I concentrate on its paradoxical defense. Paradoxical because, though morally censurable, the hypocritical attitude preserves the integrity of the ethical value, that it apparently respects, but secretly violates. (shrink)

[Reading Samuel Beckett's "Fin de Partie". Notes from a seminar]. The paper sets out the results of a didactic workshop about Fin de Partie by Samuel Beckett held by the Author at the ISPF. After clarifying the link between the concept of absurdity and the concept of contradiction, and touching the issue in Giuseppe Rensi, Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus, the Author presents his ontological reading of Beckett’s play.

This chapter deals with the link between language and epistemology of time, according with the paper issued in this session. The arise of natural science, in Early Modern Age, makes possible the constitution of an epistemic paradigm which connects himself to the definition of human nature, and allows to research objective rules for the human history and human language. The Early Twentieth century, breaks this standard, as is possible to see in the essays proposed in this part of the book.

Within a general approach that implies the closely related survey of neurosciences and philosophical thought, the essays collected in the volume develop two main lines of research. The first one, thanks to the contributions of scientists and psychologists , psychoanalysists and bioengineers , allows to fix the attention on the neurobiological, psychological, psychoanalytical and physical remembering. The second one, more specifically philosophical, is declined in three different approaches. the first - with essays by Stefania Achella, Giuseppe D'Anna and Rosario (...) Diana - points to the anlysis of the role played by the rememberance and the prefiguration in the processes of identity construction. The second - with contributions from Fiorella Battaglia, Anna Donise, Sabine Marienberg and Sara Fortuna - focuses on the role of remembering in anthropology and linguistics, as well as the identification of certain diseases of memory. The third, finally - with contributions from Gabriella Baptist, Chiara de Luzenberger and Marco Boninu - tends to define the regulatory function of memory. (shrink)

Luce Irigaray's fearlessness towards speaking the body has earned for her work the dismissive label “essentialist.” But Irigaray's Speculum de l'autre femme and Ce Sexe qui n'en est pas un suggest that essence may not be the unitary, monolithic, in short, essentialist category that anti-essentialists so often presume it to be. Irigaray strategically deploys essentialism for at least two reasons: first, to reverse and to displace Jacques Lacan's phallomorphism; and second, to expose the contradiction at the heart of Aristotelian metaphysics (...) which denies women access to “Essence” while at the same time positing the essence of “Woman” precisely as non-essential. (shrink)

This paper examines expressed hopelessness among environmental activists in Extinction Rebellion. While activists claim that they have lost all hope for a future without global warming and species extinction, through despair emerges a new hope for saving what can still be saved—a hope for what is left. This radical hope, emerging from despair, may make Extinction Rebellion even more effective. Drawing from personal interviews with 25 Extinction Rebellion activists in the United Kingdom and the published work of other Extinction Rebellion (...) activists, this paper identifies signs of radical hope. While activists have cast off false hope and passive hope, a new hope for what is still possible remains. This hope is based on virtue ethics: doing what is right in the moment, rather than being attached to a desired outcome. This drives forward activism despite the results. Through their principle of regenerative culture, Extinction Rebellion activists learn to support each other and be prepared for a more turbulent and challenging future. Through a regenerative culture they can salvage and repair what is left and sustain radical hope. (shrink)

This paper clarifies and reflects on the four values that Serene Khader argues feminism can do without in Decolonizing Universalism: independence individualism, personhood individualism, Enlightenment freedom, and gender‐role eliminativism. Persuaded by her condemnation of the view Khader calls “headship complementarianism” and her defense of a different form of gender complementarianism, the paper leaves the question of gender role eliminativism aside. It starts by presenting some concerns about her treatment of Enlightenment freedom, independence individualism, and personhood individualism. It agrees that Enlightenment (...) freedom and independence individualism have no place in feminism. Contrary to Khader, however, it maintains that personhood individualism is necessarily a feminist value. It then shows why the value of women’s autonomy is more central to non‐imperialist feminism than Khader acknowledges. Ultimately, it agrees with Khader that feminism can be both universalist and non‐imperialist provided that these qualifications are adopted. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Secret Inside MeDiana GarciaGrowing up, our Chicano household was loud and boisterous. There were eight of us in one small house with one small bathroom. All five of us girls shared one bedroom so there was not much privacy, if any. Watching my sisters go through their puberty was isolating—I was never on the receiving end of the secret whispers and knowing looks I saw my mother exchange (...) with my sisters when they started menstruating. It made me feel “different” and excluded from that mother–daughter connection. My only comfort was that my sister, who was one year younger, had not started her period either, and we shared our fears that we were different from our other sisters.In 1979, when I was a senior in high school, I approached my mother and assertively told her that I had made the decision to seek out a doctor as soon as I turned eighteen years old because I felt I needed to get answers for myself and my sister. I was positive that something was not right. From the time I was about twelve years old, I would question my mom about why I hadn’t started my period. She always shooed me away saying that I was a late bloomer and that every girl starts at different ages, some at nine, some at fourteen years old. However, I always knew something was not right. I just knew.My mother was annoyed, but she said, “Alright mija, I’ve just been worried because you are a virgin and I don’t think I want anyone probing you down there.”I remember telling her something like, “Mom, at this point, if that is what needs to happen for me to find out, then so be it. But can you come with me to the doctor? Please?” [End Page 92]She said, “I know; I’m worried, too and yes, I’ll go with you.” My mom and I hugged, and I could feel the worry and tension in our hug. I was not sure if it was coming from me or her.The day of my gynecology appointment finally came. I had been looking forward to it for so long. This was my first experience as an adult other than having that grownup feeling the day I graduated from high school. The nurse told me to undress and to put on the paper gown and then left the room. I told my mother to stay sitting in her chair, that I did not want her to leave me for a second. The young doctor entered the room and introduced himself to us and asked me to sit on the examining table as he asked, “So, what is the reason for this visit?” I told him, “I want to know why I haven’t started my period. I feel like something is very wrong with me.”He had me lay back and put my feet in the stirrups, instructing me to relax. I reached my hand out to my mother and she stood and came by my side and held my hand tightly.He squeezed some gel on his gloved hand and again asked me to relax and to just let my knees drop back. His fingers with the cold gel probed and after a few seconds of probing he looked up and said,“What the heck?! There’s no cervix?”My mother and I looked at each other in confusion and then he said, “There’s nothing!”He then stood up and said, “Please get dressed and the nurse will show you to my office.” He exited the room, leaving us to look at each other with tears in our eyes, stunned at his outbursts.I will never forget his reaction or his words.A sympathetic nurse led us into the doctor’s office and we sat down.He looked at me and said, “You need to have surgery immediately or you will die of cancer.”I turned to look at my mother and we both started tearing up. I asked, “Why? What do you mean? I have cancer?”He said, “No you don’t. Not right now... (shrink)

Philosophers have had surprisingly little to say about the concept of a victim although it is presupposed by the extensive philosophical literature on rights. Proceeding in four stages, I seek to remedy this deficiency and to offer an alternative to the two current paradigms that eliminates the Othering of victims. First, I analyze two victim paradigms that emerged in the late 20th century along with the initial iteration of the international human rights regime – the pathetic victim paradigm and the (...) heroic victim paradigm. Holocaust victims are quintessential instances of the pathetic victim paradigm. They are marked by passivity and innocence in the face of overpowering force and unspeakable humanly inflicted suffering. Aung San Suu Kyi is an exemplar of the heroic victim paradigm – prisoners of conscience, in Amnesty International’s terms. Because heroic victims face off against the repressive power of the state to fight injustice, they are by no means passive, but they must be innocent of wrongdoing – that is, they must use nonviolent means of dissent – to qualify as heroic victims. Second, I problematize the asymmetrical conceptions of innocence that underwrite the two victim paradigms. Whereas the pathetic victim paradigm identifies innocence with passivity, the heroic victim paradigm countenances agentic victims and adverts to a universalist, absolutist stance on the limits of the legitimate use of state power to ascribe innocence to heroic victims. Both conceptions of innocence are out of keeping with well established social and legal practices regarding what constitutes coercive force and innocent victimhood. Consequently, there is reason to be skeptical of the two victim paradigms. Third, I identify two kinds of human rights violations and two categories of victims that AI defends despite their failure to fit the two paradigms – women trafficked into sex work and prisoners on death row. In many cases, women forced to do sex work are not innocent girls who are ignorant of the trafficking system and who helplessly fall prey to smugglers. They are desperately poor women who for that reason are willing to take enormous risks to try to relieve their own and often their families’ deprivation and suffering. Although these women act nonviolently for irreproachable reasons, they lack the public political agendas that characterize heroic victims. Unless non-fulfillment of subsistence rights is recognized as a form of overpowering force that inflicts severe, avoidable suffering, these women do not qualify as pathetic victims either. The victim paradigms pose an even greater obstacle to recognizing that the death penalty is a human rights violation and that death row prisoners are victims. Because a jury concluded that these individuals committed heinous, violent crimes, they are excluded by the heroic victim paradigm. Only if death row prisoners can be proven (usually through DNA evidence) not to have committed the crimes for which they were convicted can these individuals qualify as pathetic victims. In the absence of any reason to believe that they are innocent and especially if they are unrepentant, they are widely regarded as brutal victimizers of others who deserve no sympathy for, let along relief from, the suffering they “brought on themselves.” Finally, I confront the Othering of victims that results from the two victim paradigms, which leads many victims to eschew the label, thereby opting out of human right discourse. I propose revisions in the victim paradigms that eliminate the real-world exclusions they sponsor as well as the Othering of victims of human rights abuses. In particular, I endorse greater attention to what people and the institutions they create do to other people, and I favor a presumption that unnecessary and severe humanly inflicted suffering is a human rights violation. Moreover, I reject the innocence criterion embedded in the two paradigms and urge that it be replaced by a burdened agency criterion. These modifications better align the concept of a victim with a realistic understanding of human subjectivity and agency and allow for a more capacious understanding of who is a bearer of human rights and under what conditions right-holders become victims of rights violations. (shrink)

This fascinating study presents a unique history of psychiatry in the twentieth century. It brings together the memories and narratives of over sixty patients and workers who lived, or were employed, in Severalls Psychiatric Hospital, Essex, UK. Personal accounts are contextualised both in relation to wider developments and issues in twentieth-century mental health, and in relation to policies and changes in the hospital itself. Organised around the theme of space and place, and drawing upon both quantitative and qualitative material, chapters (...) deal with key areas such as gender divisions, power relations, patterns of admission and discharge, treatments, and the daily lives and routines of patients and nurses of both sexes. (shrink)

: J. David Velleman develops a canny, albeit mentalistic, theory of selfhood that furnishes some insights feminist philosophers should heed but that does not adequately heed some of the insights feminist philosophers have developed about the embodiment and relationality of the self. In my view, reflexivity cannot do the whole job of accounting for selfhood, for it rests on an unduly sharp distinction between reflexive loci of understanding and value, on the one hand, and embodiment and relationality, on the other. (...) I conclude that what is missing from Velleman's account is an appreciation of the psycho-corporeal attributes and capabilities embedded in the embodied self and the relational self. (shrink)

In this article I look at the methodology of one the most unique figures in Russian philosophy—Merab Mamardašvili—who was known for his focus on consciousness. According to him, the application of the subject–object dualism to the analysis of consciousness leads to a series of complications. Within the phenomenological framework of intentionality there is an interwining of perspective and object to which this perspective is directed. As soon as we try to apply to consciousness subject–object schemes, then we immediately come across (...) paradoxes. It is impossible to determine consciousness by means of subject–object, not only because it is neither an object nor a subject, but also because consciousness inevitably turns out to be “prior” to such distinctions. (shrink)

Resumo/abstract dissertação de Mestrado FREITAS, Marissandra Silva do Rosário. Religião e inclusão social: uma análise sobre o trabalho de inclusão de surdos em igrejas cristãs de Belo Horizonte.

Humanización de los servicios de salud en Iberoamérica: una revisión sistemática de la literatura Humanização dos serviços de saúde na Ibero-América: uma revisão sistemática da literatura Humanization is an ethical imperative that contributes to safeguarding human dignity in harmony with bioethical principles and deontological regulations that govern health care practices. The present study aims to explore the advances in the humanization of Ibero-American health care in the last ten years through a systematic review. Results show that such advances point to (...) understanding the phenomenon based on theoretical approaches, a growing interest in the subject in recent years, and the creation of policies, programs and strategies that should be strengthened from a comprehensive view of the human being. Para citar este artículo / To reference this article / Para citar este artigo Carlosama DM, Villota NG, Benavides VK, Villalobos-Galvis FH, Hernández EL, Matabanchoy SM. Humanización de los servicios de salud en Iberoamérica: una revisión sistemática de la literatura. Pers Bioet. 2019;23:245-262. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5294/pebi.2019.23.2.6 Recibido: 21/06/2019 Aceptado: 04/09/2019. (shrink)

It is generally agreed that empathy can give us knowledge about others. However, the potential use of empathy as a tool to learn about features of objects in the world more generally, as opposed to learning only about others’ internal states, has not been discussed in the literature. In this paper I make the claim that empathy can help us learn about evaluative features of objects in the world. I further defend this claim by comparing empathy to testimony. Then I (...) present and respond to two possible objections to this analogy. (shrink)

Part III. Section 2. Feminine and Masculine Socialization: Two main problems are explored: 1) How are girls and boys socialized in contemporary western societies? and 2) What are adult women and men like? Meyers appropriates the main outlines of Simone de Beauvoir's account of feminine socialization in The Second Sex, but she also discusses more recent research.

Part III. Section 4. Full Autonomy - An Attainable Ideal: Maximal or full autonomy is an unrealistic goal for all people. Contrary to a common assumption, however, masculine socialization does not generally result in full autonomy, but rather in medial autonomy. Conformism is as much of an obstacle to the full autonomy of men as it is for women. Still, men in western cultures are more likely to be more autonomous than women, and this discrepancy calls for change.

Part II. Section 5. Interests, Self-Interest and Autonomy: Two questions drive this chapter: 1) What kinds of things can be objects of autonomous choices? and 2) How are these related to an individual's authentic self? If self-interest is construed as securing a set of basic goods for oneself, personal autonomy and self-interest can collide. Still, Meyers holds that autonomy based on exercising autonomy competency is compatible with the dominance principle, which counsels opting for a course of action that satisfies at (...) least one more authentic desire than other available possibilities. (shrink)

The value of autonomy - even personal autonomy - cannot be confined to the private sphere. Because autonomy bears a reciprocal relation to equal opportunity, it must be counted among the cardinal political values.

Part II. Section 1. Recent Accounts of Autonomy: Emphasizing the problematic relationship between autonomy and socialization, Meyers explores prominent views of autonomy, including Robert Young's, Stanley Benn's, Harry Frankfurt's, Gerald Dworkin's, and Gary Watson's. Having identified three main models for "rescuing autonomy from socialization," she identifies a single defect underlying all of them - namely, their assumption that personal autonomy requires transcending socialization through free will.

Part II. Section 6. Responsibility for Self: Meyers criticizes Derek Parfit's arguments against the rationality of temporal neutrality -- in other words, the principle of responsibility to self. She urges that autonomy requires providing for one's future.

Part IV. Section 2. Self-Respect and Autonomy: Meyers's discussion of self-respect takes into account work by Stephen Darwall, Thomas Hill, Jr., and Stephen Massey and proposes a unified triadic account that undermines the distinction between self-respect and self-esteem. After distinguishing compromised respect from unqualified respect, she shows why self-respect is both required for and a product of exercising autonomy competency.

Because it is characteristic of competencies that they have overarching functions, Meyers considers what the overarching function of autonomy competency might be. She defends a view of personal integration that does not entail counterproductive consistency or unity. She rejects several other solutions to this problem, including compartmentalization, sanity, happiness, and eccentric nonconformity.

Part III. Section 1. Theories of Socialization. Autonomy as autonomy competency acknowledges the necessity of socialization for autonomy. Preliminary to considering this claim in relation to gender, Meyers sketches three social scientific models of socialization - psychoanalysis, social learning, and cognitive development.

Part IV. Section 1. The Personal and the Political Value of Autonomy: Disparities in autonomy competency number among the many ways in which women and men in western societies are unequal. Meyers holds that although personal autonomy is not the sole or paramount value, medial autonomy is not only a personal good, but is also a political good.

Resumen En este trabajo se reflexiona, en primer término, acerca del valor como categoría analítica de las estrategias de cortesía atenuadora. Se sostiene que, para interpretar que se ha producido una atenuación, es necesario identificar la actividad comunicativa que se evalúa como amenazante en ese contexto. Una estrategia de cortesía atenuadora se define como aquella cuya función es disminuir el efecto social negativo que pueda tener una actividad de imagen amenazante en el estado de la relación interpersonal y en el (...) clima socio-emocional de la interlocución en curso. Con base en Bravo proponemos un modelo para la interpretación de este tipo de estrategias en su contexto de producción. En segundo término, queremos hacer un aporte al estudio de las estrategias de cortesía atenuadora, planteando las dificultades que se le presentan al/la analista a la hora de registrar este tipo de actividades de imagen en discursos públicos en los cuales el nivel de conflicto interlocutivo es elevado. Se concluye que, si bien priman las estrategias de autoimagen y las de descortesía, la atenuación matiza la confrontación en beneficio de la construcción de una identidad de imagen acorde con las expectativas de diferentes auditorios. (shrink)

En el marco de un estudio sobre la evolución del género trágico desde el siglo IV a.C. hasta Bizancio, nos detenemos en la Exagogé de Ezequiel para proponer un texto y una versión castellana, a la vez que en el comentario destacamos los rasgos que la hacen pertenecer a dicho género y su valor como antecedente de piezas bizantinas. In the context of a study on the evolution of the tragic genre from the IV century B.C. to Byzantium, we stop (...) in the Exagoge, the work of Ezechiel, in order to propose a text and a Spanish version ; at the same time, in our commentary we emphasise the characteristics which make it to belong to this genre and its values as precedent of Byzantine plays. (shrink)