L’article de Nelson Goodman que nous traduisons ici, « Seven Strictures on Similarity», a été publié dans le recueil Problems and Projects [Goodman 1972]. Ce dernier ouvrage n’a pas fait l’objet d’une traduction exhaustive en français, sans doute parce qu’il contient nombre d’articles fort techniques, qui demandent une connaissance préalable des travaux de Goodman en logique, en épistémologie et en philosophie du langage. Cependant, plusieurs textes de ce recueil revêtent un intérêt majeur ta...

L’interactivité est communément perçue comme la marque caractéristique des technologies digitales et, par extension, de différentes formes de fictions, de médias ou d’œuvres numériques – de la littérature hypertextuelle et des jeux vidéo au net art. On peut toutefois s’interroger sur le sens précis qu’il convient de donner à cette notion, ainsi que sur les promesses auxquelles elle est souvent associée. À défaut de pouvoir cerner un concept unique et maxi-englobant d’interactivité, nous suggérons qu’il est plus profitable de tenter d’identifier (...) des types et des degrés d’interactivité. Nous tentons de montrer pourquoi cette théorie pluraliste et gradualiste est plus attrayante que d’autres approches développées dans la littérature récente. Nous mettons enfin cette conception à l’épreuve du jeu vidéo, en montrant qu’elle permet de réévaluer le rôle que joue l’interactivité dans ce médium, mais qu’elle met aussi au jour les limitations inhérentes des fictions interactives que l’on y trouve. (shrink)

Être vu, nu, par un chat ; essayer de savoir quel effet cela fait d’être une chauve-souris ; penser les modes de cohabitation et de compagnonnage que nous formons avec les animaux, en dépit de toutes les violences que nous leur faisons subir, constituent autant d’expériences de pensée limites qui ont ponctué le discours philosophique sur l’animalité au xxe siècle. Il n’est pas étonnant que Cora Diamond fasse un cas de toutes ces expériences : ce qu’elle nomme « une difficulté (...) de la réalité », c’est-à-dire un point d’achoppement entre la pensée et ce qu’elle essaye de saisir, le réel, qui est susceptible de nous faire perdre nos concepts. Je me propose dans ce texte d’explorer les voies de cette difficulté, qui sont souvent des voies contournées ou des déviations. L’idée est aussi de réfléchir aux moyens dont la philosophie dispose pour affronter cette difficulté, sans dénégation et sans déviation. (shrink)

À une métaphysique fermée prétendant découvrir ou identifier des essences fixes et chercher une formule de la nature qui n’aurait pas d’histoire, Goodman oppose une métaphysique ouverte. Les gens font les mondes dans lesquels ils interagissent et habitent et ils les font en utilisant des outils représentationnels. Si l’abandon du point de vue du spectateur suppose que nous œuvrons, en tant que locuteurs et producteurs d’outils symboliques, à la forme du monde que nous habitons, et si l’amélioration de ces outils (...) est à notre portée, il s’agit d’imaginer des améliorations qui conduisent à des transformations efficaces, à la fois cognitivement et politiquement. Cet article entraîne la théorie goodmanienne du worldmaking du côté de l’ingénierie conceptuelle. En dernière analyse, il entreprend de montrer ce que l’ingénierie conceptuelle aurait à gagner à redéployer la théorie goodmanienne de la projectibilité (degrés de projectibilité, implantation, projectibilité héritée). (shrink)

Alexis Anne-Braun Dans cet article, je présente quelques-uns des enjeux du débat en philosophie contemporaine sur la photographie. Ce débat, comme cela a déjà été noté dans un certain nombre de publications récentes, est en fait hanté par une question sceptique, qui fut posée à la photographie dès son invention : si l’image photographique s’excepte du régime traditionnel de la représentation et si elle est bien le résultat d’une prise de vue automatique, en quel sens pouvons-nous encore dire qu’elle (...) est artistique? Il me semble que le concept goodmanien d’exemplification permet de répondre au défi lancé par le sceptique. J’essaie de montrer pourquoi. Plus encore, je m’emploie à montrer comment le concept goodmanien d’exemplification pourrait s’accommoder assez bien de la spécificité du médium photographique. (shrink)

Que ce soit à l’occasion d’un exercice académique obligé, dans les marges de l’activité théorique, ou bien qu’il s’agisse d’un exercice philosophique destiné à tester la cohérence et la solidité d’un « système », la philosophie produit du biographique, selon les modalités et les régimes discursifs les plus divers. Depuis l’Antiquité, des philosophes compilent discours et anecdotes, et font l’exégèse d’une doctrine dans une perspective tantôt apologétique, tantôt critique – que l’on songe, par...

RÉSUMÉCet article est une défense de la position exposée par Nelson Goodman dans Langages de l'art. Goodman affirme que les images fonctionnent dans des systèmes symboliques denses. La différence entre texte et image ne se situe pas là où nous l'aurions spontanément cherchée : dans l'expérience perceptuelle que nous avons des images. Une telle théorie de la dépiction peut sembler iconoclaste, voire complètement fausse, et ce, parce que nous y voyons à tort une explication de la représentation picturale. Elle offre (...) cependant, rapportée à d'autres intuitions philosophiques qui essaiment ailleurs dans l’œuvre de Goodman, une meilleure compréhension du fonctionnement des images.ABSTRACTIn this paper, I draw unexpected conclusions from Nelson Goodman's views on depiction. Faithful to the symbolic turn of aesthetics in the twentieth century, Goodman argues that pictures are as conventional and natural as scripts. Unlike scripts, however, pictures work in dense symbolic systems. The difference between image and script cannot be found where we would have spontaneously looked: in our perceptual experience of pictures. Obviously, the structural approach which is at stake in Languages of Art is iconoclast; we often consider it surprising, or even absolutely misleading, perhaps because we do not connect the analyses Goodman conducts in his essay with the experience we ordinarily have of pictures. I argue that Goodman's position becomes clearer when it is reduced to a much more modest philosophical purpose: to offer a criterion for discrimination between scripts and pictures. Pictures, unlike scripts, are dense. Of course, that does not explain depiction. However, my account of Goodman's view, when connected to intuitions about cognitive processes that have spread elsewhere in his work, sheds light on the way pictures are connected with the objects they depict. (shrink)

M’appuyant sur la pratique de l’artiste Marina Abramović qui vise à constituer la performance en art de répertoire, je propose dans cet article une ontologie des œuvres performatives. Est-il possible de re-performer une œuvre du passé, comme on exécuterait une œuvre musicale définie par sa partition? La question philosophique que j’adresse s’inscrit dans le cadre d’une ontologie appliquée sensible aux problèmes concrets que soulèvent certaines pratiques bien identifiées dans le monde de l’art : identification, préservation et conservation des œuvres. J’examine (...) successivement différentes hypothèses : une performance artistique est un événement typique identifié par son script et multiplement instanciable ; la performance artistique est l’énonciation d’une idée ; la performance artistique est un événement doublement initié et par le contexte de sa composition et par celui de son exécution. Ces différentes formulations conduisent à interroger la place de l’interprète dans les performances artistiques. Ma contribution principale consiste à mettre au jour les conditions de félicité des œuvres performatives et à interroger la relation que ces conditions de félicité entretiennent avec les critères d’identification des œuvres dans le cadre d’une interprétation contextualiste de l’ontologie. (shrink)

Cet article porte sur les pratiques contemporaines d’écriture qui mêlent récit de soi et théorie. Je m’emploie à montrer qu’une intelligence du monde social (des rapports de classe, de genre, de race et d’autres formes de domination) s’exerce à l’étage des vécus singuliers. Ce n’est pas seulement que les gens sont différents les unes des autres – encore que j’insiste sur la vérité et la force d’une affirmation à première vue si banale –, mais aussi qu’un sens renouvelé de l’objectivité (...) s’obtient lorsque la production d’un savoir est réfléchie depuis la position particulière de celui qui l’énonce. Sans doute est-ce l’une des leçons fondamentales des épistémologies féministes. (shrink)

Les jeux vidéo sont des artefacts qui possèdent des propriétés esthétiques et qui donnent lieu à des pratiques d’appréciation riches et variées. Dans la littérature contemporaine, plusieurs philosophes se sont demandé s’ils entraient dans la catégorie traditionnelle de l’art. Une autre façon de considérer la chose, qui ne présuppose aucune définition de l’art, consiste à appréhender la forme artistique particulière à laquelle appartiennent les œuvres vidéoludiques. Cet article propose ainsi de repérer les propriétés esthétiques standards et variables des œuvres vidéoludiques (...) en tant que forme artistique, pour partie déterminée par les propriétés du medium des arts numériques. (shrink)

1 La ressemblance comme problème philosophique transversal Personne ne nierait que les chats se ressemblent sous un grand nombre de rapports, ni ne douterait du fait qu’ils ressemblent plus aux chiens qu’aux bactéries ou aux matchs de tennis. En réalité, il semble légitime de croire que c’est en vertu de cette similarité d’ensemble que nous pouvons dire que certains individus appartiennent à une même espèce, qu’ils sont tous des chats. Ces intuitions partagées suggèrent que la notion de resse...

« L’injustice et les animaux » est un essai de la philosophe américaine Cora Diamond, paru en 2001 dans un ouvrage collectif édité par Carl Elliott intitulé Slow Cures and Bad Philosophers. Comme l’indique l’auteure dans une note finale, le texte est la reprise d’une conférence donnée à l’Université d’Indiana sur les droits des animaux. Sa traduction en français avait été un moment envisagée pour l’intégrer aux essais réunis dans le recueil L’Importance d’être humain. En raison de certains re...

L’article de Nelson Goodman que nous traduisons ici, « Seven Strictures on Similarity», a été publié dans le recueil Problems and Projects [Goodman 1972]. Ce dernier ouvrage n’a pas fait l’objet d’une traduction exhaustive en français, sans doute parce qu’il contient nombre d’articles fort techniques, qui demandent une connaissance préalable des travaux de Goodman en logique, en épistémologie et en philosophie du langage. Cependant, plusieurs textes de ce recueil revêtent un intérêt majeur ta...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Respire, Con-spireMarielle Macé (bio)Translated by Alexis Ann StanleyA rather suffocating atmosphere is becoming our customary environment, ecologically, politically, and socially. It is time to affirm "a universal right to breathe"–what Achille Mbembe called the essential demand for justice that escalated during the age of the Anthropocene and is now crudely reemerging in the current pandemic's attack on the respiratory system.But the right to breathe is not "merely" the (...) right to live, to breathe in unpolluted spaces, or to share clean air; it is also the right to a breathable life, a life worth caring for. It is the right to love life, life with and among one another: the right to fraternize in and through breath, the right to detoxify our relationships and breathe with others. To respire with: to con-spire.Because in order to breathe, one needs air, but one especially needs other living beings, a world and landscapes with which to breathe, in which to breathe, and which can breathe through us. To breathe is not only to maintain one's own breath or nourish one's own organic system as if it lived an unconnected life; it is to acquiesce to the world, to the fact that there is a world—this one, precisely—and to participate in it. A person who breathes, in fact, partakes both in and of the world. Moreover, they make a gift to it, contributing to the way of the world in its entirety by a breath that tightly holds the ties binding each of our bodies to the current state of the living._______The lack of air, the feeling of a stifling age, even the fear of overwhelming suffocation—such is our current "natural" condition, the primary characteristic not only of our virtually toxic living environment, but also of our smothering, asphyxiating political condition wrought with violence and discrimination. Such also is the state of our social condition—the way we (rather poorly) create community—or rather, of our distinct social conditions. For there is a very inequitable distribution of the right to air or to breathe determined by which lives "count" and which do not.The Anthropocene is perhaps the age of a new respiratory 'condition.' Toxic fumes, pestilential odors, extensive carbon consumption, agro-chemical [End Page 177] discharge, microparticles, deforestation and soil asphyxiation, radioactive clouds with phantom trajectories and invisible powers of penetration… the history of industrial modernity is that of "the continuous and large-scale alteration of life's atmospheric conditions" (Zimmer 25). Recently, wildfires affecting America and Europe have been adding their horrifying fumes to century-old pollution. Even clouds ("the clouds up there, the marvelous clouds" of Baudelaire) are being targeted: China recently announced the country's intention to accelerate its cloud seeding program1 (in 2008, over one thousand shells loaded with silver iodide were dispersed in order to clear the skies of Beijing and prevent rain from ruining the opening ceremony of the Olympic games. This technique is also used more and more frequently to generate rainfall and avoid agricultural droughts. This type of 'sky colonization' or climate militarization is a profanation of language as much as of nature: to "sow the clouds" (or "grow meat")—even language tells us something is wrong…)It took a great amount of time and much denial before widespread bodily infection and industrial pollution's public health effects could be recognized. Industrialists may object (at times with doctors), but in the most working-class regions, bodies know: "lungs and our sense of smell protest in their own way against any conclusive evidence which would exonerate factories" (Zimmer 23).The history of pollution is, in fact, also a question of exploitation as well as a social history: that of the unequal distribution of air and the inequitable exposure (depending on one's living milieux) to what is oppressive, stifling—in a word, unbreathable. Unsanitary housing, proximity to mines or factories, and lack of access to healthcare are always factors; respiratory diseases are the most prevalent of occupational illnesses2; and the staggering surge in childhood lead poisoning in the very heart of our capitals—the weakest of bodies have... (shrink)

RésuméCet article examine le duel à l’époque moderne entendu à la fois comme la forme suprême de la querelle, son aboutissement naturel sous certaines conditions, alors qu’il est lui-même objet de controverses vives. Le duel, qui repose sur des lois, réglemente le dissensus en même temps qu’il le porte à son paroxysme. Il peut servir de révélateur de la place du dissensus dans la société, de la façon dont les rapports sociaux prennent acte du désaccord entre les individus et réglementent (...) les façons de le résoudre. Cet article examine la forme du duel comme fin des querelles. Il se porte ensuite sur les controverses autour des duels. Il examine enfin la place du duel dans la littérature, sa fonction poétique et dramatique, afin de souligner les façons dont le texte littéraire participe de cette réflexion sur le duel. (shrink)

In this article, we assess the generalizability of the feminist agrifood systems model developed by Sachs et al.. We ask to what extent might these findings generated from the study of Pennsylvania women farmers be generalized to other regions of the U.S. We define and situate the FAST theory to the Michigan, U.S. context in order to better understand how the shifts in agriculture and women’s roles in the U.S. based on our data, align or depart with that experienced by (...) women farmers in the northeast. We find that there are many similarities in the experiences of these two populations, but there are also some differences. Five primary differences in the two populations are articulated. Michigan women farmers appear to struggle to assert the identity of a farmer; struggle to access land via inheritance; are income dependent on males; often work in value-added production that does not challenge traditionally-coded ‘women’s work’; and perpetuate on-farm education/networks based on nostalgia which may further the distance between producers and consumers. We conclude with a brief discussion of what may account for these differences. (shrink)

The precarious rights of senior citizens, especially those who are highly educated and who are expected to counsel and guide the younger generations, has stimulated the creation internationally of advocacy associations and opinion leader groups. The strength of these groups, however, varies from country to country. In some countries, they are supported and are the focus of intense interest; in others, they are practically ignored. For this is reason we believe that the creation of a network of all these associations (...) is essential. The proposed network would act as a support for the already-existing policies of the United Nations’ High Commission for Human Rights, of independent experts, and of the Global Alliance for the Rights of Older People. All three have long ago recommended the creation of a recognized instrument for uniting presently scattered efforts. The proposed network, therefore, will seek to promote the international exchange of relevant expertise, and it will reinforce the commitments and actions that single countries are currently taking to meet these objectives. For example, informative public events can be organised to promote particular support initiatives and to provide an opportunity for new members of the network to be presented. The network will promote health for senior citizens, disease prevention, senior mobility, safe free time for seniors, alimentary education, protection against new risks and dangers, as well as equity in the services necessary for seniors to adopt new information and communication technologies. In the case of retired academic members, the network will promote equality with respect to continuing use of digital technologies (particularly email), continuing access to research libraries, and the guaranteed ability for seniors to fund their own research programs and to deliver free seminars. (shrink)

Historically, scientific and engineering expertise has been key in shaping research and innovation policies, with benefits presumed to accrue to society more broadly over time. But there is persistent and growing concern about whether and how ethical and societal values are integrated into R&I policies and governance, as we confront public disbelief in science and political suspicion toward evidence-based policy-making. Erosion of such a social contract with science limits the ability of democratic societies to deal with challenges presented by new, (...) disruptive technologies, such as synthetic biology, nanotechnology, genetic engineering, automation and robotics, and artificial intelligence. Many policy efforts have emerged in response to such concerns, one prominent example being Europe's Eighth Framework Programme, Horizon 2020, whose focus on “Responsible Research and Innovation” provides a case study for the translation of such normative perspectives into concrete policy action and implementation. Our analysis of this H2020 RRI approach suggests a lack of consistent integration of elements such as ethics, open access, open innovation, and public engagement. On the basis of our evaluation, we suggest possible pathways for strengthening efforts to deliver R&I policies that deepen mutually beneficial science and society relationships. (shrink)

This paper offers a conceptualmodel for participatory research projects thataim to improve the sustainability ofagriculture and natural resource management.The purpose of the model is to provide asystematic framework that can guide the designof participatory research projects, theiranalysis, and the documentation of results. Inthe model, conceptual boundaries are drawnbetween research and development, developmentand extension and between extension andimplementation. Objectives, activities, andactors associated with each of these realmsneed to be carefully selected, monitored, andevaluated throughout the course of a projectusing well-designed indicators. The (...) depth ofdisciplinary and methodological integration,and quality of participation needed to reachthe desired impact effectively and efficiently,however, needs to be determined on acase-by-case basis depending on the context andissues surrounding each particular project. (shrink)

In the influential 1995 article “Social Conditions as Fundamental Causes of Disease,” Bruce Link and Jo Phelan described social and political factors as “fundamental causes” of death and disease. Whitney Pirtle has recently declared racial capitalism another such fundamental cause. Using the case of the water crisis in Flint, Michigan, she has argued that racial capitalism's role in that situation meets each of the criteria Link and Phelan's article outlines: racial capitalism influenced multiple disease outcomes, affected disease outcomes through multiple (...) risk factors, involved access to flexible resources that can be used to minimize both risks and the consequences of disease, and was reproduced over time through the continual replacement of intervening mechanisms. We argue for Pirtle's conclusion using the extensive literature on racial capitalism and case studies concerning housing in the United States and Brazil and what Naomi Klein has termed “corona capitalism” in India. If races correspond to hierarchies of material security, as suggested by Ruth Wilson Gilmore, then these hierarchies and their causal effects are fundamental determinants of public health. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage donne la parole à cinq philosophes marxistes français de renommée internationale - Main Badiou, Étienne Balibar, Jacques Bidet, Michael Löwy, Lucien Sève - qui présentent l'évolution de leur rapport à Marx, à la philosophie et à la politique, depuis les années 1950 jusqu'à aujourd'hui. Dans ces entretiens, chacun à son tour, les auteurs ont répondu aux questions posées par deux philosophes de générations différentes, Alexis Cukier et Isabelle Garo : comment avez-vous rencontré la pensée de Marx, et (...) comment avez-vous commencé à en faire usage? Dans quel contexte théorique et politique, pour répondre à quelle urgence et à quel problème, en rapport avec quels engagements militants? Quelle a été l'évolution de votre conception du communisme et que devraient être une action ou une organisation politique communiste aujourd'hui? Que retenez-vous d'essentiel de la pensée de Marx pour penser la période politique présente? Au fil des réponses à ces questions, les auteurs analysent les rapports entre philosophie et politique, reviennent sur la trajectoire du marxisme en France et abordent la signification du communisme aujourd'hui. L'introduction, complétée d'une bibliographie étendue, présente les coordonnées théoriques et politiques complexes de ces trajectoires singulières, leurs convergences et leurs divergences, qui éclairent le renouvellement en cours de la philosophie marxiste ainsi que de l'engagement communiste."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Alexis de Tocqueville asserted that America had no truly great literature, and that American writers merely mimicked the British and European traditions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This new edited collection masterfully refutes Tocqueville's monocultural myopia and reveals the distinctive role American poetry and prose have played in reflecting and passing judgment upon the core values of American democracy. The essays, profiling the work of Mark Twain, F. Scott Fitzgerald, John Updike, Edith Wharton, Walt Whitman, Henry James, Willa (...) Cather, Walker Percy, and Tom Wolfe, reveal how America's greatest writers have acted as society's most ardent cheerleaders and its most penetrating critics. Christine Dunn Henderson's exciting new work offers literature as a portal through which to view the philosophical principles that animate America's political order and the mores which either reinforce or undermine them. (shrink)

We advocate and develop a states-based semantics for both nominal and adjectival confidence reports, as in "Ann is confident/has confidence that it's raining", and their comparatives "Ann is more confident/has more confidence that it's raining than that it's snowing". Other examples of adjectives that can report confidence include "sure" and "certain". Our account adapts Wellwood's account of adjectival comparatives in which the adjectives denote properties of states, and measure functions are introduced compositionally. We further explore the prospects of applying these (...) tools to the semantics of probability operators. We emphasize three desirable and novel features of our semantics: (i) probability claims only exploit qualitative resources unless there is explicit compositional pressure for quantitative resources; (ii) the semantics applies to both probabilistic adjectives (e.g., "likely") and probabilistic nouns (e.g., "probability"); (iii) the semantics can be combined with an account of belief reports that allows thinkers to have incoherent probabilistic beliefs (e.g. thinking that A & B is more likely than A) even while validating the relevant purely probabilistic claims (e.g. validating the claim that A & B is never more likely than A). Finally, we explore the interaction between confidence-reporting discourse (e.g., "I am confident that...") and belief-reports about probabilistic discourse (e.g.,"I think it's likely that.."). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Beyond DisciplineOn the Status of Bodily Difference in PhilosophyEmily Anne ParkerMuch deserved attention has recently been directed to the fact that philosophy faculty are surprisingly homogeneous when compared to faculty in other fields, not only in the humanities and social sciences but also in the natural sciences (Alcoff 2011, 7–8). Perhaps it is as a result of this bodily homogeneity that sexual harassment and sexual assault in philosophy departments (...) are routine and that stories about such experiences, when they can be shared, are questioned or ignored. Certainly such experiences deserve attention. But they also deserve philosophical examination. Linda Martín Alcoff points out that a study of the relationship between percentages of (predominantly white, hetero, cisgendered, normatively abled) women in a department and the status of that department in Brian Leiter’s Philosophical Gourmet demonstrates a “reverse correlation, where the higher the percentages of women, the lower the rankings. Departments concerned about their Leiter rankings would be ‘rational,’ then to forego hiring too many women” (Alcoff 2011, 8). Alcoff suggests that instead of simply counting the nonwhite, cisgendered, heterosexual, normatively abled men in the field, we need to consider the connection between the “climate for women and the attitude toward feminist philosophy” and (as her own work elsewhere would suggest) the philosophy of race. Clearly Alcoff is right to suggest that we should not think of sexual harassment as the obstacle to participation of a very small sampling of bodily diversity in the field, but rather as a circular indicator and cause of a larger problem. [End Page 222]But what is the problem?I would like to suggest that the problem, still underdiscussed, is the implicit disciplining of what counts as philosophical. It is this quiet yet ubiquitous questioning that not only keeps philosophy homogeneous, but also prevents most critics of that homogeneity from doing more than reporting limited demographical information about the field. To be sure, when one wants to argue that there is something wrong with the culture of philosophy as a field, it seems necessary to marshal data. And yet it will always be the case that such studies can never answer questions about how a culture develops, what its assumptions, horizons, and cosmologies are. For this one needs (critical race, feminist, ability, queer, trans, economic, ecological) philosophy. And yet, circularly, disciplining what counts as philosophical sets limits to what questions can be explored.Kristie Dotson, Gayle Salamon, and Alexis Shotwell have each in separate contexts pointed out that what counts as “philosophy” should be recognized as the philosophical question that it itself apparently is (Dotson 2011, 2012; Salamon 2009; Shotwell 2010). This conversation about what counts as philosophy is directly related to the status not only of white hetero women in the field, but also the status of anyone who challenges the philosophical centrality of normatively raced-classed-abled-gendered bodies. In a recent paper, Dotson reflects on having been asked repeatedly, “How is this paper philosophy?” (Dotson 2012, 407). This question is extremely common, and as Shotwell points out, having to answer it is “a common experience for people who attempt to do work in philosophy while departing in archive and method from accepted norms” (117). Shotwell further suggests that it’s not just archive and method that make one suspect; it’s also the questions that one is willing to ask about oneself, about community, about world. Read together, Dotson and Shotwell make it clear not only that the question of whether one’s work is or is not philosophical is a common question, but that this is the case precisely because it is taken for granted what philosophy is, perhaps especially by those who ask whether X is or is not philosophy. Otherwise the question of how some project or other is philosophy simply wouldn’t be articulable as a question.For the moment I would like to take a widely common and implicit definition of philosophy seriously: “Philosophy” is whatever directs fundamental questions at itself. Perhaps this means that philosophy is the art of attempting to discern the creative within the wrongly presumed. We could then say that philosophy asks, What do we presuppose? Why, and... (shrink)

Background: To place a dependent with severe dementia in a nursing home is a painful and difficult decision to make. In collectivistic oriented societies or families, children tend to be socialised to care for ageing parents and to experience guilt and shame if they violate this principle. Leaving the care to professional caregivers does not conform with the cultural expectations of many ethnic groups and becomes a sign of the family’s moral failure. Research design: Qualitative design with individual in-depth interviews (...) with nurses, family members and dementia care coordinators in Norway, Montenegro, Serbia and South Africa. Braun and Clarke’s six analytic phases were used. Ethical considerations: The project was approved by the Regional Committee for Research, South-Eastern Norway; the Norwegian Centre for Research Data; the Ethics Committee; University of Limpopo, MEDUNSA Campus, South Africa; and by the local heads of the respective nursing homes or home care services. Interviewees were informed orally and in writing and signed an informed consent form. Findings: Healthcare professionals tend to be contacted only when the situation becomes unmanageable. Interviewees talked about feelings of obligation, shame and stigma in their societies regarding dementia, particularly in connection with institutionalisation of family members. Many lacked support during the decision-making process and were in a squeeze between their own needs and the patients’ need of professional care, and the feeling of duty and worry about being stigmatised by their surroundings. This conflict may be a source of pre-decision regret. Conclusion: Family caregivers need help to understand the behaviours of persons with dementia and how to access the formal and informal services available. Thus, they may provide effective support to patients and family carers alike. Supportive interventions for caregivers need to be tailored to meet the individual needs of both the caregiver and the persons with dementia. (shrink)

Many competent speakers initially judge that (i) is true and (ii) isfalse, though they know that (iii) is true. (i) Superman leaps more tallbuildings than Clark Kent. (ii) Superman leaps more tall buildings thanSuperman. (iii) Superman is identical with Clark Kent. Semanticexplanations of these intuitions say that (i) and (ii) really can differin truth-value. Pragmatic explanations deny this, and say that theintuitions are due to misleading implicatures. This paper argues thatboth explanations are incorrect. (i) and (ii) cannot differ intruth-value, yet (...) the intuitions are not due to implicatures, but ratherto mistakes in evaluating (i) and (ii). (shrink)

Conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics are branches of philosophy concerned with questions about how to assess and ameliorate our representational devices (such as concepts and words). It's a part of philosophy concerned with questions about which concepts we should use (and why), how concepts can be improved, when concepts should be abandoned, and how proposals for amelioration can be implemented. Central parts of the history of philosophy have engaged with these issues, but the focus of this volume is on applications (...) to work in contemporary philosophy of language and mind, epistemology, gender and race theory, ethics, philosophy of science, and philosophical logic. This is the first volume devoted entirely to conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics. The volume explores the possibilities, benefits, problems, and applications of conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics. It consists of twenty chapters written by leading philosophers. (shrink)

This is a concise, advanced introduction to current philosophical debates about truth. A blend of philosophical and technical material, the book is organized around, but not limited to, the tendency known as deflationism, according to which there is not much to say about the nature of truth. In clear language, Burgess and Burgess cover a wide range of issues, including the nature of truth, the status of truth-value gaps, the relationship between truth and meaning, relativism and pluralism about truth, and (...) semantic paradoxes from Alfred Tarski to Saul Kripke and beyond. Following a brief introduction that reviews the most influential traditional and contemporary theories of truth, short chapters cover Tarski, deflationism, indeterminacy, realism, antirealism, Kripke, and the possible insolubility of semantic paradoxes. The book provides a rich picture of contemporary philosophical theorizing about truth, one that will be essential reading for philosophy students as well as philosophers specializing in other areas. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been growing discussion amongst philosophers about “conceptual engineering”. Put roughly, conceptual engineering concerns the assessment and improvement of concepts, or of other devices we use in thought and talk (e.g., words). This often involves attempts to modify our existing concepts (or other representational devices), and/or our practices of using them. This paper explores the relation between conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics, where conceptual ethics is taken to encompass normative and evaluative questions about concepts, words, and (...) other broadly “representational” and/or “inferential” devices we use in thought and talk. We take some of the central questions in conceptual ethics to concern which concepts we should use and what words should mean, and why. We put forward a view of conceptual engineering in terms of the following three activities: conceptual ethics, conceptual innovation, and conceptual implementation. On our view, conceptual engineering can be defined in terms of these three activities, but not in a straightforward, Boolean way. Conceptual engineering, we argue, is made up of mereologically complex activities whose parts fall into the categories associated with each of these three different activities. (shrink)

Which concepts should we use to think and talk about the world and to do all of the other things that mental and linguistic representation facilitates? This is the guiding question of the field that we call ‘conceptual ethics’. Conceptual ethics is not often discussed as its own systematic branch of normative theory. A case can nevertheless be made that the field is already quite active, with contributions coming in from areas as diverse as fundamental metaphysics and social/political philosophy. In (...) this pair of papers, we try to unify the field, reflecting on its basic nature, structure, and methodology. (shrink)

Which concepts should we use to think and talk about the world and to do all of the other things that mental and linguistic representation facilitates? This is the guiding question of the field that we call ‘conceptual ethics’. Conceptual ethics is not often discussed as its own systematic branch of normative theory. A case can nevertheless be made that the field is already quite active, with contributions coming in from areas as diverse as fundamental metaphysics and social/political philosophy. In (...) this pair of papers, we try to unify the field, reflecting on its basic nature, structure, and methodology. (shrink)

This book reimagines the compositional semantics of comparative sentences using words such as more, as, too, and others. The book's central thesis entails a rejection of a fundamental assumption of degree semantic frameworks: that gradable adjectives like tall lexicalize functions from individuals to degrees, i.e., measure functions. I argue that comparative expressions in English themselves introduce “measure functions”; this is the case whether that morphology targets adjectives, as in *taller* or *more intelligent*; nouns, as in *more coffee*, *more coffees*; verbs, (...) such as *run more*, *jump more*; or expressions of other categories. Furthermore, she suggests that expressions that comfortably and meaningfully appear in the comparative form should be distinguished from those that do not in terms of a general notion of "measurability": a measurable predicate has a domain of application with non-trivial structure. This notion unifies the independently motivated distinctions between, for example, gradable and non-gradable adjectives, mass and count nouns, singular and plural noun phrases, and telic and atelic verb phrases. Based on careful examination of the distribution of dimensions for comparison within the class of measurable predicates, I tie the selection of measure functions to the specific nature and structure of the domain entities targeted for measurement. The book ultimately explores how, precisely, we should understand semantic theories that invoke the "nature" of domain entities: does the theory depend for its explanation on features of metaphysical reality, or something else? Such questions are especially pertinent in light of a growing body of research in cognitive science exploring the understanding and acquisition of comparative sentences. (shrink)

Which concepts should we use to think and talk about the world, and to do all of the other things that mental and linguistic representation facilitates? This is the guiding question of the field that we call ‘conceptual ethics’. Conceptual ethics is not often discussed as its own systematic branch of normative theory. A case can nevertheless be made that the field is already quite active, with contributions coming in from areas as diverse as fundamental metaphysics and social/political philosophy. In (...) this pair of papers, we try to unify the field, reflecting on its basic nature, structure, and methodology. (shrink)

In Against Purity, Alexis Shotwell proposes a powerful new conception of social movements as custodians for the past and incubators for liberated futures. Against Purity undertakes an analysis that draws on theories of race, disability, gender, and animal ethics as a foundation for an innovative approach to the politics and ethics of responding to systemic problems.

Aristoteles zwischen jüdischer und islamischer Philosophie -- Die historische Vernunft und das Problem der Zeit -- Sinn und Sein -- Leben und Bewusstsein bei Dilthey -- Die Krise der Kultur und ihrer Werte sowie der Westpädagogik -- Der Sinn und seine Verfehlung -- Schuld -- Der Trieb als Gegenstand der Philosophie -- Von der Person zur Existenz? -- Die verschlungenen Wege der Ich-Pädagogik: Versuch, Geschichte der Pädagogik neu zu schreiben.

How are we able to experience values? Two sides are competing in contemporary literature: ‘Meinongians’ (represented notably by Christine Tappolet) claim that axiological properties are apprehended in emotions, while ‘Hildebrandians’ (represented in particular by Ingrid Vendrell Ferran) assert that such experiences of value (or valueceptions) are accomplished in special ‘value feelings’, and that emotions are only responses to these felt values. In this paper, I study the Husserlian viewpoint on this issue. I reveal that, contrary to what almost all scholars (...) have assumed so far, Husserl’s position is not reducible to Meinong’s and must on the contrary be regarded as an innovative and stimulating approach that helps unifying the two standard frameworks. It indeed recognizes (with Hildebrandians) the existence of non-emotional value feelings, while maintaining (with Meinongians) that originary axiological experiences are necessarily emotional. (shrink)