Alan R. Perreiah - Renaissance Truth and the Latin Language Turn - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:2 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.2 319-321 Ann Moss. Renaissance Truth and the Latin Language Turn. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. 306. Cloth, $74.00. Ann Moss offers an exciting and informative history of humanism from Johannes Balbus through Melanchthon, who completed the "turn" from scholastic to humanistic Latin. She marshals considerable evidence from lexicography and letters that (...) scholastics and humanists cultivated two idioms of Latin that created "two different mind-sets" , two "orders of truth-values" , and "two Latin speech communities that talked past one another" . While her main thesis that the "two linguistic universes" were "incommensurable" is questionable, it is a useful heuristic device to highlight differences between the two traditions. Moss illustrates many of her claims by controversies surrounding the legend of St. Ann, mother of Mary. Whether she is misled by the rhetoric of those heated debates on religious folklore, or whether they support her claim of "incommensurability" must be.. (shrink)

For humanists the perfect language was a revived Classical Latin. For scholastics it was a practical logic adapted to the needs of education. Though they have long been portrayed as arch rivals, Alan Perreiah here argues that humanists and scholastics were working in complementary ways toward some of the same goals: most significantly, the early modern search for the perfect language. The study advances research on language pedagogy in the Renaissance by clarifying the connections between truth and translation.

To meet a dilemma between the axiomatic theory of demonstrative science in Posterior analytics and the non-axiomatic practice of demonstrative science in the physical treatises, Jonathan Barnes has proposed that the theory of demonstration was not meant to guide scientific research but rather scientific pedagogy. The present paper argues that far from contributing directly to oral instruction, the axiomatic account of demonstrative science is a model for the written expression of science. The paper shows how this interpretation accords with related (...) theories in the Organon, including the theories of dialectic in Topics and of deduction in Prior analytics. (shrink)

The past 25 years have seen an increasing interest in later medieval logic and in the theory of supposition. a review of literature reveals, however, wide differences of interpretation of supposition-theory. taking the theory in the widest sense as a contribution to semiotic or the theory of signs, this study shows how supposition has been variously treated as a syntactical, semantical and even pragmatical theory. the main views of p. boehner, e. moody, p. geach, d. p. henry, w. c. kneale (...) and l. m. de rijk are examined, compared and appraised with respect to overall progress in the elucidation of supposition-theory. (shrink)

For the past three decades the theory of supposition (suppositio) has been a crux of scholarship in Medieval logic. Although supposition was one of the banner doctrines of the logic modernorum, its nature and purpose have remained elusive to modern interpreters. In this paper I outline an alternative approach to supposition theory. (edited).

Jean Buridan was a leader among those logicians of the fourteenth century who sought to carry out the nominalist program in logic. This volume presents the first English translations of two key tracts, the Treatise on Suppositions and the Treatise on Consequences based respectively on the editions of Maria Elena Reina in "Giovanni Buridano: Tractatus de suppositionibus," Rivista critica di storia della filosofia, pp. 175-208 and pp. 323-52, and Hubert Hubien, Iohannis Buridani tractatus de consequentiis: Édition critique, in Philosophes médiévaux (...) Vol. 16, Université de Louvain, 1976. The extensive introduction and notes locate the texts within a conceptual framework which has held special interest for logicians and historians of logic over the last three decades. (shrink)

This set reprints a wide range of key articles originally published in both philosophy and business journals and includes some of the essential work in the field. The cross-section of materials includes: * what is business ethics and how has it developed * are ethics compatible with the free market? * international business ethics * case studies.

The truthmaker objection to presentism (the view that only what exists now exists simpliciter) is that it lacks sufficient metaphysical resources to ground truths about the past. In this paper I identify five constraints that an adequate presentist response must satisfy. In light of these constraints, I examine and reject responses by Bigelow, Keller, Crisp, and Bourne. Consideration of how these responses fail, however, points toward a proposal that works; one that posits God’s memories as truthmakers for truths about the (...) past. I conclude that presentists have, in the truthmaker objection, considerable incentive to endorse theism. (shrink)

The authors focus on the ways in which various models of the distribution of power in society treat interest groups and evaluate their significance.

In 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature' Richard Rorty presented his provocation and influential vision of the post-philosophical culture, calling upon professional philosophers to accept that epistemology is dead, that the analytic method is a myth, and that philosophy and science are merely forms of literature.

Discussions of the evidential argument from evil generally pay little attention to how different models of divine providence constrain the theist's options for response. After describing four models of providence and general theistic strategies for engaging the evidential argument, I articulate and defend a definition of 'gratuitous evil' that renders the theological premise of the argument uncontroversial for theists. This forces theists to focus their fire on the evidential premise, enabling us to compare models of providence with respect to how (...) plausibly they can resist it. I then assess the four models, concluding that theists are better off vis-à-vis the evidential argument if they reject meticulous providence. (shrink)

Mr. T. H. Mcpherson has given, in a recent article in PHILOSOPHY , various reasons for supposing that there was a development in Butler's ethics from the Sermons to the Analogy . He argues that Butler was in the Sermons a “rational egoist” or “Ethical Eudaemonist,” and in the Analogy an Intuitionist. By “Ethical Eudaemonism” he seems1 to mean that “the ground or criterion of rightness is conduciveness to the agent's interest” or that “it is the happiness-producing character of acts (...) that makes them right” . I shall use the phrase “McPherson's view” to denote the theory that this was Butler's view in the Sermons. (shrink)