For some time now, certain theorists have been urging us to move beyond text-based understandings of culture to consider the impact of new media on the structure and organization of knowledge. This article, however, reconsiders the usual priority given to digital media by comparing Wikipedia, the free, user-led online Encyclopedia, with Diderot and D'Alembert's eighteenth-century Encyclopédie. It begins by suggesting that the dichotomy between information system and text is not sufficient for describing the differences between the two. It then considers (...) more closely the type of critical thinking presupposed by the Encyclopédie. It concludes by raising the question of the role of judgement in making sense of any encyclopedia in a modern world in which knowledge systems only coexist on the condition of being partially blind to one another. (shrink)

A new and complete translation of Gadamers public lectures and essays of the late 1970s and early 1980s, this volume continues his examination of the predominance of scientific rationality in modern culture. Each essay develops a different perspective of Gadamers view that human reason originates not in abstract rationality but in our participation and practical knowledge of the world. They remain faithful to the tenets of Gadamers philosophy as developed in Truth and Method: that there is no external viewpoint from (...) which to judge our beliefs and that the scientific method is not a privileged access to truth since truth arises from discourse rather than from a set of propositions about the world. (shrink)

Certain characteristics make machine learning a powerful tool for processing large amounts of data, and also particularly unsuitable for explanatory purposes. There are worries that its increasing use in science may sideline the explanatory goals of research. We analyze the key characteristics of ML that might have implications for the future directions in scientific research: epistemic opacity and the ‘theory-agnostic’ modeling. These characteristics are further analyzed in a comparison of ML with the traditional statistical methods, in order to demonstrate what (...) it is specifically that makes ML methodology substantially unsuitable for reaching explanations. The analysis is given broader philosophical context by connecting it with the views on the role of prediction and explanation in science, their relationship, and the value of explanation. We proceed to show, first, that ML disrupts the relationship between prediction and explanation commonly understood as a functional relationship. Then we show that the value of explanation is not exhausted in purely predictive functions, but rather has a ubiquitously recognized value for both science and everyday life. We then invoke two hypothetical scenarios with different degrees of automatization of science, which help test our intuitions on the role of explanation in science. The main question we address is whether ML will reorient or otherwise impact our standard explanatory practice. We conclude with a prognosis that ML would diversify science into purely predictively oriented research based on ML-like techniques and, on the other hand, remaining faithful to anthropocentric research focused on the search for explanation. (shrink)

H. Collins has challenged the empiricist understanding of experimentation by identifying what he thinks constitutes the experimenter’s regress: an instrument is deemed good because it produces good results, and vice versa. The calibration of an instrument cannot alone validate the results: the regressive circling is broken by an agreement essentially external to experimental procedures. In response, A. Franklin has argued that calibration is a key reasonable strategy physicists use to validate production of results independently of their interpretation. The physicists’ arguments (...) about the merits of calibration are not coextensive with the interpretation of results, and thus an objective validation of results is possible. I argue, however, that the in-situ calibrating and measurement procedures and parameters at the Large Hadron Collider are closely and systematically interrelated. This requires empiricists to question their insistence on the independence of calibration from the outcomes of the experiment and rethink their position. Yet this does not leave the case of in-situ calibration open to the experimenter’s regress argument; it is predicated on too crude a view of the relationship between calibration and measurement that fails to capture crucial subtleties of the case. (shrink)

E. Schrödinger's ideas on interpreting quantum mechanics have been recently re-examined by historians and revived by philosophers of quantum mechanics. Such recent re-evaluations have focused on Schrödinger's retention of space–time continuity and his relinquishment of the corpuscularian understanding of microphysical systems. Several of these historical re-examinations claim that Schrödinger refrained from pursuing his 1926 wave-mechanical interpretation of quantum mechanics under pressure from the Copenhagen and Göttingen physicists, who misinterpreted his ideas in their dogmatic pursuit of the complementarity doctrine and the (...) principle of uncertainty. My analysis points to very different reasons for Schrödinger's decision and, accordingly, to a rather different understanding of the dialogue between Schrödinger and N. Bohr, who refuted Schrödinger's arguments. Bohr's critique of Schrödinger's arguments predominantly focused on the results of experiments on the scattering of electrons performed by Bothe and Geiger, and by Compton and Simon. Although he shared Schrödinger's rejection of full-blown classical entities, Bohr argued that these results demonstrated the corpuscular nature of atomic interactions. I argue that it was Schrödinger's agreement with Bohr's critique, not the dogmatic pressure, which led him to give up pursuing his interpretation for 7 yr. Bohr's critique reflected his deep understanding of Schrödinger's ideas and motivated, at least in part, his own pursuit of his complementarity principle. However, in 1935 Schrödinger revived and reformulated the wave-mechanical interpretation. The revival reflected N. F. Mott's novel wave-mechanical treatment of particle-like properties. R. Shankland's experiment, which demonstrated an apparent conflict with the results of Bothe–Geiger and Compton–Simon, may have been additional motivation for the revival. Subsequent measurements have proven the original experimental results accurate, and I argue that Schrödinger may have perceived even the reformulated wave-mechanical approach as too tenuous in light of Bohr's critique. (shrink)

Identifying optimal ways of organizing exploration in particle physics mega-labs is a challenging task that requires a combination of case-based and formal epistemic approaches. Data-driven studies suggest that projects pursued by smaller master-teams are substantially more efficient than larger ones across sciences, including experimental particle physics. Smaller teams also seem to make better project choices than larger, centralized teams. Yet the epistemic requirement of small, decentralized, and diverse teams contradicts the often emphasized and allegedly inescapable logic of discovery that forces (...) physicists pursuing the fundamental levels of the physical world to perform centralized experiments in mega-labs at high energies. We explain, however, that this epistemic requirement could be met, since the nature of theoretical and physical constraints in high energy physics and the technological obstacles stemming from them turn out to be surprisingly open-ended. (shrink)

Ontology – the study of the most fundamental categories of being – lies at the very heart of metaphysics. The reason why it appears to be so central is because it takes on the following questions: What sorts of entities are there? What features do those entities have? How do they relate to one another? And so on. Section 1 of this Element presents a fast-paced historical overview of some of the notable approaches to these questions. Section 2 tells the (...) story of how one of the oldest, most disputed, but also most developed ontological categories – universals – got introduced. Section 3 builds on the discussion of universals as it considers the desiderata for a promising system of ontological categories. And Section 4 looks at ways in which philosophers might break with tradition and explore some new ontological categories. (shrink)

Focussed around three core themes - capitalism, the metaphysics of democracy and aesthetics - these 12 essays emphasise the potential of Nancy's political thought, and collectively situate it within a broader intellectual context which includes engagements with Badiou, Ranciere, Foucault, Agamben and Lefort.

Language, Ideology, and the Human: New Interventions redefines the critical picture of language as a system of signs and ideological tropes inextricably linked to human existence. Offering reflections on the status, discursive possibilities, and political, ideological and practical uses of oral or written word in both contemporary society and the work of previous thinkers, this book traverses South African courts, British clinics, language schools in East Timor, prison cells, cinemas, literary criticism textbooks and philosophical treatises in order to forge a (...) new, diversified perspective on language, ideology, and what it means to be human. This truly international and interdisciplinary collection explores the implications that language, always materialising in the form of a historically and ideologically identifiable discourse, as well as the concept of ideology itself, have for the construction, definition and ways of speaking about 'the human'. Thematically arranged and drawing together the latest research from experts around the world, Language, Ideology, and the Human offers a view of language, ideology and the human subject that eschews simplifications and binary definitions. With contributions from across the social sciences and humanities, this book will appeal to scholars from a range of disciplines, including sociology, cultural studies, anthropology, law, linguistics, literary studies, philosophy and political science. © Sanja Bahun, Dušan Radunović and the contributors 2012. All rights reserved. (shrink)

We propose a model that identifies the configurations of relations between environmental practices and other management practices that can improve employee performance, measured as labor productivity. To test our model, we use the qualitative comparative analysis methodology, which allows us to demonstrate empirically how different configurations of management practices, including environmental practices, quality management systems, teamwork, and interorganizational relations, contribute to work systems in ways that increase labor productivity. Our results, based on data from 4,975 employees from 1,866 firms, show (...) that environmental practices are associated with higher labor productivity only when they are combined with other management practices. (shrink)

The ontological and epistemological priority of the infinite has been extensively dealt with in Spinoza scholarship. However, Spinoza’s widely debated understanding of the infinite has not figured to the same extent in accounts of his therapy of the passions, the topic which this essay sets out to explore. My reasoning consists of six steps. First, I introduce Spinoza’s cognitive therapy, which claims that we can be healed from our passions by acquiring adequate ideas of them; second, I show that Spinoza’s (...) cognitive therapy is subject to the Affective Force Condition, i.e., the claim that only a stronger affect can defeat another affect ; third, I suggest that the one way an affect can be reliably weakened or strengthened is by us considering its intentional object as necessary or free, respectively; fourth, I argue that we can only adequately ascribe freedom to things if we regard them as absolutely infinite, and necessity to finite things if we can have an adequate idea of them as inscribed in an infinite causal nexus. This presupposes having an adequate idea of the infinite, and so fifth, I ask by which capacity, or from which perspective, we can acquire such an idea, on Spinoza’s view. Sixth, I finally ask whether the infinity of the causal history of a finite thing qualifies as the kind of infinity which we can adequately conceive, and give a tentative answer to this question by situating this infinity in Spinoza’s taxonomy of infinities. (shrink)

This paper emphasizes the crucial role that language use plays in climate change communication. In particular, this paper examines UN public discourse and narratives about climate change. It will be shown that the climate change is often described as a "threat to human wellbeing" and as an external enemy—the Other. On the other hand, humanity is often portrayed as a victim of climate change. The consequence of this rhetoric and logic of apocalypse is insufficient action in relation to climate change. (...) The narrative construction of the Other that is described as a threat is founded on binary oppositions: we/they, self/other, culture/nature, human/non-human and so forth. As long as climate change is described as an external enemy and "independent matter" and climate policy is based on binary oppositions, action to combat climate change will remain insufficient. (shrink)

I argue that instead of a rather narrow focus on N. Bohr's account of complementarity as a particular and perhaps obscure metaphysical or epistemological concept (or as being motivated by such a concept), we should consider it to result from pursuing a particular method of studying physical phenomena. More precisely, I identify a strong undercurrent of Baconian method of induction in Bohr's work that likely emerged during his experimental training and practice. When its development is analyzed in light of Baconian (...) induction, complementarity emerges as a levelheaded rather than a controversial account, carefully elicited from a comprehensive grasp of the available experimental basis, shunning hasty metaphysically motivated generalizations based on partial experimental evidence. In fact, Bohr's insistence on the “classical” nature of observations in experiments, as well as the counterintuitive synthesis of wave and particle concepts that have puzzled scholars, seem a natural outcome (an updated instance) of the inductive method. Such analysis clarifies the intricacies of early Schrödinger's critique of the account as well as Bohr's response, which have been misinterpreted in the literature. If adequate, the analysis may lend considerable support to the view that Bacon explicated the general terms of an experimentally minded strand of the scientific method, developed and refined by scientists in the following three centuries. (shrink)

Much of the recent metaphysical literature on the problem of the relational unity of complexes leaves the impression that Bradley (or some Bradleyan argument) has uncovered a serious problem to be addressed. The problem is thought to be particularly challenging for trope theorists and realists about universals. In truth, there has been little clarity about the nature and import of the original Bradley’s regress arguments. In this paper, I offer a careful analysis and reconstruction of the arguments in Bradley’s Appearance (...) and Reality (1893). The analysis reveals that no less than three regress arguments against relations can be found. I show that none of them are compelling. I argue that, as a result, it is a serious misstep for philosophers today to offer metaphysical theses based on the unchallenged assumption that Bradley has established his regress result. I further analyze the underpinnings of the Bradley problem as it is frequently cast in contemporary literature and show that they rely on certain confusions and biases, which once brought to light, make current Bradley-inspired arguments against relations unconvincing. (shrink)

It is by now generally understood that the nature of events are central to Deleuze’s philosophical endeavour. This has not meant, however, that the process mapped out by this concept has been adequately grasped. Indeed, the lines mapping out events are obscured, theoretical, even otherworldly, whenever the complexities of the creating of the virtual and the actual as the created, are reductively conceived as giving way to two separated domains; two separated domains whereby the repeater would be forever condemned to (...) be the result of an otherworldly will that “works through it,” one that would signal that they would never be capable of becoming worthy of the events that make a life. [i] The perspectival reality of the virtual with respect to the actual, which despite its fragmentary nature is in its entirety encompassed in each singular event, requires of us that we grasp what it is that Antonin Artaud’s points to when saying, I “am my son, my father, my mother, and myself.” It is not as though events perceived in the form of a virtual complex render beings inconsequential; instead, events are capable of ousting the verb “to be” in a double sense, because they enfold what is most affirmative in the activity of beings, the being of becoming whereby a life is born, always yet again, and as a function of which, as Alfred North Whitehead notes, what an actual being is, is how that entity becomes. It is adequate to its becoming. The actual as present-being expresses the verb “to be” in an ephemeral sense, or it is expressed by it in a restrictive way, while when affirmed as indistinct from the virtual, being, the verb “to be,” implies nothing else than the return of becoming. It is an untimely instant in which what is affirmed is the continuation of becoming; an instant that makes each event be the infinite becoming-finite of an actual being. So as to explore the nature of events in Deleuze’s philosophy, it is this displacement, the ousting of the verb “to be,” that I focus in on in this paper. (shrink)

What is it to have a mental disorder? The paper proposes an ability-based view of mental disorder. It argues that such a view is preferable to biological dysfunction views such as Wakefield’s Harmful Dysfunction Analysis and Boorse’s Biostatistical Theory. According to the proposed view, having a mental disorder is basically a matter of having a certain type of inability (or: an ability that is not sufficiently high): the inability to respond adequately to some of one’s available reasons in some of (...) one’s reasons-sensitive attitudes or actions, where the threshold of inability is determined by one’s being harmed. The relevant concepts of inability, reasons, and harm are sketched. The paper argues that the proposed view evades some problems of biological dysfunction views by remaining neutral on questions of causation and the evolution of the mind. Furthermore, it can capture better what is distinctively “mental” about mental disorder. On the proposed view, it is the rational relations among an individual’s attitudes and actions that are “disordered” and the relevant norms in mental disorder are the norms of reasons. As further merits, the view can account for degrees of disorder, incorporate biological as well as social aspects, and elucidate the relations among disorders, symptoms, and their causes. (shrink)

The Modern Synthesis of Darwinism and genetics regards non-genetic factors as merely constraints on the genetic variations that result in the characteristics of organisms. Even though the environment (including social interactions and culture) is as necessary as genes in terms of selection and inheritance, it does not contain the information that controls the development of the traits. S. Oyama’s account of the Parity Thesis, however, states that one cannot conceivably distinguish in a meaningful way between nature-based (i.e., gene-based) and nurture-based (...) (i.e., environment-based) characteristics in development because the information necessary for the resulting characteristics is contained at both levels. Oyama and others argue that the Parity Thesis has far-reaching implications for developmental psychology, in that both nativist and interactionist developmental accounts of motor, cognitive, affective, social, and linguistic capacities that presuppose a substantial nature/nurture dichotomy are inadequate. After considering these arguments, we conclude that either Oyama’s version of the Parity Thesis does not differ from the version advocated by liberal interactionists, or it renders precarious any analysis involving abilities present at birth (despite her claim to the contrary). More importantly, developmental psychologists need not discard the distinction between innate characteristics present at birth and those acquired by learning, even if they abandon genocentrism. Furthermore, we suggest a way nativists can disentangle the concept of maturation from a genocentric view of biological nature. More specifically, we suggest they can invoke the maturational segment of the developmental process (which involves genetic, epigenetic and environmental causes) that results in the biological “machinery” (e.g. language acquisition device) which is necessary for learning as a subsequent segment of the developmental process. (shrink)

This paper contains some of the most important results obtained from surveys on domestic violence in Serbia and Macedonia, as well as from a survey on violence against women in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These surveys have confirmed the results of other research showing that wife abuse is one of the most serious yet at the same time most hidden forms of victimization. It represents the manifestation of power and control over the victim, leading to a loss of (...) trust and a threat to safety. Bearing that in mind, the aim of this paper is to examine the prevalence, structure and some features of wife abuse in the post-war societies of the former Yugoslavia, based on an analysis of the results of these surveys, with particular emphasis on the impact of the economic crisis and war on this phenomenon. (shrink)

The question of a universal human nature and the universally human significance of values, first and foremost moral values—a question that, it would seem, had long ago been thoroughly scrutinized in the works of Marxist scholars, including V. P. Tugarinov—has suddenly acquired a "second wind" in public consciousness and in the journalism of our days. Well-known writers, journalists, and scholars have come together on a theoretical platform, which is summed up in a statement by D. S. Likhachev: "Morality is a (...) part of human nature. Its norms are stable and eternal. Indeed, what can be counterposed to the commandment "Thou shalt not kill'? Some new commandment? ‘Kill’? And what about the commandment ‘Thou shalt not steal’? or ‘Thou shalt not bear false witness’?". (shrink)

A recent rethinking of the early history of Quantum Mechanics deemed the late 1920s agreement on the equivalence of Matrix Mechanics and Wave Mechanics, prompted by Schrödinger’s 1926 proof, a myth. Schrödinger supposedly failed to achieve the goal of proving isomorphism of the mathematical structures of the two theories, while only later developments in the early 1930s, especially the work of mathematician John von Neumman (1932) provided sound proof of equivalence. The alleged agreement about the Copenhagen Interpretation, predicated to a (...) large extent on this equivalence, was deemed a myth as well. If such analysis is correct, it provides considerable evidence that, in its critical moments, the foundations of scientific practice might not live up to the minimal standards of rigor, as such standards are established in the practice of logic, mathematics, and mathematical physics, thereby prompting one to question the rationality of the practice of physics. In response, I argue that Schrödinger’s proof concerned primarily a domain-specific ontological equivalence, rather than the isomorphism. It stemmed initially from the agreement of the eigenvalues of Wave Mechanics and energy-states of Bohr’s Model that was discovered and published by Schrödinger in his First and Second Communications of 1926. Schrödinger demonstrated in this proof that the laws of motion arrived at by the method of Matrix Mechanics could be derived successfully from eigenfunctions as well (while he only outlined the reversed derivation of eigenfunctions from Matrix Mechanics, which was necessary for the proof of isomorphism of the two theories). This result was intended to demonstrate the domain-specific ontological equivalence of Matrix Mechanics and Wave Mechanics, with respect to the domain of Bohr’s atom. And although the full-fledged mathematico-logical equivalence of the theories did not seem out of the reach of existing theories and methods, Schrödinger never intended to fully explore such a possibility in his proof paper. In a further development of Quantum Mechanics, Bohr’s complementarity and Copenhagen Interpretation captured a more substantial convergence of the subsequently revised (in light of the experimental results) Wave and Matrix Mechanics. I argue that both the equivalence and Copenhagen Interpretation can be deemed myths if one predicates the philosophical and historical analysis on a narrow model of physical theory which disregards its historical context, and focuses exclusively on its formal aspects and the exploration of the logical models supposedly implicit in it. (shrink)

The article gives an overview of the past and present situation on the Croatian lesbian scene – from the period prior to the war in Croatia, after the war, right up to the present situation. The ‘coming out’ process of Croatian lesbians during the 1980s and 1990s has been determined by social and cultural homophobic indoctrination, which sends out clear messages about how deviant and unacceptable homosexuality is. Heterosexuality has traditionally been the imperative of social normality within Croatian society. Not (...) being compatible with the social norm, lesbians are condemned by society to failure and isolation. Nevertheless, after the 10-year rule of a strongly nationalistic, rightist and patriarchal regime, recent political changes have brought Croatia to the threshold of a new transitional period. Even though the new Social Democratic and Liberal coalition government is sending mixed signals on many issues to do with gender equality, the homosexual population of Croatia can finally hope for better times to come. (shrink)

U teoriji holarhijske evolucije Kozmosa Wilber razlikuje četiri temeljna tipa holarhija, shvaćajući da ih je nemoguće svesti na jednu, osnovnu holarhiju. Mapa četiriju kvadranata ukazuje na dimenzionalnost i »dubinskost« njegove kozmologije. Pojmovi »holon« i »holarhija« ključni su pojmovi u Wilberovoj interpetaciji stupnjeva spiralnoga razvoja ljudske svijesti. U teoriji spiralne dinamike društvenoga razvoja Dona Becka i Chrisa Cowana poznati su kao »Memi« – sustavi temeljnih vrijednosti, reprezentanti beskonačnih stupnjeva progresa ili regresa. Na modelu »spiralne dinamike« Wilber interpretira stupnjevanje unutarnje transformacije koja (...) prati razvoj svijesti, posvećujući posebnu pažnju četirima stupnjevima »višega«, transpersonalnog razvoja koje još naziva »psihičkim«, »suptilnim«, »kauzalnim« i »nedvojnim«. To su razine svijesti na kojima um prestaje, a o njima svjedoče mistične, kontemplativne i jogičke tradicije. Na ovome mjestu njegova teorija postaje znanstveno neprihvatljiva i, time, problematičnaIn his theory of a holarchic evolution of Cosmos, Wilber distinguishes four fundamental types of holarchies, realizing that there is no possibility to reduce them to one, basic holarchy. The map of four quadrants indicates dimensionality and profundity of his Cosmology. Notions such as “holon” and “holarchy” represent the key notions in his interpretation of spiral evolution stages of human consciousness. In the theory of spiral dynamics of social development, created by Don Beck and Chris Cowan, they are known as “Memes”– systems of core values, the representatives of infinite stages of progress or regress. By means of a spiral dynamics model, Wilber interprets staging of the inner transformation that accompanies the evolution of consciousness, paying special attention to four stages of a “higher”, transpersonal evolution, which he also calls “psychic”, “subtle”, “causal” and “nondual” stages. These are levels of consciousness where the mind stops and which are testified by various mystic, contemplative and yoga traditions. At this point, his theory becomes scientifically unacceptable and rather problematic. (shrink)

A recent rethinking of the early history of Quantum Mechanics deemed the late 1920s agreement on the equivalence of Matrix Mechanics and Wave Mechanics, prompted by Schrödinger's 1926 proof, a myth. Schrödinger supposedly failed to prove isomorphism, or even a weaker equivalence (“Schrödinger-equivalence”) of the mathematical structures of the two theories; developments in the early 1930s, especially the work of mathematician von Neumann provided sound proof of mathematical equivalence. The alleged agreement about the Copenhagen Interpretation, predicated to a large extent (...) on this equivalence, was deemed a myth as well. In response, I argue that Schrödinger's proof concerned primarily a domain-specific ontological equivalence, rather than the isomorphism or a weaker mathematical equivalence. It stemmed initially from the agreement of the eigenvalues of Wave Mechanics and energy-states of Bohr's Model that was discovered and published by Schrödinger in his first and second communications of 1926. Schrödinger demonstrated in this proof that the laws of motion arrived at by the method of Matrix Mechanics are satisfied by assigning the auxiliary role to eigenfunctions in the derivation of matrices (while he only outlined the reversed derivation of eigenfunctions from Matrix Mechanics, which was necessary for the proof of both isomorphism and Schrödinger-equivalence of the two theories). This result was intended to demonstrate the domain-specific ontological equivalence of Matrix Mechanics and Wave Mechanics, with respect to the domain of Bohr's atom. And although the mathematical equivalence of the theories did not seem out of the reach of existing theories and methods, Schrödinger never intended to fully explore such a possibility in his proof paper. In a further development of Quantum Mechanics, Bohr's complementarity and Copenhagen Interpretation captured a more substantial convergence of the subsequently revised (in light of the experimental results) Wave and Matrix Mechanics. -/- I argue that both the equivalence and Copenhagen Interpretation can be deemed myths if one predicates the philosophical and historical analysis on a narrow model of physical theory which disregards its historical context, and focuses exclusively on its formal aspects and the exploration of the logical models supposedly implicit in it. -/- . (shrink)

The book Phenomenology of Plurality: Hannah Arendt on Political Intersubjectivity is a contribution not only to the phenomenological tradition of thought and Hannah Arendt studies, but also political science and, most importantly, political philosophy. Sophie Loidolt advances an intervention that stands in contrast to contemporary phenomenological research which in certain times have had the tendency to perform depoliticized examination of the self and sociality, actually revealing the intention of Phenomenology of Plurality to articulate the numerous elements that comprise the methodological (...) novelty with which Arendt changes the theory of the political. (shrink)

In The Problems of Philosophy, Russell presented his famous regress argument against the nominalist denial of universals. In this paper I explore the origin of the argument in Russell and explore its relevance in contemporary metaphysical debate. I argue that a hundred years on, the argument still presents a powerful tool for realists in their debate with nominalists and trope theorists.

There are two ways in which sense has been approached in contemporary philosophy. The dividing line is between those who interpret sense as abiding with models of recognition and those who determine sense and paradox as co-present. In The Logic of Sense, Gilles Deleuze puts forth a paradoxical constitution of sense in order to render that which is new in being something untimely, the always new in being. In placing paradox at the center of the constitution of sense, Deleuze effectively (...) works to displace the two aspects of doxa, good sense and common sense. In relation to paradox, sense moves in two directions simultaneously; it is actualized in the present, and it is continuously reborn in the transcendental field .. (shrink)

Focusing on the discovery of weak currents, the current debate on the theory-ladenness of observation in modern physics might be too narrow, as it concerns only the last stage of a complex experimental process and statistical methods required to analyze data. The scope of the debate should be extended to include broader experimental conditions that concern the design of the apparatus and different levels of the detection process. These neglected conditions often decisively delimit experiments long before the last stage has (...) been reached, thus predetermining the extent of the dependence of data production on the theory. I explain the nature of these conditions and the theory-ladenness tendencies they produce, noting how they affect the last stage of the data analysis and providing some relevant examples. (shrink)

Because of its practical advantages, machine learning (ML) is increasingly used for decision-making in numerous sectors. This paper demonstrates that the integral characteristics of ML, such as semi-autonomy, complexity, and non-deterministic modeling have important ethical implications. In particular, these characteristics lead to a lack of insight and lack of comprehensibility, and ultimately to the loss of human control over decision-making. Errors, which are bound to occur in any decision-making process, may lead to great harm and human rights violations. It is (...) important to have a principled way of assigning responsibility for such errors. The integral characteristics of ML, however, pose serious difficulties in defining responsibility and regulating ML decision-making. First, we elaborate on these characteristics and their epistemic and ethical implications. We then analyze possible general strategies for resolving the assignment of moral responsibility and show that, due to the specific way in which ML functions, each potential solution is problematic, whether we assign responsibility to humans, machines, or using hybrid models. Then, we shift focus on an alternative approach that bypasses moral responsibility and attempts to define legal liability independently through solutions such as informed consent and the no-fault compensation system. Both of these solutions prove unsatisfactory because they leave too much room for potential abuses of ML decision-making. We conclude that both ethical and legal solutions are fraught with serious difficulties. These difficulties prompt us to re-weigh the costs and benefits of using ML for high-stake decisions. (shrink)

Human rights do not represent an absolute truth. Otherwise, they would represent ideology, which is contradictory to the basic idea of human rights itself. Consequently, there is a need for redefinition of the main presuppositions of modern conception of human rights represented in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This paper argues that Rawls’s conception of human rights is significant for the refiguration of human rights. It.

La Fontaine’s allegory of “montrer patte blanche / showing the white paw” – from his fable «The Wolf, the Goat, and the Kid – should help me trace the problem of documenting sex and/or gender. In the first decade of the 21st century, the legislative bodies of certain social democratic countries (e.g. Australia, New Zealand, Nepal, Germany) have made a change into the binary system of presenting sex or gender on official identification documents, by introducing a third possibility – that (...) of gender indeterminacy. Would it now be possible to issue an official Id without knowing the precise sex of the person? My questioning tackles this new practice, measuring it from the standpoint of social ontology. (shrink)

Problemi identiteta i razlike u okviru politicke teorije artikulisani su u vidu spora koji se od uspostavljanja liberalnih demokratija intenzivira, spora o nacinu na koji se politicka zajednica uspostavlja i opravdava, u relaciji sa pitanjem odnosa pojedinca i kolektiva. Rad analizira najaktuelnije refleksije evropske politike na problem razlike i verovatnost teze o kraju multikulturalizma koja se cula na konferenciji za bezbednost odrzanoj u Minhenu 2011. godine, kroz objasnjenje geneze problema i razmatranje ponudjenih resenja. Pored toga, rad obrazlaze pojam moderne drzave (...) kroz principe gradjanstva i nacije u relaciji sa pitanjem identiteta i razlike, sa posebnim akcentom na konceptima neutralnosti i tolerancije kao kljucnim tackama u sporu. Kao zakljucak, iznose se razlozi zasto problem razlike ne moze tako lako da bude prevazidjen i na koji nacin diskurzivna demokratija potencijalno moze da bude buduca smernica za drugaciji fokus spora. PR Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 179049: Politike drustvenog pamcenja i nacionalnog identiteta - regionalni i evropski kontekst. (shrink)

Menschen haben psychische Störungen, zum Beispiel Depressionen, Angst- oder Abhängigkeitsstörungen. Doch was genau heißt es, eine psychische Störung zu haben? Dies ist die Hauptfrage, um die es in meinem Buch geht. Die Hauptthese, für die ich argumentiere, ist folgende: Eine Person hat dann und nur dann eine psychische Störung, wenn sie (i) mindestens eine der Fä- higkeiten, in ihrem Denken, Fühlen oder Handeln angemessen auf die ihr ver- fügbaren (scheinbaren) Gründe zu reagieren, nicht hat und sie (ii) durch den Zustand, (...) der dieser Unfähigkeit zugrunde liegt oder aus ihr resultiert, geschädigt wird. Ich nenne dies den “;Rehability View" (RHA), wobei “;;Rehability" ein Port- manteau aus den drei relevanten Grundbegriffen “;reasons" (Gründe), “;;harm" (Schädigung) und “;ability" (Fähigkeit) ist. (shrink)

This article explores Vietnam’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic as an example of good ethical practice in dealing with the COVID-19 outbreak. Vietnam’s response to the pandemic is in accordance with the ethics of care which emphasizes solidarity and responsibility. Vietnam’s approach to the COVID-19 pandemic is also in accordance with the third generation of human rights that promote solidarity and responsibilities towards the community. A full implementation of human rights requires more emphasis on responsibilities, especially in the time of (...) crisis. (shrink)

Some properties and relations take time to be instantiated. They are not instantiated at a time, but through a temporal interval. Cognitive properties and relations such as understanding and thinking are like this, but also many biological, chemical, and microphysical properties and relations such as absorbing, freezing, radiating, and decaying. In this paper, I make a case for taking seriously such temporally extended properties (TEPs). I argue that they are ubiquitous and that our current theories of persistence would do well (...) to make room for them in their ontology. The focus here is on fourdimensionalism and different ways it can accommodate TEPs. I explore four different ways of dealing with TEPs within a fourdimensionalist framework. These are: (a) to make the objects that bear apparent TEPs temporally more extended or “chunky”, while giving TEPs a reductive or eliminativist treatment in favor of instantaneous properties (IPs); (b) to make a series of objects the bearer of TEP predicates, while, again, holding only to IPs; (c) to endorse TEPs in their own right and take them to be temporally extended in a literal sense; and (d) to hold on to TEPs as atemporal properties and make the exemplification relation temporally extended. I discuss each of these options and highlight the types of problems that a fourdimensionalist faces in attempting to accommodate TEPs. I conclude that fourdimensionalists do not yet have a satisfactory account of TEPs in their hands. (shrink)

A new Meno would say: it is knowledge that is nothing more than an empirical figure, a simple result which continually falls back into experience; whereas learning is the true transcendental structure which unites difference to difference, dissimilarity to dissimilarity, without mediating between them—not in the form of a mythical past or former present, but in the pure form of an empty time in general.1In Difference and Repetition (1968), Gilles Deleuze calls for a new Meno. The Meno is one of (...) the Platonic dialogues in which Socrates asserts that learning is recollection. While Deleuze’s central philosophical writing has not been interpreted as a text on learning, his treatment of Plato’s Meno cannot be reduced .. (shrink)