The property common to three kinds of paradoxes (logical, semantic, and cultural) is the underlying presence of an exclusive disjunction: even when it is put to a check by the paradox, it is still invoked at the level of implicit discourse. Hence the argumentative strength of paradoxical propositions is derived. Logical paradoxes (insolubilia) always involve two contradictory, mutually exclusive, truths. One truth is always perceived to the detriment of the other, in accordance with a succession which is endlessly repetitive. A (...) check is put on the principle of the excluded middle by the logical paradoxes, because self-reference leads to an endlessly repeating circle, out of which no resolution is conceivable. Logical paradoxes are to be compared with the `objective ambiguity' prevalent in oracles (Gallet, 1990). Semantic paradoxes are contextually-determined occurrences, whose resolution at the metalinguistic level is made possible by the discovery of a middle term. They express a wilful ambiguity, in which the interlocutor is invited to take an active part in the construction of sense, since what must be found is the unexpected sense thanks to which A and not-A can be asserted simultaneously. Cultural paradoxes play about doxa (`common sense') and openly challenge common opinion because of their character as inopinata (`unexpected'). My aim is to show that even cultural paradoxes hide sometimes a flaw of argumentation similar to logical or semantic paradox; they too imply an exclusive disjunction leading to the disappearance of the middle terms. Finally, basing myself on the theory of topoi (Anscombre and Ducrot, 1983), a tentative resolution of the cultural paradoxes will be suggested. (shrink)

First published in 1994. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The paper develops a philosophical account of emotions experienced and communicated on the internet, and, in particular, in the context of social media use. A growing body of research across disciplines has investigated the distinctive features of emotions in the digital age, and a key question in this regard concerns whether online emotions are the same kind of phenomena as those undergone offline. In this paper, I contribute to addressing this question by suggesting that the structure and characteristic features of (...) internet-mediated emotions can be accounted for within the perspective of Peter Goldie’s narrative theory of emotion. To do so, I first offer a reconstruction of Goldie’s conception of emotions as complex, dynamic, episodic and structured phenomena. I then move to show how the experience of emotions on social media like Facebook displays the characteristics which are at the core of Goldie’s account, proceeding to suggest that this enables us to better understand some of the features of emotions undergone on the internet. More specifically, I argue that the intensity, persistence and contagiousness of some online emotions can be better understood if we adopt Goldie’s framework. (shrink)

Statt Emotionen auf ein allgemeingültiges Prinzip zu reduzieren, richtet Wittgenstein sein Interesse in seiner Spätphilosophie auf die Möglichkeit des subtilen Sprechens und Ausdrückens über und von Emotionen: Was liegt emotionalen Sprachspielen logisch zugrunde? Wie lernt ein Kind sich emotional auszudrücken? Wie sind kulturelle Unterschiede möglich? Und wie ist es möglich, dass auch interkulturelle Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen verschiedenen Menschen und Völkern existieren? Wie kann Gewissheit über das emotionale Empfinden eines anderen Menschen erlangt werden? Wie ist ein Zweifel daran möglich? Ist emotionales Verhalten (...) kulturell erlernt oder als Instinkt angeboren? Wittgenstein erarbeitet ein anthropologisches Modell von Emotionen, in welchem er sowohl den Instinkt als auch die Sozialisation des Menschen ins Zentrum seines Fokusses rückt"--Back cover. (shrink)

If mathematics is the purest form of knowledge, the perfect foundation of all the hard sciences, and a uniquely precise discipline, then how can the human brain, an imperfect and imprecise organ, process mathematical ideas? Is mathematics made up of eternal, universal truths? Or, as some have claimed, could mathematics simply be a human invention, a kind of tool or metaphor? These questions are among the greatest enigmas of science and epistemology, discussed at length by mathematicians, physicians, and philosophers. But, (...) curiously enough, neuroscientists have been absent in the debate, even though it is precisely the field of neuroscience—which studies the brain’s mechanisms for thinking and reasoning—that ought to be at the very center of these discussions. How our Emotions and Bodies are Vital for Abstract Thought explores the unique mechanisms of cooperation between the body, emotions, and the cortex, based on fundamental physical principles. It is these mechanisms that help us to overcome the limitations of our physiology and allow our imperfect, human brains to make transcendent mathematical discoveries. This book is written for anyone who is interested in the nature of abstract thought, including mathematicians, physicists, computer scientists, psychologists, and psychiatrists. (shrink)

This book brings together leading scholars in the history of science, history of universities, intellectual history, and the history of the Royal Society, to honor Professor Mordechai Feingold. The essays collected here reflect the impact Feingold's scholarship has had on a range of fields and address several topics, including: the dynamic pedagogical techniques employed in early modern universities, networks of communication through which scientific knowledge was shared, experimental techniques and knowledge production, the life and times of Isaac Newton, Newton's reception, (...) and the scientific culture of the Royal Society. Modeling the interdisciplinary approaches championed by Feingold as well as the essential role of archival studies, the volume attests to the enduring value of his scholarship and sets a benchmark for future work in the history of science and its allied fields. (shrink)

The publication, first in German, then in the Italian translation, of the volume 60 of the Martin Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe, which is devoted to a Phenomenology of the religious life, reopened the debate on the relationship between his thought and theology. The author reviews an essay by Luca Savarino, which reconstructs Heidegger’s reflection on Christianity from 1916 to 1927 and aims at defining its place in the development of his thought. Mirroring the thesis according to which an ontologization of Aristotelian categories (...) would happen in the existential analytics, the author argues that the ontological project of Sein und Zeit originates from a formalization and subsequent elevation to the ontological plan of some fundamental structures of life which reveal themselves in the Christian experience. (shrink)

How do languages of the world refer to motion? According to one widely held view, languages draw on a pool of common ‘building blocks’ in representing motion events, such as figure and ground, path (or trajectory), manner, cause of motion, and so on (cf. Talmy, 1985). Nevertheless, individual languages differ both in the elements they select out of the available stock of motion ‘primitives’ and in the way they conflate them into specific lexical and clausal structures (Talmy, 1985; Slobin, 1996a; (...) Choi & Bowerman, 1991; Jackendoff, 1990; and many others). (shrink)

Stimmungen bilden in der Wiener Moderne einen experimentellen Zugang zur Ich-Welt-Einheit. Sie führen Leib, Sprache und physikalische Welt in einen Zusammenhang, der sich jedoch begrifflichem Erfassen entzieht. So ist die Einheit, die Stimmungen vermitteln, paradoxerweise nur mehrdeutig sagbar. Sie drückt sich als eine bewegte Konfiguration aus Stimmung, Leib und Sprache in Texten der Wiener Moderne aus. Gisbertz' Studie fokussiert auf gemeinsame Strukturen und Funktionen von >StimmungStimmungStimmung.

Although the subject matter of this Element is properties, do not expect in-depth introductions to the various views on properties 'on the market'. Instead, here that subject matter is treated meta-philosophically. Rather than ask and try to answer a question like do properties exist? this Element asks what reasons one might have for thinking that properties exist, what counts as solving that problems, as well as how we ought to proceed when trying to find out if properties exist. As it (...) turns out, these questions and their answers are all intricately intertwined. Theory comparison and theory evaluation is in other words tricky. Do properties exist? After reading this Element all we can say is therefore this: that depends. (shrink)