En este breve comentario discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación de la epistemología de Davidson que sugiere Willian Duica en su reciente libro. Luego de una presentación somera del libro me centro en tres asuntos centrales de la interpretación de Duica. En primer lugar, argumento que su lectura de la crítica de Davidson al dualismo esquema/contenido es muy restrictiva y deja abierta la posibilidad de un realismo directo empirista. En segundo lugar, argumento que en su lectura el propio Duica se (...) compromete inadvertidamente con un empirismo de este tipo y, de este modo, su interpretación entra en tensión con el coherentismo de Davidson. Finalmente, discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación que hace Duica de la tesis davidsoniana de la triangulación. In this short comment I discuss some aspects of William Duica's interpretation of Davidson's epistemology in a recent book. After a brief review of the book, I focus on three central issues of Duica's interpretation. First, I argue that his reading of Davidson's criticism of the scheme/content dualism is too restrictive and leaves open the possibility of an empiricist direct realism. Second, I argue in his reading Duica inadvertently commits himself to an empiricism of this sort and, as a result, his interpretation is in tension with Davidson's own coherentism. Finally, I discuss some aspects of Duica's interpretation of Davidsonian triangulation. (shrink)

In contemporary philosophy there has been a widespread reaction against the cartesian subjective-individualist conception of a person being normative to any understanding of human personality. Looking back to early greek tragedy we find another model such as the objective-participant conception which also dominates the political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.

Inhalt: Philosophie in Selbstdarstellungen (1975) · Autobiographische Aufzeichnungen in drei Teilen (1976, 1979, 1988) · Noch wußte es niemand (1904-1945) · Noch nicht aller Tage Abend (1945-1964) · Eine Geschichte wie ein Strahl (1964-1986) · F wie Fortuna. Eine Erzählung (1945) · Editorische Hinweise · Veröffentlichungsnachweise · Personenregister. Ein "kosmopolitischer Eremit" wurde Josef Pieper von seinem Kollegen Fernando Inciarte an seinem 90. Geburtstag genannt. Kein Wort könnte besser die Signatur eines Lebens benennen, das in seiner Zeit- und Weltverbundenheit die eigene (...) Mitte erkundet und vertieft hat. Von hoher erzählerischer Qualität eröffnen die autobiographischen Aufzeichnungen Piepers eine Fülle von Perspektiven für unterschiedliche Leseinteressen. Pieper berichtet von seinen Begegnungen mit zeitgeschichtlich bedeutenden Persönlichkeiten, von seinen zahlreichen Gastprofessuren in Nordamerika und Kanada und den Forschungsreisen in die asiatische Welt zum Studium der östlichen Festkultur. Vor allem philosophisch interessierte Leser werden in den autobiographischen Schriften weiteren Aufschluß finden zur Genese und Deutung des philosophischen Werks. Dies ist jedoch nur ein Ausschnitt eines vielfarbigen Ganzen, das im Spiegel des eigenen Lebens beinahe über ein ganzes Jahrhundert hinweg die Veränderung sozialer, kultureller und kirchlicher Milieus dokumentiert. (shrink)

"Christliche Philosophie" steht in dem Verdacht, weder Philosophie noch christlich zu sein. Ob dieser Vorbehalt zurecht besteht, entscheidet sich an der Frage nach der Weite der Vernunft. Wo nur das als vernünftig anerkannt wird, wird, was die Naturwissenschaften von der Wirklichkeit erfassen, bleibt die Vernunft hinter ihren Möglichkeiten zurück. Auf jeden Fall bleibt das Bedürfnis der Vernunft, Sinn und Ziel des Ganzen als Zusammenhang von Gott, Welt und Mensch zu verstehen, unerfüllt. Aber welche Möglichkeiten hat die Vernunft, ihrem Erkenntnisbedürfnis zu (...) folgen? Eine Leitthese des Buches wird sein, dass die philosophische Einsicht im gleichen Maße zunimmt, wie sie im Hören auf die christliche Offenbarung vom Anfang und Ende aller Dinge mitbegründet ist. Pieper und Lewis waren überzeugt, dass im verstehenden Nachvollzug des Gehörten mehr Licht auf die großen Lebensfragen des Menschen fällt, als dies im modernitätstypischen Kontext einer selbstreferentiellen Vernunft der Fall sein kann. Autonomie der Vernunft und Anerkennung religiöser Überlieferungen schließen sich für Lewis und Pieper nicht aus. Ihre Denkwege sind eine für jeden nachvollziehbare Herausforderung, seine Grundoptionen angesichts der Wirklichkeit im Ganzen zu überprüfen. (shrink)

"Philosophieren heißt, Sterben lernen!" - Das antike Ideal des Weisen von Sokrates und Seneca bis hin zu Montaigne stellt uns vor die Frage, ob in der Sterblichkeit des Menschen ein Anlaß zur Hoffnung liegt oder nicht eher zur Resignation. Mit der Geburt ist alles Lebendige unterwegs zu seinem Tod. Der Tod scheint daher auch für den Menschen sein natürliches Ende zu sein. Die Rede vom "natürlichen Ende" läßt allerdings noch ungeklärt, ob das "Ende" als Aufhören oder als Vollendung zu denken (...) ist, und ob ein bloßes Aufhören des Lebens für den Menschen schon die Vollendung als Person sein kann. Bezeichnend für das besondere Verhältnis des Menschen zu seinem Tod ist seit den Anfängen der Philosophie die Frage nach der Unsterblichkeit der Geistseele. Josef Pieper hat ihr sein Buch "Tod und Unsterblichkeit" gewidmet. Die vorliegenden Beiträge nehmen den 50. Todestag von C. S. Lewis zum Anlaß, die philosophische Frage nach Leid und Tod neu zu durchdenken. (shrink)

This selection of essays by Boeder follows thematically in the wake of his two main works, Topologie der Metaphysik and Das Vernunftgefüge der Moderne. Gerald Meier's choice of essays here is intended to bring to the fore that overriding purpose which has from the very outset guided Boeder's over-thirty-year-long preoccupation with ancient Greek and medieval philosophy. Thus the criterion of selection could not have been based on a mere chronological ordering of the most important works to have appeared between 1959 (...) and 1993. Instead the editor has striven--with marked success--to order the articles in such way that in each case the preceding text illumines the theoretical and historical implications of the next. (shrink)

The German term “Antiziganismus” could be translated as “antigypsyism”, but the semantic roots are, in fact, different. Coined in the 1980s, “Antiziganismus” might be misconceived as a sheer abstraction: a “close reading” of the term's context could indeed partially justify the assumption that it in many ways reproduces certain impacts and implications of its better known equivalent – an actively employed anti-Semitism. However, the article's main thesis is that “Antiziganismus” denotes a term in its own right. This status cannot be (...) challenged even by the most recent development, which is an interest group's attempt to internationalize the scope of the term by coining the derivative “antiziganism”. (shrink)

Epistemologists have recently debated how we should respond to apparent cases of rational disagreement. Is it possible for two people to disagree and have both people still be rational? Those involved in this debate make use of the idea of epistemic peers. Two people are epistemic peers if they share the same knowledge of a given topic and have similar epistemic virtues. My paper argues that we have different kinds of epistemic peers; close peers who think similarly to ourselves, and (...) remote peers who think very differently. I argue that remote peers are genuine peers, but that we should respond to disagreement from remote peers differently than disagreement from close peers. (shrink)

Pourquoi les philosophes pleurent-ils à l'écoute de la musique?

In examining Hegel's and Kierkegaard's theories of language, I argue that both entail conceptions of the therapeutic power of language to heal us from madness and despair. I show that whereas Hegel quite straightforwardly celebrates the emancipatory power of language, Kierkegaard is more ambivalent; on the one hand, he devotes his life to a maieutic authorship in service of aiding the reader, but on the other, he believes that ultimately it is only faith in God that can cure us, and (...) that faith requires silence. I use Lacan's psychoanalytic account of the role of language to explore Hegel's view that language constitutes the self and Kierkegaard's experimentation with an indirect form of communication that he hopes will enable him to fulfill each of his apparently conflicting goals, to write and yet to remain silent. (shrink)

In Flip Thinking, Berthold Gunster, the founder of the Dutch omdenken--or flip thinking--philosophy, presents fifteen strategies to transform your thinking away from limitations and negativities and towards possibilities and opportunities. From disrupting (turn all the rules upside down) to flaunting (play up what you want to hide) and from importing (get the enemy on board) to amplifying (do more of what works), Gunster's strategies and stories will have you approaching even the most challenging problems--from an annoying neighbor to an (...) angry colleague to an unhappy partner--in a whole new way. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Talking Cures, the Clinic, and the Value of the IneffableDaniel Berthold (bio)KeywordsMadness, disease, the normal, the abnormal, the ineffable, Hegel, Kierkegaard, LacanI am most grateful to my readers, James Phillips and Louis Sass, who have led me to several new insights by suggesting ways of complicating my reading of a Lacanian approach to Hegel's and Kierkegaard's conceptions of madness. I am a Kierkegaard and Hegel scholar, with very (...) little pretense to expertise about Lacan and regrettably even less about the theory and practice of psychiatry. In submitting my essay to Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Philosophy, I was hoping to entice a community of practitioners and theoreticians I have great respect for to consider the musings of a philosopher on topics which engage them as thinkers and actors in their professions. I could not possibly have hoped for more intelligent and provocative replies than I have been given by my two respondents.Phillips' framing of his response in terms of the distinction between the "madness of the philosophers" and the "madness of the clinic" is very helpful. It is a distinction that is indeed central to the question of the possibility of dialogue between philosophers and clinicians—so central, in fact, that it is generous of Phillips not to reproach me for failing to mention it. On the one hand, the challenge for philosophers is to show that their descriptions are not merely metaphoric and that their preoccupation with the dark side of human experience connects in some way with the reality of disease, so that there is some way for clinicians to translate their language into the language of psychiatry. Otherwise, philosophers will have only poetic or literary interest for the psychiatrist or psychologist.On the other hand, the challenge for clinicians is the extent to which they are open to moving beyond a reduction of "mental illness" to a purely biological conception of disease. One needn't go so far—nor should we—as Thomas Szasz or Michel Foucault in seeing "mental disease" as itself merely a metaphor. But granting the evidence of underlying organic disorder, symptoms nevertheless display themselves as mental and behavioral states (what Hegel calls "shapes of consciousness") that, as Hegel argued, are paralleled in "normal" experience, so that the distinction between disease and normality (and hence illness and metaphor) is often elusive. Madness "has the healthy consciousness for its presupposition," Hegel writes, because the healthy mind is still grappling with the same sorts of contradictions and feelings of alienation, the same "infinite pain" which characterizes insanity. Madness is not the absolute "other" of rationality, but an echo of it (1978, 3:382, 408).Hegel himself accepted the medicalization of madness that began to occur in the late eighteenth [End Page 325] century, and rejected the metaphysical and theological categories of what was called "romantic medicine." But he also cautioned against the narrowness of the "somatic" school which he felt lacked sufficient explanatory value if not connected to a "speculative" (i.e., philosophic) framework (see Berthold-Bond 1995, ch. 2).It might even be argued that every person seeking therapy is first of all suffering from "philosophic" madness, at least in the sense that initially she does not understand her own suffering as "disease," but experiences her torment in the vocabulary of the philosopher. Thus the philosopher's descriptions are the closest to the subject's own self-understanding, and while the therapist must seek to rephrase these descriptions into the vocabulary of the clinic (just as Hegel, for example, translated his own philosophic description of the madness of his friend Hölderlin in the Phenomenology as the "lost soul" whose "light dies away within it" into the medical category of Wahnsinn—mania or frenzy, which today we would call schizophrenia—in the classificatory scheme of mental disorder he gives in the Encyclopaedia; 1977, 400; 1978, 408)—there is a real question about which vocabulary is a metaphor for the other.The second main point Phillips addresses, which is taken up in different ways by Sass as well, has to do with the relation between speech and silence in madness. Phillips finds that Kierkegaard offers a more complex and subtle view than... (shrink)

The idea of “place” has become a topic of growing interest in environmental ethics literature. I explore a variety of issues surrounding the conceptualization of “place” in bioregional theory. I show that there is a necessary vagueness in bioregional definitions of region or place because these concepts elude any purely objective, geographically literal categorization. I argue that this elusiveness is in fact a great meritbecause it calls attention to a more essential “subjective” and experiential geography of place. I use a (...) reading of Aldo Leopold’s Sand Country Almanac as an example of the value of a non-literalistic geography for the understanding of place. (shrink)

While ideals of racial purity may be out of fashion, other sorts of purity ideals are increasingly popular in the United States today. The theme of purity is noticeable everywhere, but it is especially prominent in our contemporary fixation on health and hygiene. This may seem totally unrelated to issues of racism and classism, but in fact, the purveyors of purity draw upon the same themes of physical and moral purity that have helped produce white identity and dominance in the (...) US. Historically, this is where the purity rhetoric gets its power. To invoke purity ideals in the US is to mobilize this genealogy of racialized associations. Today's zealous preoccupation with hygiene is part of our living heritage in a racist culture.Just as ideas of race and racial purity were debunked by biologists long before the public would begin to question them, ideals of extreme hygienic purity linger with us, even flourish, despite scientific evidence of their futility and harm. Why are we still so enamored with purity? Because, to some extent, our very self-conceptions are at stake. Other scholars have described how our process of self individuation is based upon exclusion. The unique contribution of a genealogical approach to this issue is that, instead of merely locating the problem in ideologies held by others, it can evoke self-recognition and self-transformation. We will tend to assume the problem lies elsewhere until we learn to recognize ourselves in practices that reproduce cultural ideals. As inheritors of this racist culture, we are all lovers of purity, and we are all responsible for rethinking this value. (shrink)

When Humpty-Dumpty had his great fall nobody could put him together again. A vastly more moderate challenge is to reunite the two partial beams of a Stern-Gerlach apparatus with such precision that the original spin state is recovered. Nevertheless, as we demonstrate, a substantial loss of spin coherence always occurs, unless the experimenter is able to control the magnetic field's inhomogeneity with an accuracy of at least one part in 105.

Positive and negative feelings were central to the development of economics, especially in utility theory in classical economics. While neoclassical utility theory ignored feelings, behavioral economics more recently reintroduced feelings in utility theory. Beyond feelings, economic theorists use full-fledged specific emotions to explain behavior that otherwise could not be understood or they study emotions out of interest for the emotion itself. While some analyses display a strong overlap between psychological thinking and economic modelling, in most cases there is still a (...) large gap between economic and psychological approaches to emotion research. Ways how to reduce this gap are discussed. (shrink)