We present the bundle (Aff(3)⊗ℂ⊗Λ)(ℝ3), with a geometric Dirac equation on it, as a three-dimensional geometric interpretation of the SM fermions. Each (ℂ⊗Λ)(ℝ3) describes an electroweak doublet. The Dirac equation has a doubler-free staggered spatial discretization on the lattice space (Aff(3)⊗ℂ)(ℤ3). This space allows a simple physical interpretation as a phase space of a lattice of cells.We find the SM SU(3) c ×SU(2) L ×U(1) Y action on (Aff(3)⊗ℂ⊗Λ)(ℝ3) to be a maximal anomaly-free gauge action (...) preserving E(3) symmetry and symplectic structure, which can be constructed using two simple types of gauge-like lattice fields: Wilson gauge fields and correction terms for lattice deformations.The lattice fermion fields we propose to quantize as low energy states of a canonical quantum theory with ℤ2-degenerated vacuum state. We construct anticommuting fermion operators for the resulting ℤ2-valued (spin) field theory.A metric theory of gravity compatible with this model is presented too. (shrink)

It is argued that a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics is possible and useful. Current interpretations, from “Copenhagen” to “many worlds” are critically revisited. The difficulties for intuitive models of quantum physics are pointed out and possible solutions proposed. In particular the existence of discrete states, the quantum jumps, the alleged lack of objective properties, measurement theory, the probabilistic character of quantum physics, the wave–particle duality and the Bell inequalities are analyzed. The sketch of a realistic picture (...) of the quantum world is presented. It rests upon the assumption that quantum mechanics is a stochastic theory whose randomness derives from the existence of vacuum fields. They correspond to the vacuum fluctuations of quantum field theory, but taken as real rather than virtual. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate, within the framework of realistic interpretations of the wave function in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, the mathematical and physical nature of the wave function. I argue against the view that mathematically the wave function is a two-component scalar field on configuration space. First, I review how this view makes quantum mechanics non- Galilei invariant and yields the wrong classical limit. Moreover, I argue that interpreting the wave function as a ray, in agreement many physicists, Galilei (...) invariance is preserved. In addition, I discuss how the wave function behaves more similarly to a gauge potential than to a field. Finally I show how this favors a nomological rather than an ontological view of the wave function. (shrink)

The central aim of this dissertation is to clarify, defend and develop a realist field ontology of the causal-inertial structure of spacetime forcefully advanced by Hermann Weyl. Weyl's field ontology of spacetime structure may roughly be described as follows. The Special and General as well as the non-relativistic spacetime theories are principle theories of spacetime structure. They all postulate various structural constraints, and events within spacetime are held to satisfy these constraints. When interpreted physically, these mathematical structures correspond to physical (...) structural fields on spacetime. ;The thesis begins with a discussion of the significance of Riemann's Dynamical Hypothesis within the context of the debate between geometrical realism and conventionalism. In particular, Grunbaum's unyielding insistence that Riemann's work must be seen as the immediate progenitor of his brand of geometrical conventionalism is challenged and shown to be unsupported by a textual analysis of the relevant works by Riemann. The first two chapters provide a historical/exegetical analysis of Riemann's Habilitationsvortrag. Chapter 3 presents a general account of geometrical conventionalism apart from issues of its alleged historical ancestry as seen by Grunbaum. This is followed by a critical examination of Grunbaum's interpretation of Riemann. ;Grunbaum has repeatedly argued that Weyl's interpretation of Riemann accords with his. It is shown, however, that Weyl's understanding of Riemann is the direct opposite of that of Grunbaum. Chapter 4 provides an examination of Weyl's philosophy of geometry and his interpretation of Riemann. It is shown that Weyl considers Riemann's work to be essentially progenitorial of his version of geometrical realism. . . . UMI. (shrink)

It is generally believed that two rival non-relativistic quantum theories, the realist interpretation of quantum mechanics and Bohmian mechanics, are empirically equivalent. In this paper, I use these two quantum theories to show that it is possible to offer a solution to underdetermination in some local cases, by specifying what counts as relevant empirical evidence in empirical equivalence and underdetermination. I argue for a _domain-sensitive_ approach to underdetermination. Domain sensitivity on theories’ predictions plays a role in determining whether two (...) or more theories are empirically equivalent and underdetermined. To support my argument for the denial of the empirical equivalence between Bohmian mechanics and the realist interpretation of quantum mechanics, I argue that they are not empirically equivalent when we consider their predictions for domains outside their application, using the relativistic domain as an example. (shrink)

The paper investigates the spontaneous breaking of gauge symmetries in gauge theories from a philosophical angle, taking into account the fact that the notion of a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry, though widely employed in textbook expositions of the Higgs mechanism, is not supported by our leading theoretical frameworks of gauge quantum theories. In the context of lattice gauge theory, the statement that local gauge symmetry cannot be spontaneously broken can even be made (...) rigorous in the form of Elitzur’s theorem. Nevertheless, gauge symmetry breaking does occur in gauge quantum field theories in the form of the breaking of remnant subgroups of the original local gauge group under which the theories typically remain invariant after gauge fixing. The paper discusses the relation between these instances of symmetry breaking and phase transitions and draws some more general conclusions for the philosophical interpretation of gauge symmetries and their breaking. (shrink)

In this note, I briefly review Lyre's analysis and interpretation of the Higgs mechanism. Contrary to Lyre, I maintain that, on the proper understanding of the term, the Higgs mechanism refers to a physical process in the course of which gauge bosons acquire a mass. Since also Lyre's worries about imaginary masses can be dismissed, a realistic interpretation of the Higgs mechanism seems viable.

My model-theoretic realist account of science places linguistic systems and the corresponding non-linguistic structures at different stages of the scientific process. It is shown that science and its progress cannot be analysed in terms of only one of these strata. Philosophy of science literature offers mainly two approaches; to the structure of scientific knowledge analysed in terms of theories and their models, the "statement" and the "non-statement" approaches. In opposition to the statement approach's belief that scientific knowledge is embodied in (...) theories symbolic language) with direct interpretative links---via so-called "bridge principles"---to reality, the defenders of the non-statement approach believe in an analysis where the language in which the theory is formulated plays a much smaller role than the structures which satisfy that theory. ;The model-theoretic realism expounded here retains the notion of a scientific theory as a set of sentences, while simultaneously emphasising the interpretative role of the conceptual models of these theories. My criticism against the non-statement approach is based on the fact that merely "giving" the theory "in terms of" its mathematical structures leaves out any real interpretation of the nature and role of general terms in science. Against the statement approach's "direct" linking of general theoretical terms to reality, my approach interpolates models between theories and reality in the interpretative chain. ;The links between the general terms of scientific theories and their interpretations in the various models of the theory regulate the whole referential process. The terms of a theory are "general" in the sense that they are the result of certain abstractive conceptualisations of the object of scientific investigation and subsequent linguistic formulations of these conceptualisations. Their meanings can be "given back" only by interpreting them in the limited context, of the various conceptual models of their theory and, finally, by finding an isomorphic relation between some substructure of the conceptual model in question and some empirical conceptualisation of relevant experimental data. In this sense the notion of scientific "truth" becomes inextricably linked with that of articulated reference, as it---given its model-dependent nature---should be. (shrink)

D. Dieks has proposed a semantical rule which he claims yields a realistic interpretation of the formalism of quantum mechanics without the projection postulate. I argue that his proposal is unacceptable because it violates a natural requirement of psychophysical parallelism. His "semantical rule" is not an acceptable interpretive rule because it does not identify structures in the theory with structures in our experience, but postulates a merely probabilistic relationship between the two. Dieks' interpretation is contrasted with Everett's (...) relative state interpretation, which attempts the same task but respects psychophysical parallelism. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyse and interpret Thomas Aquinas's account of faith in order to show how Thomistic faith is a veridical cognitive state that directs the mind to God, and consequently constitutes a distinct form of knowledge of God. By assenting to the revealed propositions of faith, and thereby forming true beliefs about God under the authority and guidance of God's grace, the possessor of faith comes to know or apprehend truly something about God, even if she fails to (...) ‘see’ or know fully the truth that she believes. A further task of the paper is to show how Thomistic faith qualifies as knowledge from a contemporary epistemological standpoint, insofar as it consists of true belief that is appropriately justified and warranted, by virtue of being supernaturally informed and generated. By expositing and defending this central claim – focusing specifically on faith as a form of knowledge – I show how Aquinas offers an epistemologically realist account of faith. (shrink)

A model-theoretic realist account of science places linguistic systems and their corresponding non-linguistic structures at different stages or different levels of abstraction of the scientific process. Apart from the obvious problem of underdetermination of theories by data, philosophers of science are also faced with the inverse (and very real) problem of overdetermination of theories by their empirical models, which is what this article will focus on. I acknowledge the contingency of the factors determining the nature – and choice – of (...) a certain model at a certain time, but in my terms, this is a matter about which we can talk and whose structure we can formalise. In this article a mechanism for tracing "empirical choices" and their particularized observational-theoretical entanglements will be offered in the form of Yoav Shoham's version of non-monotonic logic. Such an analysis of the structure of scientific theories may clarify the motivations underlying choices in favor of certain empirical models (and not others) in a way that shows that "disentangling" theoretical and observation terms is more deeply model-specific than theory-specific. This kind of analysis offers a method for getting an articulable grip on the overdetermination of theories by their models – implied by empirical equivalence – which Kuipers' structuralist analysis of the structure of theories does not offer. (shrink)

This article offers a realist interpretation of Tacitus’s analysis of political failure. Tacitus described the early Roman Empire as a balance between the conflicting and irreconcilable values and interests of the emperor, the army, and the senate. For him Stoic-republican morality in itself—without the intervention of a political standard demanding political agency in every circumstance—cannot provide an all-purpose guide to action. He provides a fine-grained analysis of types of political failure, such as failing to act, or to realize one’s (...) limited scope for maneuver, or the inevitability of failure given particular political circumstances. Tacitus also describes Thrasea, a moderate member of the senatorial opposition to Nero, as an exceptionally laudable figure. His preference for moderate politics places Tacitus on the side of contemporary status-quo oriented, liberal, realists (e.g., Bernard Williams), rather than on the side of radical realists (e.g., Raymond Geuss, Enzo Rossi), but the central lesson of his understanding of Roman politics is not so much that political order is fragile as that the cost of political failure can indeed be unbearably high. (shrink)

In this book Emma Ruttkamp demonstrates the power of the full-blown employment of the model-theoretic paradigm in the philosophy of science. Within this paradigm she gives an account of sciences as process and product. She expounds the "received statement" and the "non-statement" views of science, and shows how the model-theoretic approach resolves the spurious tension between these views. In this endeavour she also engages the views of a number of contemporary philosophers of science with affinity to model theory. This text (...) can be read by specialists working in philosophy of science or formal semantics, by logicians working on the structure of theories, and by students in philosophy of science - this text offers a thorough introduction to non-statement accounts of sciences as well as a discussion of the traditional statement account of science. (shrink)

The elucidation of the gauge principle ‘‘is the most pressing problem in current philosophy of physics’’ said Michael Redhead in 2003. This paper argues for two points that contribute to this elucidation in the context of Yang–Mills theories. (1) Yang–Mills theories, including quantum electrodynamics, form a class. They should be interpreted together. To focus on electrodynamics is potentially misleading. (2) The essential role of gauge and BRST symmetries is to provide a local field theory that can be quantized (...) and would be equivalent to the quantization of the non-local reduced theory. If this is correct, the gauge symmetry is significant, not so much because it implies ontological consequences, but because it allows us to quantize theories that we would not be able to quantize otherwise. Thus, in the context of Yang–Mills theories, it is essentially a pragmatic principle. This does not seem to be the case for the gauge symmetry in general relativity. (shrink)

Testable predictions of quantum mechanics are invariant under time reversal. But the evolution of the quantum state in time is not so, neither in the collapse nor in the no-collapse interpretations of the theory. This is a fact that challenges any realistic interpretation of the quantum state. On the other hand, this fact raises no difficulty if we interpret the quantum state as a mere calculation device, bookkeeping past real quantum events.

After decades of neglect philosophers of physics have discovered gauge theories--arguably the paradigm of modern field physics--as a genuine topic for foundational and philosophical research. Incidentally, in the last couple of years interest from the philosophy of physics in structural realism--in the eyes of its proponents the best suited realist position towards modern physics--has also raised. This paper tries to connect both topics and aims to show that structural realism gains further credence from an ontological analysis of gauge (...) theories--in particular U(1) gauge theory. In the first part of the paper the framework of fiber bundle gauge theories is briefly presented and the interpretation of local gauge symmetry will be examined. In the second part, an ontological underdetermination of gauge theories is carved out by considering the various kinds of non-locality involved in such typical effects as the Aharonov-Bohm effect. The analysis shows that the peculiar form of non-separability figuring in gauge theories is a variant of spatiotemporal holism and can be distinguished from quantum theoretic holism. In the last part of the paper the arguments for a gauge theoretic support of structural realism are laid out and discussed. (shrink)

We propose that the ontic understanding of quantum mechanics can be extended to a fully realistic theory that describes the evolution of the wavefunction at all times, including during a measurement. In such an approach the wave equation should reduce to the standard wave equation when there is no measurement, and describe state reduction when the system is measured. The general wave equation must be nonlinear and nonlocal, and we require it to be time-symmetric; consequently, this approach is not (...) a new interpretation but a new theory. The wave equation is an integrodifferential equation (IDE). The time symmetry requirement leads to a retrocausal approach, in which the wave equation is solved subject to initial and final conditions to determine history at intermediate times. We propose that different outcomes from (apparently) identically prepared experiments may result from uncontrolled parameters; both the nonlocality and the retrocausality of the theory imply that Bell’s Theorem cannot rule out such “hidden variables.” Beginning with Hamilton’s principle, we demonstrate the construction of such a theory by replacing the action with a functional designed to give rise to a nonlinear, nonlocal IDE as the wave equation. This IDE reduces to the standard wave equation (a differential equation) in the absence of a measurement, but exhibits state reduction to a single eigenvalue when the system interacts with another system with the properties of a measurement apparatus. We demonstrate several desirable features of this theory; for other properties we indicate their plausibility and possible avenues to a proof. (shrink)

The prospects for realistic interpretation of the nature of initial mathematical truths and objects are considered in the article. The arguments of realism, reasons impeding its recognition among philosophers of mathematics as well as the ways to eliminate these reasons are discussed. It is proven that the absence of acceptable ontological interpretation of mathematical realism is the main obstacle to its recognition. This paper explicates the introductory positions of this interpretation and presents a realistic (...) class='Hi'>interpretation of the arithmetical component of mathematics. In summary, we should like to note that such constructions, as it is shown to us, ought to bring the direct use not only for the philosophical foundation of mathematics but for mathematics itself. In the justification of the author’s conclusions based on the works of famous mathematicians of the twentieth century, interpreting their findings in a broad historical and philosophical context. To illustrate his point, the author gives examples of arithmetic and geometry - both Euclidean and non-Euclidean. (shrink)

This article aims to present a realistic reading of the parable of the Lost Coin in Q. A realistic reading of the parable focuses on the social realia invoked by the parables, that is, the social realities and practices embedded by any given parable. As will be indicated, available documented papyri can be used to identify the possible social realia invoked by the parables, and this can help the modern reader to identify what is ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’ in (...) a parable being interpreted. This, in turn, can help the modern reader to come to grips with the probable intended meaning of the parable. In a realistic reading of the Lost Coin, it is argued that two things are important: the price and daily consumption of oil, and the Lost Coin being one of the gendered doublets in Q. Apart from proposing a possible meaning of the Lost Coin, it is also indicated that a realistic reading explains why the seeking of the woman is described as being ἐπιμελῶς [diligent]. (shrink)

The paper considers Paul Natorp's Kantian reading of Plato's theory of ideas, as developed in his monumental work, Platos Ideenlehre, eine Einführung in den Idealismus (1903, 1921). Central to Natrop's reading are, I argue, the following two claims: (1) Plato's ideas are laws, not things; and (2) Plato's theory of ideas in the first instance a theory about the possibility and nature of thought - in particular cognitive and indeed scientific or explanatory thought - and only as a consequence is (...) it a theory about the nature of reality. Natrop thus argues that Plato's theory of ideas is at its heart a transcendental theory, and that Plato's metaphysics is built on this basis. The paper considers these claims - and their textual basis in Plato - in some detail, and attempts an initial evaluation of their plausibility as a reading of Plato. I am on the whole sympathetic to Natorp's reading, though a proper assessment goes beyond the present paper. The wider interest of this idealist or anti-realist reading of Plato ought to be obvious, especially in view of the commonly accepted assumption these days that both Plato and Aristotle, and indeed the Greeks in general, took realism entirely for granted (see e.g. M. Burnyeat). Natorp argues that this is true of Aristotle, but quite untrue of Plato. But he is quite clear that the idealism he ascribes to Plato is not Berkeleyan or metaphysical idealism, but a certain kind of transcendental or epistemological idealism. Natorp, however, is no uncritical follower of Kant, and the version of trascendental idealism that he ascribes to Plato is, I argue, very different from Kant's. (shrink)

The old-fashioned concept of state is shown to be inadequate and misleading. Replacing it by a concept of information and taking advantage of the invariance of the mechanical description under time reversal puts the problems of the interpretation of quantum mechanics in a new light. A more realistic interpretation appears to be possible. Moreover, a new explanation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox is presented, too.

The article deals with the approach to understanding science and technology as well as natural and cultural practices developed by the American philosopher Karen Barad in the concept of agential realism. The peculiarity of her approach consists in referring as a starting point to quantum mechanics in its interpretation, which was proposed by Niels Bohr. Barad proposes a reinterpretation of Bohr's propositions through revealing their ontological content. In this regard, the article addresses the epistemological and ontological problems that quantum (...) physics has faced, such as the conditions for the possibility of an objective description of the world, the nature of measurement, and the relationship between language and the material world. Discussed is the shift that Barad argues is asserted in Bohr's philosophy-physics, which consists of quantum mechanics moving from the linguistic concepts in which the world of classical science was represented to what Barad calls material-discursive practices through which the world is articulated and explained. The possibilities of a different interpretation of Niels Bohr's philosophy-physics are considered. (shrink)

Husserl’s conception of ideal objects convinced some of his early disciples that he was presenting a new form of realism. This impression arises, in my view, from a twofold misunderstanding. First, there was a misunderstanding of the limits of the phenomenological claims of Logical Investigations and, second, an erroneous belief that ideal objects are interpreted in a realist fashion therein. The ultimate source of the first phenomenological schism is not, therefore, so much a reaction to an alleged sudden change in (...) Husserl’s position, but rather a misunderstanding of the concept of ideality presented in Logical Investigations. Further, an alleged “compatibility” between the realist conception of ideality and the Husserlian conception is to be found in one of the ways that Husserl addresses the problem of constitution. However, the Spanish philosopher Antonio Millán-Puelles has shown that the use of terms such as “constitutive activity” or “genesis”—in a realist metaphysics, to designate the arising of ideal objects—should not be interpreted in a psychologistic way, as though these objects remained absorbed by the reality of the mental processes they are made present by. (shrink)

I undertake to explain how the well known laws of formal logic – Barbara Syllogism, modus ponens, etc. – relate to experience by developing Edmund Husserl's critique ofFormalism and Psychologism in logical theory and then briefly explaining his positive views of the laws of logic. His view rests upon his understanding of the proposition as a complex, intentional property. The laws of formal logic are, on his view (and mine), statements about the truth values of propositions as determined by their (...) formal character and relationships alone. The laws thus understood explain how algorithms set up to mirror them can accomplish what they do to advance knowledge, even though they operate purely mechanically. Further, they explain the proper sense in which formal laws "govern," and may guide, processes of actual thinking. Husserl's theory is a realist theory in the sense that, on his interpretation, the laws of pure or formal logic hold true regardless of what any individual, culture or species may or may not think, or even if no thinking ever occurs. (shrink)

In “Taking Taniwha seriously,” Justine Kingsbury proposes a way for taniwha pūrākau—traditional narratives about taniwha—to be taken seriously by non-Māori, which is one step towards respecting te ao Māori—the Māori world view. Taniwha are powerful water creatures who act deliberately to protect and sometimes punish humans. So characterised, there is an obvious obstacle to those who wish to respect te ao Māori but who are sceptical about the existence of supernatural entities. Kingsbury proposes a way to take taniwha discourse seriously, (...) but not literally. I agree that her view is realist, and that it overcomes the obstacle noted above. I argue in this paper that her approach ought to be considered an instance of what I call neutral realism, and that when we characterise it this way, we can see precisely how it enables the sort of intercultural respect that she seeks. (shrink)

The Theory of Relativity has been portrayed as a theory that redefined the way we look at the cosmos, enabling us to unlock the reality we live in. Its proponents are constantly reminding us of how Einstein managed to reveal the true nature of the universe with his groundbreaking theory, which has been proved multiple times until now. Yet, philosophy of science teaches us that no theory has any privileged connection with what we call reality per se. The role of (...) science is to formulate models of the cosmos we see and not to try to interpret or reveal reality. This paper tries to show how this holds true even for the famous relativity theory, by showing specific objections to the connection of the theory with the Holy Grail of philosophers. By analyzing various subjects related to the theory, from the twins’ paradox to the GPS satellites, this paper illustrates that relativity is much less connected to reality than what we would like to think. At the end, what Einstein’s theory provides is nothing more than a way to formalize the interactions of the world but without being able to make any claims whatsoever regarding the ‘reality’ of its conclusions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Towards a Realist Philosophy of History by Adam TimminsAviezer TuckerTIMMINS, Adam. Towards a Realist Philosophy of History. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2022. 192 pp. Cloth, $95.00The debate about scientific realism, whether science represents reality or just discovers measurements and correlations that are followed by theoretical stories about them, is at the center of the philosophy of science. One potent and frequently discussed antirealist argument has been Larry Laudan’s (...) “pessimistic induction”: Historically, all scientific theories, especially in physics, have been proven false. Hence, all contemporary scientific theories will be proven false and science cannot represent reality. This pessimistic induction relies on knowledge of the history of science, on historiographic realism. Luckily for the pessimistic induction, the history of historiography, the scientific representation of the human past, supports an optimistic induction: Since the revolutions associated with Ranke in historiography, Lyle in geological history, and Darwin in biological history, the historical sciences have made progress but have not [End Page 368] overhauled the founders’ representations of the past. We know more about the human past than Ranke did and much more about the biological past than Darwin did, but the modern historical sciences have not overturned their theories and conclusions. Though there are many new methodologies, historians still go to the archives to compare primary sources, and biologists still study fossils and assume natural selection.Though scientific antirealism assumes historiographic realism, it has received scant philosophic attention. Often it is perceived or presented as a naive “empiricist” concept of historiography that imagines historians “observe” history and then describe it in historiography. Radical antirealist theories of historiography that reduce it to fiction, myth, or manipulative ideology use this image of realism as naive empiricism to dialectically support its equally naive antirealist antithesis. Both ignore the evidential, mostly testimonial, justifications of historiography.Adam Timmins’s project is to articulate and justify a sophisticated historiographic realism that fits historiographic practices and premises. He argues that historiography is “successful in providing information and understanding about the historical past that is constrained by and reflects what actually happened in the past itself.”Timmins’s historiographic realism springs out of the philosophy of language rather than epistemology or philosophy of science. This distinguishes it from Murray Murphey’s historiographic realism, which argued that historiographic ontology is theoretical. Famously, Murphey compared George Washington to the electron as two well-corroborated but unobservable theoretical entities. Timmins retorts that Washington is a proper name and not a theoretical concept, and it is impossible to conduct experiments with Washingtons. Timmins inquires how the language historians use may be interpreted as referring to past events and how historiography can represent history. He does not devote much attention to how historians justify their statements about history to a degree that may warrant a realistic interpretation of historiography. Rather, Timmins assumes so. He proceeds through polemical dialogues with philosophers of historiography who took antirealist stances like Leon Goldstein, Frank Ankersmit, and Jouni Kuukkanen.Timmins’s realism is founded on the belief in a universally accepted core of historiographic facts. He does not inquire about the theoretical foundations of historiographic inferences that allow the emergence of such a consensus. Rather than consider historiographic epistemology, the critical methods of historiography, Timmins considers linguistic communities and entrenched uses of language. He confronts the problem of reference to the past in the absence of its perception by asserting that historiographic representations are of “mental files” that have names (for example, “the Renaissance,” “the Second World War”) and evolving core facts about those historical events (for example, Petrarch and Da Vinci in the Renaissance, the main battles in the war). Though the exact contents of these files may differ between historians, they still refer to the same events and have the same labels. Timmins suggests that experts gradually introduce fluid norms of reference on the basis of broadly accepted facts [End Page 369] whose references caused information chains that led to them. He suggests that complex or colligated concepts are in the mind but refer through mediation to some directly referenced events. For example, the First World War is a concept that through the mediation of facts like its main battles refers to real... (shrink)

A new approach to understanding hegemony is developed based on the method of critical realism. Breaking from the traditional interpretations that emphasise inter-subjective, superstructural and cultural aspects of hegemony, this article looks at hegemony's structural context and the conditions for its possibility. A realist conception of hegemony relates hegemonic projects to structural reproduction and transformation via Bhaskar’s transformational model of social activity. In doing so this model is itself modified to incorporate hegemony as the political moment of social reproduction. A (...) distinction is made between hegemony in its structural aspect, and specific hegemonic projects as emergent possibilities. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the feasibility of a realistic interpretation of the quantum mechanical path integral - that is, an interpretation according to which the particle actually follows the paths that contribute to the integral. I argue that an interpretation of this sort requires spacetime to have a branching structure similar to the structures of the branching spacetimes proposed by previous authors. I point out one possible way to construct branching spacetimes of the required sort, (...) and I ask whether the resulting interpretation of quantum mechanics is empirically testable. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Realism, Universalism, and the Science of the HumanAmanda Anderson (bio)Satya P. Mohanty. Literary Theory and the Claims of History: Postmodernism, Objectivity, Multicultural Politics. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1997.Martha C. Nussbaum. Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1997.It is arguably a peculiar fact that a book announcing itself as a defense of objectivity and realism would begin by assuring readers of the political efficacy (...) of its theories. After all, the critique of objectivity and realism within progressive cultural criticism of the past several decades has taken for granted that claims to objectivity and realism are suspicious in part because of their pretense to value-neutrality. But Satya P. Mohanty’s ambitious and wide-ranging Literary Theory and the Claims of History joins with other recent attempts to lay claim to a refurbished realism that not only overcomes variously construed limitations of postmodernism but fully answers to the charges leveled against “traditional” objectivity or “naïve” realism [see Alcoff; Livingston]. Such a project can in part be analyzed against a broader critique of postmodernism and poststructuralism advanced through reconsideration of Enlightenment ideals, including, most prominently, the ideals of universalism and its less abstract cousin, cosmopolitanism [see Anderson]. The reconstructions of both universalism and realism have claimed a greater intellectual integrity and coherence than the forms of postmodernism that they challenge and a more promising ethico-political vision, one that more convincingly acknowledges the place and claims of marginalized others. These reconstructive projects thus fundamentally challenge the familiar postmodernist idea that claims to universalism or objectivity themselves enact forms of privilege or exclusion that inherently disable any properly egalitarian or nonviolent relation to others.Mohanty would appear to combine the universalist and realist ambitions, insofar as he asserts a moral position based on Kantian notions of autonomy and dignity at the same time that, in epistemological terms, he elaborates a “postpositivist realist alternative.” Maintaining that the critique of objectivity within postmodernism is propped up by an outdated understanding of scientific method and theory, he argues that the more sophisticated theories within current philosophy of science elaborate epistemological models that are fully compatible with a generalized hermeneutical method, precisely because they acknowledge both the theory-laden nature of all inquiry and the larger social and historical contexts of knowledge and experience. Before elaborating this realist alternative, however, Mohanty situates his project by forwarding a number of critiques of “constructivist postmodernism,” critiques that enable us to better gauge the motivations behind his work. Foregrounded at the start are what Mohanty sees as the [End Page 3] harmful political and ethical consequences of relativism, skepticism, and constructivism. According to Mohanty, while the claims for diversity and difference in the 1960s “had a political edge,” at this historical moment they are used primarily for conservative ends, via a state-sponsored bland multiculturalism that diverts attention from the blunt material issues of race politics [17]. In broader ethico-political terms, moreover, relativist arguments that display skepticism toward the possibilities for rational exchange between variously construed collectivities and cultures lead not to a proper respect for the other but rather to indifference. As Mohanty puts it, to deny the possibility of “general criteria” for “interpretive validity” is “to assert that all spaces are equivalent, that they have equal value, that since the lowest common principle of evaluation is all that I can invoke, I cannot—and consequently need not—think about how your space impinges on mine or how my history is defined together with yours. If that is the case, I may have started by declaring a pious political wish, but I end by denying that I need to take you seriously” [131; Mohanty’s emphasis].Beyond these harmful consequences, however, lies a more fundamental problem. In its monolithic assault on Western Reason and the unified subject of humanism, constructivist postmodernism has deprived itself of any coherent account of human agency and rationality. Without a philosophical anthropology establishing the “capacities, tasks, and limits that might make up a specifically human existence,” Mohanty argues, it becomes impossible to account properly for cultural practices and historical agency, for the self-understanding of cultures and the historical transformations they enact [138... (shrink)

Motivated by examples from general relativity and Newtonian gravitation, this essay attempts to distinguish between the dynamical structure associated with a theory in physics, and its kinematical structure. This enables a distinction to be made between a structural realist interpretation of a theory based on its dynamical structure, and a structural realist interpretation of spacetime, as described by a theory, based on its kinematical structure. I offer category-theoretic formulations of dynamical and kinematical structure and indicate the extent to (...) which such formulations deflect recent criticism of the radical ontic structural realist's conception of structure as "relations devoid of relata". (shrink)

In this paper it will be argued that any realist interpretation of quantum mechanics intending to preserve the objectivity of the set of the definite-valued observables should require such a set to be invariant under the symmetry group of the theory. In particular, it will be shown that the natural way to reach this goal is to appeal to the Casimir operators of the Galilean group. Additionally, this idea will be generalized in two ways: by selecting the definite-valued observables (...) of a system in quantum field theory as those represented by the Casimir operators of the Poincaré group, and by extending the strategy to gauge symmetries. (shrink)

This contribution is an essay of formal philosophy—and more specifically of formal ontology and formal epistemology—applied, respectively, to the philosophy of nature and to the philosophy of sciences, interpreted the former as the ontology and the latter as the epistemology of the modern mathematical, natural, and artificial sciences, the theoretical computer science included. I present the formal philosophy in the framework of the category theory (CT) as an axiomatic metalanguage—in many senses “wider” than set theory (ST)—of mathematics and logic, both (...) of the “extensional” logics of the pure and applied mathematical sciences (=mathematical logic), and the “intensional” modal logics of the philosophical disciplines (=philosophical logic). It is particularly significant in this categorical framework the possibility of extending the operator algebra formalism from (quantum and classical) physics to logic, via the so-called “Boolean algebras with operators” (BAOs), with this extension being the core of our formal ontology. In this context, I discuss the relevance of the algebraic Hopf coproduct and colimit operations, and then of the category of coalgebras in the computations over lattices of quantum numbers in the quantum field theory (QFT), interpreted as the fundamental physics. This coalgebraic formalism is particularly relevant for modeling the notion of the “quantum vacuum foliation” in QFT of dissipative systems, as a foundation of the notion of “complexity” in physics, and “memory” in biological and neural systems, using the powerful “colimit” operators. Finally, I suggest that in the CT logic, the relational semantics of BAOs, applied to the modal coalgebraic relational logic of the “possible worlds” in Kripke’s model theory, is the proper logic of the formal ontology and epistemology of the natural realism, as a formalized philosophy of nature and sciences. (shrink)

This paper deals with those time travels mostly considered by physics, namely those in the form of the so-called closed timelike curves. Some authoritative scholars have raised doubts about the status of these journeys as proper time travels. By using David Lewis’ famous definition of time travels proposed in 1976, we show that this proper status may actually be recovered, at least in some cosmological contexts containing spacetime regions, such as those concerning black holes described by the Kerr–Newman metric, that (...) allow the formation of local closed curves. But, the mathematical incompatibility between ordinary black hole solutions to Einstein field equations and the cosmological solutions induces us to take into consideration the more general issue pertaining to the slippery interplay between models related to local and global aspects of the world, highlighting, in particular, the different notions of time that these domains inevitably imply. This leads us to think that time is not a univocal entity of the world, but is a scale-related characteristic which claims the adoption, when investigating its ontological status, of a sort of regional approach. We also briefly dwell upon the most appropriate form of realism that such a kind of dispute between local and global models may involve. (shrink)

Theoria, Volume 88, Issue 4, Page 733-742, August 2022.

The rough set theory has interesting properties such as that a rough set is considered as distinct sets in distinct knowledge bases, and that distinct rough sets are considered as one same set in a certain knowledge base. This leads to a significant philosophical interpretation: a concept (or phenomenon) may be understood as different ones in different philosophical perspectives, while different concepts (or phenomena) may be understood as a same one in a certain philosophical perspective. Such properties of rough (...) set theory produce a mathematical model to support critical realism and the theory ladenness of observation in the philosophy of science. (shrink)

This paper presents an interpretation of Husserl''s phenomenological epoché or bracketing ( Einklammerung), which makes it possible to compare his position with philosophical programs developed within the framework of modern analytical philosophy. At the same time it asks in what sense Husserl''s phenomenology is a form of idealism or exceeds the traditional discussion of idealism versus realism.

This paper defends a realist interpretation of theories and a modest realism concerning the existence of quantities as providing the best account both of the logic of quantity concepts and of scientific measurement practices. Various operationist analyses of measurement are shown to be inadequate accounts of measurement practices used by scientists. We argue, furthermore, that appeals to implicit definitions to provide meaning for theoretical terms over and above operational definitions fail because implicit definitions cannot generate the requisite descriptive content. (...) The special case of establishing a temperature scale is examined to show that nonrealist accounts fail to provide insight into the theoretical connections that scientific laws postulate to hold among quantities. (shrink)

We present an alternative to the Copenhagen interpretation of the formalism of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. The basic difference is that the new inter- pretation is formulated in the language of epistemological realism. It involves a change in some basic physical concepts. Elementary particles are considered as extended objects and nonlocal effects are included. The role of the new concepts in the problems of measurement and of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations is described. Experiments to distinguish the proposed interpretation from the (...) Copenhagen one are pointed out. (shrink)

Presenting a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics and, in particular, a realistic view of quantum waves, this book defends, with one exception, ...

This book engages in an analytical and realistic enquiry into legal interpretation and a selection of related matters including legal gaps, judicial fictions, judicial precedent, legal defeasibility, and legislation. Chapter 1 provides an outline of the central theoretical and methodological tenets of analytical realism. Chapter 2 presents a conceptual apparatus concerning the phenomenon of legal interpretation, which it subsequently applies to investigate the truth-in-legal-interpretation issue. Chapters 3 to 6 argue for a theory of legal interpretation (...) - pragmatic realism - by outlining a theory of interpretive games, revisiting the debate between literalism and contextualism in contemporary philosophy of language, and underscoring the many shortcomings of the container-retrieval view and pragmatic formalism. In turn, Chapter 7, focusing on comparative legal theory, advocates an interpretation-sensitive theory of legal gaps, as opposed to purely normativist ones. Chapter 8 explores the connection between judicial reasoning and judicial fictions, casting light on the structure and purpose of fictional reasoning. Chapter 9 provides an analytical enquiry into judicial precedent, examining a variety of ideal-typical systems in terms of their normative or de iure relevance. Chapter 10 addresses defeasibility and legal indeterminacy. In closing, Chapter 11 highlights the central tenets of a realistic theory of legislation. (shrink)

Any realist interpretation of quantum theory must grapple with the measurement problem and the status of state-vector collapse. In a no-collapse approach, measurement is typically modeled as a dynamical process involving decoherence. We describe how the minimal modal interpretation closes a gap in this dynamical description, leading to a complete and consistent resolution to the measurement problem and an effective form of state collapse. Our interpretation also provides insight into the indivisible nature of measurement—the fact that you (...) can't stop a measurement part-way through and uncover the underlying 'ontic' dynamics of the system in question. Having discussed the hidden dynamics of a system's ontic state during measurement, we turn to more general forms of open-system dynamics and explore the extent to which the details of the underlying ontic behavior of a system can be described. We construct a space of ontic trajectories and describe obstructions to defining a probability measure on this space. (shrink)

In this work we will consider gauge interpretations of the conventionality of simultaneity as developed initially by Anderson and Stedman, and later by Rynasiewicz. We will make a critical reassessment of these interpretations in relation to the “tradition” as developed in particular by Reichenbach, Grünbaum, and Edwards. This paper will address different issues, including: the relation between these two gauge interpretations; what advantages or defects these gauge approaches might have; how “new” Rynasiewicz’s approach in relation to the (...) previous ones is; how much of the gauge interpretation Rynasiewicz actually applies to deal with objections to the conventionality of simultaneity thesis. The conclusion is that the gauge interpretations, in their current formulation, do not provide a better “rationale” of the conventionality of simultaneity thesis that supersedes the “tradition”. (shrink)