It is a common pessimistic worry among both philosophers and non-philosophers that our lives, viewed sub specie aeternitatis, are meaningless given that they make neither a noticeable nor lasting impact from this vast, cosmic perspective. The preferred solution for escaping this kind of pessimism is to adopt a different measure by which to evaluate life’s meaningfulness. One of two primary routes is often taken here. First, one can retreat back to the sub specie humanitatis perspective, and argue (...) that life is meaningful only when viewed within the local context of human values, cares, and concerns. Or, second, one can distinguish between perspectives and standards for meaningfulness, arguing that the latter are independent of the former and are the most appropriate means by which evaluations of life’s meaningfulness are made. Importantly, none of these issues can be sufficiently addressed without first answering a prior question, and one that is surprisingly under-addressed in the literature: What is the sub specie aeternitatis perspective? Unfortunately, many philosophers who employ this perspective do so without carefully defining or clarifying it, or, if they do clarify what it means, they only note its time and spatial components. I will argue that, in addition to these components, this perspective includes something like a modal component (following Thomas Nagel), and an ontological Normative component. I will then apply this more nuanced understanding of the sub specie aeternitatis perspective to the question of whether perspectives can be distinguished from standards for meaningfulness. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 This article will present an interpretation of Wittgenstein ’ s understanding of the relationship between ethics and aesthetics. In extension, it will inform recent discussions regarding a special kind of nonsensicality , which forms a central part of ethical and aesthetical expressions. Instead of identity between ethics and aesthetics, we should understand the relationship in terms of interdependence . Both attitudes provide a view sub specie aeternitatis and thus permit a view (...) of the world as a whole. Employing the vocabulary of Charles Taylor and Harry Frankfurt, it must be remembered that rather than a neutral view from nowhere, such wholeness arises out of strong evaluations that are made against the backdrop of a constitutive framework of intelligibility. At this point, the epistemic gain of actualizing Wittgenstein will reveal itself: it will put us in a position where it is possible to differentiate between ethical and aesthetical forms of identification that Taylor and Frankfurt neglect. However, in order to actualize Wittgenstein ’ s ideas, it is necessary to argue that Tractatus should not be understood in a Kantian fashion as suggested by Tilghman for instance. (shrink)

Several philosophers have argued that if we examine our lives in context of the cosmos at large, sub specie aeternitatis, we cannot escape life's meaninglessness. To see our lives as meaningful, we have to shun the point of view of the cosmos and consider our lives only in the narrower context of the here and now. I argue that this view is incorrect: life can be seen as meaningful also sub specie aeternitatis. While criticizing arguments by, (...) among others, Simon Blackburn, Nicholas Rescher, and Thomas Nagel, I show that what determines assessments of the meaning of a life are the standards of meaningfulness one endorses rather than the size of the context in which that life is assessed. Employing non-demanding standards of meaningfulness to assess a life is compatible with examining it in the context of the cosmos at large. That is also the case if we accept Nagel's claim that to examine a life sub specie aeternitatis is to examine it externally, impersonally and objectively: life can be evaluated as meaningful also when under these perspectives if the standards of meaningfulness we adopt are not overly challenging. Nor does the contingency of our existence, realized sub specie aeternitatis, render our life meaningless. Contrary to a commonly accepted view, then, examining our lives sub specie aeternitatis does not necessitate that we see them as meaningless. (shrink)

A formalização de noções pré-teóricas não é uma ciência, mas uma arte. Isso se evidencia quando temos de decidir o que é indispensável e o que é prescindível na passagem do intuitivo para o formal. Exemplifico esse tipo de dificuldade com a formalização de uma noção intuitiva de coleção finita de objetos. A observância de maior fidelidade à noção pré-teórica, mesmo que desnecessária da perspectiva formal, resultou em duas novas definições de conjunto finito.

This paper criticizes some Wittgensteinian philosophers' adoption of Wittgenstein's idea of the view sub specie aeternitatis as independence of the world to seek to illuminate the character of self-renouncing religious belief. The form of absence of self that accompanies the view sub specie aeternitatis is neither inherently self-renouncing nor intrinsic to a self-renouncing response to the world. Extrapolating Wittgenstein's idea in an attempt to clarify the nature of religious belief is of limited use to descriptive philosophers (...) since it oversimplifies the character and forms of self-renunciation found in religious life. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Not Only Sub Specie Aeternitatis, but Equally Sub Specie DurationisA Defense of Hegel's Criticisms of Spinoza's PhilosophyJ. M. Fritzman and Brianne RileyIn what seem like halcyon days, when William Jefferson Clinton was America's President, James Carville wrote We're Right, They're Wrong: A Handbook for Spirited Progressives, arguing against the Republican Party's "Contract with America" (derided by the Left as a "Contract on America") and for progressivism. (...) In the present philosophical conjuncture, what is required is a precisely analogous intervention—"Hegel's Right, Spinoza's Wrong: An Article for Spirited Hegelians." Hegel criticizes Spinoza's philosophy at various places in his writings.1 Spinozists have made several major challenges to Hegel's criticisms.2 Although there have been explications of Hegel's criticisms, there has been no effective response to the Spinozists' challenges.3 Until now. This article defends Hegel's criticisms of Spinoza's philosophy and shows that the challenges to his criticisms fail.This article presents a précis of Spinoza's system and shows the senses in which Hegel is not wholly enamored with it. It defends Hegel's criticism of Spinoza's system as an acosmism from Parkinson's challenges to it. It considers both Myers's view that Hegel's system begins where Spinoza's system ends and McMinn's charge that the systems of Spinoza and Hegel are fundamentally identical. Myers and McMinn misunderstand Hegel's dialectical method, and so they incorrectly believe that the methods of Spinoza and Hegel are complementary. Hegel's dialectics can sublate the systematic pluralism that Myers and Armour propose as its alternative. The penultimate section discusses the modifications that must be made to Spinoza's system to advance from his substance to Hegel's subject.Clinton successfully appropriated what was worthwhile in the "Contract with America," but he also effectively argued that the "Contract" would be a disaster for America. Similarly, Hegel assimilates the truth in his predecessors' philosophies while demonstrating how those philosophies remain [End Page 76] one-sided and partial. This article concludes by showing how this happens to Spinoza's philosophy.Everybody Loves SpinozaSpinoza's philosophy is a metaphysical monism. That is, he thinks that there is only one basic substance. Although there is only one substance, it necessarily expresses itself through an infinite number of attributes, and an attribute is the essence of substance as experienced by the intellect.4 Humans are capable of knowing only two of these attributes: thought and extension. Objects, ideas, and relations—Spinoza refers to all of these as "modes"—are presented through some attribute or other. Spinoza denies that a thing presented through one attribute can cause or be affected by anything presented through another attribute. Rather, each thing which is presented through an attribute has an infinite number of counterparts presented through the infinite number of attributes. Indeed, those infinite counterparts are that thing, presented through the other attributes. Substance necessarily expresses itself through the attributes and modes, according to Spinoza, and everything that is possible is also actual.5Spinoza's substance expresses itself through its attributes and modes, but what occurs at the level of the attributes and modes has no reciprocal effect on substance. Like unrequited love, expression is a one-way street. Not e pluribus unum (out of many, one), but e unibus plurum (out of one, many). Unlike the relation of the states to the federal government, the attributes and modes do not possess a relative or circumscribed autonomy vis-à-vis substance.6 Substance expressing itself through its attributes and modes is nature, according to Spinoza, and nature in turn is God. Hence, Spinoza's God is wholly immanent within the world—for him, God is the world—and so he rejects that traditional God of theism, who transcends and is wholly independent from the world. Spinoza rejects as illusory all notions of purpose and intention.7 Although individuals generally believe that their actions are performed in order to fulfill some goal, Spinoza instead maintains that human actions are entirely determined and necessary and that the belief that actions are done to accomplish something is entirely mistaken. He believes that all happenings—physical... (shrink)

How should the artist manage his time and work? Art practice is a complex, diverse and multifaceted enterprise. The premium on innovation and creativity is unusually high, the return on investment is almost impossible to calculate and the value, when it is truly successful, is priceless. Yet like any form of organized, analyzable work which produces material output, art practice is governed by specific task-orientated, rule-bound skills pertaining to technique, craft and presentation which are culture-specific and a tradition unto themselves. (...) The contemporary artist has almost all of the methods, approaches and philosophies of the history of art to pick from. What place and significance might pragmatism have in this selection? (shrink)

I begin my eulogy to folly not in jest as did the illustrious Erasmus of Rotterdam in the old days, but in all sincerity and from all my heart. In this task Berdiaev's new book will be of great assistance to me. Had he wished to do so, he could have titled it, following his long-deceased colleague's example, In Praise of Folly, because its purpose is to challenge common sense. True, the book is a collection of articles written in the (...) last six years, hence, properly speaking, it does not and cannot serve some one purpose. Six years is a long time: not only a writer like Berdiaev, but any writer will change to some extent during so long a period. The book opens with an article written long ago, "The Struggle for Idealism" [Bor'ba za idealizm], in which the author still maintains a strictly Kantian viewpoint that admits, as we know, common sense and all its accompanying virtues. Then the author gradually evolves and, by the end of the book, he openly declares war on common sense, but what he opposes to common sense is not Folly, as is usually done, but Great Reason. Of course, one can express oneself in this way, calling Folly Great Reason, and, if you like, this has a deep meaning or, more precisely, a deep sting, for what can be more insulting and humiliating to common sense than to confer the honorific title of Great Reason on Folly? Until now common sense has been accepted as the father and closest friend of all minds, great and small. Now, Berdiaev, scorning genealogy and historically shaped heraldry, elevates "opposition to common sense," that is, Folly to the order of Great Reason. No doubt, this is very audacious, but Berdiaev is a writer who above all is daring and, in my opinion, this is his greatest strength. I would say that his gift, his philosophical and literary talent, lies in his audacity. As soon as it abandons him, the source of his inspiration evaporates, he has nothing to say, and he ceases to be himself. But I have run too far ahead. Let us return to his evolution or, rather, to the evolution of his idea. (shrink)

L’enjeu de cette analyse de la signification de l’expression sub quadam specie aeternitatis est double: projeter un éclairage nouveau, d’une part sur la nature des rapports entre raison et science intuitive, d’autre part sur l’articulation entre durée et éternité. Que les formules sub specie et sub quadam specie aeternitatis soient équivalentes ou non, il s’agit dans les deux cas de figure, de déterminer les raisons de la présence, puis de la disparition de l’adjectif quadam. Enfin (...) on examine les occurrences de l’expression sub quadam specie aeternitatis et des deux autres variantes pour mieux cerner leur signification et leur portée. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Joshua W. Seachris (2012) argues that the distinction I make between perspectives and standards in sub specie aeternitatis arguments for the meaninglessness of life does not hold for a salient component of the sub specie aeternitatis perspective: the ontological-normative component. In this article I suggest that Seachris’s argument is problematic in a number of ways and ought to be rejected.

As a contribution to the debate on the future of philosophy as an autonomous discipline beyond its current function within Western-type universities, a comparison is offered between three diverging strategies of “speaking the universal” which keep their relevance today; the “Double Truth” strategy for secular tolerance, illustrated by Spinoza and Wittgenstein; the construction of the universal as “hegemony,” analyzed by Hegel and Marx in terms of collective consciousnesses or ideologies; and the program of generalized translation as it emerges from the (...) critique of traditional “paradoxes of the untranslatable” in the works of contemporary socio-linguists and pragmatic philosophers. The conclusion remains an open questioning on the equivocity of the universal. (shrink)

On a traditional view of human agency, intentional actions are performed sub specie boni: Agents, in acting intentionally, must see some good in what they are doing. This view has come under heavy criticism, which has partly focussed on several putative counterexamples, and partly on the view’s underlying rationale. In this paper, I defend one version of the sub specie boni view and try to show that it still deserves its old standing as the “default view” about acting (...) with an intention. For, as I argue, this view helps us to make sense of some crucial features of intentions – in particular, that we are sometimes rationally permitted to abandon intentions in the light of obstacles and costs –­, for which an alternative explanation will be hard to find. (shrink)

This chapter explores Gilles Deleuze's Bergsonism and the notion of multiplicity with respect to latitude and longitude, and the relation between the spatial and the temporal in performance. It highlights the complexity of the ordinary and the thickness of the present against narratives of disappearance, or correlative emphases on virtuality. It suggests that the collaborative performance group Goat Island's ‘creative response’ might also be an apt description of Deleuze's Bergsonism, though it was not a representation of Henri Bergson, so much (...) as a creative interpretation that aims to generate novelty. (shrink)

In this article the author has presented several important issues regarding the sociology of religion, but primarily the issue of the sociologically acceptable definition of religion both in theoretical and empirical research. Bearing in mind the sociology of religion in former Yugoslavia the author has first discussed the possibility of a general definition of the sociology of religion, but has stated the opposite view as well. Then he has dealt with the two basic approaches towards religion and two general definitions (...) of sociology, namely substantial and functional ones. Finally the author has tried to define the religiousness in terms of sociological empirical research of human attachment to religion and church in post-socialism. U ovom clanku autor izlaze nekoliko osnovnih problema u sociologiji religije a prvenstveno problem oko socioloski prihvatljive definicije religije, i to ne samo za teorijska nego iza iskustvena istrazivanja. Imajuci na umu sociologiju religije bivse SFRJ, na prvom mestu se razmatra mogucnost opste definicije religije, ali se iznosi i suprotno stanoviste. Potom se diskutuje o dva temeljna pristupa religiji i o dve opste definicije religije supstantivnoj i funkcionalistickoj. Na kraju se definise religioznost u kontekstu socioloskog iskustvenog istrazivanja vezanosti ljudi za religiju i crkvu u post socijalizmu.. (shrink)

Prezentowana tu książka jest poświęcona relacjom między filozofią a polityką, politycznemu zaangażowaniu filozofii bądź jej ucieczce przed owym zaangażowaniem. W moim ujęciu pytania o autowizerunek filozofa w XX wieku są pytaniami o jego uwikłania, i uwikłania jego filozofii, w politykę. Nigdy wcześniej filozofowie nie żywili takich nadziei na przemodelowanie społeczeństwa z pomocą polityki (i tym się różnili od licznych wcześniejszych utopistów) zgodnie ze swoją filozoficzną wizją jak właśnie w XX wieku. Jest to zarazem książka o tradycyjnych antynomiach i opozycjach filozoficznych: (...) bios teoretikos i bios praktikos, teoria i praktyka, myśl i działanie, interpretowanie świata i jego zmienianie, człowiek kontemplacji i człowiek czynu, wieża z kości słoniowej i zaangażowanie etc. etc. I dlatego, pisząc tu o autowizerunku filozofa, mam na myśli jego autowizerunek ujmowany z punktu widzenia polityki. Interesują mnie tu odpowiedzi na pytanie o stosunek między filozofią a polityką, bowiem to pytanie uważam dzisiaj z racji historycznych za fundamentalne. Dlaczego pytam tu o autowizerunek filozofa? Uważam, że w filozofii (pytającej o swoje uwikłania w politykę) sposób ujmowania siebie determinuje sposób ujmowania świata. Im bardziej filozofia zostaje odniesiona do „teraz”, tym wymaga większej precyzji, dokładniejszego usytuowania siebie w ramach dostępnych bądź wyobrażonych w kulturze możliwości. Autowizerunek to platforma, z której korzysta filozof, to pewien horyzont konstytuujący jego tożsamość, podający zakres możliwych do przyjęcia ról w kulturze. Zupełnie inny jest autowizerunek filozofa w filozofii odniesionej do „teraz”, a zupełnie inny w filozofii nastawionej na uniwersalność, wieczne i niezmienne prawa, na spoglądanie na świat sub specie aeternitatis. Kluczowe słowa w takiej perspektywie to choćby rewolucja intelektualna, przemoc, nowy świat, nowy człowiek, nowa era, zmiana, postęp, konstruktywny wkład, przyłączenie się i zaangażowanie czy wymogi chwili. Pytam tutaj o chęć wywoływania zmian politycznych mocą filozofii i poprzez filozofię jako narzędzie, pytam o filozofa jako politycznego „zbawcę” (Habermas o Martinie Heideggerze), o filozofa jako egzekutora wyroków historii dysponującego pełną świadomością doniosłości chwili, która nikomu poza filozofami nie może się w pełni odsłonić i ujawnić. Dlaczego jednak filozofia potrzebuje siły? Skąd bierze się jej odwieczne marzenie o wykroczeniu poza uniwersum teorii, myśli, kontemplacji - ku realnemu światu, w którym filozof działa? Książka ta w pewnej mierze stanowi analizę marzeń o filozofii działającej, o filozofii czynu - o filozofie przekonanym o swoim posłannictwie jako posłannictwie człowieka działania. Filozof działający to człowiek oddany wspólnocie - przekonany o politycznie sprawczej roli wypowiadanego, filozoficznego słowa; zwierciadlanym odbiciem tego ideału jest filozof oddany tekstowi, czyli (bezpośrednio) lekceważący społeczne powinności i zobowiązania — przekonany o politycznej i społecznej bezsilności tegoż słowa, skoncentrowany na dostarczaniu interpretacji kolejnych interpretacji tekstów filozoficznych. Jednak oprócz nich w perspektywie autowizerunku politycznego pojawiają się i inni: tekstualiści marzący o drobnych, choć społecznie wpływowych wspólnotach czytelników; wspólnotowcy pragnący działać poprzez filozoficzne słowo, a jednak zarazem pozbawieni złudzeń co do swojej historycznej skuteczności, poniekąd z góry świadomi, że tą drogą świata (przynajmniej w przewidywalnym horyzoncie czasowym) zmienić się nie da; miłośnicy tekstu budujący programy społecznej naprawy świata, a poszukujący wśród tekstualistów (na przykład genealogicznej czy dekonstrukcjonistycznej) „metody”, którą można by wprost zastosować w praktyce, na sposób działających w historii wspólnotowców. Tekst, wspólnota - to jedynie ogólne hasła wywoławcze mające ewokować pewne marzenia o miejscu filozofii i filozofa w kulturze. Z jednej strony stoi autowizerunek, w ramach którego naczelnym hasłem jest „robienie historii” (Emil Cioran) czy „robienie rewolucji”, z drugiej autowizerunek z naczelnym hasłem „robienia tekstów”, czyli bycia uważnym czytelnikiem tekstów filozoficznych i uważnym ich autorem. A oprócz tego, pomiędzy nimi, jest miejsce na autowizerunki pośrednie, mieszane i mniej czy bardziej skłaniające się ku któremuś ze skrajnych wyborów oraz na autowizerunki, których powyższe przeciwstawienie nie uchwytuje. Oba motywy mają do pewnego stopnia organizować prezentowaną książkę, ale nie mają stać się jakimś nowym kluczem pozwalającym na zupełnie nową odsłonę filozoficznego pejzażu. Stoi przecież za nimi długa, filozoficzna tradycja, korzystająca na przestrzeni dziejów z określeń pochodzących z różnych słowników. Kto powiedział, że filozofia ma „robić rewolucję”, tzn. gruntować ją i przygotowywać, promować i usprawiedliwiać, znajdować dla niej wielki intelektualny kontekst, stanowić jej awangardę i magazyn niezbędnych pojęć, legitymizować jej przemoc i uzasadniać jej terror, dawać jej broń w walce i podtrzymywać marzenia o jej nieuchronności, wyjątkowości, celowości i wartości? Kojeve, Heidegger, de Man, Sartre, Bataille (w analizowanych tu przeze mnie tekstach i w ściśle określonych okresach) - byli o tym przekonani. Dlaczego odpowiadał im właśnie taki autowizerunek? Co więcej - albo co innego - daje filozofowi „filozofia wspólnoty” niż „filozofia tekstu”, by sięgnąć do dwóch skrajności w ramach długiego continuum? Czym jest owa nadwyżka? Uczuciem spełnienia, świadomością realizacji marzeń, wcielenia w życie filozoficznych ideałów? Przejściem do świata rzeczywistego - a może wreszcie „pracą”, w mocnym sensie tego terminu? Jednak im filozofia była bliżej świata, tym większe rodziła napięcia. Tym większe miała wyrzuty sumienia. Kluczowy problem analizowanych tu propozycji filozoficznych można by podsumować tak: czy szukać przejść — a jeśli tak, to jakie powinny one przyjmować formy - między uniwersum. zagadnień filozoficznych a światem rzeczywistym? Jaka relacja wiąże filozofa ze światem realnym: z historią, postępem, zmianą? Kim jest filozof zanurzony w historii, kim jest filozof „robiący historię”? W jakiej mierze filozofia jest niezbędnym fundamentem społecznych transformacji i społecznych rewolucji? Jak związać filozofię z czynem i z działaniem? Jak związać spekulację i kontemplację z aktywizmem? Jaki stosunek wobec gwałtownych i radykalnych zmian w świecie społecznym ma zajmować filozof - i w jakim charakterze? Filozofa? Obywatela? Obywatela-filozofa? Czy umieszczać filozofię w głównym nurcie zmian społecznych - w ramach toczących się rewolucji — czy przyjmować w niej postawę wyczekującą, obserwującą, niezaangażowaną, która pozwala spoglądać na akcydentalne zawirowania świata rzeczywistego z perspektywy jego istoty? Czy filozofia ma brać na siebie odpowiedzialność za zmienianie świata? Czy ma się do niego dostosowywać, czy może wręcz je ugruntowywać, znajdując dla niego szeroki, metafizyczny kontekst? Spis treści Wprowadzenie. „TYRANIA HEGLA” I MYŚLENIE PONOWOCZESNE W KONTEKŚCIE PYTAŃ 0 AUTO WIZERUNEK FILOZOFA (9) „Uwolnić się od Hegla”? (10) Panorama (15) „Przyszłość świata” a „interpretacja pism Hegla” (24) Podsumowanie: filozof czynu, filozofia działania (27) Rozdział 1. Przykład wspólnotowy: Alexandre’a KOJEVE’A filozof zmieniający świat (FRANCUSKI HEGEL) (37) Antropologia, panowanie, niewola (41) Kojeve-Strauss: debata stulecia? (44) Filozof wedle Straussa (47) Filozof wedle Kojeve’a (50) Historia, filozofia, przemoc. „Humanizm” i „terror” (57) Rządzenie: zdolności i powinności (61) Kres historii (63) Podsumowanie (68) Rozdział 2. PRZYKŁAD TEKSTUALNY: DELEUZE’A 1 KLOSSOWSKIEGO FILOZOF TWORZĄCY TEKST (francuski Nietzsche) (70) „Jakiegoż to adwersarza, jakiegoś wroga należy pokonać?” (73) „Między Heglem a Nietzschem nie może być kompromisu” 77 Nietzsche, Freud, Marks 90 Historia i genealogia 96 Kwestia stylu 99 Rozdział 3. PRZYPADEK GEORGESA BATAILLE’A: MIĘDZY HEGLEM A NlETZSCHEM? 106 „Człowiek integralny” a działanie 110 Rewolucja, ekstaza, krew 115 W towarzystwie Nietzschego 124 Ekonomia nadmiaru 128 Rozdział 4. WOKÓŁ ZAANGAŻOWANIA. OD WSPÓLNOTY DO TEKSTU I DALEJ: SARTRE, BARTHES, BLANCHOT, FOUCAULT 133 „Umiłowanie mądrości” a polityka 133 Filozofia, polityka - tekst, wspólnota 136 Pisarze i piszący 138 „Co to znaczy pisać?”142 Pisanie - czysta bierność na marginesie historii? 151 Poza opozycję esteta/pisarz zaangażowany 157 Intelektualiści - władza 161 Książki-doświadczenia i książki-prawdy 166 „Tyrania prawdy”168 Rozdział 5. FILOZOF A CZASY PRZEŁOMU. FRANCUSKIE BURZE WOKÓŁ MARTINA HEIDEGGERA W PERSPEKTYWIE SPORU O MIEJSCE FILOZOFII W SFERZE OBYWATELSKOŚCI. 172 Początki 172 Heidegger - francuski „mistrz myślenia”180 „Czy można jeszcze wierzyć filozofom?” 184 Heideggera sen o przywództwie 188 Dyskusje, dyskusje 205 Specyficzna aura filozofa? 210 „Przyjdźcie do nas, a będziecie mogli przekuć waszą myśl w czyn” 230 Rozdział 6. WOKÓŁ PAULA DE MANA - EUROPEJSKIE PYTANIA O SŁOWA JAKO CZYNY 233 Kontekst europejski - rewolucja intelektualna 238 Nowy porządek, nowy początek 248 „Konstruktywne” podejście do rewolucji a „humanizm” 255 Europejski cień człowieka czynu 257 Ideologia estetyczna 262 Rozdział 7. W STRONĘ ESTETYKI EGZYSTENCJI: MICHEL FOUCAULT 266 „Dać żyjącym exempla...” 271 Kanta i Nietzschego „troska o siebie” 272 Etyka jako estetyka 283 Foucault, Kant i „ontologia teraźniejszości” 291 „Troska o siebie” jako praktyka wolności 302 Myślenie - niebezpiecznym aktem? 310 Bibliografia 313 SUMMARY 331 CONTENTS. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Mind's Eternity in Spinoza's EthicsSteven ParchmentIn the Emendation of the Intellect, Spinoza describes how he abandoned mundane pursuits of money, fame, and sensuality for the pleasures of philosophy and, by doing so, traded in merely temporary goods for a joy which is eternal (TdIE, G II/1-II/7).1 Given this motivating quest for eternal happiness, it is ironic that the section of the Ethics most frequently condemned by critics as (...) a hopeless muddle is just that section in which Spinoza attempts to demonstrate the possibility of the mind's eternal salvation. From the perspective of these critics, Spinoza has carefully constructed a deductive system of metaphysics, featuring a variety of intriguing theories such as the parallelism of mind and body, only to sully his achievement by tacking on a contradictory finale. In a vain effort to salvage immortality,2 Spinoza has placed himself in the embarrassing position of espousing both the mind's eternity and the body's limited duration, all the while maintaining that mind and body are one and the same thing. In the face of this and other seemingly blatant contradictions, some commentators have given up trying to make sense of Spinoza's remarks on the mind's eternity, preferring instead to speculate on how such a profound thinker could be led to such write such rubbish. Was it due to an overwhelming fear of death? Or perhaps a desperate leap into mysticism?3 [End Page 349]Other interpreters, of course, have been more charitable and have regarded this section of the Ethics as its rightful culmination. But the diversity of their interpretations belies, if not the inconsistency of Spinoza's position, at least the difficulty of understanding how, and in what sense, Spinoza's metaphysics can support a belief in the mind's eternity. In this paper, I examine four common answers to this question and, finding each interpretation inadequate in some way, venture a fifth. The first two sections of the paper outline and criticize the four interpretations. The last three develop an alternative reading of the mind's eternityæone, it is claimed, that is consistent with Spinoza's metaphysics.1. Interpretations of the Mind's EternityOne pivotal point by which various interpretations can be classified is how they account for the mind's eternity in relation to parallelism. The mind is the idea of the body (IIP13). Since an idea and its ideatum are "one and the same thing" (IIP7S), the mind and the body are one and the same thing, conceived under different attributes (IIP21S). But how then can Spinoza maintain that the mind is eternal, despite the destruction of the body (VP23)? One answer is that Spinoza is not literally referring to an eternal state of being; instead, he is metaphorically describing a state of knowing that is acquired in this life whenever the mind grasps sub specie aeternitatis truths about itself and its body. Thus, the eternity of the mind is compatible with parallelism, for its "eternal" life lasts no longer than the temporally limited life of the body. This view is called the epistemological interpretation. In contrast, the ontological interpretation is the view that, for Spinoza, the mind is literally eternal. Clearly, the onus falls upon advocates of the ontological interpretation to explain why the mind's eternal existence does not contradict parallelism. Generally, three types of explanations have been advanced. 1)The Episodic Ideatum Theory: Faced with the dilemma between parallelism and the mind's eternal existence, this theory qualifies the former. The mind is the idea of the body only for as long as the body endures; afterwards, the mind possesses an independent existence. 2)The Incremental Ideatum Theory: This theory maintains that the mind is the idea of a particular body only at the beginning of its existence. By reason and intuition, the mind expands its ideatum to such a point that it no longer reflects merely one finite body but rather the whole material universe. By doing so, it becomes united with God. 3)The Double Existence Theory: On this theory, the mind has an eternal existence, because the human body itself is, in some sense, eternal... (shrink)

Consists of a series of related essays that deal with a new approach to historical-mindedness and a new way of understanding the distinguishing characteristics of Western civilization.

ABSTRACTThis essay offers a reconfiguration of the possibility‐space of positions regarding the metaphysics and epistemology associated with historical knowledge. A tradition within analytic philosophy from Danto to Dummett attempts to answer questions about the reality of the past on the basis of two shared assumptions. The first takes individual statements as the relevant unit of semantic and philosophical analysis. The second presumes that variants of realism and antirealism about the past exhaust the metaphysical options . This essay argues that both (...) of these assumptions should be rejected. It develops as an alternative an irrealist account of history, a view based in part on work by Leon Goldstein and Ian Hacking. On an irrealist view, historical claims ought to be treated as subject to the same conditions and caveats that apply to any theory of empirical or scientific knowledge. Irrealism argues for pasts as made and not found. The argument emphasizes the priority of classification over perception in the order of understanding and so verification. Because nothing a priori anchors practices of classification, no sense can be attached to claims that some single structure must or does determine what events take place in human history. Irrealism denies to realism the very intelligibility of any imagined view from nowhere, that is, a determinately configured past subsisting sub specie aeternitatis. A plurality of pasts exists because constituting a past always depends to some degree on socially mediated negotiations of a fit between descriptions and experience. (shrink)

Bradley believes that the metaphysician’s dream of contemplating reality sub specie aeternitatis cannot be fulfilled. The theory of thought put forward in The Principles of Logic provides him with a basis for arguing that human understanding is inadequate to the task of grasping the ultimate truth about what there is. His position is far from being a sceptical one, however, and he argues that we can rise up to an imperfect knowledge of the nature of reality. ‘I am (...) so bold as to believe that we have knowledge of the Absolute, certain and real, though I am sure that our comprehension is miserably incomplete’. Among the most important things we know, are the following. They are all centred upon the distinction between appearance and reality. (shrink)

I do not think the notion of rigidity in designation can be correct, at least not in any way that can serve to ground a semantics purports both to be fundamental in a semiotical sense and to the best science of the day. A careful examination of both content and the character of our best scientific knowledge not cannot support anything like what the notion of rigidity requires, but actually shows the notion to be, at bottom, incoherent. In particular, the (...) scientific meaning of natural kind terms can be determined only within the context of a fixed scientific framework and not sub specie aeternitatis. Along the way, I provide grounds for the rejection of essentialist views of the ontology of natural kinds. (shrink)

Many historians of analytic philosophy consider the early philosophy of Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein as much more neo-Hegelian as once believed. At the same time, the authors who closely investigate Green, Bradley and Bosanquet find out that these have little in common with Hegel. The thesis advanced in this chapter is that what the British (ill-named) neo-Hegelians brought to the early analytic philosophers were, above all, some ideas of Lotze, not of Hegel. This is true regarding: (i) Lotze’s logical approach (...) to practically all philosophical problems; (ii) his treating of the concepts relation, structure (constructions) and order; (iii) the discussion of the concepts of states of affairs, multiple theory of judgment, general logical form; (iv) some common themes like panpsychism and contemplating the world sub specie aeternitatis. (shrink)

'You ask me about the idiosyncrasies of philosophers? There is their lack of historical sense, their hatred of even the idea of becoming, their Egyptianism. They think they are doing a thing honour when they dehistoricize it, sub specie aeternitatis — when they make a mummy of it.'Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols.

Modernity seemed to be the autumn of eternity. The secularization of European culture provided little sustenance to the concept of eternity with its heavy theological baggage. Yet, our hero would not leave the stage without an outstanding performance of its power and temptation. Indeed, in the first three centuries of the modern period – the subject of the third chapter by Yitzhak Melamed - the concept of eternity will play a crucial role in the great philosophical systems of the period. (...) The first part of this chapter concentrates on the debate about the temporality of God. While most of the great metaphysicians of the seventeenth century – Suarez, Spinoza, Malebranche, and Leibniz – ascribed to God eternal, non-temporal, existence, a growing number of philosophers conceived God as existing in time. For Newton, God’s eternity was simply the fact that “He was, he is, and is to come.” A similar view of God as being essentially in time was endorsed by Pierre Gassendi, Henry More, Samuel Clarke, Isaac Barrow, John Locke, and most probably Descartes as well. In the second part of the chapter we study the concept of eternal truth, and its relation to the emerging notion of Laws of Nature. The third part of the chapter explicates Spinoza’s original understanding of eternity as a modal concept. For Spinoza, eternity is a unique kind of necessary existence: it is existence that is self-necessitated (unlike the existence of other things whose necessity derives from external causes). Eternity is the existence of God or the one substance. Yet, Spinoza claims that if we conceive finite things adequately - “sub specie aeternitatis” – as nothing but modes flowing from the essence of God, even finite things (like our minds) can take part in God’s eternity. The fourth and final part of the chapter is mostly focused on the reception of Spinoza’s original conception of eternity by Leibniz and other eighteenth century philosophers. (shrink)

In a recent article Iddo Landau has defended his distinction between perspectives on and standards of meaning in life to support his rebuttal of a familiar pessimistic objection to the meaningfulness of human life. According to that complaint, human life is meaningless when viewed from a detached, cosmic, or sub specie aeternitatis [SSA] perspective. Landau argues that a cosmic perspective need not entail a comparably high standard of meaningfulness. What counts on his view then is not the perspective, (...) which is compatible with any number of possible standards for what constitutes an adequate amount of meaningfulness, but the standard that sets that threshold. In this article I argue that Landau has 1.a.) underestimated the severity of the pessimists’ critique of the availability of any standards for meaningfulness and has also 1.b.) misunderstood the pessimists to be saying that human lives are meaningless because they make an insufficient spatio-temporal impact. I argue further that 2.a.) Landau has left unexplained on what basis we would locate the standard of meaning, leaving a gap in his account. Finally, I maintain that 2.b.) by acknowledging that the ontological, normative, or theological content of the SSA perspective can influence the placing of that standard, Landau leaves himself open to the plausible alternative possibility that the meaning of a life is settled not by the standard itself but by the character attributed to the SSA perspective. (shrink)

Georg Simmel’s treatment of the lie – in the essay ‘The Sociology of Secrecy and Secret Societies’, but in other, lesser known texts as well – is an aspect of his thought that has not received a great deal of attention among theorists. And yet many of his better known contributions to social theory – including his concepts of ‘interaction’ and ‘sociation’, his appreciation of the spatial and the aesthetic dimensions of social life, and his speculations about culture and subjectivity (...) in the modern world – draw on ideas that he developed while contemplating the problem of deception. In this article, I bring Simmel’s work on mendacity to the fore, and show how a consideration of it sheds new light on some of his most familiar claims. I further argue that Simmel’s work on the lie illuminates a very old and vexing set of philosophical debates, and especially the debate over self-deception, or whether or not it is possible to lie to oneself. Along with providing a close study of his comments on the lie in ‘The Sociology of Secrecy and Secret Societies’, and in the chapter of his monumental Sociology that is based on that essay, I propose a reading of Simmel’s heretofore ignored fable or fairytale ‘Der Lügenmacher’ – one of the eight short pieces that he published pseudonymously between 1899 and 1903 in the cultural journal Der Jugend under the heading ‘ Momentbilder’ or ‘Snapshots, sub specie aeternitatis’. (shrink)

This paper resolves some puzzles regarding Spinoza’s appropriations and rejections of various aspects of Bacon’s methodology, and uses these solutions to resolve some long-standing puzzles concerning Spinoza’s modus operandi in the TTP. We argue first that, appearances to contrary, Spinoza takes a consistent line in his assessment of Bacon’s epistemic approach. We argue that Spinoza follows Bacon in grounding his overall epistemic method in a “historiola mentis” (a brief account or history of the mind), and that differences between Spinoza’s and (...) Bacon’s respective historiola mentis can explain Spinoza’s embrace of this inductive method for his interpretation of Scripture in the TTP, as well as his general abandonment of Bacon’s inductive method in the metaphysical investigation of the Ethics. In short, we argue that the “historiola mentis” constructed by Bacon depicts the intellect as an error-prone faculty that needs be continuously restrained by observation and experimentation—a depiction which motivates Bacon’s reformed inductive empiricism. Spinoza accepts this depiction in regard to a subset of the mind’s ideas—the ideas of the imagination, and hence sees the inductive method as suitable for interpreting Scripture. But contra Bacon, Spinoza’s “historiola mentis” also shows that the human mind includes a subset of ideas that yield true, certain knowledge of things “infinite” and sub specie aeternitatis. Spinoza finds these “intellectual” ideas to be quite useful for systematic metaphysics, but of limited use for interpreting historical texts like Scripture. (shrink)

What did wittgenstein mean when he said that 'ethics and aesthetics are one', Since these are generally contrasted than amalgamated? his "1914-1916 notebooks", The "tractatus", And the "lecture on ethics", Show that he regarded them as one because they shared a "sub specie aeternitatis" attitude. Study of his remarks reveals the implications of his account and shows that wittgenstein, In this phase of development, Belonged in the mainstream of ethical and aesthetic philosophy.

In the dispute between presentism and eternalism, the affective dimensions of the debate have been somewhat neglected. Contemporary philosophers of time have not tried to relate these ontological positions with two of the most discussed maxims in the history of ethics – “live in the present” vs. “look at your life under the aspect of the eternity” (sub specie aeternitatis)– that since the Hellenistic times have been regarded as strictly connected with them. Consequently, I raise the question of (...) whether the endorsement of one of these two ontological views can make a practical difference in the way we should live. -/- . (shrink)

In letter 37 to Johannes Bouwmeester, Spinoza identifies a historiola mentis à la Bacon as an important tool for distinguishing more easily between adequate and inadequate ideas. This paper contends that Spinoza's advice is to take into account Baconian-style ‘Civil History’ as providing instructive material for contemplating the variety, complexity, and persistency of human passionate behaviour. Specifically, it argues that Baconian civil history forms an integral part of Spinoza's reflections on provisional morality. Although for Spinoza, philosophical beatitude ultimately demands understanding (...) affects through their first causes – the intuitive perception of things sub specie aeternitatis – in the realm of everyday Spinoza allows for a different, more pragmatic approach to morality. This paper argues at this stage that a philosophical understanding of the mind and its affections is not needed. Spinoza, following Bacon, holds that conduct of practical affairs is particularly improved when those so engage.. (shrink)

In Ethics 4, Spinoza argues that “A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation on life, not on death” (E4p67). Spinoza’s argument for this claim depends on his view of imagination, reason, and scientia intuitiva and on his notion of conatus. I explicate Spinoza’s view of life in terms of power (potentia) and show that Spinozan death amounts to reconfiguration rather than absolute annihilation. I then show that E4p67 reflects Spinoza’s well-known account (...) of the three kinds of knowing. Thinking of death is quintessentially imaginative and passive. The free person of E4p67 is in contrast a rational person. To reason, and as becomes especially clear E5, to experience scientia intuitiva, moreover is to think of things “without any relation to time, but [rather] sub specie aeternatitis”(E2p44c2) and to experience activity To the extent, then, that we are rational, free, and active, death is a non-issue. Indeed, to the extent that we are able to meditate on life sub specie aeternitatis, we actually experience joy, love (E5p20s, p32c), eternity (Sp23s), and “the greatest satisfaction of the Mind” (E5p27). (shrink)

This article attempts a new interpretation of Lao Tzu's metaphysics of Tao by employing a combined method of linguistic and philosophical analyses. This new methodological approach involves the following basic assumptions: (1) Lao Tzu's metaphysics of Tao can be characterized as a kind of non?dualistic and non?conceptual metaphysics sub specie aeternitatis; (2) Tao is not an entity, substance, God, Idee, or anything hypostatized or conceptualized, but is rather a metaphysical symbol unifying various dimensions of Nature as the totality (...) of things?as?they?are; (3) there is, generally speaking, no confusion or inconsistency of thought involved in the Lao?Tzu; (4) there are two kinds of speech used by Lao Tzu, viz. philosophical (real) speech and figurative (metaphorical) speech; and (5) figurative expressions, which predominate, can be reduced to philosophical expressions for the sake of the clarification of Lao Tzu's thought. In the light of these basic assumptions, a philosophical explication of Lao Tzu's conception of Tao is undertaken by exploring its six dimensions. They are: (i) Tao as Reality, (ii) Tao as Origin, (iii) Tao as Principle, (iv) Tao as Function, (v) Tao as Virtue, and (vi) Tao as Technique; and (ii)?(vi) can be subsumed under Tao as Manifestation (to us). These six dimensions are not ?categories? or ?attributes? in the Western (conceptual) sense, but are the inseparable aspects or perspectives of Tao reconstructed from the Lao?Tzu in order to show the best possible way of understanding Lao Tzu's metaphysical thinking. In the Epilogue, a brief comparison of Lao Tzu and Spinoza is made in order to emphasize the non?conceptual and non?propositional nature of Lao Tzu's metaphysical language. (shrink)

Gottlob Frege’s conception of works of art has received scant notice in the literature. This is a pity since, as this paper undertakes to reveal, his innovative philosophy of language motivated a theoretically and historically consequential, yet unaccountably marginalized Wittgenstinian line of inquiry in the domain of aesthetics. The element of Frege’s approach that most clearly inspired this development is the idea that only complete sentences articulate thoughts and that what sentences in works of drama and literary art express are (...) ‘mock thoughts’ (Schiengedanken). The early Wittgenstein closely followed Frege’s lead on this theme. One sees this, for example, in the Tractatus, where Wittgenstein announces that only sentential propositions model (‘picture’) states of affairs whereas works of art are objects we perceive sub specie aeternitatis (1961, 83). By the 1930s, however, Wittgenstein began to revise his view beyond his initial Frege-inspired standpoint. He came to insist that works of art can convey thoughts as well, but that thoughts do not model (picture) the world of facts and hence do not convey information about measurable objects and events. Rather, his contention was that aesthetically configured thoughts that artworks communicate impart information about our perspective on reality and reconfigure our view of life. To be more explicit, successful (gelungene) or ‘good’ works of art (ibid.), in Wittgenstein’s view, can supply aesthetically instructive ‘gestures’ that open to living experience promising new ways of being. It is in this respect, he held, that artists ‘have something to teach’ (1980, 36). (shrink)