Background: Despite an increase in health research conducted in Africa, there are still inadequate human resources with research ethics training and lack of local long-term training opportunities in research ethics. A research ethics training program named United States-Mali Research Ethics Training Program (US-Mali RETP) was established through a partnership between the George Washington University Milken Institute School of Public Health (GWSPH), USA and University of Sciences, Techniques & Technologies of Bamako (USTTB), to address the critical need for improved bioethics training, (...) leadership, and policy in Mali. Methods: The aims of the capacity building programme are achieved by leveraging US and Africa-based expertise to strengthen research ethics education and capacity through: (1) intensive faculty development to design ethics training curricula; (2) development of a research ethics specialization within the existing Masters of Public Health program (MPH); and (3) establishing professional development courses through short-term training workshops and webinars to address research and professional needs in ethics. Results: The program will strengthen USTTB’s capacity of research ethics by training at least 15 MPH students over 5 years to prepare the next generation of ethics researchers. During the first two years of the program, a new ethics training curricula was developed, two cohorts of Master’s students were enrolled, and a series of webinars and workshops were conducted with participation of Malian and international researchers. Conclusions: US-Mali RETP will promote a sustainable bioethics enterprise at USTTB, and enable dissemination of research ethics training to increase health research capacity in Mali. (shrink)

This paper presents an alternative view for understanding abduction as "inference to the best explanation", than can account from the simplest perception to the introduction of any new ideas. Subsequently the view offered is applied to medical practice and some consequences are extracted for it. The discussion is considered in the context of Peirce's theories of men classification, fixation of belief and inquiry.

This paper presents an alternative view for understanding abduction as ‘inference to the best explanation’, than can account from the simplest perception to the introduction of any new ideas. Subsequently the view offered is applied to medical practice and some consequences are extracted for it. The discussion is considered in the context of Peirce’s theories of men classification, fixation of belief and inquiry.

La meccanica quantistica è una delle più grandi conquiste intellettuali del xx secolo. Le sue leggi regolano il mondo atomico e subatomico e si riverberano su una miriade di fenomeni del mondo macroscopico, dalla formazione dei cristalli alla superconduttività, dalle proprietà dei fluidi a bassa temperatura agli spettri di emissione di una candela che brucia o di una supernova che esplode, dai meccanismi di combustione della fornace solare ai principi di base delle nanotecnologie. Non c’è quasi nulla nel mondo che (...) ci circonda su cui non soffi l’alito delle leggi quantistiche. Tuttavia, per come è usualmente presentata nei libri di testo, la meccanica quantistica è sostanzialmente un’insieme di regole per calcolare le distribuzioni di probabilità dei risultati di qualunque esperimento (nel dominio di validità della meccanica quantistica). In quanto tale, non ci fornisce direttamente una descrizione della realtà. Una descrizione della realtà, cioè un’ontologia, dovrebbe dirci che cosa c’è nel mondo e come si comporta, quali sono i processi che si realizzano a livello microscopico e, di conseguenza, fornirci una spiegazione del formalismo quantistico. (shrink)

Russell's involuted path in the development of his theory of logical types from 1903 to 1910-13 is examined and explained in terms of the development in his early philosophy of the notion of a logical subject vis-a-vis the problem of the one and many; i.e., the problem for russell, first, of a class-as-one as a logical subject as opposed to a class as many, and, secondly, of a propositional function as a single and separate logical subject as opposed to existing (...) only in the many propositions that are its values. (shrink)

My new homepage is at jostylr.com . The corresponding e-mail address is [email protected] . On my new homepage there will be information about Bohmian mechanics, my papers, professional information, and personal information. As of 7/30/04, there is not much there, but it should improve.

In this paper (in Italian) we discuss how quantum theories can be thought of as having the same structure. If so, even the theories that appear to be about the wave function are incomplete, even if in a way which is very different from the one Einstein proposed.

O problema da causação descendente é um ponto central na formulação do fisicalismo não-redutivo e na compreensão da emergência de propriedades. Duas interpretações possíveis da causação descendente, nas quais a contribuição do pensamento aristotélico é importante, são examinadas. Os requisitos do programa de matematização da natureza na mecanica clássica, que levaram ao abandono de três dos modos causais aristotélicos, nao parecem igualmente importantes nas ciencias especiais. Isto sugere que a contribuição de Aristóteles pode ser, de certa maneira, retomada. Uma definição (...) de propriedade emergente é apresentada, sendo a causação descendente interprerada de acordo com os modos causais formal e funcional.The problem of downward causation is a key subject in the formulation of nonreductive physicalism as well as in the understanding of property emergence. Two possible interpretations of downward causation, to which Aristotelian thought is relevant, are examined. In the mathematical understanding of nature in classical mechanics, the principle of causality should meet requirements that entailed the rejection of three among the four Aristotelian causal modes. Those requirements do not seem equally important in the special sciences and one may suggest, then, that Aristotle’s contribution may be taken into account. A definition of an emergent property is proposed, in which downward causation is interpreted according to the formal and functional causal modes. (shrink)

La meccanica quantistica è una delle più grandi conquiste intellettuali del xx secolo. Le sue leggiregolano il mondo atomico e subatomico e si riverberano su una miriade di fenomeni del mondomacroscopico, dalla formazione dei cristalli alla superconduttività, dalle proprietà dei fluidi a bassatemperatura agli spettri di emissione di una candela che brucia o di una supernova che esplode, daimeccanismi di combustione della fornace solare ai principi di base delle nanotecnologie. Non c’èquasi nulla nel mondo che ci circonda su cui non (...) soffi l’alito delle leggi quantistiche. Tuttavia, per come è usualmente presentata nei libri di testo, la meccanica quantistica è sostanzialmenteun’insieme di regole per calcolare le distribuzioni di probabilità dei risultati di qualunqueesperimento (nel dominio di validità della meccanica quantistica). In quanto tale, non ci forniscedirettamente una descrizione della realtà. Una descrizione della realtà, cioè un’ ontologia , dovrebbedirci che cosa c’è nel mondo e come si comporta, quali sono i processi che si realizzano a livellomicroscopico e, di conseguenza, fornirci una spiegazione del formalismo quantistico. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell introduced several novel ideas in his 1903 Principles of Mathematics that he later gave up and never went back to in his subsequent work. Two of these are the related notions of denoting concepts and classes as many. In this paper we reconstruct each of these notions in the framework of conceptual realism and connect them through a logic of names that encompasses both proper and common names, and among the latter, complex as well as simple common names. (...) Names, proper or common, and simple or complex, occur as parts of quantifier phrases, which in conceptual realism stand for referential concepts, i.e., cognitive capacities that inform our speech and mental acts with a referential nature and account for the intentionality, or directedness, of those acts. In Russell’s theory, quantifier phrases express denoting concepts (which do not include proper names). In conceptual realism, names, as well as predicates, can be nominalized and allowed to occur as "singular terms", i.e., as arguments of predicates. Occurring as a singular term, a name denotes, if it denotes at all, a class as many, where, as in Russell’s theory, a class as many of one object is identical with that one object, and a class as many of more than one object is a plurality, i.e., a plural object that we call a group. Also, as in Russell’s theory, there is no empty class as many. When nominalized, proper names function as "singular terms" just the way they do in so-called free logic. Leśniewski’s ontology, which is also called a logic of names can be completely interpreted within this conceptualist framework, and the well-known oddities of Leśniewski’s system are shown not to be odd at all when his system is so interpreted. Finally, we show how the pluralities, or groups, of the logic of classes as many can be used as the semantic basis of plural reference and predication. We explain in this way Russell’s "fundamental doctrine upon which all rests", i.e., "the doctrine that the subject of a proposition may be plural, and that such plural subjects are what is meant by classes [as many] which have more than one term" (Russell 1938, p. 517). (shrink)

Some internal and philosophical remarks are made regarding a system of a second order logic of existence axiomatized by the author. Attributes are distinguished in the system according as their possession entails existence or not, The former being called e-Attributes. Some discussion of the special principles assumed for e-Attributes is given as well as of the two notions of identity resulting from such a distinction among attributes. Non-Existing objects are of course indiscernible in terms of e-Attributes. In addition, However, Existing (...) objects indiscernible in terms of e-Attributes are indiscernible in terms of all attributes. (shrink)

A propositional logic with modal operators for logical necessity and possibility is formulated as a formal ontology for logical atomism (with negative facts). It is shown that such modal operators represent purely formal, Internal 'properties' of propositions if and only if the notion of 'all possible worlds' has its standard and not the secondary interpretation which it is usually given (as, E.G., In kripke model-Structures). Allowing arbitrary restrictions on the notion of 'all possible worlds', At least in such a framework (...) as logical atomism, Generates internal 'properties' of propositions with material instead of purely formal content. (shrink)

There are different views of the logic of plurals that are now in circulation, two of which we will compare in this paper. One of these is based on a two-place relation of being among, as in ‘Peter is among the juveniles arrested’. This approach seems to be the one that is discussed the most in philosophical journals today. The other is based on Bertrand Russell’s early notion of a class as many, by which is meant not a class as (...) one, i.e., as a single entity, but merely a plurality of things. It was this notion that Russell used to explain plurals in his 1903 Principles of Mathematics; and it was this notion that I was able to develop as a consistent system that contains not only a logic of plurals but also a logic of mass nouns as well. We compare these two logics here and then show that the logic of the Among relation is reducible to the logic of classes as many. (shrink)

El propósito de este artículo es identificar convergencias y diferencias acerca de la relación fe-cultura en las reflexiones de tres teólogos latinoamericanos, quienes representan, de alguna manera, tres grandes líneas teológicas de los últimos cincuenta años. Los tres autores convergen en su interés por conocer e interpretar la cultura latinoamericana y su relación con el Evangelio. Pero divergen en una variedad de aspectos. Esto se puede apreciar por los conceptos, o categorías, utilizados: la idea de la liberación sociocultural como implicación (...) de la misma evangelización, la idea de una síntesis entre las culturas originarias y la evangelización ibérica, y la idea que valora la realidad multiétnica y pluricultural de nuestro subcontinente. Los tres autores estudiados muestran más diversidad que convergencia, e incluso, oposición entre sus planteamientos y opciones pastorales. The purpose of this article is to identify similarities and differences about the relationship between faith and culture in the reflections of three Latin American theologians who represent, somehow, three great theological lines cin-account recent years. The three authors converge in their interest to know and interpret Latin American culture and its relationship with the Gospel. But they diverge in a variety of ways. This can be seen by concepts, or categories, used the idea of cultural liberation as involvement in the same evangelization, the idea of a synthesis between the native cultures and the Iberian evangelization, and the idea that values the multiethnic and multicultural reality of our continent. The three authors studied show more diversity than convergence, and even opposition between his approach and pastoral options. (shrink)

The Peircean semiotic approach to information that we developed in previous papers raises several new questions, and shows both similarities and differenceswith regard to other accounts of information. We do not intend to present here any exhaustive discussion about the relationships between our account and otherapproaches to information. Rather, our interest is mainly to address its relationship to ideas about information put forward by Gregory Bateson and Eva Jablonka. We conclude that all these authors offer quite broad concepts of information, (...) but we argue that they are just as broad as they should be, since information is in itself a sweeping concept. Furthermore, all of them suggest a processual approach to information, which departs from the treatment of information as something that is contained in some structure (e.g., in sequences of nucleotides) and moves towards an understanding of information as a process — in terms of our account, a semiotic process, i.e., semiosis. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene la intención de recuperar la idea nietzscheana de una moral trágica en su obra de juventud “El nacimiento de la tragedia”. Nietzsche nos propone el enfrentamiento entre dos esferas antitéticas e irreconciliables que se dependen mutuamente: Apolo y Dioni-sio, cuya subsistencia individual está en un eterno devenir de negación y aceptación entre am-bos, permitiendo así cuestionarnos y crear nuestra propia moral originaria. Por tanto, partien-do de lo racional a lo irracional y viceversa esto se vuelve algo (...) posible y real, pues nos permi-te forjar los límites de una nueva moral. En síntesis, hacer de la moral existente una moral trágica implica aceptar nuestros instintos, placeres y pasiones dionisiacas para conjuntarlos atemporalmente con la mesura, contemplación e ilusión apolínea: formando así desde estos antagónicos el devenir trágico del uno originario. (shrink)

O problema da causação descendente é um ponto central na formulação do fisicalismo não-redutivo e na compreensão da emergência de propriedades. Duas interpretações possíveis da causação descendente, nas quais a contribuição do pensamento aristotélico é importante, são examinadas. Os requisitos do programa de matematização da natureza na mecanica clássica, que levaram ao abandono de três dos modos causais aristotélicos, nao parecem igualmente importantes nas ciencias especiais. Isto sugere que a contribuição de Aristóteles pode ser, de certa maneira, retomada. Uma definição (...) de propriedade emergente é apresentada, sendo a causação descendente interprerada de acordo com os modos causais formal e funcional.The problem of downward causation is a key subject in the formulation of nonreductive physicalism as well as in the understanding of property emergence. Two possible interpretations of downward causation, to which Aristotelian thought is relevant, are examined. In the mathematical understanding of nature in classical mechanics, the principle of causality should meet requirements that entailed the rejection of three among the four Aristotelian causal modes. Those requirements do not seem equally important in the special sciences and one may suggest, then, that Aristotle’s contribution may be taken into account. A definition of an emergent property is proposed, in which downward causation is interpreted according to the formal and functional causal modes. (shrink)

L. E. HAHN and P. A. SCHILPP (eds.), The philosophy of W. V. Quine. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1986. xvi + 705 pp. $35.95 cloth/$16.50 (paper).

Como representar, por intermédio de modelo geométrico, diagramático, gráfico ou topológico, o signo e a semiose é uma questão cujo tratamento recorrente, por especialistas na obra de C.S. Peirce, sugere a medida de sua importância. Nossos propósitos aqui são: (i) definir signo e semiose, (ii) definir sumariamente “modelo”, (iii) apresentar diversos modelos da semiose, (iv) relacionar os modelos com algumas constrições derivadas da teoria das categorias de Peirce, e, finalmente, (v) apresentar um modelo baseado no “estruturalismo hierárquico” de S. Salthe. (...) -/- . (shrink)

The year 2005 has been named the World Year of Physics in recognition of the 100th anniversary of Albert Einstein's "Miracle Year," in which he published four landmark papers which had deep and great influence on the last and the current century: quantum theory, general relativity, and statistical mechanics. Despite the enormous importance that Einstein’s discoveries played in these theories, most physicists adopt a version of quantum theory which is incompatible with the idea that motivated Einstein in the first place. (...) This seems to suggest that Einstein was fundamentally incapable of appreciating the `quantum revolution,’ and that his vision of physics as an attempt to reach a complete and comprehensive description of reality was ultimately impossible to obtain. Relativity theory has provided us with a picture of reality in which the world can be though as independent on who observes it, and the same can be said for statistical mechanics. Instead, quantum mechanics seems to suggest that physical objects do not exist `out there’ when someone is not observing them. In this framework, it is often suggested that any kind of causal explanation is impossible in the atomic and subatomic world, and therefore should be abandoned. This is why many think that it is in principle impossible for quantum theory to provide us with a coherent and comprehensive view of the world, in contrast with what happens with relativity and statistical mechanics. Is it really impossible to pursue Einstein’s ideal of physics also in the quantum framework? This book argues that this is not the case: the central idea is that Einstein’s vision of physics is still a live option, and indeed it is the one that best allows obtaining a unitary understanding of our physical theories. One can consider all the three theories mentioned above, suitably modified, as theories that are able to account and explain the world around us without too much departure from the classical framework. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------- -/- La teoria della relatività, la meccanica statistica e la meccanica quantistica hanno profondamente rivoluzionato il nostro modo di concepire spazio, tempo, materia, probabilità e causalità, nonché il rapporto tra universo fisico ed osservatore, nozioni che sono state al centro della discussione filosofica dal mondo greco fino ai nostri giorni. Questo volume, opera di Valia Allori, Mauro Dorato, Federico Laudisa e Nino Zanghì, non solo intende suggerire nuovi metodi di confronto tra fisica e filosofia, ma prova altresì a rendere espliciti i presupposti filosofici che sono presenti nell'interpretazione che i fisici stessi danno del formalismo matematico. (shrink)

Neste artigo, discutimos o papel das explicações teleológicas na teoriaGaia. Mostramos que seu principal proponente, James Lovelock, pretendeevitá-las devido a uma interpretação equivocada da natureza de taisexplicações. Na tentativa de evitar compromissos com a teleologia,Lovelock recorre ao conceito de propriedades emergentes. Esta não é,contudo, uma saída consistente, porque os conceitos de propriedadesemergentes e teleologia não são mutuamente excludentes. Discutimostambém as dificuldades de uma interpretação de Gaia de uma perspectivateleonômica, considerando problemas como o da noção de superorganismo.Para avaliar o estatuto das (...) explicações teleológicas em Gaia, examinamoso caso da interação entre algas e nuvens, que resultou num novo campo depesquisas e expõe as contribuições teóricas e empíricas que Gaia podeoferecer. Com base nos argumentos apresentados ao longo do artigo,sugerimos uma reorganização da estrutura do programa de pesquisa Gaia,visando à continuação de seu progresso teórico e empírico.In this paper, we discuss the role of teleological explanations in Gaia theory.We show that its main proponent, James Lovelock, intends to avoid themdue to a misinterpretation of the nature of teleological explanations. Inorder to avoid a commitment to teleology, Lovelock appeals to the conceptof emergent properties. This is not a consistent solution, however, since the concepts of emergent properties and teleology are not mutuallyexclusive. We also discuss difficulties in an interpretation of Gaia from ateleonomic perspective, discussing problems such as that of the notion ofsuperorganism. In order to appraise the status of teleological explanationsin Gaia, we examine the case of the interaction between algae and clouds,which gave birth to a new research field and show the theoretical andempirical contributions that Gaia can bring. Based on the argumentsdeveloped in the paper, we suggest a reorganization of the structure ofGaia research program, in order to go on with its theoretical and empiricalprogress. (shrink)

A major disagreement between different views about the foundations of quantum mechanics concerns whether for a theory to be intelligible as a fundamental physical theory it must involve a ‘primitive ontology’ (PO), i.e. variables describing the distribution of matter in four-dimensional space–time. In this article, we illustrate the value of having a PO. We do so by focusing on the role that the PO plays for extracting predictions from a given theory and discuss valid and invalid derivations of predictions. To (...) this end, we investigate a number of examples based on toy models built from the elements of familiar interpretations of quantum theory. (shrink)

In Bohmian mechanics elementary particles exist objectively, as point particles moving according to a law determined by a wavefunction. In this context, questions as to whether the particles of a certain species are real---questions such as, Do photons exist? Electrons? Or just the quarks?---have a clear meaning. We explain that, whatever the answer, there is a corresponding Bohm-type theory, and no experiment can ever decide between these theories. Another question that has a clear meaning is whether particles are intrinsically distinguishable, (...) i.e., whether particle world lines have labels indicating the species. We discuss the intriguing possibility that the answer is no, and particles are points---just points. (shrink)

O Darwinismo Neural explica o funcionamento do sistema nervosocentral com base em um processo de seleção populacional de gruposneuronais. Três características são compartilhadas entre DN e a teoria daseleção natural: repertórios variados de elementos, cuja fonte de variaçãonão está causalmente relacionada a eventos subseqüentes; interaçãocom o ambiente, permitindo a seleção de variantes favorecidas; e reprodução diferencial e herança de características das variantes.Interpretado como uma forma de epistemologia evolucionista, DN podeser incluído no programa da epistemologia evolucionista de mecanismos, como entendido por (...) Bradie. Este autor caracteriza este programapor enfocar o entendimento da dinâmica das estruturas cognitivas de umaperspectiva evolutiva. Neste artigo, discutimos como o DN foi construídoa partir de uma extensão metafórica da teoria da seleção natural. Osmecanismos propostos por aquela teoria para explicar o desenvolvimentoda dinâmica do SNC também são discutidos.Neural Darwinism explains the functioning of the central nervoussystem on the grounds of a process of populational selection ofneuronal groups. ND and the theory of natural selection share threecharacteristics: varied repertoires of elements, with variation source notbeing causally related to subsequent events; interaction with the environment, allowing for the selection of favored variants; and differential reproduction and heredity of characteristics of the variants. Ifinterpreted as a form of evolutionary epistemology, DN can be included inthe program of the evolutionary epistemology of mechanisms ,according to Bradie. He describes this program as focusing on theunderstanding of the dynamics of cognitive structures from an evolutionaryperspective. In this paper, we address how ND was built from a metaphoricalextension of the theory of natural selection. We also discuss the mechanismsproposed by that theory to explain the development of CNS dynamics. (shrink)

El artículo analiza algunos aspectos de la concepción de verdad moral que presenta el filósofo argentino Carlos Nino. En particular, intentaremos probar dos puntos. En primer lugar, buscaremos mostrar que las concepciones de verdad moral y de democracia deliberativa formuladas por Nino son incompatibles con un idealismo de corte platónico, a diferencia de lo que sostienen algunos análisis teóricos que aquí discutiremos. La postura constructivista que Nino sostiene es lo que impide pensarla desde puntos de vista trascendentes. En segundo lugar, (...) trataremos de mostrar las inconsistencias que conlleva otro aspecto del conocimiento moral que aparece en Nino: el acceso individual a la verdad moral. Para dar cuenta de esto nos ocuparemos de analizar la dimensión del conocimiento moral que nuestro autor presenta. (shrink)