As one of the Sloan Foundation's original New Liberal Arts grantees, Williams College has developed a variety of approaches to improve quantitative reasoning and technological literacy, including creating interdisciplinary courses, computer and mathematical workshops, and an STS program. Further development, however, depends critically on what technological literacy may mean in a liberal arts context. Attempts to promote technological literacy, whether in liberal arts settings or not, are likely to founder unless they take account of the complexity and context dependent nature (...) of technological literacy, as well as its history, and its relationship to scientific literacy. (shrink)

This compilation of biographical sketches of 400 “leaders” of American “science” could become a favorite resource for students at the secondary school level. Easy to navigate, with useful and quick summary information, it should appeal to those accustomed to instant feedback in a variety of predigested forms. Included in the list are 380 men and 20 women, not more than a quarter of whom started their careers before 1900. The earliest is Benjamin Banneker; the latest, Jason Lanier. Various features make (...) it easy and absorbing to search or browse the disk. One can search by text, attribute, or subject, with the results displayed for further actions. For example, one can search by some or all of the following “attributes”: occupation, birth and/or death date, sex, ethnicity, and birthplace. One can then view the results along a “timeline,” which is unfortunately anchored mostly by political events or wars rather than great events in science and technology. “Birthplace” leads to one of 85 basic, colored, easy‐to‐read “maps” of states and countries of origin. “Notebook” permits cutting, pasting, and annotating selected text from the disk or adding one's own to compile an original document. “Ethnicity” yields 375 Caucasians, 14 Afro‐Americans, 11 Asians, and 2 Hispanics. Most biographical sketches come with a photograph or portrait of the scientist and have bibliographical references for further information. Highlighted text links to other biographies, geographical locations, or a glossary of 294 terms to help with unfamiliar terminology. There is a 71‐term “subject index,” and appropriate “help” is available. But there are shortcomings. Glossary explanations are limited, and it's not clear why some terms are included but others not. A relative lack of inclusion of specialized terms limits technical understanding, and hence the educational value of the CD. Although the sketches are described as “in‐depth profiles,” most are quite short and have few bibliographic references. References, dating to 1996, are a mixture of popular and scholarly articles, books, and websites; Asimov's Biographical Encyclopedia of Science and Technology seems to be cited more often than the Dictionary of Scientific Biography. Credits describe the author, Amanda de la Garza, as “a professional writer, web page designer, and editor,” further reinforcing the impression that this is not a scholarly work. A perennial problem with such compilations is who's included and who's excluded. The absence of explicit selection criteria, as in this case, only augments inevitable questions about bias and representativeness. No scientist before Banneker is listed, and a number of pre‐Revolutionary notables are omitted. Many eminent scientists from 1800 to 1860 are omitted. Ironically, O. C. Marsh is in, but E. D. Cope is out. Barry Commoner is the one environmental biologist, Rachel Carson the sole ecologist. Nearly 25 percent of the list are physicists, who, despite their acknowledged importance in science, make up less than 10 percent of the scientific community. Nobelists are well represented—and the Nobel Prize may be a major selection criterion for the twentieth‐century scientists on the list. There are 18 inventors, 1 promoter, 1 explorer, and 1 industrialist among the “scientists,” who also include 33 “medical” people, including 8 surgeons. It is clear from the list of occupations that the term “scientist” is broadly inclusive; the consequent blurring of common distinctions between science, engineering, medicine, and invention further raises questions about what it means to be a “leader of science.” It would have been useful to have more attributes included, thus making the sketches more uniform and comparable and the search combinations more varied. A complete and separate bibliography would have been useful. So, too, would have been a Mac version, especially given Apple's connection with education and its appeal to scientists and engineers. All in all, this disk is a good pilot project with obvious promise. Much still remains to be done to make it a reputable educational tool for higher education. At the moment, it's sadly too truncated for other than the most superficial college or university work. (shrink)

This book offers both theoretical overviews and practical approaches for educators, academics, education students and parents who are interested in transforming schools. It encourages reinvigorating approaches to learning and teaching that can easily be integrated into both public and private K-12 school classrooms, with many ideas also applicable to higher education. It supports an educational system based on the beliefs that heart and spirit are intertwined with mind and intellect, and that inner peace, wisdom, compassion, and conscience can be developed (...) together with academic content and skills. (shrink)

Sense and Sensitivity explores the semantics and pragmatics of focus in natural language discourse, advancing a new account of focus sensitivity which posits a three-way distinction between different effects of focus. Makes a valuable contribution to the ongoing research in the field of focus sensitivity Discusses the features of QFC, an original theory of focus implying a new typology of focus-sensitive expressions Presents novel cross-linguistic data on focus and focus sensitivity Concludes with a case study of exclusives (like “only”), arguing (...) that the entire existing literature (reviewed in detail) has missed crucial generalizations, and that the focus sensitivity of these expressions must be understood in terms of their meaning and discourse function. (shrink)

Of the various forms of life writing with which the present collection is concerned, I want in this chapter to devote my attention to the genre of the memoir (and so the autobiographical), and its relation to the seemingly sharply contrasting literary genre of the novel (insofar as the former is understood as a mode of writing concerned with the recounting of the facts or reality of a particular human life, and the latter is understood as concerned only with the (...) appearance of such lives, with the essentially unreal or fictional). Of course, the recent interest in what is termed ‘autofiction’ has served to raise once again the question of the distinction between the memoir and the novel; but rather than engage with that discussion, I want here to focus instead on a particular author’s explicit critical response to that distinction, insofar as it has persistently marked the reception of his work. -/- In a recent lecture, the acclaimed novelist Amit Chaudhuri replied to an accusation that has greeted his fiction from the start of his literary career: that since his novels contain people and events drawn from his own life, they are better thought of as thinly disguised memoirs—as not really novels at all. To examine this charge, I want to draw on an account by the philosopher Stephen Mulhall of the work of another celebrated novelist—J.M. Coetzee (more specifically, that work which features the character Elizabeth Costello). In particular, I want to establish the pertinence to Chaudhuri’s lecture of Mulhall’s analogy between aspects of that work and the work of the influential art historian and critic Michael Fried on the history of modernist painting. In so doing, I aim to show that the commitment to the projects of literary modernism and realism which Mulhall finds in Coetzee (and Costello), can also be found in Chaudhuri’s understanding of the sense in which his novels both are, and are not, autobiographical. (shrink)

Neutrality functions as an ideal in deliberation—we are supposed to have a neutral standpoint in debate, speak without bias or taking sides. We argue against the ideal of neutrality. We sketch how a theory of meaning could avoid commitment even to the coherence of a neutral space of discourse for exchanging reasons. In a model that accepts the ideal of neutrality, what makes propaganda exceptional is its non-neutrality. However, a critique of propaganda cannot take the form of “clearing out” the (...) obstacles for a “neutral space of discourse for exchanging reasons”, since that is to misunderstand how speech works. Such a critique would suggest that any emotive appeal is fundamentally undemocratic, and would delegitimize almost all historical protest movements. In this paper, we contrast a neo-Fregean picture of the neutral core of language with our own practice-based view, a view that takes political propaganda and the language of protest as central cases, and in which all language practice is understood as fundamentally perspectival. (shrink)

A provocative case for the inherently political nature of language In The Politics of Language, David Beaver and Jason Stanley present a radical new approach to the theory of meaning, offering an account of communication in which political and social identity, affect, and shared practices play as important a role as information. This new view of language, they argue, has dramatic consequences for free speech, democracy, and a range of other areas in which speech plays a central role. Drawing (...) on a wealth of disciplines, The Politics of Language argues that the function of speech—whether in dialogue, larger group interactions, or mass communication—is to attune people to something, be it a shared reality, emotion, or identity. Reconceptualizing the central ideas of pragmatics and semantics, Beaver and Stanley apply their account to a range of phenomena that defy standard frameworks in linguistics and philosophy of language—from dog whistles and covert persuasion to echo chambers and genocidal speech. The authors use their framework to show that speech is inevitably political because all communication is imbued with the resonances of particular ideologies and their normative perspectives on reality. At a time when democracy is under attack, authoritarianism is on the rise, and diversity and equality are being demanded, The Politics of Language offers a powerful new vision of the language of politics, ideology, and protest. (shrink)

This paper presents an implemented computational model of word acquisition which learns directly from raw multimodal sensory input. Set in an information theoretic framework, the model acquires a lexicon by finding and statistically modeling consistent cross‐modal structure. The model has been implemented in a system using novel speech processing, computer vision, and machine learning algorithms. In evaluations the model successfully performed speech segmentation, word discovery and visual categorization from spontaneous infant‐directed speech paired with video images of single objects. These results (...) demonstrate the possibility of using state‐of‐the‐art techniques from sensory pattern recognition and machine learning to implement cognitive models which can process raw sensor data without the need for human transcription or labeling. (shrink)

Most observers agree that modern physical theory attempts to provide objective representations of reality. However, the claim that these representations are based on conventional choices is viewed by many as a denial of their objectivity. As a result, objectivity and conventionality in representation are often framed as polar opposites. Offering a new appraisal of symmetry in modern physics, employing detailed case studies from relativity theory and quantum mechanics, Objectivity, Invariance, and Convention contends that the physical sciences, though dependent on convention, (...) may produce objective representations of reality. Talal Debs and Michael Redhead show that both realists and constructivists have recognized important elements of an understanding of science that may not be contradictory. The position--"perspectival invariantism"-- introduced in this book highlights the shortcomings of existing approaches to symmetry in physics, and, for the constructivist, demonstrates that a dependence on conventions in representation reaches into the domain of the most technical sciences. For the realist, it stands as evidence against the claim that conventionality must undermine objectivity. We can be committed to the existence of a single real ontology while maintaining a cultural view of science. (shrink)

Projective contents, which include presuppositional inferences and Potts's conventional implicatures, are contents that may project when a construction is embedded, as standardly identified by the FAMILY-OF-SENTENCES diagnostic. This article establishes distinctions among projective contents on the basis of a series of diagnostics, including a variant of the family-of-sentences diagnostic, that can be applied with linguistically untrained consultants in the field and the laboratory. These diagnostics are intended to serve as part of a toolkit for exploring projective contents across languages, thus (...) allowing generalizations to be examined and validated crosslinguistically. We apply the diagnostics in two languages, focusing on Paraguayan Guaraní, and comparing the results to those for English. Our study of Paraguayan Guaraní is the first systematic exploration of projective content in a language other than English. Based on the application of our diagnostics to a wide range of constructions, four subclasses of projective contents emerge. The resulting taxonomy of projective content has strong implications for contemporary theories of projection, which were developed for the projective properties of particular subclasses and fail to generalize to the full set of projective contents. (shrink)

The empirical phenomenon at the center of this paper is projection, which we define (uncontroversially) as follows: (1) Definition of projection An implication projects if and only if it survives as an utterance implication when the expression that triggers the implication occurs under the syntactic scope of an entailment-cancelling operator. Projection is observed, for example, with utterances containing aspectual verbs like stop, as shown in (2) and (3) with examples from English and Paraguayan Guaraní (Paraguay, Tupí-Guaraní).1 The Guaraní example in (...) (2) and its English translation have at least the following implications: (i) Carla has previously smoked, and (ii) Carla stopped smoking. The first but not the second of these implications is also conveyed by the question version of sentence (2), as in (3a), or when (2) is embedded under entailment-cancelling sentential operators, such as negation, as in (3b), the antecedent of a conditional, as in (3c), or an epistemic modal, as in (3d). Hence, by the definition in (14), the first but not the second implication of (2) projects. (shrink)

The Phenomenological Mind, by Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, is part of a recent initiative to show that phenomenology, classically conceived as the tradition inaugurated by Edmund Husserl and not as mere introspection, contributes something important to cognitive science. (For other examples, see “References” below.) Phenomenology, of course, has been a part of cognitive science for a long time. It implicitly informs the works of Andy Clark (e.g. 1997) and John Haugeland (e.g. 1998), and Hubert Dreyfus explicitly uses it (e.g. (...) 1992). But where the former use phenomenology in the background as broad context and Dreyfus uses it primarily (though not exclusively) as a critique of conventional AI, Gallagher and Zahavi wish to indicate a positive and constructive place for it within cognitive science. They do not recommend that we simply accept pronouncements of thinkers like Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau‐Ponty and apply them to questions of cognition, but that we use revised forms of phenomenology to illuminate dimensions of cognitive experience that are missing in current research. The book is presented as an “introduction to philosophy of mind and cognitive science” written from a phenomenological perspective. It seeks to justify the use of phenomenology in cognitive science by showing what kinds of questions it asks and answers, the variety of uses to which it has recently been put and the fruitfulness of some of its findings. The catalog of topics, for the most part, matches other introductions to the philosophy of mind, such as questions of method, consciousness, perception, intentionality, embodiment, action, agency and other minds. One issue presented here that is not generally dealt with in existing philosophy of mind and cognitive science texts is temporality, a mainstay of the continental tradition. After an introductory chapter that places phenomenology in the context of other approaches, the book lays out the main tenets of phenomenological method. Here, one encounters expected components of phenomenology: the epoché (described below), phenomenological reduction, eidetic variation, and so on. This traditional fare is soon followed by some potential surprises, namely, attempts to “naturalize” phenomenology, a few attempts to formalize it, and the emergence of ‘neurophenomenology’. Each of these is a bit surprising because Husserl was a vocal critic of naturalism, seeing transcendental phenomenology as an alternative to the empirical study of consciousness. He was also skeptical about the possibilities of mathematizing phenomenology. Gallagher and Zahavi acknowledge these points, but since they are not repeating history or undertaking exegesis, strict adherence to canonical phenomenology is not required. Naturalizing phenomenology means recognizing that “the phenomena it studies are part of nature and are therefore also open to empirical investigation” (p.. (shrink)

Russell and Strawson sparked a well known debate on the subject of Linguistic Presupposition inspiring many linguists and philosophers to follow suit, including Frege, whose work initiated the modern study in this area. Beaver begins with the most comprehensive overview and critical discussion of this burgeoning field published to date. He then goes on to motivate and develop his own account based on a Dynamic Semantics. This account is a recent line of theoretical work in which the Tarskian emphasis (...) on truth conditions is questioned. The central plank of the theory of meaning is a formal account of the change in information effected by use of language on hearers or readers. The proposal thus consolidates ideas of Stalnaker, Karttunen and Heim, all of whom had suggested that such an account was needed. At the same time it provides a new impulse and motivation to Dynamic Semantics itself. (shrink)

In the Treatise of Human Nature , Hume argues that, because we have adequate ideas of the smallest parts of space, we can infer that space itself must conform to our representations of it. The paper examines two challenges to this argument based on Descartes's and Locke's treatments of adequate ideas, ideas that fully capture the objects they represent. The first challenge, posed by Arnauld in his Objections to the Meditations , asks how we can know that an idea is (...) adequate. The second challenge, implicit in Locke's Essay , asks how an empiricist can characterize an idea as inadequate, as both picking out an object and yet failing to capture it fully. In showing how Hume responds to these challenges, his theory of perceptual representation is explained and his treatment of space is related to his scepticism. His conclusion is shown not to be a characterization of space as it exists wholly apart from our powers of conception. Instead, in an adumbration of Kant, his claim is restricted to space as it appears to us. (shrink)

Hegemony and Education explores how the educational insights implicit in Antonio Gramsci's historical materialist outlook have been reconciled to the post-Marxist theory of 'radical democracy.' The author argues that there is an urgent need to redefine the dynamics of hegemony as a theory centering on the problem of cognitive and moral submissiveness; that is, a problem indicative of the pathologies of capitalism with respect to democratic theorizing.

Hegemony and Education explores how the educational insights implicit in Antonio Gramsci's historical materialist outlook have been reconciled to the post-Marxist theory of "radical democracy." The author argues that there is an urgent need to redefine the dynamics of hegemony as a theory centering on the problem of cognitive and moral submissiveness; that is, a problem indicative of the pathologies of capitalism with respect to democratic theorizing.

This paper distinguishes between definiteness and determinacy. Definiteness is seen as a morphological category which, in English, marks a uniqueness presupposition, while determinacy consists in denoting an individual. Definite descriptions are argued to be fundamentally predicative, presupposing uniqueness but not existence, and to acquire existential import through general type-shifting operations that apply not only to definites, but also indefinites and possessives. Through these shifts, argumental definite descriptions may become either determinate or indeterminate. The latter option is observed in examples like (...) ‘Anna didn’t give the only invited talk at the conference’, which, on its indeterminate reading, implies that there is nothing in the extension of ‘only invited talk at the conference’. The paper also offers a resolution of the issue of whether possessives are inherently indefinite or definite, suggesting that, like indefinites, they do not mark definiteness lexically, but like definites, they typically yield determinate readings due to a general preference for the shifting operation that produces them. (shrink)

In this paper it is shown how a partial semantics for presuppositions can be given which is empirically more satisfactory than its predecessors, and how this semantics can be integrated with a technically sound, compositional grammar in the Montagovian fashion. Additionally, it is argued that the classical objection to partial accounts of presupposition projection, namely that they lack “flexibility,” is based on a misconception. Partial logics can give rise to flexible predictions without postulating any ad hoc ambiguities. Finally, it is (...) shown how the partial foundation can be combined with a dynamic system of common-ground maintenance to account for accommodation. (shrink)

There is more than one way to say that composition is identity. Yi has distinguished the Weak Composition thesis from the Strong Composition thesis and attributed the former to David Lewis while noting that Lewis associates something like the latter with me. Weak Composition is the thesis that the relation between the parts collectively and their whole is closely analogous to identity. Strong Composition is the thesis that the relation between the parts collectively and their whole is identity. Yi is (...) right that Strong Composition does not fully reflect my view. We must recognize further what, borrowing Lewis's characterization, could be called the "stronger, and stranger" Composition thesis, or what I'll call the Stronger Composition thesis for short. On Strong Composition, it is only collectively that the parts are identical with the whole. On Stronger Composition, they are individually identical with it as well. I will explain and motivate this thesis. (shrink)

Interpretations of the ethical significance of the Bhagavadgītā typically understand the debate between Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa in terms of a struggle between consequentialist and deontological doctrines. In this paper, I provide instead a reading of the Gītā which draws on a conception of moral thinking that can be understood to cut across those positions – that developed by Stanley Cavell, which he calls ‘Emersonian Moral Perfectionism’. In so doing, I emphasise how Kṛṣṇa’s consolation of Arjuna can centrally and fruitfully be (...) viewed as concerned with resuscitating the latter’s individuality, thereby allowing Arjuna to overcome an unthinking conformity to the current degenerate state of his society. This leads me to explore the relation between this perfectionist understanding of spiritual reorientation and the Gītā’s religious account of human redemption; and to conclude by suggesting how the text of the Gītā itself might have similar therapeutic designs upon its readers. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Historical‐Dialectical Thought in Hegel and Marx Marx's Onto‐formative View of Human Nature Capitalism As a Counter‐ontological, Fetishizing Force Gramsci's Historical and Dialectical Campaign against Capitalism Conclusion Notes References.

Next SectionThis paper provides a lexical entry schema for exclusives covering the adverbs only, just, exclusively, merely, purely, solely, simply, and the adjectives only, sole, pure, exclusive and alone. We argue, on the basis of inter-paraphrasability relations among these exclusives and entailments involving at least and at most, that all of these items make an at-issue contribution of an upper bound on the viable answers to the current question under discussion (expressible with at most), and signal that a lower bound (...) on those answers (expressible with at least) is taken for granted. The lexical entry schema accommodates two main points of variation, which makes it possible to capture the differences in meaning among these terms: (i) semantic type (restricted to the class of modifiers), and (ii) constraints on the current question under discussion or the strength ranking over its alternative possible answers. We propose 22 different specific instantiations of the schema for exclusives in English. (shrink)