This chapter contains sections titled: Ptolemy and Copernicus A Clash of Two Worldviews The Heliocentric Worldview Copernicus was not a Scientific Revolutionary The Transition to Newton Some Philosophical Lessons Copernicus and Scientific Revolutions The Anthropic Principle: A Reversal of the Copernican Turn? Reading List Essay Questions.

After a short sketch of the biography of Nicolaus Copernicus, the great astronomer's conception of God is analysed according to the original introduction into the first book of De revolutionibus and the dedicatory epistle to Pope Paul III. For Copernicus as for many ancient philosophers the sky is the visible God; therefore the study of the movement of the celestial bodies is the most excellent way to the invisible God. The Creator is the great architect of all (...) things; in the cognition of the mathematically simple structure of the universe man will become united with Him. It is suggested that these theological ideas gave Copernicus the pertinacy to work out his heliocentric system despite the misgivings of the contemporary Aristotelian physicists. (shrink)

The story is frequently told about how with the publication of De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium (On the Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres) in 1543 Nicolaus Copernicus (d. 1543) looked beyond the vanity of human self-centeredness and perceived that Earth was just one of several planets revolving around the sun. In doing so, he triggered the modern scientific revolution as people began to look at themselves and their place in the universe in a more objective light.

The reception of the heliocentric theory of Nicolaus Copernicus in Jewish thought of the 17th-century period is a good exemplification of the issue concerning the formation of the relationship between natural science and theology, or more broadly: between science and religion. The fundamental question concerning this relationship, which we can ask from today’s perspective of this problem, is: How does it happen that claims of a scientific nature, which are initially considered from a religious point of view to (...) be incompatible with the religious view of the world, are later accepted as possible to agree with this image of reality and are assimilated by a given religion? Based on the reception of the Copernican image of the universe by two representatives of Jewish philosophy in the 17th century—David Gans and Joseph Solomon Delmedigo—it is possible to trace this process and pose the thesis that it takes place according to two strategies. Within the framework of the first one, represented by Gans, in a situation of incompatibility between the scientific and religious images of nature, a scientific theory is sought that explains the observed phenomena and, on the other hand, satisfies the religious claims. Finding such a theory solves the problem of the incompatibility mentioned above of images of the world, gives the theory credibility from the religious point of view and constitutes an argument for its correctness. The second strategy, represented by Delmedigo, consists in refraining from pursuing a direct, immediate, and unequivocal reconciliation of the two images of the world while at the same time recognizing a properly justified scientific theory as correctly describing and explaining the phenomena occurring in nature. Consequently, the apparent incompatibility between the scientific and the religious worldview demands either a reformulation of religious statements in such a way as to remove this incompatibility or the restriction of the meaning of religious statements to the strictly religious and moral sphere, without the ambition to speak about nature. In either case, however, it is already a task for the representatives of the religion concerned who, when confronted with adequately justified scientific claims, to avoid exposing their religion to the accusation that its claims are unreasonable and anachronistic, undertake the task mentioned above of modifying or limiting the scope of their statements. It seems that in the representatives of Jewish thought and Judaism, who are the successors of Gans and Delmedigo, generally speaking, the second strategy has prevailed in this version, in which one abandons the claim of religion to statements about the material world at the price of a significant divergence of the paths of science and religion. Consequently, it treats them as different narratives, describing and explaining two separate spheres of reality. (shrink)

Contemporary development of research methods and tools is often conducive to ambitious art studies, in which the research methodology and study protocol are the result of negotiations between creative and research strategies. The article discusses the key sources, possibilities, and threats of interdisciplinary projects often referred to as practice-as-research. The following comparison of the orders of the scientific methodology and the artistic convention allows one to show the similarities and potential points of contact between science and art, which are independent (...) of the different values and methods of evaluation in both of these areas. The research-based practice model by Pil Hansen and Bruce Barton is also presented as a solution that takes these issues into account. It is also used to present the project of Interdisciplinary Center for New Technologies of the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń and the Art & Science Research Foundation om—organisms and machines in culture (FUNom) the project "Neurophysiology of the Artist in Performance", which is a bold example of the transdisciplinary activities of scientists and researchers. Its content is analyzed through the reports of artists, researchers, and participants taking part in public presentations of the project. (shrink)

The aim of this book is to present essays centered upon the subjects of Formal Ontology and Logical Philosophy. The idea of investigating philosophical problems by means of logical methods was intensively promoted in Torun by the Department of Logic of Nicolaus Copernicus University during last decade. Another aim of this book is to present to the philosophical and logical audience the activities of the Torunian Department of Logic during this decade. The papers in this volume contain (...) the results concerning Logic and Logical Philosophy, obtained within the confines of the projects initiated by the Department of Logic and other research projects in which the Torunian Department of Logic took part. (shrink)

The scientific papers published in a special edition of the journal “Scientia et Fides” are the result of an international scientific project titled “The Dynamic Theodicy Model: Understanding God, Evil, and Evolution.” The project leaders are Prof. Piotr Roszak (Nicolaus Copernicus University) and Prof. Saša Horvat (University of Rijeka), under the auspices of the University of Oxford and the John Templeton Foundation. Other members of the project team include Grzegorz Karwasz, Michał Oleksowicz, Tomasz Huzarek, and (...) Jan Wółkowski. (shrink)

Zbigniew Herbert studied philosophy at the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń in the years 1949–1951 and attended seminars conducted by prof. Henryk Elzenberg, whose philosophical stance had a relevant impact on the poet’s oeuvre. This work analyses Stoic heritage present in the works of both the Philosopher and the Poet, as well as presents the axiological system of Elzenberg and its meaning for the attitude of “Mr. Cogito”. Elzenberg, following Seneca, divided values into the utilitarian and perfect (...) ones, where the latter possessed the quality of dignitas (“nobleness”). The perfect values referred to the Greek notion of kalokagathia and they were of primary importance in the creation of high culture that constituted the sphere of human dignity and freedom as opposed to the existential dread, indifference of nature or historical necessity. Herbert shared his Master’s stand on the meaning of culture and the table of values in human life, which is depicted, inter alia, in the poem dedicated to the Professor To Henryk Elzenberg on the Centenary of His Birth. Elzenberg claimed that axiologization the the world equals its substantialization. Finally, the acme of his axiology became natural mysticism and the source of perfect value the “transempirical” reality which Elzenberg used to call “the Undefined”. The Professor was distanced and sceptical towards the world and society. Herbert, on the other hand, remained faithful to the Christian heritage with its confirmation of the world as it is, as well as the everyday human reality, which he treated with sympathy and uderstanding, according to the idea of Christian agape. (shrink)

The problems investigated in the paper concern mainly the question: What do components of the predicative sentence „A is b” refer to? The following particular issues are considered: the Aristotelian distinction between particularity and ontic self-sufficiency; the interpretation of different kinds of predication based on that distinction; a debate on different standpoints in the controversy concerning the nature of the predicate referent, in particular a contemporary version of nominalism called The Resemblance Theory of Universals (with the related problem of the (...) ontic status of the relation of temporal existence in general and different kinds of this relation; and finally different dimensions of the complexity of a thing. A former version of the paper was published in English in The Proceedings of The Second German-Polish Workshop on Logic and Logical Philosophy (Nicolaus Copernicus University Press, Toruń 1998). (shrink)

One of the reasons for organizing the above-mentioned conversation was the publication of Urszula Zegleń's book Philosophy of Mind. Urszula Zegleń is a profesor of philosophy at the Nicolaus Copernicus University. The one-day conversation had three parts and each part consisted of two speeches. After each speech there was a short but very active discussion on the respective topics.

One of the reasons for organizing the above-mentioned conversation was the publication of Urszula Zegleń's book Philosophy of Mind. Urszula Zegleń is a profesor of philosophy at the Nicolaus Copernicus University. The one-day conversation had three parts and each part consisted of two speeches. After each speech there was a short but very active discussion on the respective topics.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:DOES SCIENCE SAY THAT HUMAN EXISTENCE IS POINTLESS? ROBERT M. AUGROS St. Anselm College Manchester, New Hampshire I N AN ARTICLE published by Marine Biological Laboratory, historian of science William Provine claims that contemporary science imposes on us the view that human existence is meaningless: "Modern science directly implies that the world is organized strictly in accordance with mechanistic principles. There are no purposive principles whatsoever in nature. There (...) are no gods and no designing forces that are rationally detectable.... Modern science directly implies that there are no inherent moral or ethical laws, no absolute guiding principles for human society.... When I die I shall rot and that is the end of me. There is no hope of life everlasting.... Free will as it is traditionally conceived, the freedom to make uncoerced unpredictable choices among alternative possible courses of action, simply does not exist.... There is no ultimate meaning for humans."1 Provine's position can be reduced to five denials: no purposefulness in nature, no God, no ethical principles, no immortality, no free will. Are these denials scientific as Provine contends? No one would maintain that they are scientific in the sense of being proven. No experimental science claims to prove any of them. One occasionally finds one of the five denials, simply asserted without evidence, in the introduction to a textbook or in the popular writings of a scientist, but no scientific proofs are ever offered. Provine himself, in the article proclaiming these denials, neither offers nor refers to any such proofs. He seems to 1 William Provine, "Evolution and The Foundation of Ethics," MBL Science 3 (1988): 27-28. 577 578 ROBERT M. AUGROS concede that there are none when he says "modern science directly implies," not proves. If the five denials are not scientific in the sense of being proven, perhaps they are nevertheless indispensable as background assumptions to make the scientific method work properly. Must the working scientist adopt Provine's five denials to make discoveries or to explain phenomena? The founders of modern science did not think so, and did not assume the five denials in their work. On the contrary, they integrated into their scientific work the existence of God, purpose in the universe, free choice, the immortality of the human soul, and the reality of ethics. For instance, Copernicus argued that the cosmos must be harmonious because' it is made by the "best and most orderly Workman of all."2 By explicitly following the principle that nature is purposeful, William Harvey discovered the circulation of blood.3 Seventeenth-century chemist Robert Boyle wrote: "When I consider the rational soul as an immaterial and immortal being, that bears the image of its divine maker, being endowed with a capacious intellect, and a will, that no creature can force: I am by these considerations disposed to think the soul of man a nobler and more valuable being, than the whole corporeal world."4 It was the passion of Kepler's life to investigate the deeper harmonies of the heavens, for, in his words, the "fuller knowledge of God through nature."5 "Galileo never thought of denying an ultimately religious answer to the problems of the universe," writes E. A. Burtt.6 Galileo repudiated Aristotle's physics but praised and extolled his ethics. Isaac Newton con2 Nicolaus Copernicus, On the Revolutions ofthe HemJenly Spheres, trans. Charles Glenn Wallis, vol. 16 of Great Books of the Western World (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), 508. 3 William Harvey, "An Anatomical Disquisition on the Motion of the Heart and Blood in Animals," vol. 26 of Great Books of the Western World, ed. Philip Goetz (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1990), 285. 4 Robert Boyle, The Works of the Honourable Robert Boyle, ed. Thomas Birch (London, 1672) vol. 4, 19. sJoannis Kepleri Astronomi Opera Omnia, ed. Ch. Frisch (Frankfurt and Erlangen, 1858), vol. 8, 688. 6 Edwin Arthur Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950), 93. IS HUMAN EXISTENCE POINTLESS? 579 sidered his Principia to be one great proof for the existence of God whom he describes in his famous General Scholium as living, intelligent, perfect, eternal, omniscient, and omnipresent.7 If the founding fathers of modern... (shrink)

The publication of Copernicus’ On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres marked the beginning of the Scientific Revolution. Christian doctrine played a key role for the emergence of the scientific turning point, that brought about the transition from a qualitative to a quantitative approach to natural phenomena. Although the Polish scientist was not a philosopher in the ordinary sense of the term, he shared with many other protagonists of modern science the idea of the universe as mathematical harmony created (...) by God. In this sense, modern scientific thought completed the development that took place since the Scholastic Age. In the historical period between the XII and the XVII century, indeed, Christianity proved a fundamental factor for a considerable growth in natural knowledge. (shrink)

This paper studies the different conceptions of both centrality and the principle or starting point of motion in the Universe held by Aristotle and later on by Copernicanism until Kepler and Bruno. According to Aristotle, the true centre of the Universe is the sphere of the fixed stars. This is also the starting point of motion. From this point of view, the diurnal motion is the fundamental one. Our analysis gives pride of place to De caelo II, 10, a chapter (...) of Aristotle’s text which curiously allows an ‘Alpetragian’ reading of the transmission of motion.In Copernicus and the Copernicans, natural centrality is identified with the geometrical centre and, therefore, the Sun is acknowledged as the body through which the Deity acts on the world and it also plays the role of the principle and starting point of cosmic motion. This motion, however, is no longer diurnal motion, but the annual periodical motion of the planets. Within this context, we pose the question of to what extent it is possible to think that, before Kepler, there is a tacit attribution of a dynamic or motive role to the Sun by Copernicus, Rheticus, and Digges.For Bruno, since the Universe is infinite and homogeneous and the relationship of the Deity with it is one of indifferent presence everywhere, the Universe has no absolute centre, for any point is a centre. By the same token, there is no place that enjoys the prerogative of being—as being the seat of God—the motionless principle and starting point of motion.Author Keywords: Author Keywords: Aristotle; Copernicus; Bruno; Centrality; Principle of movement; Extension of the Universe. (shrink)

Note: Sections at a more advanced level are indicated by ∞. Preface ix Acknowledgments x Introduction 1 I Nicolaus Copernicus: The Loss of Centrality 3 1 Ptolemy and Copernicus 3 2 A Clash of Two Worldviews 4 2.1 The geocentric worldview 5 2.2 Aristotle’s cosmology 5 2.3 Ptolemy’s geocentrism 9 2.4 A philosophical aside: Outlook 14 2.5 Shaking the presuppositions: Some medieval developments 17 3 The Heliocentric Worldview 20 3.1 Nicolaus Copernicus 21 3.2 The explanation (...) of the seasons 25 3.3 Copernicus and the Copernican turn 28 3.3.1 A philosophical aside: From empirical adequacy to theoretical validity 32 3.4 Copernicus consolidated: Kepler and Galileo 32 4 Copernicus was not a Scientifi c Revolutionary 37 4.1 The Copernican method 39 4.2 The relativity of motion 42 5 The Transition to Newton 43 5.1 On hypotheses 45 6 Some Philosophical Lessons 47 6.1 The loss of centrality 48 6.2 Was Copernicus a realist? 51 6.2.1 Lessons for instrumentalism and realism 52 6.3 Modern realism 55 6.4 The underdetermination of theories by evidence 58 6.4.1 The Duhem--Quine thesis 59 ∞ 6.4.2 The power of constraints 61 ∞ 6.5 Theories, models, and laws 64 ∞ 6.5.1 Theories and models 64 ∞ 6.5.2 Laws of nature, laws of science 68 ∞ 6.5.3 Philosophical views of laws 69 ∞ 6.5.3.1 The inference view 69 ∞ 6.5.3.2 The regularity view 70 ∞ 6.5.3.3 The necessitarian view 73 ∞ 6.5.3.4 The structural view 75 7 Copernicus and Scientifi c Revolutions 77 8 The Anthropic Principle: A Reversal of the Copernican Turn? 83 Reading List 87 Essay Questions 91 II Charles Darwin: The Loss of Rational Design 93 1 Darwin and Copernicus 93 2 Views of Organic Life 94 2.1 Teleology 94 2.1.1 The Great Chain of Being 97 2.1.2 Design arguments 99 2.1.3 Jean Baptiste Lamarck 104 3 Fossil Discoveries 106 3.1 Of bones and skeletons 108 3.2 The antiquity of man 110 4 Darwin’s Revolution 112 4.1 The Darwinian view of life 114 4.1.1 Principles of evolution 116 4.2 The descent of man 119 5 Philosophical Matters 124 5.1 Philosophical presuppositions: Mechanical worldview, determinism, materialism 125 5.2 From biology to the philosophy of mind 129 5.2.1 Empiricism 129 5.2.2 Philosophy of mind 132 5.2.3 Emergent minds 134 5.3 The loss of rational design 136 5.4 Intelligent design 139 6 A Question of Method 143 6.1 Darwinian inferences 143 6.2 Philosophical empiricism 147 6.3 Some principles of elimination 149 ∞ 6.4 Essential features of eliminative induction 150 6.5 Falsifi ability or testability? 155 6.6 Explanation and prediction 157 ∞ 6.7 Some models of scientifi c explanation 159 ∞ 6.7.1 Hempel’s models 160 ∞ 6.7.2 Functional models 161 ∞ 6.7.3 Causal models 163 6.7.3.1 A counterfactual-interventionist account 163 6.7.3.2 A conditional model of causation 165 ∞ 6.7.4 Structural explanations 169 6.8 A brief return to realism 172 6.9 Darwin and scientifi c revolutions 174 6.9.1 Philosophical consequences 176 Reading List 177 Essay Questions 183 III Sigmund Freud: The Loss of Transparency 185 1 Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud 185 2 Some Views of Humankind 187 2.1 Enlightenment views of human nature 188 2.2 Nietzsche’s view of human nature 190 3 Scientism and the Freudian Model of Personality 191 3.1 Freud’s model of the mind 192 3.1.1 A summary of psychoanalytic theory 192 3.1.2 Analogy with physics 195 3.1.3 Freud as an Enlightenment thinker 200 3.1.4 The scientifi c status of the Freudian model 202 3.1.4.1 Freud’s methods 202 ∞ 3.1.4.2 The method of eliminative induction, again 205 3.1.5 Freud stands between the empirical and the hermeneutic models 208 3.1.6 The role of mind in the social world 209 4 The Social Sciences beyond Freud 210 4.1 Two standard models of the social sciences -- some history 210 4.1.1 The naturalistic model 211 4.1.2 The hermeneutic model 213 4.2 Essential features of social science models 218 4.2.1 Essential features of the naturalistic model 218 4.2.2 Essential features of the hermeneutic model 221 4.3 Questions of methodology 224 ∞ 4.3.1 What is Verstehen? 225 ∞ 4.3.2 Weber’s methodology of ideal types 229 ∞ 4.3.3 Verstehen and objectivity 234 ∞ 4.4 Causation in the social sciences 236 ∞ 4.4.1 Weber on causation 236 ∞ 4.4.2 On the existence of social laws 239 4.4.3 Explanation and prediction in the social sciences 242 4.4.4 Underdetermination 243 4.4.5 Realism and relativism 244 ∞ 4.4.6 Reductionism and functionalism 248 5 Evolution and the Social Sciences 253 5.1 Sociobiology -- the fourth revolution? 254 5.2 Evolutionary psychology 257 6 Freud and Revolutions in Thought 261 6.1 Revolutions in thought vs. revolutions in science 263 Reading List 263 Essay Questions 269 Name Index 271 Subject Index 274. (shrink)

The article discusses the reception of Grotius by Catholic lawyers at the university of Prague. It focuses on the Grotius commentary by Nicolaus Ignaz Königsmann, which was meant as a response to the discussion of Central European Catholic lawyers on questions of toleration and permissions in law. I argue that Königsmann agreed with Grotius because his conception could be combined with the Catholic belief in free will and dictamen sanae rationis. He grounded natural law in rational human nature (...) and rejected attempts to derive natural law from the highest principle. (shrink)

Drawing on a half century of scholarship, of Polish studies of Copernicus and Cracow University, and of Copernicus's sources, this book offers a comprehensive re-evaluation of Copernicus's achievement, and explains his commitment to the ...

In the last three decades several cosmological principles and styles of reasoning termed 'anthropic' have been introduced into physics research and popular accounts of the universe and human beings' place in it. I discuss the circumstances of 'fine tuning' that have motivated this development, and what is common among the principles. I examine the two primary principles, and find a sharp difference between these 'Weak' and 'Strong' varieties: contrary to the view of the progenitors that all anthropic principles represent a (...) departure from Copernicanism in cosmology, the Weak Anthropic Principle is an instance of Copernicanism. It has close affinities with the step of Copernicus that Immanuel Kant took himself to be imitating in the 'critical' turn that gave rise to the Critique of Pure Reason. I conclude that the fact that a way of going about natural science mentions human beings is not sufficient reason to think that it is a subjective approach; in fact, it may need to mention human beings in order to be objective. (shrink)

During most of Copernicus's life he was an inhabitant of political settings rather than scientific settings. His settings from 1492 to 1500 offered him a large amount of information about astrology. Most of Copernicus's known significant contacts at the Jagiellonian University had expertise in astrology, in some cases at national level. Information was available to Copernicus about the inaccuracies and the difficulties of astrological practice as well as about a notably successful astrologer-patron relationship. The experience of (...) astrological practice that was available to Copernicus in Bologna ranged from the benign to the potentially dangerous, and his departure from Bologna was contemporary with the threat of military reprisals against the town which appeared to show the incorrect outcome of the relevant prediction in Domenico Maria di Novara's prognostication for 1500. After this date Copernicus no longer participated in roles in which prognostication was a duty, he generally inhabited locations that were less potentially dangerous than Bologna was in 1500, and while at some later points he was keen to interest astrologers in his astronomical work, astrology is completely absent from his own explanations of the reasons for his astronomical work. (shrink)

Originally published in English in 1973. This volume traces the development of the revolution which so drastically altered manâes view of the universe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The "astronomical revolution" was accomplished in three stages, each linked with the work of one man. With Copernicus, the sun became the centre of the universe. With Kepler, celestial dynamics replaced the kinematics of circles and spheres used by Copernicus. With Borelli the unification of celestial and terrestrial physics was (...) completed by abandonment of the circle in favour the straight line to infinity. (shrink)

In 1454 Georg Peurbach taught astronomy at the Collegium Civium in Vienna by reading a work of his own: the Theoricae novae planetarum. In 1483 Albert of Brudzewo, teaching astronomy at Cracow University, adopted Peurbach’s text together with a commentariolum of his own. Among the numerous commentaries preserved both in manuscript and in printed form, Brudzewo’s stands out because it submits Peurbach’s work to a subtle analysis that, while recognising the merits for which it was widely accepted, also focuses (...) on the limitations of the celestial spheres described in it. Budzewo’s commentary is of interest, in itself both for its criticism of Peurbach’s descriptions of solar, lunar and planetary theory and also for its importance to Copernicus’s own planetary theory. For Copernicus makes clear in the Commentariolus that his concern was the very same issue, violation of uniform circular motion by the rotation of spheres, that Brudzewo criticises in detail. In this way, Brudzewo’s commentary stands as the original motivation for the investigation of the motion of the planets that was eventually to lead Copernicus to a planetary theory based strictly upon uniform rotation of spheres, and through that investigation to the motion of the Earth and the heliocentric theory. (shrink)

Copernicus claimed that his system was preferable in part on the grounds of its superior harmony and simplicity, but left very few hints as to what was meant by these terms. Copernicus’s pupil, Rheticus, was more forthcoming. Kepler, influenced by Rheticus, articulated further the nature of the virtues of harmony and simplicity. I argue that these terms are metaphors for the structural features of the Copernican system that make it more able to effectively exploit the available data. So (...) it is a mistake to conclude that early Copernicans could only offer aesthetic or pragmatic arguments; they could and did offer evidential ones as well. Moreover, the evidential arguments they offered parallel current arguments in the philosophical literature.Keywords: Nicolaus Copernicus; Georg Joachim Rheticus; Johannes Kepler; Simplicity; Bayesianism; Hirotsugu Akaike. (shrink)

Current popular narratives regarding the history of astronomy espouse the narrative of scientific development arising from clashes between observed phenomena and dogmatic religious scripture. Such narratives consider the development of our understandings of the cosmos as isolated episodes in ground-breaking, world-view shifting events, led by rational, objective and secular observers. As observation of astronomical development in the early 1600s shows, however, such a narrative is false. Developments by Johannes Kepler, for instance, followed earlier efforts by Nicholas Copernicus to refine (...) Aristotelian-based dogma with observed phenomena. Kepler's efforts specifically were not meant to challenge official Church teachings, but offer a superior system to what was than available, based around theological justifications. Popular acceptance of a heliocentric model came not from Kepler's writings, but from the philosophical teachings of Rene Descartes. Through strictly mathematical and philosophical reasoning, Descartes not only rendered the Aristotelian model baseless in society, but also provided a cosmological understanding of the universe that centred our solar system within a vast expanse of other stars. The shift than, from the Aristotelian geocentric model to the heliocentric model, came not from clashes between theology and reason, but from negotiations between theology and observed phenomena. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to determine why copernicus made a personal seal of the ancient intaglio with the image of apollo playing a lyre, A representation illustrating the myth of phoebus the sun-God and his music as the source of the harmony of the universe. The reasons seem to be: a remarkable role played by the ancient opinions concerned with the harmony of the world in the creative process of copernicus' cosmological theory (his acceptance of "plato's (...) axiom"), The fact that in his theory the sun became the centre of the universe, And that a harmony of sounds, Supposed to be produced by the spheres moving under the rule of phoebus' music, Became--In his opinion--The real although not acoustical harmony of the simple circular spheres on which planets move in a uniform way around the sun. (shrink)