Within Ajzen's Planned Behavior Theory framework, this article tests a model to estimate the predictors of entrepreneurial intention in academic scientists working in Chile. We adapted into Spanish the entrepreneurship intention questionnaire. We tested the entrepreneurship intention model on a sample of 1,027 scientists leading research projects funded by the Chilean Scientific and Technological Development Fund, the country's primary scientific research grant. The results show strong empirical support for the entrepreneurship intention model proposed while highlighting some critical issues specific to (...) entrepreneurial intention in scientists. In particular, we found an indirect effect of perceived subjective social support on entrepreneurial intention, which is mediated by entrepreneurial attitude and perceived behavioral control toward entrepreneurship. These results suggest that policies orientated toward promoting academic entrepreneurship should include developing a healthy social environment toward it, meaning that entrepreneurial intention is not only an individual but an organizational challenge. These policies should analyze the social norms guiding the scientists' reference groups to increase their effectiveness. (shrink)

The use of black box algorithms in medicine has raised scholarly concerns due to their opaqueness and lack of trustworthiness. Concerns about potential bias, accountability and responsibility, patient autonomy and compromised trust transpire with black box algorithms. These worries connect epistemic concerns with normative issues. In this paper, we outline that black box algorithms are less problematic for epistemic reasons than many scholars seem to believe. By outlining that more transparency in algorithms is not always necessary, and by explaining that (...) computational processes are indeed methodologically opaque to humans, we argue that the reliability of algorithms provides reasons for trusting the outcomes of medical artificial intelligence. To this end, we explain how computational reliabilism, which does not require transparency and supports the reliability of algorithms, justifies the belief that results of medical AI are to be trusted. We also argue that several ethical concerns remain with black box algorithms, even when the results are trustworthy. Having justified knowledge from reliable indicators is, therefore, necessary but not sufficient for normatively justifying physicians to act. This means that deliberation about the results of reliable algorithms is required to find out what is a desirable action. Thus understood, we argue that such challenges should not dismiss the use of black box algorithms altogether but should inform the way in which these algorithms are designed and implemented. When physicians are trained to acquire the necessary skills and expertise, and collaborate with medical informatics and data scientists, black box algorithms can contribute to improving medical care. (shrink)

Several philosophical issues in connection with computer simulations rely on the assumption that results of simulations are trustworthy. Examples of these include the debate on the experimental role of computer simulations :483–496, 2009; Morrison in Philos Stud 143:33–57, 2009), the nature of computer data Computer simulations and the changing face of scientific experimentation, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Barcelona, 2013; Humphreys, in: Durán, Arnold Computer simulations and the changing face of scientific experimentation, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Barcelona, 2013), and the explanatory power (...) of computer simulations :277–292, 2008; Durán in Int Stud Philos Sci 31:27–45, 2017). The aim of this article is to show that these authors are right in assuming that results of computer simulations are to be trusted when computer simulations are reliable processes. After a short reconstruction of the problem of epistemic opacity, the article elaborates extensively on computational reliabilism, a specified form of process reliabilism with computer simulations located at the center. The article ends with a discussion of four sources for computational reliabilism, namely, verification and validation, robustness analysis for computer simulations, a history of successful implementations, and the role of expert knowledge in simulations. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 2, Page 162-169, February 2022.

This book addresses key conceptual issues relating to the modern scientific and engineering use of computer simulations. It analyses a broad set of questions, from the nature of computer simulations to their epistemological power, including the many scientific, social and ethics implications of using computer simulations. The book is written in an easily accessible narrative, one that weaves together philosophical questions and scientific technicalities. It will thus appeal equally to all academic scientists, engineers, and researchers in industry interested in questions (...) related to the general practice of computer simulations. (shrink)

This article aims to develop a new account of scientific explanation for computer simulations. To this end, two questions are answered: what is the explanatory relation for computer simulations? And what kind of epistemic gain should be expected? For several reasons tailored to the benefits and needs of computer simulations, these questions are better answered within the unificationist model of scientific explanation. Unlike previous efforts in the literature, I submit that the explanatory relation is between the simulation model and the (...) results of the simulation. I also argue that our epistemic gain goes beyond the unificationist account, encompassing a practical dimension as well. (shrink)

Many philosophical accounts of scientific models fail to distinguish between a simulation model and other forms of models. This failure is unfortunate because there are important differences pertaining to their methodology and epistemology that favor their philosophical understanding. The core claim presented here is that simulation models are rich and complex units of analysis in their own right, that they depart from known forms of scientific models in significant ways, and that a proper understanding of the type of model simulations (...) are fundamental for their philosophical assessment. I argue that simulation models can be distinguished from other forms of models by the many algorithmic structures, representation relations, and new semantic connections involved in their architecture. In this article, I reconstruct a general architecture for a simulation model, one that faithfully captures the complexities involved in most scientific research with computer simulations. Furthermore, I submit that a new methodology capable of conforming such architecture into a fully functional, computationally tractable computer simulation must be in place. I discuss this methodology—what I call recasting—and argue for its philosophical novelty. If these efforts are heading towards the right interpretation of simulation models, then one can show that computer simulations shed new light on the philosophy of science. To illustrate the potential of my interpretation of simulation models, I briefly discuss simulation-based explanations as a novel approach to questions about scientific explanation. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss epistemic and ethical concerns brought about by machine learning (ML) systems implemented in medicine. We begin by fleshing out the logic underlying a common approach in the specialized literature (which we call the _informativeness account_). We maintain that the informativeness account limits its analysis to the impact of epistemological issues on ethical concerns without assessing the bearings that ethical features have on the epistemological evaluation of ML systems. We argue that according to this methodological approach, (...) epistemological issues are _instrumental_ to and _autonomous_ of ethical considerations. This means that the informativeness account considers epistemological evaluation uninfluenced and unregulated by an ethical counterpart. Using an example that does not square well into the _informativeness account_, we argue for ethical assessments that have a substantial influence on the epistemological assessment of ML and that such influence should not be understood as merely informative but rather regulatory. Drawing on the case analyzed, we claim that within the theoretical framework of the informativeness approach, forms of epistemic injustice—especially _epistemic objectification_—remain unaddressed. Our analysis should motivate further research investigating the regulatory role that ethical elements play in the epistemology of ML. (shrink)

We argue that there is no tension between Reid's description of science and his claim that science is based on the principles of common sense. For Reid, science is rooted in common sense since it is based on the idea that fixed laws govern nature. This, however, does not contradict his view that the scientific notions of causation and explanation are fundamentally different from their common sense counterparts. After discussing these points, we dispute with Cobb's and Benbaji's interpretations of Reid's (...) views on causation and explanation. Finally, we present Reid's views from the perspective of the contemporary debate on scientific explanation. (shrink)

When one wants to use citizen input to inform policy, what should the standards of informedness on the part of the citizens be? While there are moral reasons to allow every citizen to participate and have a voice on every issue, regardless of education and involvement, designers of participatory assessments have to make decisions about how to structure deliberations as well as how much background information and deliberation time to provide to participants. After assessing different frameworks for the relationship between (...) science and society, we use Philip Kitcher's framework of Well-Ordered Science to propose an epistemic standard on how citizen deliberations should be structured. We explore what potential standards follow from this epistemic framework focusing on significance versus scientific and engineering expertise. We argue that citizens should be tutored on the historical context of why scientific questions became significant and deemed scientifically and socially valuable, and if citizens report that they are capable of weighing in on an issue then they should be able to do so. We explore what this standard can mean by looking at actual citizen deliberations tied to the 2014 NASA ECAST Asteroid Initiative Citizen forums. We code different vignettes of citizens debating alternative approaches for Mars exploration based upon what level of information seemed to be sufficient for them to feel comfortable in making a policy position. The analysis provides recommendations on how to design and assess future citizen assessments grounded in properly conveying the historical value context surrounding a scientific issue and trusting citizens to seek out sufficient information to deliberate. (shrink)

We would like to thank the authors of the commentaries for their critical appraisal of our feature article, Who is afraid of black box algorithms?1 Their comments, suggestions and concerns are various, and we are glad that our article contributes to the academic debate about the ethical and epistemic conditions for medical Explanatory AI. We would like to bring to attention a few issues that are common worries across reviewers. Most prominently are the merits of computational reliabilism —in particular, when (...) promoted as an alternative to transparency—and CR as necessary but not sufficient for delivering trust. We finalise our response by addressing concerns about the place and role of artificial intelligence in medical decision-making and the physician’s responsibilities. We understand the concerns and reservations that some of the reviewers express regarding the epistemic merits of CR. We believe that, in part, this is due to a practice too deeply rooted in transparency. But on …. (shrink)

A chronicled approach to the notion of computer simulations shows that there are two predominant interpretations in the specialized literature. According to the first interpretation, computer simulations are techniques for finding the set of solutions to a mathematical model. I call this first interpretation the problem-solving technique viewpoint. In its second interpretation, computer simulations are considered to describe patterns of behavior of a target system. I call this second interpretation the description of patterns of behavior viewpoint of computer simulations. This (...) article explores these two interpretations of computer simulations from three different angles. First, I collect a series of definitions of computer simulation from the historical record. I track back definitions to the early 1960s and show how each viewpoint shares similar interpretations of computer simulations—ultimately clustering into the two viewpoints aforementioned. This reconstruction also includes the most recent literature. Second, I unpack the philosophical assumptions behind each viewpoint, with a special emphasis on their differences. Third, I discuss the philosophical implications of each viewpoint in the context of the recent discussion on the logic of scientific explanation for computer simulations. (shrink)

A chronicled approach to the notion of computer simulations shows that there are two predominant interpretations in the specialized literature. According to the first interpretation, computer simulations are techniques for finding the set of solutions to a mathematical model. I call this first interpretation the problem-solving technique viewpoint. In its second interpretation, computer simulations are considered to describe patterns of behavior of a target system. I call this second interpretation the description of patterns of behavior viewpoint of computer simulations. This (...) article explores these two interpretations of computer simulations from three different angles. First, I collect a series of definitions of computer simulation from the historical record. I track back definitions to the early 1960s and show how each viewpoint shares similar interpretations of computer simulations—ultimately clustering into the two viewpoints aforementioned. This reconstruction also includes the most recent literature. Second, I unpack the philosophical assumptions behind each viewpoint, with a special emphasis on their differences. Third, I discuss the philosophical implications of each viewpoint in the context of the recent discussion on the logic of scientific explanation for computer simulations. (shrink)

This article asks the question, ``what is reliable machine learning?'' As I intend to answer it, this is a question about epistemic justification. Reliable machine learning gives justification for believing its output. Current approaches to reliability (e.g., transparency) involve showing the inner workings of an algorithm (functions, variables, etc.) and how they render outputs. We then have justification for believing the output because we know how it was computed. Thus, justification is contingent on what can be shown about the algorithm, (...) its properties, and its behavior. In this paper, I defend computational reliabilism (CR). CR is a computationally-inspired off-shoot of process reliabilism that does not require showing the inner workings of an algorithm. CR credits reliability to machine learning by identifying reliability indicators external to the algorithm (validation methods, knowledge-based integration, etc.). Thus, we have justification for believing the output of machine learning when we have identified the appropriate reliability indicators. CR is advanced as a more suitable epistemology for machine learning. The main goal of this article is to lay the groundwork for CR, how it works, and what we can expect as a justificatory framework for reliable machine learning. (shrink)

Many studies in big data focus on the uses of data available to researchers, leaving without treatment data that is on the servers but of which researchers are unaware. We call this dark data, and in this article, we present and discuss it in the context of high-performance computing facilities. To this end, we provide statistics of a major HPC facility in Europe, the High-Performance Computing Center Stuttgart. We also propose a new position tailor-made for coping with dark data and (...) general data management. We call it the scientific data officer and we distinguish it from other standard positions in HPC facilities such as chief data officers, system administrators, and security officers. In order to understand the role of the SDO in HPC facilities, we discuss two kinds of responsibilities, namely, technical responsibilities and ethical responsibilities. While the former are intended to characterize the position, the latter raise concerns—and proposes solutions—to the control and authority that the SDO would acquire. (shrink)

In this volume, scientists, historians, and philosophers join to examine computer simulations in scientific practice. One central aim of the volume is to provide a multiperspective view on the topic. Therefore, the text includes philosophical studies on computer simulations, as well as case studies from simulation practice, and historical studies of the evolution of simulations as a research method.

Many studies in big data focus on the uses of data available to researchers, leaving without treatment data that is on the servers but of which researchers are unaware. We call this dark data, and in this article, we present and discuss it in the context of high-performance computing facilities. To this end, we provide statistics of a major HPC facility in Europe, the High-Performance Computing Center Stuttgart. We also propose a new position tailor-made for coping with dark data and (...) general data management. We call it the scientific data officer and we distinguish it from other standard positions in HPC facilities such as chief data officers, system administrators, and security officers. In order to understand the role of the SDO in HPC facilities, we discuss two kinds of responsibilities, namely, technical responsibilities and ethical responsibilities. While the former are intended to characterize the position, the latter raise concerns—and proposes solutions—to the control and authority that the SDO would acquire. (shrink)

Una imagen muy generalizada a la hora de entender el software de computador es la que lo representa como una “caja negra”: no importa realmente saber qué partes lo componen internamente, sino qué resultados se obtienen de él según ciertos valores de entrada. Al hacer esto, muchos problemas filosóficos son ocultados, negados o simplemente mal entendidos. Este artículo discute tres unidades de análisis del software de computador, esto es, las especificaciones, los algoritmos y los procesos computacionales. El objetivo central es (...) entender las prácticas cientficas e ingenieriles detrás de cada unidad de software, así como analizar su metodología, ontología y epistemología. (shrink)

In this article, I focus on the role of computer simulations as exploratory strategies. I begin by establishing the non-theory-driven nature of simulations. This refers to their ability to characterize phenomena without relying on a predefined conceptual framework that is provided by an implemented mathematical model. Drawing on Steinle’s notion of exploratory experimentation and Gelfert’s work on exploratory models, I present three exploratory strategies for computer simulations: (1) starting points and continuation of scientific inquiry, (2) varying the parameters, and (3) (...) scientific prototyping. (shrink)

En este trabajo presento un estudio sobre el estado del arte de la llamada ‘epistemología de las simulaciones computacionales’. En particular, me centro en los varios trabajos de Eric Winsberg quién es uno de los filósofos más fructíferos y sistemáticos en este tema. Además de analizar la obra de Winsberg, y basándome en sus trabajos y en el de otros filósofos, mostraré que hay buenas razones para pensar que la epistemología tradicional de la ciencia no es suficiente para el análisis (...) de las simulaciones computacionales. (shrink)

There is a widely extended image of computer software as some sort of ‘black box,’ where it does not matter how it internally works, but rather what sort of results are obtained given certain input values. By approaching computer software this way, many philosophical issues are hidden, neglected, or simply misunderstood. This article discusses three units of analysis of computer software, namely, specifications, algorithms, and computer processes. The aim is to understand the scientific and engineering practices supporting each unit of (...) analysis, as well as to analyze their methodology, ontology, and epistemology. (shrink)

En este trabajo presento algunos argumentos para sostener que la creencia religiosa es un lenguaje distinto al de la ciencia. Para esto hago uso de los trabajos de Wittgenstein sobre ‘juegos de lenguaje’ y creencia religiosa. Sostengo que a pesar de que se haga un uso de términos sintácticamente idéntico, la dimensión pragmática de dichos términos es la que determina en qué juego de lenguaje se está. Concluyo mostrando un caso donde se hace un uso inadecuado del lenguaje de un (...) sistema y que se aplica a otro sistema. (shrink)

With the rapidly growing amounts of information, visualization is becoming increasingly important, as it allows users to easily explore and understand large amounts of information. However the field of information visualiza- tion currently lacks sufficient theoretical foundations. This article addresses foundational questions connecting information visualization with computing and philosophy studies. The idea of multiscale information granula- tion is described based on two fundamental concepts: information (structure) and computation (process). A new information processing paradigm of Granular Computing enables stepwise increase of (...) granulation/aggregation of information on different levels of resolution, which makes possible dynamical viewing of data. Information produced by Google Earth is an illustration of visualization based on clustering (granulation) of information on a succession of layers. Depending on level, specific emergent properties become visible as a result of different ways of aggregation of data/information. As information visualization ultimately aims at amplifying cognition, we discuss the process of simulation and emulation in relation to cognition, and in particular visual cognition. (shrink)

This paper examines the Hans Blumeberg’s philosophical program: the metaphorology. My intention is to show the importance of Blumenberg’s ideas into the current debate on the relations between philosophy and metaphor.

El libro Aurelio Arturo y la poesía colombiana del siglo xx. Espacio y subjetividad en el contexto de la modernidad tardía despliega ante el lector una sucesión de marcos de análisis de la poesía colombiana del siglo xx. A manera de eje transversal, distintas piezas poéticas de la obra del poeta colombiano Aurelio Arturo (1906-1974) son tomadas como referente literario a partir del cual distinguir los principales tópicos de la poesía colombiana en el siglo xx. Dicho así, la reflexión se (...) concentra en una concepción canónica de la poesía colombiana, con remisión a la personalidad y la obra de autores como Rafael Maya, José Eustasio Rivera, el grupo Piedra y Cielo, Eduardo Carranza, el grupo Mito, Jorge Gaitán Durán, el grupo Nadaísmo, Jaime Jaramillo Agudelo, José Manuel Arango, Héctor Rojas Erazo, Andrés Holguín y Álvaro Mutis. (shrink)

After outlining some of the reasons for the delayed and uninspiring Hispanophone translations of Milton's works, this essay examines the ways in which El Paraíso Perdido, Juan de Escoiquiz's translation of 1812?the first and still most readily-available Spanish verse translation of Paradise Lost (1667)?Catholicizes Milton's Protestant epic. A comparative close reading of key anti-Catholic passages in Milton's original and Escoiquiz's translation demonstrates the translator's avowed practice of excising anything ?ridiculous or indecent to the rites and practices of the Catholic (...) Church.? Silent additions, though, are the primary means by which Milton's Anglo-Protestant epic is converted into a Hispano-Catholic translation. A brief discussion of Areopagitica, in terms of its content and its popularity in Spanish translation, ties together the issues of translation, censorship, and reading reception circulating with El Paraíso Perdido. (shrink)

La publicación del trabajo doctoral de Carlos Arturo López sacude desde la raíz el relato convencional de lo que ha sido la filosofía en Colombia. En un regreso “a los textos mismos” publicados entre 1892 y 1910, atendiendo a los criterios de escritura válidos en ese momento y lugar, López propone describir las condiciones históricas de un “relieve específico de la escritura filosófica” (38). Con esto aporta un concepto metodológico prometedor para futuras investigaciones. El concep-to de mínimo textual reúne los (...) temas, problemas y modos de argumentar y de reconocerse entre escritores contempo-ráneos a una determinada época; “define las exigencias y limitaciones, creencias y procedimientos técnicos propios de la escritura filosófica en Colombia” duran-te el período estudiado (cf. 36-38), para dar una imagen fija de las ideas más o menos compartidas sobre lo que debería ser la filosofía entre los escritores locales que se identificaban a sí mismos como “filósofos”. (shrink)

Modernidad y crisis de sentido / Augusto Hortal Alonso / - Fenomenología de las formas ambientales de religión en América Latina / Pedro Trigo / - Cultura y religión paraguaya en transición / Bartoleu Melia / - Filosofía y fenomenología / Paul Gilbert / - De la fenomenología de la religión en América Latina a una filosofía de la religión / Juan Carlos Scannone / - Religión y cultura. Elementos para una filosofía de la religión / Gerardo Remolina / (...) - Experiencia simbólica, experiencia religiosa y experiencia mística. Nuevos ámbitos para el encuentro personal / Jorge R. Seibold / - Etica y filosofía de la religión. Una cuestión de fronteras / Vicente Durán Casa /. (shrink)

Overviews -- Hildegard of Bingen -- Anne Conway -- Mary Astell -- Mary Wollstonecraft -- Harriet Taylor Mill -- Edith Stein -- Simone Weil -- Simone de Beauvoir -- Conclusions.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Women Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century, and: Anne Conway: A Woman PhilosopherJane DuranWomen Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century, by Jacqueline Broad; 204 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. $65.00. Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher, by Sarah Hutton; 280 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. $75.00.Recent work on women philosophers has, in general, approached the topic from two vantage points: on the one hand, a number of anthologies have (...) been published, wherein commentators present a small portion of the woman thinker's work, often without the background necessary for a fuller understanding. On the other hand, some few women philosophers have been the subject of full-length works, but these have tended, by and large, to be women thinkers of the twentieth century, with whose work we are already familiar. Two recent books, one by Jacqueline Broad and the other by Sarah Hutton, go a long way toward improving the situation.Work by Eileen O'Neill, Sarah Hutton and Margaret Atherton, among others, has helped familiarize us with the notion that the seventeenth century—that era so commonly associated with Descartes and the rise of modern philosophy—was also a time of rich theorizing by women philosophers. Jacqueline Broad's book possesses many virtues: it has the finely-tuned style of the careful historian, while at the same time not failing to demonstrate acquaintance with a range of contemporary feminist commentary. Part of the problem in addressing women thinkers of the past is another version of what we are now tempted to call the essentialism problem: does it make sense to think that there is a style that might be demarcated as "feminine," or that might, in some way, pertain uniquely to women theorists? These are difficult issues, but a partial response to the question is to try to remember that it is not for no reason that women thinkers have, indeed, been left out of the canon. As Broad herself says, women philosophers "are now mere footnotes to the standard historical-intellectual accounts of the early modern period" (p. 1).Broad does a superb job of navigating between the need to set out the plain tenets of the thinker's philosophy, and the desire to try to tie it into these larger questions. In six chapters, she addresses the work of Elizabeth of Bohemia, [End Page 200] Margaret Cavendish, Anne Conway, Mary Astell, Damaris Masham and Catharine Trotter Cockburn The chapters on Elizabeth, Margaret Cavendish and Mary Astell are particularly strong—here part of the difficulty is that we do have familiar commentaries addressing the work of these women, and it is hard to try to see them in a new light. We are accustomed, for example, to think of Elizabeth merely as Descartes's correspondent. As is the case with information that is currently coming to bear on the question of Harriet Taylor Mill's input into the work of John Stuart Mill, it is difficult for us to see Elizabeth as a thinker in her own right, or, indeed, to give her the credit that Descartes himself gave her; as Broad notes, he had described her as "the only person I have so far found who has completely understood all my previous works" (p. 13). Margaret Cavendish's reputation has suffered from the somewhat scattered approach of her writings, and Broad cites her "reputation for eccentricity" (p. 38). Nevertheless, the sheer volume of her work and its allusion to the problems addressed by the Cambridge Platonists (areas also worked on by Anne Conway) demands that she be taken far more seriously than she has in the past. Astell has become known largely for her more overtly feminist works, such as A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, but she was also the author of several other pieces addressing issues in metaphysics, and again the amount of her work and its citation during her own time would militate against the notion that it should not receive thorough examination.Broad does a wonderful job of setting out the main philosophical questions found in these theorists' works, and she excels at pitting their views against those of the various male philosophers whose work—according to... (shrink)