Kierkegaard's fundamental view of life was negative and Gnostic. It was through his interpretation of life that his vision of the nothingness of existence became positive. What formed the material of Kierkegaard's interpretation was the common experience of existence, what ?all? men know. His concept of existence has a threefold content : immediacy, subjectivity, and the Christian Revelation. Immediate reality that is not made content of subjectivity becomes empty changeableness, and subjectivity that does not appropriate immediacy deprives itself of the (...) concrete (as with the mystic). Immediacy's ?text? first acquires a qualitative transcendent content through the ?repetition? of subjective choice. Kierkegaard takes this appropriation of the immediate to be also the self?development of subjectivity. Consciousness of guilt is an expression of a God?relationship. Implicated with this consciousness is the consciousness of the nothingness of everything ? echoed in man as dread. Yet even when subjectivity is conscious of guilt the truth remains immanent in subjectivity. In the Christian Revelation truth is outside man: subjectivity is untruth (sin). (shrink)

ONTOLOGY This book is a book about the world. I am concerned with ontology, not merely with language. Many ontological treatises concentrate largely on the ...

This volume is devoted to problems within analytic metaphysics. It defends an ontology and theory of categories inspired by Aristotle, but revised in such a way as to be compatible with modern science. The ontology of both natural and social reality is addressed, starting out from the view that universals exist but only in the spatiotemporal world. In attempting to bring Aristotle's ontology up-to-date, the author relies very much on the thinking of Edmund Husserl, conceiving the cement of the universe (...) as Husserlian relations of existential dependence and regarding intentionality as a non-reducible category in the ontology of mind. The work is thoroughly realistic in spirit, but large parts of it should nonetheless be of interest to conceptualists and nominalists, too. (shrink)

It is argued that medical science requires a classificatory system that (a) puts functions in the taxonomic center and (b) does justice ontologically to the difference between the processes which are the realizations of functions and the objects which are their bearers. We propose formulae for constructing such a system and describe some of its benefits. The arguments are general enough to be of interest to all the life sciences.

It is argued that medical science requires a classificatory system that (a) puts functions in the taxonomic center and (b) does justice ontologically to the difference between the processes which are the realizations of functions and the objects which are their bearers. We propose formulae for constructing such a system and describe some of its benefits. The arguments are general enough to be of interest to all the life sciences.

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The paper ends with an argument that says: necessarily, if there are finitely spatially extended particulars, then there are monadic universals. Before that, in order to characterize the distinction between particulars and universals, Roman Ingarden’s notions of existential moments and modes (ways) of being are presented, and a new pair of such existential moments is introduced: multiplicity–monadicity. Also, it is argued that there are not only real universals, but instances of universals (tropes) and fictional universals too.

Process metaphysics (process philosophy) has been suggested as a route, to a more ‘processbased’ approach to organizational studies, as opposed to a ‘substance-based’ view said to be dominant in Western thinking — including most contemporary organizational researchers. This paper explores some of the ideas of early-twentieth-century process thinkers and provides an interpretation of some of the major works of Alfred N. Whitehead. The objective is to evaluate its possible relevance to modern organizational research. The paper argues that Whitehead’s radical ontology (...) — that was based on a generalization of quantum theory in physics — appears largely to have been refuted or disregarded by succeeding process philosophers. Furthermore, his epistemology is found to represent a process view on scientific knowledge creation taken for granted by most contemporary researchers. For different reasons, major elements of his theories do not appear to be directly relevant to efforts to advance organizational theory into more radical process-based theories. On the other hand, the paper argues that the early-twentieth-century process thinkers — including Whitehead — offer a plurality of analytical conceptions that may serve as useful and inspirational contributions to further development of methods and perspectives to investigate into organizations, change and innovation processes. There are also particular approaches within the domain that have properties quite similar to some of those conceptions in process philosophy — like ‘sensemaking processes’ as represented by Karl Weick and others, which may in particular benefit from exploring the area of process philosophy. (shrink)

Since summer 2019 there is a new document that defines what in science should be regarded as being one second, one meter, and one kilogram, respectively. It is the ninth edition of the SI Brochure. Compared with older editions, a new definitional approach has been used. The seven base units are now defined by being directly related to a so-called defining constant. The paper discusses the second, the meter, and the kilogram. One odd salient, but nonetheless not discussed, feature of (...) the formulations of the definitions is that, from a purely linguistic point of view, they are circular. That is, symbols for what is to be defined appear also in the defining expressions. However, underneath the circularities there are, appearances notwithstanding, substantially non-circular definitions. The aim of the paper is to uncover these never before presented definitional structures. It is made by means of the two notions absolutely discrete quantities and metrical coordinative definitions. When the true definitional structures become visible, two important substantial metrological facts can be seen. First, the new definition of the kilogram is very much in need of further discussion. Second, contrary to what the Brochure hints at, there is no need to try to exchange the atomic parameter used in the definition of the second. (shrink)

Can there be relational universals? If so, how can they be exemplified? A monadic universal is by definition capable of having a scattered spatiotemporal localization of its different exemplifications, but the problem of relational universals is that one single exemplification seems to have to be scattered in the many places where the relata are. The paper argues that it is possible to bite this bullet, and to accept a hitherto un-discussed kind of exemplification relation called ‘scattered exemplification’. It has no (...) immediate symbolic counterpart in any Indo-European natural language or in any so far constructed logical language. In order to remedy this, a notion called ‘many-place copula’ is introduced, too. (shrink)

The paper presents and discusses phenomenological facts about perceptual spaces and percepts, but ends with a few thoughts about possible causal explanations of such spaces. The overarching double-sided hypothesis claims that - from a phenomenological point of view - each individual animal has at each consciously perceived moment of time a sense-modality-neutral perceptual space, and that these perceptual spaces are so-called container spaces. This means, to be concrete, that blind persons, deaf persons, and all perceptually non-handicapped persons have the same (...) kind of phenomenological perceptual space, a sense-modality-neutral container space. The causal reflections bring in James J. Gibson’s work on such matters. (shrink)

The paper argues that causal systems and spatial patterns are species of the same genus, namely pattern, and that a clear view of spatial patterns throws light on some aspects of the ontological nature of causal systems. In particular, it is argued that all patterns (and systems) depend on a fiat delimitation of something which in itself is a unity without borders. Pattern realism is true.

According to immanent realism, there are universals in the spatiotemporal world quite independently of language and the mind. The existence of these universals, furthermore, is not dependent upon there being Platonic universals existing outside the spatiotemporal world. In this paper I will try to show that immanent realism holds not only for many determinate universals, but for some determinable universals as well. In other words, there are ontological determinables as well as conceptual determinables.

This textbook introduces the reader to basic problems in the philosophy of science and ethics, mainly by means of examples from medicine. It is based on the conviction that philosophy, medical science, medical informatics, and medical ethics are overlapping disciplines. It claims that the philosophical lessons to learn from the twentieth century are not that nature is a 'social construction' and that 'anything goes' with respect to methodological and moral rules. Instead, it claims that there is scientific knowledge, but that (...) it is never completely secure; that there are norms, but that they are situation-bound; and that, therefore, it makes good sense to search for scientific truths and try to act in a morally decent way. Using philosophical catchwords, the authors advocate 'fallibilism' and 'particularism'; a combination that might be called 'pragmatic realism'. (shrink)

Famously, Galilei made the ontological claim that the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics. Probably, if only implicitly, most contemporary natural scientists share his view. This paper, in contradistinction, argues that nature is only partly written in the language of mathematics; partly, it is written in the language of functions and partly in a very simple purely qualitative language, too. During the argumentation, three more specific but in themselves interesting theses are put forward: first (in Section (...) 3), there are more shapes than real numbers; second (in Section 4), the metrological notion ‘amount of substance’ can profitably be exchanged for ‘number of entities’; third (in Section 5), prototypical concepts will always be scientifically important. (shrink)

During the last decades, the enigmatic field of volition has been the object of quantitative brain mapping studies. In this essay, emphasis will be given to brain mapping observations during overt or imagined willed acts in conscious normal individuals. The findings suggest that such acts are ‘formulated’ in the frontal/prefrontal cortex as neuronal programs for future motor, behavioural, verbal, or cognitive acts. During imagined movements or speech, brain mapping reveals important prefrontal activations which contrast to perirolandic activations during overt willed (...) acts. In psychiatric disorders with symptoms of a ‘sick will', like in schizophrenia, affective disorders, and organic dementia, reductions of the resting prefrontal activity have been recorded. The relationship between will and prefrontal activity is compatible with the view that frontal/prefrontal parts of the cortex are involved in the serial temporal programming of motor behaviour, speech, and cognition. In addition, there are unconscious mechanisms participating in volition. Electrophysiological evidence presented by Libet supports this view. (shrink)

One purely formal discipline, mathematics, permeates modern natural, social, and medical sciences as well as technology and engineering. Another purely formal discipline, formal mereology, has the last decades rapidly grown within philosophy. The obvious question now is: of what use can formal mereology be in the sciences and in engineering? In philosophy, this question has seldom so far been posed, but now there has appeared an anthology in which the editors C. Calosi and P. Graziani rightly state: “It should be (...) clear that the present volume fills indeed the gap between philosophical reflections on parts and wholes and the contemporary scientific context. Or better, it begins to fill this gap” . The book is truly to be welcomed. The editors have divided the contributions into four parts: I “Physics” , II “Mathematics” , III “Natural Sciences” , and IV “Computer Sciences and Engineering” . Each part is preceded by a brief two pages introduc .. (shrink)

Newtonian mechanics has a container conception of space. Space is regarded as an empty receptacle in which all material bodies exist. For a long time, most defenders of this view claimed that it must be mind-dependent. Anton Marty is the first modern philosopher to argue both that physical space is mind-independent and that it has the features characteristic of Newtonian physical space. Moreover, he works out a number of metaphysical implications of this view. Therefore, Marty ought to be given a (...) prominent place in the history of conceptions of space. As shown by Graham Nerlich, a container conception can be defended even after the twentieth-century revolutions in physics. By bringing Marty and Nerlich together, the paper claims that a container conception of space/space-time should even today be taken seriously in the philosophy of physics. (shrink)

Summary The article argues thatceteris paribus clauses have to be separated from another type of clauses called closure clauses. The former are associated with laws and theories, the latter with test situations of a particular kind. It is also argued that closure clauses, but notceteris paribus clauses, make Popper's falsifiability principle untenable. In that way, it also resolves the quarrel between Popper and Lakatos aboutceteris paribus clauses and falsifiability by saying that both are partly wrong and partly right.

This essay aims to describe and analyse the important contributions of the Chinese philosopher and diplomat P.C. Chang concerning the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the UDHR). After a brief biographical sketch, Chang’s main contributions will be presented and discussed. A study of Chang’s contributions in this context may also highlight the ethical potential of the UDHR and its great relevance to global ethics and world politics today.

A recent hypothesis in empirical brain research on language is that the fundamental difference between animal and human communication systems is captured by the distinction between finite-state and more complex phrase-structure grammars, such as context-free and context-sensitive grammars. However, the relevance of this distinction for the study of language as a neurobiological system has been questioned and it has been suggested that a more relevant and partly analogous distinction is that between non-adjacent and adjacent dependencies. Online memory resources are central (...) to the processing of non-adjacent dependencies as information has to be maintained across intervening material. One proposal is that an external memory device in the form of a limited push-down stack is used to process non-adjacent dependencies. We tested this hypothesis in an artificial grammar learning paradigm where subjects acquired non-adjacent dependencies implicitly. Generally, we found no qualitative differences between the acquisition of non-adjacent dependencies and adjacent dependencies. This suggests that although the acquisition of non-adjacent dependencies requires more exposure to the acquisition material, it utilizes the same mechanisms used for acquiring adjacent dependencies. We challenge the push-down stack model further by testing its processing predictions for nested and crossed multiple non-adjacent dependencies. The push-down stack model is partly supported by the results, and we suggest that stack-like properties are some among many natural properties characterizing the underlying neurophysiological mechanisms that implement the online memory resources used in language and structured sequence processing. (shrink)

We defend the fundamental ontological-pragmatic principle that where there are continua in reality science is often forced to make partly fiat terminological delimitations. In particular, this principle applies when it comes to describing biological organisms, their parts, properties, and relations. Human-made fiat delimitations are indispensable at the level of both individuals and the natural kinds which they instantiate. The kinds of pragmatically based ‘fiatness’ that we describe can create incompatibilities and lack of interoperability even between properly designed ontologies, if not (...) appropriately handled. (shrink)

This essay expands on Barry Smith’s paper “Against Fantology” of 2005, which defends the view that analytic philosophy has throughout its history been marked by a tendency to conceive the syntax of first-order predicate logic as a key to ontology. I present fantology (or "F(a)ntology") in the light of a more general and in itself ontologically neutral operation that I call a default ontologization of a language. I then discuss Quine’s views, since he is the most outspoken fantologist in the (...) second half of the twentieth century. As Smith points out, “fantology sometimes takes the form of a thesis according to which the language of standard predicate logic can serve the formulation of the truths of natural science in a uniquely illuminating way”. Hence Quine’s doctrine according to which the ontological commitments of a theory become evident only when the theory has been regimented in fantological clothing. (shrink)

The International System of Units tries to find or construct something that does not change with time and place, since such constancy is the best possible ground for definitions of fundamental measurement units. This problem of constancy has received scant attention within the philosophy of science, but is the topic of the paper. The paper first highlights inevitable kinds of circularities, semantic and epistemic, that belongs to the search for constancy, and then discusses contingent dependencies between unit definitions. The New (...) SI proposal is criticized for not paying due attention to the fact that it defines units for one kind of quantity by means of a constancy that belongs to another. This inattention flaws the kilogram definition. The New SI definitions of the mole and the second neglect the distinction between discrete and continuous quantities; which make the definitions refer to constancies that are not invariants of nature. (shrink)