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There are important similarities between moral thought and talk and thought and talk about gender: disagreements about gender, like disagreements about morality, seem to be intractable and to outstrip descriptive agreement; and it seems coherent to reject any definition of what it is to be a woman in terms of particular social, biological, or other descriptive features, just as it seems coherent to reject any definition of what it is to be good or right in terms of any set of (...) descriptive properties. These similarities give us reason to investigate the idea that, like moral thought and talk, gender thought and talk is inherently normative. This paper proposes a normative account of gender thought and talk in terms of fitting treatment. On this fitting treatment account, to judge that A is gender G is just to judge that it is fitting to treat A as a G. This account is a descriptive or hermeneutical account of our gender thought and talk rather than an ameliorative account of our gender concepts or a metaphysical account of gender properties in social metaphysics. This paper argues that other descriptive accounts of gender thought and talk face problems that the fitting treatment account overcomes. (shrink)

Der fünfte Band der Reihe trägt den Titel Ethik und Politik aus interkultureller Sicht. Neben einer begrifflichen, methodischen und inhaltlichen Klärung, was aus interkultureller Sicht bedeutet, werden in den verschiedenen Beiträgen ethische und politische Ansätze im heutigen Weltkontext der Philosophie erörtert. Interkulturell orientiertes philosophisches Denken weist alle Zentrismen zurück, ohne jedoch die jeweilige kulturelle Sedimentiertheit in Frage zu stellen. Folgerichtig wird so auch ein jeder Monismus abgelehnt. Das heutige Angesprochensein der Kulturen verlangt von uns, von den beiden Fiktionen einer totalen (...) Identität und völligen Differenz unter den ethischen und politischen Modellen Abschied zu nehmen. Die These von der Überlappung zielt auf das Wahrnehmen von grundsätzlichen Ähnlichkeiten und erhellenden Differenzen in den Ansätzen. Wer einen Pluralismus bejaht, muß auch bereit sein, im Geiste der Toleranz die unterschiedlichen Ansätze zur Ethik und Politik ernst zu nehmen. Wer den Konsens zu sehr betont, liebäugelt mit irgendeinem Identitätsmodell, vernachlässigt den Kompromiß. Tatsache ist jedoch, daß gerade Kompromisse zur Konfliktlösung beitragen. So sind die Beiträge dieses Bandes dem Ziel gewidmet, sowohl eine theoretische Begründung als auch eine praktische Bewältigung der interkulturellen Verständigung in Ethik und Politik zu leisten. (shrink)

A popular argument is that peer disagreement about controversial moral topics undermines justified moral belief in a way that peer disagreement about non-moral topics does not undermine justified non-moral belief. Call this argument the argument for moral skepticism from peer disagreement. Jason Decker and Daniel Groll have recently made a companions in guilt response to this argument. Decker and Groll argue that if peer disagreement undermines justified moral belief, then peer disagreement undermines much non-moral justified belief; if the argument for (...) moral skepticism from peer disagreement succeeds, then a kind of non-moral skepticism holds too. And we should not hold that the status of such non-moral beliefs are undermined by peer disagreement. In this paper, I shows that Decker and Groll’s companions in guilt argument fails. I then draw out the implications of my argument for the epistemology of disagreement and the epistemology of moral disagreement more generally. For instance, I then argue that peer disagreement about morality does not undermine all justified moral belief but that peer disagreement about morality does preclude most moral beliefs from being justified and constituting knowledge in a way that peer disagreement about non-moral topics does not preclude most non-moral beliefs from being justified and constituting knowledge. (shrink)

Sociological and philosophical analysis of the role of will power upon the moral development of individuals.

This book is an attack on the widespread assumption that the mind has parts and that it is the interaction between these parts which accounts for the irrational behaviour displayed un self- deception and weakness of will.

Epistemic decision theorists aim to justify Bayesian norms by arguing that these norms further the goal of epistemic accuracy—having beliefs that are as close as possible to the truth. The standard defense of Probabilism appeals to accuracy dominance: for every belief state that violates the probability calculus, there is some probabilistic belief state that is more accurate, come what may. The standard defense of Conditionalization, on the other hand, appeals to expected accuracy: before the evidence is in, one should expect (...) to do better by conditionalizing than by following any other rule. We present a new argument for Conditionalization that appeals to accuracy‐dominance, rather than expected accuracy. Our argument suggests that Conditionalization is a rule of coherence: plans that conflict with Conditionalization don't just prescribe bad responses to the evidence; they also give rise to inconsistent attitudes. (shrink)

A spirited critique of what Tsanoff believes to be two misguided themes in much of Western thought: cosmologies which take substances and things, rather than processes and actions, as basic, and the tendency to reduce the multiple dimensions of reality to one particular perspective. The contention is advanced that in assuming substances to be primary, philosophers have brought upon themselves the vexing problems involved in a world view that distinguishes sharply between minds and bodies. Tsanoff suggests that the (...) problem of relating minds and bodies can be solved only by viewing reality, not substantivally, but as complexes of events in the dynamic system of nature. He concludes that only a dramatic view, that is, one in which numerous forces and perspectives are seen in their interrelation, is adequate to capture the novelty and richness of reality.--B. G. R. (shrink)

Part of the Studies in Crime and Public Policy series, this book, written by one of the top philosophers of punishment, examines the main trends in penal theorizing over the past three decades. Duff asks what can justify criminal punishment, and then explores the legitimacy of actual practices by examining what would count as adequate justification for them. Duff argues that a "communicative conception of punishment," which he presents as a third way between consequentialist and retributive theories, offers the most (...) fruitful way of understanding punishment's meaning and justification. Duff addresses such questions as how much sentences should be constrained by proportionality requirements; what modalities of punishment best communicate their intended meaning; and what decisionmaking procedures he envisions. This book will appeal to criminologists, philosophers, and others interested in theories of punishment. (shrink)

Marcia Baron has offered an illuminating and fruitful discussion of extra-legal excuses. What is particularly useful, and particularly important, is her focus on our excusatory practices—on the ways and contexts in which we make, offer, accept, bestow and reject excuses: if we are to reach an adequate understanding of excuses, their implications and their grounds, we must attend to the roles that they can play in our human activities and relationships—and to the complexities and particularities of those roles. However, I (...) want to focus my comments less on the details of Baron’s discussions of excuses in extra-legal contexts than on the implications of her discussion for our understanding of excuses in the criminal law. What light (if any, a sceptic might add) can such analyses of our extra-legal concepts and practices throw on legal concepts and doctrines? (shrink)

In response to Lawrence Solum's advocacy of a ‘virtue–centred theory of judging’, I argue that there is indeed important work to be done in identifying and characterising those qualities of character that constitute judicial virtues – those qualities that a person needs if she is to judge well (though I criticise Solum's account of one of the five pairs of judicial vices and virtues that he identifies – avarice and temperance). However, Solum's more ambitious claims – that a judge's vice (...) necessarily corrupts her decisions, and that in at least some contexts we must define a legally correct decision as one that would be reached by a virtuous judge – should be rejected: we can undermine the former by attending to the requirements of due process, and the latter by attending to the ways in which a judge would try to justify her decision. (shrink)