This volume may be of interest for all those who wish that philosophy had a scientific character. As an adherent of the Polish Lvov-Warsaw Philosophical School, the author of this collection of papers endeavours to clarify some basic notions of epistemology, ontology and psychology of cognitive acts, such as judgment, existence, being etc. In his investigations he refrains from unnecessary rejection of common-sense knowledge but at the same time searches for suitable patterns in contemporary sciences. Regarding formal logic as a (...) fundamental tool for the precise expression and justification of thoughts, the author tries to clear logic from ontological commitments, shows how to construct logic of norms and how to use safely different definitions in research works. The book presents a new conception of antinomies and an innovatory approach to realistic epistemology. Moreover, some applications of logical methods are illustrated by examples of semantical analyses of the general notion of similarity and the biological concept of homology. (shrink)

The chief aim of the paper is to extend the calculusDSC 1 (see [4]) in such a way as to satisfy all the requirements listed in [4] as well as a further stipulation — called the principle of uninvolvement — to the effect that neither deontic compatibility nor deontic incompatibility of codes (see [2]) should be presupposed in deontic logic.

SummaryMain theses and assumptions: I. The so called sense‐data do not exist; II. In sensory cognition we perceive immediately objects, their features and relations; III. Each simple cognitive situation comprises cognitive conditions. Accordingly, a full simple sentence ought to have the shape: p“under conditions C” where p has one of the forms ‐ ; IV The subject should be treated as an abstract entity, not be identified with the man; V. Existence is an empirical feature; VI. Reality is the totality (...) of all existing objects; VII. Truth is accordance of the contents of sentences with reality.Some consequences of I‐VII have been investigated in the paper. (shrink)

Some requirements concerning deontic logic are formulated and discussed. Stress is laid on the need to distinguish between theories and deductive systems. It is argued that deontic theories need not be closed under the rule of detachment. Two deontic calculi, called DSC1, DSC2, are presented and talked over.

The aim of the paper is to extend the calculus DSC1 in such a way as to satisfy all the requirements listed in [2] as well as a further stipulation { called `the principle of unionvolvement' { to the eect that neither deontic compatibility nor deontic incompatibility of codes should be presupposed in deontic logic. The observation that sentences of the form PKuw are stronger than it was suggested in [1] has been the point of departure.

The logician Kurt Godel in 1951 established a disjunctive thesis about the scope and limits of mathematical knowledge: either the mathematical mind is equivalent to a Turing machine (i.e., a computer), or there are absolutely undecidable mathematical problems. In the second half of the twentieth century, attempts have been made to arrive at a stronger conclusion. In particular, arguments have been produced by the philosopher J.R. Lucas and by the physicist and mathematician Roger Penrose that intend to show that the (...) mathematical mind is more powerful than any computer. These arguments, and counterarguments to them, have not convinced the logical and philosophical community. The reason for this is an insufficiency if rigour in the debate. The contributions in this volume move the debate forward by formulating rigorous frameworks and formally spelling out and evaluating arguments that bear on Godel's disjunction in these frameworks. The contributions in this volume have been written by world leading experts in the field. (shrink)

We formulate and explore two basic axiomatic systems of type-free subjective probability. One of them explicates a notion of finitely additive probability. The other explicates a concept of infinitely additive probability. It is argued that the first of these systems is a suitable background theory for formally investigating controversial principles about type-free subjective probability.

Recent AI progress led to a boost in beneficial applications from multiple research areas including VR. Simultaneously, in this newly unfolding deepfake era, ethically and security-relevant disagreements arose in the scientific community regarding the epistemic capabilities of present-day AI. However, given what is at stake, one can postulate that for a responsible approach, prior to engaging in a rigorous epistemic assessment of AI, humans may profit from a self-questioning strategy, an examination and calibration of the experience of their own epistemic (...) agency – especially to counteract both intentional misdirection by unethical actors and unintentional epistemic self-sabotage. In this paper, we expound on a new avenue of utilizing AIVR tools to advance an AI-related misdirection awareness of humans in the deepfake era. Firstly, we harness scientific knowledge from the psychology and neuroscience of magic where the study of misdirection techniques is center stage. Secondly, we connect the latter to creativity research linking human creative potential to inspiration from the seemingly impossible. Overall, AIVR could become an empowering experiential testbed for human epistemic agency enabling a better rational evaluation of AI capabilities. However, a misuse of the same type of tools could yield AIVR safety risks if not counteracted preemptively. (shrink)

Como reacción a la recuperación académica de un Marx completamente desvinculado de la tradición marxista-leninista realizada a finales del siglo xx, las dos últimas décadas han presenciado un nuevo intento, propiamente filosófico, de rescatar partes del pensamiento de Lenin, si bien se han llevado a cabo desde posiciones epistemológicas, y con objetivos políticos, altamente divergentes. El presente artículo analiza y compara las que consideramos que son las dos líneas principales de esta recuperación: La liderada por Slavoj Žižek desde posiciones sociosimbólicas (...) post-althusserianas, y la desarrollada por Antonio Negri y Michael Hardt a partir de la ontología deleuzoguattariana y el post-operaísmo. (shrink)

This article gives an epistemological analysis of the reflection process by means of which you can come to know the consistency of a mathematical theory that you already accept. It is argued that this process can result in warranted belief in new mathematical principles without justifying them.

Professor Pompa's study of Vico has done a great deal to stimulate and inform the growing interest in the English-speaking world in this remarkable figure. It remains the only work devoted almost exclusively to an interpretation of the New Science and offers a comprehensive guide to the main theoretical problems to which the text gives rise. For this second edition Professor Pompa has responded to the reactions of reviewers and critics and added a new chapter which analyses Vico's conception of (...) the principles which govern the development of law. (shrink)

[ES]Una historia de la ontología que pretenda dar cuenta de su acontecer de manera integral y equilibrada, ha de considerar tanto los aspectos historiográficos y filosóficos de sus fuentes así como los relativos a su contexto socio-cultural y necesariamente en relación con los de la metafísica, pues sus historias están indisolublemente ligadas, aunque ello no significa que necesariamente sean las mismas. En este trabajo, se intenta de manera elemental y mínima bosquejar dichas consideraciones, a través de una breve revisión historiográfica (...) de distintas nociones y hechos que puedan configurar una base sólida para la constitución de la historia de la ontología e interpretación de su significado y naturaleza. [EN] A history of ontology that pretends to be an integral and well-balanced account of its development, must considerer the historiographical and philosophical aspects of its sources, as well as the relation with its socio-cultural context, and necessarily, the relation with the same aspects of Metaphysics, as both histories are inextricably related, without necessarily being the same. In this work, it is intended, in a minimal way, to outline such considerations, trough a brief historiographic revision of the distinctive facts and notions that can configure a solid ground for the constitution of the history of ontology and the interpretation of its significance and nature. (shrink)

We combine two recent probabilistic approaches to natural language understanding, exploring the formal pragmatics of communication on a noisy channel. We first extend a model of rational communication between a speaker and listener, to allow for the possibility that messages are corrupted by noise. In this model, common knowledge of a noisy channel leads to the use and correct understanding of sentence fragments. A further extension of the model, which allows the speaker to intentionally reduce the noise rate on a (...) word, is used to model prosodic emphasis. We show that the model derives several well-known changes in meaning associated with prosodic emphasis. Our results show that nominal amounts of actual noise can be leveraged for communicative purposes. (shrink)

The definitive establishment of public-private governance has forced to abandon the theories of political autonomy that were valid until a few decades ago. In return, there has been a boom in the autonomy of the right conceived as a recovery of the natural law inherent to Human Rights. This article rescues from oblivion the two main criticisms made in the second half of the twentieth century to Human Rights: that of the conservative jurist Ernst Forsthoff and that of the Marxist (...) philosopher Antonio Negri. Although these thinkers are completely antagonistic from the point of view of their political projects, both agree that, in the current technical societies where collaborative work prevails, the liberal conception of right is no longer able to function as a guarantor of the freedoms and empowerment of citizens: it has lost all capacity for control and organization of material production relationships. (shrink)

RESUMEN Como reacción a la recuperación académica de un Marx completamente desvinculado de la tradición marxista-leninista realizada a finales del siglo XX, las dos últimas décadas han presenciado un nuevo intento, propiamente filosófico, de rescatar partes del pensamiento de Lenin, si bien se han llevado a cabo desde posiciones epistemológicas, y con objetivos políticos, altamente divergentes. El presente artículo analiza y compara las que consideramos que son las dos líneas principales de esta recuperación: La liderada por Slavoj Žižek desde posiciones (...) sociosimbólicas post-althusserianas, y la desarrollada por Antonio Negri y Michael Hardt a partir de la ontología deleuzo-guattariana y el post-operaísmo. ABSTRACT Towards the end of the 2oth century there took place an academic recovery of a Marx completely detached from the Marxist-Leninist tradition. As a reaction, in the last two decades there has been a new properly philosophical attempt to rescue pieces of Lenin's thinking. This recovery has been carried out from epistemological positions and with clearly divergent political objectives. This article analyzes and compares what we consider to be the two main lines of this recovery: the one led by Slavoj Žižek from post-Althusserian socio-symbolic positions, and the one developed by Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt from Deleuzo-Guattarian ontology and post-operaism. (shrink)

The hard problem of consciousness is about how we could explain in physicalist terms why we are conscious. The meta-problem of consciousness is about how we could explain why we have a hard problem of consciousness. In this note I argue that the phenomenal concept strategy can in principle provide a satisfactory solution to the meta-problem.

Collingwood's well-known dicta about history and its practice are not expressions of a perverse idealism but are rooted in reflection on his own work as historian. The problem which informs his writings on history was to make sense of the discipline of history without opening the way to historical skepticism. The early view of his Speculum Mentis, rooted in an external philosophical stance and not in the actual practice of history, was actually skeptical. In his middle years he regarded history (...) as the science of historical evidence, but this view left obscure the interest of history in the historical past. In his most mature view, as expressed in The Idea of History, Collingwood comes to see how the discipline of history, judged in terms of its own procedures and not by external norms imposed upon it from other sources, is able to make responsible knowledge claims and avoid the threat of skepticism. His well-known views about the historian's re-thinking past thought, the autonomy of history and the historical imagination all play roles to that end, and are entirely reasonable when it is understood what Collingwood intends by them. They are part of his theory of historical knowing, not of historical explanation. (shrink)

Traduação do texto L’expérience de la méthode, de Caroline Blanvillain.