La façon dont la négligence envers l’enfant est conceptualisée dans les recherches de pointe a un impact notable sur l’organisation des services et les pratiques professionnelles auprès des familles touchées par cette problématique au Québec. Il apparaît donc important de décrire le portrait des parents que ces recherches de pointe génèrent. Cet article examine la structure épistémologique, théorique et méthodologique qui sous-tend la production de ce type de savoir en s’appuyant sur une analyse qualitative d’articles récents publiés dans l’une des (...) plus importantes revues internationales dans le domaine. Les résultats montrent que les recherches de pointe produisent des connaissances sur la négligence envers l’enfant qui excluent plus ou moins radicalement le point de vue des parents et des enfants directement impliqués dans ces situations. (shrink)

La façon dont la négligence envers l’enfant est conceptualisée dans les recherches de pointe a un impact notable sur l’organisation des services et les pratiques professionnelles auprès des familles touchées par cette problématique au Québec. Il apparaît donc important de décrire le portrait des parents que ces recherches de pointe génèrent. Cet article examine la structure épistémologique, théorique et méthodologique qui sous-tend la production de ce type de savoir en s’appuyant sur une analyse qualitative d’articles récents publiés dans l’une des (...) plus importantes revues internationales dans le domaine. Les résultats montrent que les recherches de pointe produisent des connaissances sur la négligence envers l’enfant qui excluent plus ou moins radicalement le point de vue des parents et des enfants directement impliqués dans ces situations. (shrink)

Alors que l’anthropologie montre que la naissance est d’abord un événement communautaire, actuellement des parents se retrouvent de plus en plus profondément seuls et démunis devant leur bébé. Ce phénomène est l’objet d’une recherche en cours qui essaie d’évaluer après la naissance les effets de l’isolement familial des parents sur la vie psychique du bébé lors de sa première année. Dans le cas clinique qui illustre ici cette « nouvelle solitude » des parents, les forums d’internet tentent de relayer la (...) faiblesse du soutien familial alors que les anxiétés, bien légitimes autour de la naissance, perdurent quand le bébé grandit. Au-delà des problèmes de la dépression maternelle du postpartum, l’accent est mis sur la place réelle que prend l’entourage comme soutien des processus plus intrapsychiques propres à la construction de la parentalité. (shrink)

Alors que l’anthropologie montre que la naissance est d’abord un événement communautaire, actuellement des parents se retrouvent de plus en plus profondément seuls et démunis devant leur bébé. Ce phénomène est l’objet d’une recherche en cours qui essaie d’évaluer après la naissance les effets de l’isolement familial des parents sur la vie psychique du bébé lors de sa première année. Dans le cas clinique qui illustre ici cette « nouvelle solitude » des parents, les forums d’internet tentent de relayer la (...) faiblesse du soutien familial alors que les anxiétés, bien légitimes autour de la naissance, perdurent quand le bébé grandit. Au-delà des problèmes de la dépression maternelle du postpartum, l’accent est mis sur la place réelle que prend l’entourage comme soutien des processus plus intrapsychiques propres à la construction de la parentalité. (shrink)

Remembering seems, to philosophers and scientists, one of the most mystifying of human activities. Yet natural language users have no problem understanding what is meant by ‘memory’. Memory is simply the ability to recall personally experienced events and certain kinds of information such as facts, names, or faces; or how to perform certain actions, like riding a bike or playing chess. It is on this basis that people sometimes make claims about themselves or others having a good or bad memory, (...) especially for things like names, numbers, or faces. Why then is memory such a mystery? Because, firstly, of its diversity: memory enables us to perform a plethora of different tasks, including the continuous interpretation of every moment of consciousness. Secondly, different forms of memory have different standards of accuracy, and often dramatically different criteria for success. (shrink)

This remarkable book presents a rich and up-to-date view of evolution that explores the far-reaching implications of Darwin's theory and emphasizes the power, significance, and relevance of evolution to our lives today. After all, we ourselves are the product of evolution, and we can tackle many of our gravest challenges -- from lethal resurgence of antiobiotic-resistant diseases to the wave of extinctions that looms before us -- with a sound understanding of the science.

Carl F. Craver investigates what we are doing when we use neuroscience to explain what's going on in the brain. When does an explanation succeed and when does it fail? Craver offers explicit standards for successful explanation of the workings of the brain, on the basis of a systematic view about what neuroscientific explanations are.

La confrontation que nous chercherons à faire ici porte sur deux entreprises contemporaines que nous conviendrons de placer dans le mouvement structuraliste, celle de Foucault dans les Mots et les Choses, et celle des empiristes logiques dans leurs multiples travaux d'analyse du langage scientifique.

L’impact social de la science et de la technologie se manifeste par une série de relations que le présent modèle va découper sur des boucles de rétroaction. L’activité techno-scientifique des humains crée des perturbations dans le réseau des relations interindividuelles et sociales ainsi que dans l’environnement physique ; en retour, les environnements sociaux et physiques ainsi modifiés exercent des déterminations qui conditionnent et affectent la poursuite des activités initiales. De plus, à toutes les étapes de ces boucles de rétroaction jouent (...) des relations, en boucles également, par lesquelles certaines actions individuelles produisent un effet social et des états de choses collectifs produisent des effets sur les comportements individuels.Science and technology affect social life through numerous relations and the present model undertakes to picture the main ones as specific portions of feedback cycles. By its very creativity in science and technology man induces changes in the network of interindividual and social relations, and drastically modifies the physical environment ; those social and physical changes, in turn, serve as conditions and causes for retroactive changes in the human scientific and technological behavior. Furthermore, the model introduces the concept of " amplification socioficatrice " in order to highlight those additional relations through which certain individual actions or reactions come to have a social effect and existence in the midst of the generalized loop relations obtaining between individual and society. (shrink)

Carl Craver investigates what we are doing when we sue neuroscience to explain what's going on in the brain.

The number of colleges and universities with campus agriculture projects in the US has grown from an estimated 23 in 1992 to nearly 300 today with possible increased numbers predicted. The profile emerging from campus agriculture projects looks a lot different from the traditional land grant colleges of agriculture. In spite of this emergent trend and staunch advocacy for campus agriculture projects, limited empirical research on agriculture-based learning in higher education exists outside agriculture degrees and theoretical work of scholars such (...) as Liberty Hyde Bailey and David Orr. This study explored the diversity of characteristics and pedagogical objectives of emerging campus agriculture projects through a nationwide compilation, surveying campus agriculture project directors and educators, and multiple case studies. Data collected gives empirical evidence supporting claims agriculture is taking on a different identity in higher education. Issues of sustainability, food, and agriculture are not only influencing the physical workings of colleges and universities, but pedagogy on a departmental and institutional scale. Findings illustrate a re-visioning of how higher education is interfacing with agriculture and agriculture-based education beyond traditional agriculture degrees at land grant colleges of agriculture to focus teaching sustainability, critical thinking and inquiry skills, and fostering a sense of belonging to community. (shrink)

The dominant neuroscientific theory of spatial memory is, like many theories in neuroscience, a multilevel description of a mechanism. The theory links the activities of molecules, cells, brain regions, and whole organisms into an integrated sketch of an explanation for the ability of organisms to navigate novel environments. Here I develop a taxonomy of interlevel experimental strategies for integrating the levels in such multilevel mechanisms. These experimental strategies include activation strategies, interference strategies, and additive strategies. These strategies are mutually reinforcing, (...) providing a kind of interlevel and intratheoretic robustness that has not previously been recognized. (shrink)

In his historical perspective on the changes in scientific thought over the last 100 years, Carl N. Degler explores the study of social evolution and the ongoing search for human nature. In Search of Human Nature provides a detailed perspective on the reasons behind the shifting emphasis in social thought from biology, to culture, and again to biology. Degler examines why these changes took place, the evidence and people fostering these changes and why students of human nature decided to (...) accept this momentous change in thought. He suggests varying ideologies as the underlying force behind this shift in the study of social science. From Darwin's theory that human social behaviour has drastically evolved from animals, to the belief that human experience serves as the basic differentiating factor in humans, Degler provides a thorough and captivating examination of the roots of human behaviour. (shrink)

With In Search of Mechanisms, Carl F. Craver and Lindley Darden offer both a descriptive and an instructional account of how biologists discover mechanisms. Drawing on examples from across the life sciences and through the centuries, Craver and Darden compile an impressive toolbox of strategies that biologists have used and will use again to reveal the mechanisms that produce, underlie, or maintain the phenomena characteristic of living things. They discuss the questions that figure in the search for mechanisms, characterizing (...) the experimental, observational, and conceptual considerations used to answer them, all the while providing examples from the history of biology to highlight the kinds of evidence and reasoning strategies employed to assess mechanisms. At a deeper level, Craver and Darden pose a systematic view of what biology is, of how biology makes progress, of how biological discoveries are and might be made, and of why knowledge of biological mechanisms is important for the future of the human species. (shrink)

Michel Foucault, dans les Mots et les choses cherche à montrer comment l'apparition et l'évolution de certaines sciences contemporaines préupposent un «socle épistémologique» dont la structure caractérise des étapes de la culture et conditionne l'existence même des dites sciences: c'est la structure archéologique. D'autre part, les logiciens contemporains et certains analystes du langage cherchent à mettre au jour par les méthodes de l'analyse logique la structure logique du langage scientifique. Nous conviendrons ici de voir dans ces deux entreprises des illustrations (...) de la pensée et de la méhode structuralistes. (shrink)

Après avoir caractérisé les positions respectives de Feyerabend, Kuhn et Popper concernant la «méthodologie scientifique», je veux soutenir que ces trois positions ne sont pas aussi incompatibles que le suggère la constante polémique dans laquelle elles s'expriment et qu'en fait elles forment entre elles une structure. Cette structure est articulée sur trois constructions différentes de la science, d'une part, et de la notion de norme applicable à la recherche scientifique, d'autre part. Ces différences contribuent à la formulation de trois problèmes (...) différents concernant la science et son développement, de sorte que la question du choix entre les trois positions, si elle se pose, concerne la légitimité des problèmes posés, et non pas la vérité de l'une de trois solutions incompatibles entre elles. (shrink)

Un problème est dit ici «mouvoir» la recherche, quand c'est sur lui que se concentre l'énergie du chercheur et que c'est son traitement qui fait «avancer» la recherche.Une entreprise de recherche, une « e-r »,commej'écrirai souvent, est considérée ici comme une unité individuée et je postule qu'il y a toujours au moins un « niveau » où l'on peut se placer pour qu'il soit légitime de considérer une e-r comme une unité individuée.

Le Colloque dont ce livre nous fournit les actes fut une initiative du professeur Jerzy A. Wojciechowski Les professeurs Guy Lafrance et William Shea, de la même faculté, faisaient également partie du comite d'organisation; les appuis financiers provinrent du Conseil des Arts du Canada et de l'Université d'Ottawa. Les actes contiennent la totalité des communications rédigées pour l'occasion, y compris celles qui n'ont pas été présentées oralement ; on compte 20 articles, de longueurs fort inégales, et cinq commentaires d'articles; vingt (...) contributions sont écrites en anglais, quatre en français, iine en russe. (shrink)

This is a reproduction of a book published before 1923. This book may have occasional imperfections such as missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. that were either part of the original artifact, or were introduced by the scanning process. We believe this work is culturally important, and despite the imperfections, have elected to bring it back into print as part of our continuing commitment to the preservation of printed works worldwide. We appreciate your understanding of the imperfections (...) in the preservation process, and hope you enjoy this valuable book. ++++ The below data was compiled from various identification fields in the bibliographic record of this title. This data is provided as an additional tool in helping to ensure edition identification: ++++ Uber Den Psychologischen Ursprung Der Raumvorstellung Carl Stumpf S. Hirzel, 1873 Space perception. (shrink)

Editor James Fetzer presents an analytical and historical introduction and a comprehensive bibliography together with selections of many of Carl G. Hempel's most important studies to give students and scholars an ideal opportunity to appreciate the enduring contributions of one of the most influential philosophers of science of the 20th century.

In this systematic introduction to the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce, the author focuses on four of Peirce's fundamental conceptions: pragmatism and Peirce's development of it into what he called 'pragmaticism'; his theory of signs; his phenomenology; and his theory that continuity is of prime importance for philosophy. He argues that at the centre of Peirce's philosophical project is a unique form of metaphysical realism, whereby continuity and evolutionary change are both necessary for our understanding of experience. In his final (...) chapter Professor Hausman applies this version of realism to contemporary controversies between anti-realists and anti-idealists. Peirce's views are compared to those of such contemporary figures as Davidson, Putnam, and Rorty. The book will be of particular interest to philosophers concerned with American philosophy and current debates on realism as well as linguists working in semiotics. (shrink)

According to one large family of views, scientific explanations explain a phenomenon (such as an event or a regularity) by subsuming it under a general representation, model, prototype, or schema (see Bechtel, W., & Abrahamsen, A. (2005). Explanation: A mechanist alternative. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 36(2), 421–441; Churchland, P. M. (1989). A neurocomputational perspective: The nature of mind and the structure of science. Cambridge: MIT Press; Darden (2006); Hempel, C. G. (1965). Aspects of scientific (...) explanation. In C. G. Hempel (Ed.), Aspects of scientific explanation (pp. 331–496). New York: Free Press; Kitcher (1989); Machamer, P., Darden, L., & Craver, C. F. (2000). Thinking about mechanisms. Philosophy of Science, 67(1), 1–25). My concern is with the minimal suggestion that an adequate philosophical theory of scientific explanation can limit its attention to the format or structure with which theories are represented. The representational subsumption view is a plausible hypothesis about the psychology of understanding. It is also a plausible claim about how scientists present their knowledge to the world. However, one cannot address the central questions for a philosophical theory of scientific explanation without turning one’s attention from the structure of representations to the basic commitments about the worldly structures that plausibly count as explanatory. A philosophical theory of scientific explanation should achieve two goals. The first is explanatory demarcation. It should show how explanation relates with other scientific achievements, such as control, description, measurement, prediction, and taxonomy. The second is explanatory normativity. It should say when putative explanations succeed and fail. One cannot achieve these goals without undertaking commitments about the kinds of ontic structures that plausibly count as explanatory. Representations convey explanatory information about a phenomenon when and only when they describe the ontic explanations for those phenomena. (shrink)

Carl Schmitt (1888–1985), Professor für Staats- und Völkerrecht, bewegt nach wie vor die Gemüter. Die Reaktion auf seine Schriften, Handlungen und Ausstrahlungen ist vielfältig; die Spanne reicht von entrüsteten, für die er der Teufel in Person bleibt, über viele Zwischenstufen bis zu jenen Lesern, die ihn für einen der subtilsten, noch keineswegs ausgeloteten Geistern dieses Jahrhunderts halten. Sein Leben lang war Carl Schmitt ein passionierter Schreiber von Briefen. Meist handelte es sich um handschriftlich verfasste, die für den Schreibenden (...) die Fortsetzung eines konkreten Gespräches mit anderen Mitteln war. Das macht das authentische und die Spontanität der Schmitt-Briefe aus. Als erste Edition einer umfangreichen Korrespondenz wird in dem Buch die Korrespondenz zwischen Carl Schmitt und Armin Mohler veröffentlicht. Der Briefwechsel umfasst die Zeit von 1947 bis 1980 und enthält 280 Briefe und Karten von Carl Schmitt an Armin Mohler. Von dem Briefpartner und Herausgeber wird in der Regel aus den eigenen Briefen nur auszugsweise zitiert, sofern es für das von Carl Schmitt Geschriebene notwendig ist. Armin Mohler (1920 bis 2003), ist einer der bekanntesten rechtskonservativen Schriftsteller, Kritiker und Historiker in Deutschland. Sein Handbuch zur Konservativen Revolution ist ein Standardwerk. In der Zeit des Briefwechsels war Mohler von 1949 bis 1953 Sekretär Ernst Jüngers, danach Korrespondent großer Zeitungen in Paris und von 1964 an Geschäftsführer der Carl Friedrich von Siemens Stiftung, in der er sehr beachtete Symposien zu aktuellen wissenschaftlichen Themen organisierte. Der Briefwechsel ist für die Deutung Carl Schmitts in der Nachkriegszeit in seinem Sauerländer "Exil" grundlegend, gleichzeitig enthält er pointierte Schlaglichter auf das politische und kulturelle Geschehen der frühen und mittleren Bundesrepublik sowie auf Werk und Leben von Ernst Jünger. (shrink)

Reminiscences of Peter, by P. Oppenheim.--Natural kinds, by W. V. Quine.--Inductive independence and the paradoxes of confirmation, by J. Hintikka.--Partial entailment as a basis for inductive logic, by W. C. Salmon.--Are there non-deductive logics?, by W. Sellars.--Statistical explanation vs. statistical inference, by R. C. Jeffre--Newcomb's problem and two principles of choice, by R. Nozick.--The meaning of time, by A. Grünbaum.--Lawfulness as mind-dependent, by N. Rescher.--Events and their descriptions: some considerations, by J. Kim.--The individuation of events, by D. Davidson.--On properties, by (...) H. Putnam.--A method for avoiding the Curry paradox, by F. B. Fitch.--Publications (1934-1969) by Carl G. Hempel (p. [266]-270). (shrink)

This collection of articles and associated discussion papers focuses on a problem that has attracted increasing attention from linguists and psychologists throughout the world during the past several years. Reduced to essentials, the problem is that of discovering the character of the mental capacities that make it possible for human beings to attain knowledge of their language on the basis of fragmentary and haphazard early linguistic experience. A fundamental assumption running through all of these contributions is that people possess strong (...) innate predispositions that are critical for success in this task. (shrink)

In this systematic introduction to the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce, the author focuses on four of Peirce's fundamental conceptions: pragmatism and Peirce's development of it into what he called 'pragmaticism'; his theory of signs; his phenomenology; and his theory that continuity is of prime importance for philosophy. He argues that at the centre of Peirce's philosophical project is a unique form of metaphysical realism, whereby continuity and evolutionary change are both necessary for our understanding of experience. In his final (...) chapter Professor Hausman applies this version of realism to contemporary controversies between anti-realists and anti–idealists. Peirce's views are compared to those of such contemporary figures as Davidson, Putnam, and Rorty. The book will be of particular interest to philosophers concerned with American philosophy and current debates on realism as well as linguists working in semiotics. (shrink)

Traces the development of the integral and the differential calculus and related theories since ancient times.

In what sense are the activities and properties of components in a mechanism explanatorily relevant to the behavior of a mechanism as a whole? I articulate this problem, the problem of constitutive relevance, and I show that it must be solved if we are to understand mechanisms and mechanistic explanation. I argue against some putative solutions to the problem of constitutive relevance, and I sketch a positive account according to which relevance is analyzed in terms ofrelationships of mutual manipulability between (...) the behavior of a mechanism as a whole and the properties and activities of its components. My account is a causal-mechanical account in the sense that it is a particular expression of the idea that constitutive explanation is a matter of showing how an explanandum phenomenon is situated within the causal structure of the world. It is thus offered as a rival to epistemic (argument-centered) and psychological accounts of interlevel explanation. (shrink)

Unlike exploitative exchanges, exchanges featuring externalities have never seemed to pose particular problems to liberal theories of justice. State interference with exchanges featuring externalities seems permissible, like it is for coercive or deceptive exchanges. This is because exchanges featuring negative externalities seem to be clear cases of the two exchanging parties harming a third one via the exchange—and thus of conduct violating the harm principle. This essay aims to put this idea into question. I will argue that exchanges featuring negative (...) externalities are not unjust in this straightforward way, i.e. because they would constitute an instance of wrongfully causing or risking a bodily or material harm. In fact, unless we are subscribing to particularly demanding variants of liberalism—e.g. perfectionist liberalism—or unless we are exclusively focusing on borderline cases of externalities—i.e. of effects of exchanges hardly to be called externalities—there is no liberal theory of how exchanges featuring externalities are unjust. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against one variety of contextualism about aesthetic predicates such as “beautiful.” Contextualist analyses of these and other predicates have been subject to several challenges surrounding disagreement. Focusing on one kind of contextualism— individualized indexical contextualism —I unpack these various challenges and consider the responses available to the contextualist. The three responses I consider are as follows: giving an alternative analysis of the concept of disagreement ; claiming that speakers suffer from semantic blindness; and claiming that (...) attributions of beauty carry presuppositions of commonality. I will argue that none of the available strategies gives a response which both satisfactorily explains all of the disagreement -data and is plausible independent of significant evidence in favor of contextualism. I conclude that individualized indexical contextualism about the aesthetic is untenable, although this does not rule out alternative contextualist approaches to the aesthetic. (shrink)

The fundamental tenet of modern empiricism is the view that all non-analytic knowledge is based on experience. Let us call this thesis the principle of empiricism. [1] Contemporary logical empiricism has added [2] to it the maxim that a sentence makes a cognitively meaningful assertion, and thus can be said to be either true or false, only if it is either (1) analytic or self-contradictory or (2) capable, at least in principle, of experiential test. According to this so-called empiricist criterion (...) of cognitive meaning, or of cognitive significance, many of the formulations of traditional metaphysics and large parts of epistemology are devoid of cognitive significance--however rich some of them may be in non-cognitive import by virtue of their emotive appeal or the moral inspiration they offer. Similarly certain doctrines which have been, at one time or another, formulated within empirical science or its border disciplines are so contrived as to be incapable of test by any conceivable evidence; they are therefore qualified as pseudo- [p. 42:] hypotheses, which assert nothing, and which therefore have no explanatory or predictive force whatever. This verdict applies, for example, to the neo-vitalist speculations about entelechies or vital forces, and to the "telefinalist hypothesis" propounded by Lecomte du Noüy. (shrink)