"La nouvelle nous est parvenue que pas une étymologie de Heidegger, pas même Léthé et Aléthès, n'était exacte. Mais le problème est-il bien posé?Tout critère scientifique d'étymologie n'a-t-il pas d'avance été répudié, au profit d'une pure et simple Poésie? On croit bon de dire qu'il n'y a là que des jeux de mots. Ne serait-il pas contradictoire d'attendre une quelconque correction linguistique d'un projet qui se propose explicitement de dépasser l'étant scientifique et technique vers l'étant poétique? Il ne s'agit pas (...) d'étymologie à proprement parler, mais d'opérer des agglutinations dans l'autre-langue, pour obtenir des surgissements dans la langue". (Gilles Deleuze Critique et clinique, 1993, p. 122 à 124). Ces lignes de Deleuze expriment parfaitement et par avance l'objection que l'on pourrait opposer à notre ouvrage. Cependant, et tout en conservant à Deleuze un respect entier pour sa belle oeuvre, nous ne pensons pas que des "agglutinations" dans la langue suffisent à faire passer dans un registre poétique. Le détail de notre démonstration philosophique et philologique a voulu montrer que Heidegger, en faisant comme s'il "entendait" la pensée grecque de l'origine, est entré dans une région que ne peuvent plus atteindre ni philosophie, ni philologie, ni même poésie, parce qu'elle se retire dans l'invérifiable. (shrink)

Covering the basics as well as recent research results, this book provides a very readable introduction to the exciting interface of computability and ...

In my article "berkeley's master argument" I attempt to show that an argument berkeley uses in the 'dialogues' and 'principles' to support his contention that whatever is perceivable is perceived can be seen as an illuminating attempt to relate conceptualizing, Imaging and perceiving. In consequence it cannot be dismissed as resting on an elementary fallacy, But reflects on the conditions for the self ascription of experience.

Pierre André,Michel Bourban | : Dans un contexte d’urgence, les philosophes ne peuvent plus se contenter d’élaborer des théories idéales de la justice climatique fondées sur des motivations purement morales. Il est désormais nécessaire d’envisager des approches non idéales. Nous proposons ici de prendre au sérieux le problème de la motivation à l’action et nous mettons en avant certains motifs prudentiels pour lutter contre le changement climatique, en vue non pas de remplacer, mais de renforcer les motivations morales existantes, (...) mais insuffisantes. Nous commençons par présenter trois grandes approches idéales qui ont prévalu jusqu’ici dans la recherche sur la justice climatique et sont fondées respectivement sur l’éthique déontologique, sur l’éthique des vertus et sur l’utilitarisme. Nous mettons en évidence leurs limites pratiques, en ciblant le problème de la motivation à l’action. Nous proposons ensuite quelques pistes pour résoudre ce problème en esquissant une approche non idéale de la justice climatique. Cette approche est centrée sur les motivations amorales ressortant de l’examen attentif des perturbations systémiques globales et des contextes nationaux et locaux spécifiques. Elle est à notre sens incontournable pour motiver les États-nations, les entreprises et les individus. Il s’agit cependant moins de la substituer totalement aux théories idéales de la justice climatique que de compléter celles-ci pour établir une vision plus compréhensive qui distingue le problème de la justification morale de celui de la motivation. | : In a situation of urgency, philosophers can no longer rely exclusively on ideal theories of climate justice grounded on purely moral motives. It has become necessary to build nonideal approaches. We propose to give serious consideration to the problem of motivation to act by putting forward some prudential reasons for tackling climate change—with the aim not of replacing existing but inadequate moral motivations, but of strengthening them. First, we identify three major ideal approaches that have so far prevailed in climate justice research, grounded respectively on deontological ethics, on virtue ethics, and on utilitarianism. We highlight their practical limitations, particularly with regards to the problem of motivation to act. Second, we open the way for an alternative nonideal approach to climate justice based on amoral motivations issuing from a careful examination of global systemic disruptions as well as of specific national and local situations. This approach cannot be ignored if one wishes to motivate nation-states, corporations, and individuals to act. However, our goal is not to replace ideal theory with nonideal theory, but rather to complete the former with the latter for a more comprehensive account of climate justice that distinguishes the problem of moral justification from the problem of motivation. (shrink)

Moral reasoning typically informs environmental decision-making by measuring the possible outcomes of policies or actions in light of a preferred ethical theory. This method is subject to many problems. Environmental pragmatism tries to overcome them, but it suffers also from some pitfalls. This paper proposes a new method of environmental pragmatism that avoids the problems of both the traditional method of environmental moral reasoning and of the general versions of environmental pragmatism. We call it 'justificatory moral pluralism' - it develops (...) the intuition that normative ethical theories need not be mutually exclusive. This leaves room for important forms of pluralist environmental ethics that do not require a once-and-for-all prior commitment to an ethical theory when deciding about policies or courses of action related to the protection of the environment. Justificatory moral pluralism offers a viable solution to the recurrent conflicts between efficient environmental decisions and the need for moral reasoning. (shrink)

Trata-se de capítulo de um livro sobre a noção de "substância" na história da filosofia e contém uma discussão sobre a noção ordinária de "corpo" do ponto de vista da filosofia analítica.

The book generalises earlier theories of belief change to cover all kinds of changes of sets by sets. The principal focus is still on changes of belief sets in response to new evidence, but the formal theory extends to all domains with a closure operation and a preference structure including, for example, systems of action. Contraction is the key notion; all other changes can be defined. Various new applications of the theory are outlined. A sentential version of contraction, subtraction, is (...) proposed as a formal counterpart to 'except'-locutions in natural language. Connections are emphasised with other areas at the interface between philosophical logic and artificial intelligence such as reasoning from default assumptions or from inconsistent premises. A relation of merge inference is proposed as a means of retrieving maximal but nontrivial information from inconsistent premises. Merge inference respects certain anti-Boolean intuitions while avoiding a revision of classical logic. (shrink)

The philosophy problem of identity and the related problem of change go back to the ancient Greek philosophers and fascinated later figures including Leibniz, Locke and Hume. Heraclitus argued that one could not swim in the same river twice because new waters were ever flowing in. When is a river not the same river? If one removes one plank at a time when is a ship no longer a ship? What is the basic nature of identity and persistence? This book (...) introduces and asseses the philosophical puzzles posed by things persisting through time. Beginning with essential historical background to the problem it explores the following key topics and debates: mereology and identity, including 'Leibniz's Law' the constitution view of identity the 'relative identity' argument concerning identity temporary identity four-dimensionalism, counterpart and mulitiple counterpart theory supervenience the problem of temporary intrinsics the necessity of identity presentism ontological and epistemological criteria for persistence and the difference between them. Including chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary this book is essential reading for anyone seeking a clear and informative introduction to and assessement of the metaphysics of identity. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to try to elucidate Wittgenstein’s ex-travagant thesis that each and every mathematical advancement involves some “semantical mutation”, i.e., some alteration of the very meanings of the terms involved. To do that we will argue in favor of the idea of a “modal incompati-bility” between the concepts involved, as they were prior to the advancement, and what they become after the new result was obtained. We will also argue that the adoption of this thesis profoundly (...) alters the traditional way of con-struing the idea of “progress” in mathematics. (shrink)

This paper offers a new interpretation for Wittgenstein`s treatment of mathematical identities. As it is widely known, Wittgenstein`s mature philosophy of mathematics includes a general rejection of abstract objects. On the other hand, the traditional interpretation of mathematical identities involves precisely the idea of a single abstract object – usually a number –named by both sides of an equation.

Many theists conceive of God as a perfect being, i.e., as that than which none greater is metaphysically possible. On this grand view of God, it seems plausible to think that such a supreme and maximally great being would not be subject to luck of any sort. Given the divine perfections, God is completely insulated from luck. However, I argue that the opposite is true: precisely because God is perfect, he is subject to a kind of luck called _constitutive_ luck. (...) In this paper, first I provide an analysis of luck and then explain the concept of constitutive luck. I proceed to defend constitutive luck from charges of incoherence and examine a different approach to make sense of this luck. Furthermore, I distinguish between two kinds of constitutive luck and argue that even if God isn’t subject to one kind, evading the second kind is unsuccessful. I offer two ways that God is constitutively lucky and reach a surprising conclusion: a perfect being is the luckiest of all possible beings. (shrink)

A short analysis, by 'one-who-was-there,' of one of the most significant art movements of our century.

Mit seiner Theorie der vernünftigen Übereinkunft liefert André Olbrich die Grundlegung eines Kriteriums für moralische Urteile über richtig und falsch: Im Anschluss an klassische und moderne Vertragstheoretiker wird die Akzeptanz eines Urteils durch die Betroffenen zum obersten Rechtfertigungsmaßstab erhoben. Das vertragstheoretische Denken wird weiterentwickelt und konsequent als umfassende normative Theorie ausformuliert. Die Leserinnen und Leser erfahren, von welchem Standpunkt aus sich die Regeln unseres sozialen Miteinanders einer Kritik unterziehen lassen und auf welchen moralischen Grundlagen Recht und Politik aufbauen.

The place of the State in Spinoza's ontology has emerged in scholarly literature as one of the most complex issues involving Spinoza's political thought. At issue is whether Spinoza's State is an actual individual with its own conatus . Some consider it a completely real individual, others say that its individuality can only be metaphoric, whilst others point out the conceptual insufficiency of this polarity for explaining the ontological status of political aggregates and try to overcome it through new concepts, (...) such as the multitude, transindividuality, and figuration. In this paper, each of these interpretations is analyzed and dismissed in favour of a new one stating that Spinoza's State is actually a dynamic network of political concepts operating in resemblance of individuality and reflecting the main characteristics of the modern Nation-State. (shrink)

O presente artigo tem como tema as extensas discussões de Wittgenstein sobre uma das formas mais simples e elementares de infinitude em matemática: as dízimas periódicas. Tentamos organizar os vários argumentos do autor em uma única exposição continuada. No final do artigo, introduzimos, ainda que de forma breve, o famoso argumento sobre “execução de regras” de Wittgenstein, bem como a idéia de interpretações nãostandard de processos infinitos.

A. Selbstverortung: Der hermssche Blick auf andere Religionen -- b. Öffnung zu Anderen: Das Problem geschlossener Rationalitätsformen -- ii. Einheit in der Vielfalt. Die interpretative Vernunft -- III. 3.C. Schlussfolgerungen. Bildung der Weltanschauungen -- IV. Ergebnisse und Ausblicke -- IV. 1. Perspektiven des Theorievergleichs -- IV. 1.A. Eine 'Topik der Verständigung' - als Struktur der Forschungsfragen -- IV. 1.B. Vernunft und Religion als komplementäre Konkurrenz -- IV. 2. Möglichkeiten interkultureller Koexistenz -- IV. 2.A. Evangelischer Glaube im Horizont des globalen Wandels (...) -- IV. 2.B. Diskurskultur und Diskurs der Kulturen -- IV. 2.C. Konstitutionalisierung der Wirkungsgemeinschaft der Menschheit -- Bibliografie -- Literatur von Jürgen Habermas -- Literatur von Eilert Herms -- Weitere Literatur -- Personenregister -- Sachregister. (shrink)

This paper deals with the recent Swedish proposals of a Intuitionistic notion of Truth, by Dag Prawitz and Per Martin-Löf.

The objective of this paper will be to present a critical evaluation of the so-called “standard conception of a proof”. According to this conception, a text could only be called a “demonstration of a certain mathematical proposition” if we could find a completely formalized version of that demonstration, its “corresponding formal proof”. We will compare these ideas with the treatment of the same topic within two markedly different contexts, that of contemporary Swedish intuitionism and that of modern software engineering. Finally, (...) we will offer a quick discussion of some of Wittgenstein's proposals regarding the subject. /// -/- O objetivo deste texto será o de apresentar uma avaliação crítica da assim chamada “concepção estândar” do que seja uma prova. Segundo essa concepção, um texto só poderia ser chamado de uma “demonstração de uma certa proposição matemática” se pudéssemos encontrar uma versão completamente formalizada daquela demonstração, sua “prova formal correspondente”. Faremos comparações com o tratamento do mesmo tópico em dois contextos muito distintos, aquele do intuicionismo sueco contemporâneo e o da moderna engenharia de software. Por fim, faremos uma rápida apresentação de algumas propostas de Wittgenstein sobre o assunto. (shrink)

nombreux textes inédits André Robinet. 2. LE SECOND MEMBRE DE LA DISJONCTION ARCHITECTONIQUE (D2): LES AUTOMATES SYSTÉMIQUES ( 1686-1716) Le discours leibnizien dans (v>4) emprunte la voie d'une communication qui ...

This paper offers a reconstruction of Wittgenstein's discussion on inductive proofs. A "algebraic version" of these indirect proofs is offered and contrasted with the usual ones in which an infinite sequence of modus pones is projected.

This paper presents a new reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s famous (and controversial) rule-following arguments. Two are the novel features offered by our reconstruction. In the first place, we propose a shift of the central focus of the discussion, from the general semantics and the philosophy of mind to the philosophy of mathematics and the rejection of the notion of a function. The second new feature is positive: we argue that Wittgenstein offers us a new alternative notion of a rule (to replace (...) the rejected functions), a notion reminiscent of Category Theory’s notion of a morphism. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics involves two highly controversial theses: the idea that mathematical propositions are not about (abstract) objects and the idea that no mathematical conjecture is ever answered as such, because the advent of the proof always determines a semantical shift of the meanings of the terms involved in the conjecture. The present article offers a reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s arguments supporting these theses within a very restricted setting: Archimedes’ discovery of an algorithm for calculating the number Pi.

According to André Orléan, the characteristics of the economical sciences dead ends in the analysis of Jacques Sapir, is the desire expressed by the orthodox movement to radically split up from the social sciences in order to establish the economical science as autonomous. André Orléan also points out Jacques Sapir-,s criticism to his book The monetary violence, according to which it induces a form of monergol essentialism that would render the currency an essential and contradictory social relation.

Este artigo oferece uma nova reconstrução para os argumentos do famoso segundo capítulo de Word and Object de Quine e sua idéia da Tradução Radical . De acordo com essa abordagem, o maior alvo de Quine é a noção de composicionalidade como sendo o elemento fundamental para qualquer teoria do significado. Em poucas palavras, não poderia haver nenhuma “teoria do significado”, para Quine, simplesmente porque a noção de composicionalidade deveria ser rejeitada como a concepção central da semântica. Além disso, tomamos (...) o cuidado de diferenciar argumentos empíricos de argumentos a priori de natureza modal. Esses últimos constituem-se no que propomos chamar de Teorema do Automorfismo de Quine , a idéia de que há maneiras alternativas de se reconstruir a estrutura gramatical de qualquer língua incluindo predicação e que poderiam manter invariantes todas as nossas predisposições para comportamento verbal sob quaisquer estados de coisas, atuais ou meramente possíveis. Em nosso entender, é esse teorema que determina fundamentalmente a rejeição da composicionalidade por Quine e, assim, de todas as teorias do significado. (shrink)