Friedrich Hayek was a fervent advocate of the methodological specificity of the social sciences. However, given his contact with Karl Popper, several historians and philosophers have characterized his final position as Popperian, that is, a position that would have accepted the unity of scientific method. A closer look at Hayek's philosophy and Popper's own intellectual course shows that such a thesis is based on misconceptions that can be overcome by taking the Hayekian concept of 'spontaneous order' as the (...) foundation of a methodology immune to any kind of methodological monism. (shrink)

This paper is a supplement to, and provides a proof of principle of, Kuhn vs. Popper on Criticism and Dogmatism in Science: A Resolution at the Group Level. It illustrates how calculations may be performed in order to determine how the balance between different functions in science—such as imaginative, critical, and dogmatic—should be struck, with respect to confirmation functions and rules of scientific method.

If an economist or an economic historian speaks about ethical or moral problems, one should be suspicious. Karl Popper continually repeated that he did not want to preach, and I believe that his deep-rooted distrust of modern philosophical moralists, who usually preach water and drink cognac, led to his not writing a greater work on ethics. Nevertheless he was a moral person, and perhaps we can learn more about his cosmology, his methodology, and about his philosophy in general if (...) we probe into some of the ethical foundations of his life and his thinking. It may become apparent to you that I do not refer primarily to Popper's Open Society and Its Enemies or other works of his political writings alone. In choosing not to do so, it is my intention to demonstrate that all his thinking is deeply rooted in ethics. (shrink)

Over the last few years there has been a resurgent interest in various scientific disciplines in Popper’s arguments. To gain a greater appreciation of Popper’s scientific arguments, they need to be viewed in relation to his broader philosophy and where this stands within the history of ideas. This book aims to take seriously those aspects of Popper’s writings that have received less attention and wherein he advanced metaphysical, speculative, mystical-poetic, aesthetic and Platonic arguments. Such arguments are crucial (...) for an appreciation of his scientific and political writings. I argue that Popper, much like Wittgenstein previously has been misconstrued as an Anglo-analytic philosopher. This book provides an interpretation of Popper’s mature philosophy within his Central-European intellectual context. The aim of which is to open up a fruitful line of investigation into Popper’s thought that I hope would continue over the coming years. Alexander Naraniecki has spent time at the Popper Archives at the University of Klagenfurt in Austria whilst researching for this book. He has also been a visiting scholar at Duke University and has completed a postdoctoral research fellowship at Deakin University in Melbourne. Dr Naraniecki also publishes on issues relating to multiculturalism, globalization, cosmopolitanism as well as inter-cultural relations and dialogue. He has published on Popper in various leading journals such as Philosophy, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, and The European Legacy. He is currently building his research on Popper in a broader direction by exploring issues related to creativity and problem solving for critical thinking. (shrink)

How are we to understand the use of probability in Popper’s corroboration function? Popper says logically, but this raises a problem that becomes apparent when his views on logical probability are compared with those of Keynes. Specifically, Popper does not make it clear how we could have access to, or even calculate, probability values in a logical sense. For first, he would likely want to deny the Keynesian distinction between primary and secondary propositions, and the underlying notion (...) of knowledge-by-acquaintance with Neo-Platonic entities. Second, he would presumably reject not only the notion of non-numerical probabilities, but also the claim that the principle of indifference is aught other than a heuristic, given paradoxes such as Bertrand’s. An attempt might be made to solve this problem by appeal to semantic or possible world analyses over the relative truth-values of statements, but this seems to fail due to concerns relating to infinity: if the set of possible worlds in which p is true is infinite, and the set of possible worlds in which q is true is infinite, then no numerical value for P can be reasonably determined by a comparison between those worlds. As such, an all-too-familiar sort of criticism of Popper’s view of science seems to loom large: if the corroboration function only makes sense when the probabilities employed therein are subjective, then what counts as impressive evidence for a theory might seem to be a matter of convention, or even whim. However, we now have a new interpretation of probability at our disposal: the intersubjective interpretation, recently championed by Gillies, according to which probabilities can lie on a spectrum between the aleatory and the epistemic. Might we employ this to preserve the corroboration function, and deliver ourselves from Bayesianism, without succumbing to radical subjectivism? (shrink)

This paper is a critique of Contessa’s. First, I show that Popper in The Logic of Scientific Discovery argues against the view that the logical probability of a hypothesis is identical to its degree of confirmation, rather than against Bayesianism. Second, I explain that his argument to this effect does not depend on the assumption that ‘the universe is infinite’. Third, and finally, I refine Popper’s case by developing an argument which requires only that some universal laws have (...) a logical probability of zero relative to any finite evidence, and providing an example concerning Newtonian mechanics. (shrink)

Summary The present paper constitutes an elaboration of a previous work by one of us which, among other things, proposed some modifications of Popper's tetradic schema. Here, in the first part, we consider critically and develop further these modifications and elaborate on methods which prove more satisfactory for the mapping of the problem solving processes in Physics. We also find the opportunity to make some comments on Physics and on its relation to Mathematics. In the second part, there is (...) an attempt to test the above ideas on the genesis and development of the Special Relativity Theory. In doing this, we concentrate mainly on Einstein's 1905 paper and try to explicitate its relation with the situation Physics found itself in that period as well as to clarify the epistemological status of Einstein's two postulates. (shrink)

1. Introduction. 2. Is Tarski’s theory of truth, as Popper claims after Tarski himself, a rehabilitation of the traditional view of truth as correspondence to facts? — Yes, but not for the reasons he gives. 3. Is Tarski’s explicit definition of truth , as Popper claims after Tarski himself, purely morphological ? — No. 4. Is Tarski’s theory, as Tarski claims it to be, « epistomologically neutral » ? — This thesis is ambiguous, and Tarski can support it (...) just as Popper can dispute it as well. 5. Is Popper right for all that when he goes as far as to claim that Tarski’s theory of truth provides an argument in favour of « metaphysical realism » — No. 6. Conclusions.Résumé1. Introduction 2. La théorie de la vérité de Tarski est-elle, comme Popper l’affirme à la suite de Tarski lui-même, une réhabilitation de la conception traditionnelle de la vérité comme correspondance aux faits ? — Oui, mais pas pour la raison qu’il donne. 3. La définition explicite de la vérité de Tarski est-elle, comme Popper l’affirme à la suite de Tarski lui-même, purement morphologique ? — Non. 4. La théorie de Tarski est-elle, comme celui-ci le prétend, « épistémologiquement neutre » ? — La thèse est équivoque, et Tarski peut aussi bien la soutenir que Popper la contester. 5. Popper a-t-il raison pour autant d’aller jusqu’à prétendre que la théorie de la vérité de Tarski fournit un argument en faveur du « réalisme métaphysique » ? — Non. 6. Conclusions. (shrink)

1. Introduction 2. La théorie de la vérité de Tarski est-elle, comme Popper l’affirme à la suite de Tarski lui-même, une réhabilitation de la conception traditionnelle de la vérité comme correspondance aux faits? — Oui, mais pas pour la raison qu’il donne. 3. La définition explicite de la vérité de Tarski (quand elle est possible) est-elle, comme Popper l’affirme à la suite de Tarski lui-même, purement morphologique (syntaxique)? — Non. 4. La théorie de Tarski est-elle, comme celui-ci le (...) prétend, « épistémologiquement neutre »? — La thèse est équivoque, et Tarski peut aussi bien la soutenir que Popper la contester. 5. Popper a-t-il raison pour autant d’aller jusqu’à prétendre que la théorie de la vérité de Tarski fournit un argument en faveur du « réalisme métaphysique »? — Non. 6. Conclusions. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore a prominent question of Hericlitean scholarship: how is change possible? Karl Popper and G. S. Kirk tackle this same question. Kirk asserts that Heraclitus believed that change is present on a macrocosmic level and that all change is regulated by the cosmic principle logos. Popper, on the other hand, claims Heraclitus believed that change is microcosmic and rejected that all change is regulated by logos. I argue for a combination of aspects from each (...) of their claims and conclude that change is present both microcosmically and macrocosmically and that all change is governed by logos . (shrink)

In this study, I attempt to shed light on whether some passages from the Platonic dialogue Cratylus that deal with language correspond to Karl Popper’s theory on the third world. Specifically, I attempt to prove that Plato’s third world contains both divine and human properties, something that is provided through language, that is, through the human rational and developing in objective terms construction. In the four subchapters of my study, I basically investigate the relationship between the thinking subject and (...) the noumenon as well as the role of the coiner of names and the dialectician with respect to the scientific foundation of the names. The most important conclusion drawn is that according to Plato these two are responsible for connecting a thinking subject with a noumenon by adding objective certainty to the meaning of everything is said. I also investigate how Plato’s archetypal Ideas could be considered to be the third world. (shrink)

Sulla base di un'analisi della biblioteca di Karl Popper, la "Karl Popper collection" di Klagenfurt in Austria, argomento che le letture e i commenti di questo grande pensatore del Novecento testimoniano un uso dell'autocritica e del confronto come strumento di crescita della conoscenza umana.

Este trabalho tem como objetivo refletir sobre os dois problemas fundamentais da teoria do conhecimento: o problema da demarcação científica, ou problema de Kant; e o problema da indução, ou problema de Hume. O primeiro refere-se a questão acerca do critério da demarcação, isto é, que critério devemos usar para distinguir enunciados das ciências empíricas de afirmações metafísicas e pseudocientíficas. Popper afirma que Kant foi o primeiro a formular tal problema, e com ele, a demarcação científica tornou-se o problema (...) central da teoria do conhecimento. Discutiremos a solução de Kant e de Popper para essa questão. O segundo problema fundamental da teoria do conhecimento é o problema da indução, que se refere a questão a respeito da validade ou justificação das inferências indutivas nas ciências empíricas. Popper atribui a Hume a autoria dessa indagação. Discutiremos a abordagem de Hume sobre o tema e a solução de Kant e Popper para o problema da indução. (shrink)

This paper presents an analysis of several experimental tests of Einstein's theories, together with their Popperian evaluation and a discussion of Einstein's reaction to these tests. It is shown that several relevant refutations of Einstein's theories were not accepted by Einstein as significant, and that therefore Einstein did not follow Popper's methodological rules. This is regarded as a strong case against Popper's criterion of demarcation.

Bu çalışma ilkin, ütopyacı düşünceye karşı istikrarlı bir muhalefet yürüten liberal düşüncenin sağ kanadındaki Karl Popper ve Francis Fukuyama gibi kanonik isimlerin yaklaşımlarının, zamanın sosyo-ekonomik gelişmelerinin katkısıyla genel siyaset düşüncesinin ana akımına bürünmesi sürecini ve ütopyaya ilişkin fikirlerini değerlendirecektir. Bir kez müesses nizam haline geldiği vakit menşeindeki ütopyacı niteliklerin hilafına değişimin ancak tedricen olması gerektiğini ve aksini savunan siyasal tavır alışların da yersiz radikalizmle malul siyaset dışı yönelimler olduğunu iddia eden ana akım liberal çizginin savunucuları olarak Popper ve (...) Fukuyama, bu çizgilerini radikal bir antikomünizmle taçlandırmışlardır. Aynı çizgide bu kez liberal düşüncenin sol cenahındaki sol-sosyalist fikri inkişaf döneminin ürünü çaplı toplumsal değişim taleplerini, radikal diye tabir ederek neredeyse affedilmez birer kusur gibi kabul eden kimi sol liberal feminist yaklaşımlar ile yenilginin sözde faturasını bu radikalizme keserek siyasal faaliyetini melankolik bir yazıklanmanın ötesine geçiremeyen birtakım liberal sol tavırların bu süreçteki rolü tartışılacaktır. Sonuç itibarıyla bu çalışma, çoğunlukla itham biçiminde zikredilen ütopyacılık tabirini, bu menfi kullanımın nesnesi olmaktan kurtarmak için alternatif ve daha iyi bir yaşama dair yolların çeşitlenmesinin önemli bir başlangıç noktası olarak bir paye gibi kabullenip sahiplenen Ernst Bloch’un umut mefhumu üzerinden yepyeni bir ontolojik ve epistemolojik inşaya tabi tutarak, ütopyacılığın bir tür iade-i itibarına odaklanacaktır. (shrink)

A partir del problema básico de la inducción, esto es, cómo a partir de observaciones particulares es posible obtener enunciados universales, se analiza la solución de Popper, la que es caracterizada, en un sentido amplio, de pragmática. En el presente trabajo, por tanto, se comenzará por exponer la propuesta pragmática de Popper, tratando de establecer, posteriormente, si su propuesta puede enmarcarse y bajo qué condiciones en lo que se entenderá por pargamatismo crítico, en la línea de Wittgenstein y (...) otros autores contemporáneos. (shrink)

Let me begin by saying that I think that George Soros is right in identifying fallibility and reflexivity as important phenomena in economic life, and in social life more generally, and as phenomena that mainstream economic theory has largely ignored. I also agree with Soros that economics is an uncertain science. And I think that Soros himself, being one of the world's wealthiest men and most generous philanthropists, deserves credit for being ready and willing to think for himself. It would (...) be all too easy for him to trot out conventional wisdom about market efficiency, privatization, and the like – safely under-written by economic science. It is much more difficult to question the conventional wisdom, let alone its theoretical foundations. Soros does both. Better yet, he takes the trouble to write down his ideas for public consideration and to respond to requests from academic journals to debate their significance – while he could just as easily be lounging on a yacht eating caviar for the rest of his days. Thus said, I do not agree with everything Soros says in his ‘Fallibility, reflexivity, and the human uncertainty principle’ and in what follows I will focus upon what I regard as misconceptions in what he says about fallibility, reflexivity, and scientific method. I will attribute these disagreements to misunderstandings of some of the ideas of our mutual mentor – Sir Karl Popper. In doing so, I hope to show that some of Soros' ideas may be closer to Popper's than Soros thinks, that reflexivity may not be as exclusive to social science as Soros thinks, and that it may not require a scientific method of its own. Getting clear about this may leave us with a somewhat different view of science. (shrink)

La tesis principal que aquí se defiende es que, para Popper, la validez del conocimiento estuvo vinculada siempre a la dimensión pragmática del contexto de descubrimiento (e incluso dependía de ella). Constituye, pues, un error afirmar que, para él, 1) dicha validez estaba ligada a un "empirismo encubierto" (opuesto a la tesis sobre la carga teórica de toda observación), según lo ha planteado Ana Rosa Pérez Ransanz, y que 2) en sus ideas, los factores pragmáticos carecían de importancia epistemológica, (...) como lo ha afirmado Ambrosio Velasco. Para justificar esta tesis, se examinan tres argumentos expuestos en The Logic of Scientific Discovery, enfatizando el que se refiere al carácter disposicional de los términos con los que, para Popper, se formulan los enunciados descriptivos. The main thesis I assert here is that for Popper validity of knowledge was always linked to (and even supported by) the pragmatic dimension of the context of discovery. I hold it's wrong to claim that for this author 1) validity of knowledge was linked to a "hidden empiricism" (opposed to the theory-laden character of observation), such as Ana Rosa Pérez Ransanz had propounded, and 2) pragmatic issues were epistemologically irrelevant in his philosophy, such as Ambrosio Velasco has argued. To justify my thesis I examine three arguments exposed in The Logic of Scientific Discovery, emphasizing especially Popper's argument about the dispositional character of the concepts in which descriptive statements are formulated. (shrink)

Popper is well known for rejecting a logic of discovery, but he is only justified in rejecting the same type of logic of discovery that is denied by consequentialism. His own account of hypothesis generation, based on a natural selection analogy, involves an error-eliminative logic of discovery and the differences he admits between biological and conceptual evolution suggest an error-corrective logic of discovery. These types of logics of discovery are based on principles of plausibility that are used in the (...) generation as opposed to the preliminary evaluation of hypotheses. The normative relevance of these principles is grounded in the distinction between strategic and definitory rules. (shrink)

SummaryThe conspicuous role of taxonomy and debates about taxonomy in the well‐established physical science of pedology throws into question the Popperian rejection of definition and classification.

Die Bibliographie, mit der die weltweite Rezeption Karl R. Poppers nachgezeichnet werden soll, weist alle von ihm verfassten Bücher, Aufsätze, Diskussionsbeiträge, Stellungnahmen, kritischen Anmerkungen und sonstigen Äußerungen nach, dazu auszugsweise zeitgenössische Rezensionen. Das annotierte Verzeichnis der Sekundärliteratur enthält Angaben zu Publikationen, die sich im Titel ausdrücklich auf Popper beziehen, die sich mit seinem Denken, seiner Biografie und der von ihm erzielten Wirkung auseinandersetzen, außerdem Veröffentlichungen, die in weiteren Zusammenhängen auf Ideen Poppers Bezug nehmen sowie allgemeine Würdigungen des Philosophen anlässlich (...) erfolgter Auszeichnungen oder «runder» Geburtstage und Nachrufe. Die beiden Teile der Bibliographie werden durch verschiedene Register erschlossen. (shrink)

This review article presents an important, newly published study of Popper's critical method by Zbigniew Liana. The review emphasizes the very high level of the study, points to its originality, and explains why the book is recommended mainly to specialists of Popper's thought. It is also explained how the book manages to contain so many original and valuable analyses in a small volume.

Karl Popper (1902-1994) was one of the most influential philosophers of science of the 20th century. He made significant contributions to debates concerning general scientific methodology and theory choice, the demarcation of science from non-science, the nature of probability and quantum mechanics, and the methodology of the social sciences. His work is notable for its wide influence both within the philosophy of science, within science itself, and within a broader social context. Popper’s early work attempts to solve the (...) problem of demarcation and offer a clear criterion that distinguishes scientific theories from metaphysical or mythological claims. Popper’s falsificationist methodology holds that scientific theories are characterized by entailing predictions that future observations might reveal to be false. When theories are falsified by such observations, scientists can respond by revising the theory, or by rejecting the theory in favor of a rival or by maintaining the theory as is and changing an auxiliary hypothesis. In either case, however, this process must aim at the production of new, falsifiable predictions. While Popper recognizes that scientists can and do hold onto theories in the face of failed predictions when there are no predictively superior rivals to turn to. He holds that scientific practice is characterized by its continual effort to test theories against experience and make revisions based on the outcomes of these tests. By contrast, theories that are permanently immunized from falsification by the introduction of untestable ad hoc hypotheses can no longer be classified as scientific. Among other things, Popper argues that his falsificationist proposal allows for a solution of the problem of induction, since inductive reasoning plays no role in his account of theory choice. Along with his general proposals regarding falsification and scientific methodology, Popper is notable for his work on probability and quantum mechanics and on the methodology of the social sciences. Popper defends a propensity theory of probability, according to which probabilities are interpreted as objective, mind-independent properties of experimental setups. Popper then uses this theory to provide a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics, though its applicability goes beyond this specific case. With respect to the social sciences, Popper argued against the historicist attempt to formulate universal laws covering the whole of human history and instead argued in favor of methodological individualism and situational logic. Table of Contents 1. Background 2. Falsification and the Criterion of Demarcation a. Popper on Physics and Psychoanalysis b. Auxiliary and Ad Hoc Hypotheses c. Basic Sentences and the Role of Convention d. Induction, Corroboration, and Verisimilitude 3. Criticisms of Falsificationism 4. Realism, Quantum Mechanics, and Probability 5. Methodology in the Social Sciences 6. Popper’s Legacy 7. References and Further Reading a. Primary Sources b. Secondary Sources -/- . (shrink)

According to Karl Popper, science cannot verify its theories empirically, but it can falsify them, and that suffices to account for scientific progress. For Popper, a law or theory remains a pure conjecture, probability equal to zero, however massively corroborated empirically it may be. But it does just seem to be the case that science does verify empirically laws and theories. We trust our lives to such verifications when we fly in aeroplanes, cross bridges and take modern medicines. (...) We can do some justice to this apparent capacity of science to verify if we make a number of improvements to Popper’s philosophy of science. The key step is to recognize that physics, in accepting unified theories only, thereby makes a big metaphysical assumption about the nature of the universe. The outcome is a conception of scientific method which facilitates the criticism and improvement of metaphysical assumptions of physics. This view provides, not verification, but a perfect simulacrum of verification indistinguishable from the real thing. (shrink)

Karl Popper argued in 1974 that evolutionary theory contains no testable laws and is therefore a metaphysical research program. Four years later, he said that he had changed his mind. Here we seek to understand Popper’s initial position and his subsequent retraction. We argue, contrary to Popper’s own assessment, that he did not change his mind at all about the substance of his original claim. We also explore how Popper’s views have ramifications for contemporary discussion of (...) the nature of laws and the structure of evolutionary theory. (shrink)

Karl Popper’s critique of idealism manifests itself with the application of his method, falsificationism, to metaphysics, epistemology, and social and political philosophy. According to Popper, who identifies himself as a philosophical realist, idealism has emerged as a result of the idea that reality cannot be known by reason and of the search for certainty which is erroneous, and it has begotten two mistaken and detrimental views. These views are historicism, the notion that history has an irresistible course, and (...) holism, the notion that social wholes are organic structures that amount to more than the individuals constituting them. Historicism and holism have become the philosophical underpinnings of closed societies throughout history, such as the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century. Therefore, with a practical leaning, Popper actually takes aim at these pernicious consequences of idealism while criticizing it. In this study, idealism and the contours of Popper’s philosophy are examined, and then Popper’s metaphysical, epistemological, social, and political critiques against idealism are investigated. Keywords: Karl Popper, idealism, historicism, holism, falsificationism. (shrink)