La fenomenología de la razón escudriña todos los procesos racionales que intervienen en la aprehensión del objeto real y de su constitución, y las consiguientes relaciones noético-noemáticas. Sólo la razón pura colegida, primero como fuerza que depura los procesos de la evidencia y las posiciones del sujeto, y sólo la razón entendida también como proceso que ratifica la verificabilidad del darse el objeto y de todos los demás procesos y relaciones, se revela como la única instancia posible capaz de asegurar (...) la validez del conocimiento y del objeto del conocimiento. Por otro lado, la razón juega un papel decisivo en lo que respecta al sujeto de razón. Ésta es la nota constitutiva y respectiva del ser humano, el poder que lo separa del entramado de facticidades y contingencias de las que se compone la realidad, de suerte que éste no es un factum más entre todas las objetividades, tal como postulan la psicología y las ciencias naturales. El hombre es un ser mundano, está efectivamente en el mundo. Ahora bien, “su ser en” y “su estar en” son modificados por el poder de la razón. Su modo de ser mundano es serlo racionalmente. Únicamente de este modo el Umwelt deviene Lebenswelt.The phenomenology of reason inspects all rational processes involved in the apprehension of real object and its constitution, and the respective noetic-noematic relationships. Only the pure reason comprehended, first of all, as a strength which purifies the mentioned processes, the evidence and the subject positions. Secondly the reason, also comprehended as a process which confirms the object verificability which gives itself and the other processes and relationships, appears as the only possible power, which is able to guarantee the validity of the knowledge, and so the object of knowledge. On the other hand, the reason plays a very important role in the subject of the reason. This is the constitutive and respective note of the human being, the power that separates it from the labyrinth of facts and contingencies which makes up reality, so that this isn’t a fact among all objectivities, as postulated by psychology and natural sciences. The human being is a worldly being; he is really in the world. Now then, “his being-in” and “his staying-in” are modified by the strength of the reason. His way of being worldly is being rationaly. Only in this way the “Umwelt” becomes “Lebenswelt”. (shrink)

A new Arrovian impossibility is obtained without invoking independence of irrelevant alternatives type assumptions. The new conditions leading to the impossibility are based on the concept of power of enforcement, and specify how this power can (see A3) or cannot be expanded (see A1, A2 and A4).

Conjunto de textos de pesquisadores que discutem alguns dos temas mais importantes da fenomenologia, a partir dos fundamentos de Husserl e sua influência em diversas correntes da filosofia contemporânea, principalmente a ontologia de Martin Heidegger e a fenomenologia da existência de Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

Two justifications of backward induction (BI) in generic perfect information games are formulated using Bonanno's (1992; Theory and Decision 33, 153) belief systems. The first justification concerns the BI strategy profile and is based on selecting a set of rational belief systems from which players have to choose their belief functions. The second justification concerns the BI path of play and is based on a sequential deletion of nodes that are inconsistent with the choice of rational belief functions.

The relationship between extensive and normal form analyses in non-cooperative game theory seems to be dominated, at least traditionally, by the so-called ‘sufficiency of the normal form principle’, according to which all that is necessary to analyse and ‘solve’ an extensive game is already in its normal form representation. The traditional defence of the sufficiency principle, that Myerson (1991, p. 50) attributes to von Neumann and Morgenstern, holds that, with respect to extensive games, it can be assumed without loss of (...) generality, that players formulate simultaneously and independently their strategic plans at the beginning of the game – a situation which, it is claimed, is exactly described by the normal representation of an extensive game. (shrink)

When preferences are defined over two alternatives and societies are variable, the group formed by the relative majority rule, the unanimity rule, the dictatorial rules, and the strongly dictatorial rules is characterized in terms of five axioms: unanimity, reducibility, substitutability, exchangeability, and parity. This result is used to provide characterizations of each of these rules by postulating separating axioms, that is, an axiom and its negation. Such axioms identify traits specifically differentiating a type of rule from the other types. For (...) instance, majority differs from strong dictatorship in the existence of a society for which collective indifference should be a less likely outcome than the strict preference of one alternative over the other. As a second example, the difference between majority and strong dictatorship can be traced back to the requirement that the likelihood of collective indifference diminishes with the size of society. (shrink)

It is shown that the axioms Cubitt and Sugden (1994; Economic J. 104: 798) impose on a theory of rationally justifiable play (TRJP) do not prevent the possibility that two players necessarily disagree concerning the probability they ascribe to the choice of a third player. This appears to indicate that those axioms are not sufficient for defining a `reasonable' TRJP. In addition, for the case in which a player's beliefs are statistically independent, conditions for a TRJP are suggested under which (...) the existence of a quasi-strict equilibrium is sufficient, but the existence of a consistent n-pair is not, for defining a TRJP meeting those requirements. (shrink)

Antonio Quesada (Public Choice 130:395–400, 2007) argues that a dictator has no more than two to three times the ‘average power’ of a non-dictatorial voter. If Quesada is correct, then his argument has major consequences for social choice theory; for instance, it warrants reconsidering the significance of Arrow’s Theorem. If Quesada is incorrect, however, then his position is dangerously misleading. This paper argues that Quesada is wrong. His argument depends on his own formal account of (...) power, an account that is implausible because it disregards a basic insight common to the standard characterisations of voting power: the idea that one has power over an outcome to the extent that one is able to change that outcome. Claims about power have a counterfactual component; to assert that an individual actually has determined an outcome is also to make an assertion about what would have been the case had that individual acted differently. We can employ David Lewis’s influential account of counterfactuals to show, contra Quesada, that in a dictatorship, nondictatorial individuals and groups cannot possibly determine a social preference. In short, Quesada is fundamentally mistaken about power, and thus also about the distribution of power in a dictatorship. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Acosta, José de (1539–1600) Alberdi, Juan Bautista (1810–84) Bello, Andrés (1781–1865) Bilbao, Francisco (1823–65) Bolkvar, Simón (1783–1830) Casas, Bartolomé de las (1484–1566) Caso, Antonio (1883–1946) Cruz, Sor Juana Inés de la (1651–95) da Costa, Newton Carneiro Affonso (b. 1929) Dussel, Enrique (b. 1934) Frondizi, Risieri (1910–83) Gaos, José (1900–69) González Prada, Manuel (1848–1918) Gracia, Jorge J. E. (b. 1942) Haya de la Torre, Victor Raúl (1895–1979) Hostos, Eugenio Marka de (1839–1903) Ingenieros, José (1877–1925) Korn, (...) Alejandro (1860–1936) Lastarria, José Victorino (1817–88) Lemos, Miguel (1854–1917) Mariátegui, José Carlos (1895–1930) Martk, José (1853–95) Méndez Sierra, Justo (1848–1912) Mora, José Maria Luis (1794–1850) Miró Quesada, Francisco (b. 1918) Rabossi, Eduardo (1930–2005) Ramos, Samuel (1897–1959) Rodó, José Enrique (1872–1917) Romero, Francisco (1891–1962) Sahagún, Fray Bernardino de (1499–1590) Salazar Bondy, Augusto (1925–74) Sarmiento, Domingo Faustino (1811–88) Ofelia Schutte (b. 1945) Sepslveda, Juan Ginés de (ca. 1494–1573) Torretti, Roberto (b. 1930) Vasconcelos, José (1882–1959) Vaz Ferreira, Carlos (1872–1958) Villoro, Luis (b. 1922) Vitoria, Francisco de (ca. 1483–1546) Zea Aguilar, Leopoldo (1912–2004) Acknowledgment Further Reading. (shrink)

According to the Green Paper presented by the European Commission in July 2001, corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis (Commission of the European Communities, 2001b, p. 6). On this basis, in 2002, the Italian Government, and especially the Italian Ministry of Welfare, launched an initiative called CSR-SC (social commitment) in order to foster the proactive social role of (...) Italian enterprises, with great attention on SME involvement. The technical partner of the Italian Ministry of Welfare for this initiative is Bocconi University. The goal of this contribution is to present the main results of CSR–SC research project developed by Bocconi University. The paper provides a detailed picture of the general scheme designed to carry out the research project and a review of the different methodologies used to support the solutions proposed. (shrink)

Two linear orderings are equimorphic if each can be embedded into the other. We prove that every hyperarithmetic linear ordering is equimorphic to a recursive one. On the way to our main result we prove that a linear ordering has Hausdorff rank less than $\omega _{1}^{\mathit{CK}}$ if and only if it is equimorphic to a recursive one. As a corollary of our proof we prove that, given a recursive ordinal α, the partial ordering of equimorphism types of linear orderings of (...) Hausdorff rank at most α ordered by embeddablity is recursively presentable. (shrink)

The literatures on bounded and ecological rationality are built on adaptationism—and its associated modular, cognitivist and computational paradigm—that does not address or explain the evolutionary origins of rationality. We argue that the adaptive mechanisms of evolution are not sufficient for explaining human rationality, and we posit that human rationality presents exaptive origins, where exaptations are traits evolved for other functions or no function at all, and later co-opted for new uses. We propose an embodied reconceptualization of rationality—embodied rationality—based on the (...) reuse of the perception-action system, where many neural processes involved in the control of the sensory-motor system, salient in ancestral environments have been later co-opted to create—by tinkering—high-level reasoning processes, employed in civilized niches. (shrink)

En este artículo nos proponemos exponer, a partir de los límites conceptuales encontrados a los planteamientos arqueo-genealógicos de Michel Foucault, la posibilidad de plantear, en dos momentos –arqueo-genealógico y gubernamental–, una “ética de la insubordinación reflexiva”. Es decir, una “ética de la libertad inmanente” al débil que al decir su palabra, denuncia y al denunciar cuestiona al tirano y su mundo al habar y actuar con –y por– los otros. Esta ética de la intersubjetividad planteada como una ética de la (...) insumisión concertada, crítica y deliberada, pensamos, puede derivar de ciertas “condiciones enunciativas” encontradas en las dos últimas investigaciones concernientes al “decir veraz” o el “hablar franco” expuestos en El gobierno de sí y de los otros y El coraje de la verdad. (shrink)

Technological unemployment is a subset of historically recurring problems related to jobs in general and unemployment in particular, which are now of global importance. The typical difficulties of...

La biología sintética encierra un enorme potencial transformador de los organismos vivos, incluyendo en un futuro quizás no muy lejano la transformación del propio genoma humano. Son claras las conexiones que pueden establecerse entre este enorme potencial transformador y las pretensiones de los partidarios del biomejoramiento humano. La construcción de genomas completamente sintéticos puede cambiar de forma definitiva e irreversible aspectos fundamentales de la vida humana, quizás hasta el punto de dar lugar a un organismo que difiera de nuestra especie (...) como ahora nosotros podemos diferir de los grandes simios. En este artículo se discuten los principales pros y contras que ha suscitado este debate, señalando algunos de los presupuestos más problemáticos de las propuestas recientes sobre el biomejoramiento humano. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Locke’s Letter on Tolerance has been a controversial issue since the seventeenth century: its defense of tolerance compromises restricting atheists and Catholics, which would attain religious freedom, one of the highest values of liberal theory. Taking this issue as its central, the purpose of this article is to think about this tension in Locke’s political thinking. In order to collaborate with this debate, the text is divided in two parts: in the first one, the various meanings of what Locke (...) understands by atheist will be presented in his different political texts; in the second, we will analyze the importance of religion in Lockean political thought. (shrink)

The article discusses Pausanias’ obscure statement (1.26.3) that the early Hellenistic Athenian general Olympiodoros ‘recovered the Piraeus and Mounychia’. By understanding the feat as an episode within the wider context of the Athenian stasis of 295 between the ‘tyrant’ Lachares and Olympiodoros’ democratic resistance, the article shows that the narrative of the enterprise (most likely based on an honorific decree) aimed to i) establish a parallel between Olympiodoros and the illustrious democratic recovery by Thrasyboulos, ii) rehabilitate Olympiodoros as a democratic (...) hero after his involvement in the oligarchic years of the second regime of Demetrios Poliorketes in Athens, and iii) serve as a call to action to recover the Piraeus, which was under Macedonian control when the honours were bestowed. (shrink)

Seeing, according to the enactive approach, is not something that happens inside our brain, rather it is something we do, but, as I will argue thanks to the performance art, it is something we do together. The performing arts, with their characteristics – autopoietic feed-back loop, spectator/performer exchange, oscillation of the dichotomous subject-object pair - constitute a model through which to investigate the nature of our perception, which is constitutively relational, participative, and transformative.

We propose the “microbiota‐inflammasome” hypothesis of major depressive disorder (MDD, a mental illness affecting the way a person feels and thinks, characterized by long‐lasting feelings of sadness). We hypothesize that pathological shifts in gut microbiota composition (dysbiosis) caused by stress and gut conditions result in the upregulation of pro‐inflammatory pathways mediated by the Nod‐like receptors family pyrin domain containing 3 (NLRP3) inflammasome (an intracellular platform involved in the activation of inflammatory processes). This upregulation exacerbates depressive symptomatology and further compounds gut (...) dysbiosis. In this review we describe MDD/chronic stress‐induced changes in: 1) NLRP3 inflammasome; 2) gut microbiota; and 3) metabolic pathways; and how inflammasome signaling may affect depressive‐like behavior and gut microbiota composition. The implication is that novel therapeutic strategies could emerge for MDD and co‐morbid conditions. A number of testable predictions surface from this microbiota‐gut‐inflammasome‐brain hypothesis of MDD, using approaches that modulate gut microbiota composition via inflammasome modulation, fecal microbiota transplantation, psychobiotics supplementation, or dietary change. (shrink)

Tolerance was and still is a key notion in Neo-Hindu discourse. Its systematic articulation is to be found in the speeches and writings of Swami Vivekānanda. Inspired by his master Rāmakṛṣṇa, he proclaimed non-dual Vedānta as the metaphysical basis of universal tolerance and brotherhood as well as of India’s national identity. Conceptually, his notion of tolerance is to be understood as a hierarchical inclusivism, given that all religions are said to be ultimately included in Vedāntic Hinduism. The claim is that (...) Advaita Vedānta is not a religion but Religion itself. Thus Vivekānanda promoted his understanding of Vedāntic Hinduism as the world religion based upon what he perceived to be universally valid ethical and metaphysical principles. Neo-Hinduism has had a profound, lasting influence among the educated middle classes of India and Vivekānanda was among those who paved the way for the independence movement of the early 20th century. The popular Western view of Hinduism as being synonymous wi... (shrink)

El propósito de este trabajo consiste en exponer las tareas más apremiantes que, a juicio del autor, debe asumir la Filosofía del Derecho del presente y del inmediato futuro. Para ello, se analizan las dos tareas que se consideran de interés prioritario: la primera versa en torno a lo que entraña el desafío tecnológico propio de la sociedad digital que habitamos y que se concreta en la respuesta que desde la filosofía jurídica debe avanzarse respecto a la omnipresencia en todos (...) los ámbitos sociales, económicos, políticos, culturales y jurídicos de la Inteligencia Artificial (IA). Hace referencia la segunda al riesgo cultural que entraña la pretensión de determinados movimientos que se autoconsideran portavoces de los signos del universo tecnológico y los desarrollos de la tecnociencia, para inferir la propuesta ideológica del final del humanismo y el inicio de la era posthumanista. El trabajo concluye asignando a la Filosofía del Derecho la función de ser la conciencia de la IA que es Inteligencia sin conciencia; y de reivindicar la persistente necesidad de respetar y realizar los valores humanistas frente a su pretendida abolición por el posthumanismo. (shrink)

Aos quarenta anos de O Princípio Responsabilidade, de Hans Jonas, o ensaio1 procede à sondagem exploratória e à análise da tensão ético-política acerca das concepções de utopia e de antiutopia, dispostas e posicionadas pelas filosofias blochiana e jonasiana. Se para Bloch o que tem movido — e, por certo, seguirá movendo — a humanidade recebe sua identidade da docta spes, sob a forma utopia concreta, fundada na ontologia do "ainda-não consciente"; para Jonas, ao contrário, é necessário suplantar a mentalidade utópica, (...) sobremaneira a tecnológica, derivada e executora do projeto baconiano, de modo a facilitar a consolidação da ética da responsabilidade destinada à civilização tecnológica. Se uma posição ético-política finda por interrogar a outra, intenciona-se a explicitação crítica de ambas argumentações, que poderá fornecer alguns elementos de compreensão do problema. A hipótese subjacente aponta para a parte mais vulnerável de O Princípio Responsabilidade, os capítulos V e VI, em que ocorrem a crítica jonasiana à utopia de pressupostos derivados da filosofia marxista, sintetizados e atualizados em O Princípio Esperança, de Ernst Bloch. (shrink)