American critical realism emerged in two forms: an ‘essentialist’ version defended, with some significant divergences, by George Santayana and C. A. Strong, and an ‘empirical’ version primarily defended by Roy Wood Sellars. Both forms of American critical realism aimed at an epistemologically convincing ‘representationalist’ account of perception. However, they were divided over issues of ontology. While Santayana and Strong invoked the notion of essence in order to ontologically reinforce their epistemological conceptions, Sellars attempted a more empirical, evolution-based approach. It will (...) be argued that Sellars’s view has more to recommend it because it better explains the actual mechanism of perceptual representation. (shrink)

American philosophical realism developed in two forms: “new” and “critical” realism. While the new realists sought to ‘emancipate’ ontology from epistemology and defended a direct theory of perception, the critical realists promoted a representationalist account of perception and thus argued for an epistemological dualism. Bertrand Russell’s early philosophical writings figured prominently in both of these American realist camps. However, while the new realists quite enthusiastically embraced the Russellian analytic style of reasoning (and Russell himself appreciated the American new realists as (...) anti-idealist allies), the critical realists were significantly more reserved toward Russell’s point of view. In the present paper, I identify the reasons for this difference in reception. In particular, I will show that the critical realists’ reservations pertained primarily to a more traditionalist—‘continental’—account of philosophy, whereas the neo-realists proved instrumental in setting the stage for later full-blown analytic philosophy in the United States. (shrink)

This paper examines Ralph Barton Perry's analysis of the ‘ego-centric predicament’. It will be shown that Perry convincingly argued against prevailing contemporary versions of idealism and that it makes perfectly good sense to consider him a precursor of subsequent trends in American analytic philosophy. Perry's appraisal and promotion of the contemporary logic of relations in the framework of early twentieth-century American neorealism provides further evidence of his being a proto-analytic philosopher. His personal acquaintance with Bertrand Russell proved instructive in this (...) regard. On the whole, Perry's distinctive approach to philosophy was instrumental in establishing the analytic style of reasoning in the United States. This paper is devoted to substantiating this claim. It is thus hoped that a clearer picture of early twentieth-century American philosophy will begin to emerge. (shrink)

Thought Theory seems to provide an answer to the paradox of fiction which has the ontological merits of current pretence accounts without, however, assuming mere pretence emotions. This article will question whether present formulations of TT live up to what they promise. Whenever its current versions try to include evaluative beliefs in a TT framework in order to comply with a cognitivist account of emotions, they either stop being a genuine thought theory or endorse the irrationalism of fictional emotions. This (...) unfortunate outcome can be prevented by shifting the focus to thoughts, and specifically to the genetic dynamics of how we come to think of the objects in question. This is at least what we can learn from Edmund Husserl, who developed a still underestimated account according to which it is possible to have the belief that x merits evaluation as appearing emotion-worthy without this belief implying that x merits being believed to exist. (shrink)

Structure is the connecting link between the early epistemologies of Cassirer, Schlick, and Carnap. However, there are important programmatic differences among Cassirer’s, Schlick’s, and Carnap’s articulations of the structuralistic point of view. Whereas Cassirer hoped to argue in favor of an ‚idealist‘ and Schlick in favor of a ‚realist‘ conception of structure, Carnap thought it possible to remain neutral in this respect. I will argue that Carnap’s approach, though at first sight promising, was doomed to failure precisely because of its (...) base in ‚neutralism‘. In order to distinguish mathematical from physical structures, a certain form of realism is necessarily required. (shrink)

The present paper is concerned with Helmholtz’s theory of measurement. It will be argued that an adequate understanding of this theory depends on how Helmholtz’s application of the concepts of perception and coincidence is interpreted. In contrast both to conventionalist and Kantian readings of Helmholtz’s theory, a more realistic interpretation will be suggested.

Analytic philosophy in the United States emerged parallel to the demise of idealism. During the second half of the nineteenth century, Josiah Royce had contributed importantly to the predominance of idealist systems and corresponding academic groups. With the rise of pragmatism and new realism, the situation changed dramatically: the idealist movement lost momentum and realism began to dominate the discourse. The present paper argues that the critiques of idealism put forward by the realists during the first two decades of the (...) twentieth century were instrumental to the emergence of analytic philosophy in the United States. As I will explain, Ralph Barton Perry (1876–1957) was the key figure in the underinvestigated genesis of this movement. (shrink)

Roy Wood Sellars (1880–1973) is often reduced to his role as father of Wilfrid Sellars. This is unfair because during the 1920s, ‘30s, and ‘40s, Roy Wood was one of the leading figures of the then prevailing American realist movement. In the present paper, I will focus on one particular facet of R. W. Sellars’ philosophical approach: his continual examination of Albert Einstein’s special theory of relativity. I shall primarily reconstruct his discussion of Einstein’s theory, as it can be found (...) in his seminal The Philosophy of Physical Realism (1932). In contrast to authors such as Bertrand Russell or Émile Meyerson, Sellars refused to interpret special relativity in a realist vein. In his view, it should be seen as an “ars mensurandi” and thus being interpreted purely operationally. As with Einstein himself, the concept of simultaneity was his paradigm case in point. However, Sellars opined that besides the physical (mensurational) concepts of time and simultaneity there also exists an ontological understanding of these notions. “Real” time and “absolute” simultaneity are, according to Sellars, the indispensable non-relativistic counterparts to Einstein’s respective relativistic conceptions. They are to be interpreted realistically since they prove, Sellars maintains, to be explanatory regarding events in Einstein-Minkowski’s world. In the course of the paper, I shall compare this view with the one defended by Henri Bergson. Furthermore, Sellars’ later approach from the 1940s and ‘50s will be briefly considered and critically discussed by confronting it with more recent attempts at ontologically ‘grounding’ special relativistic kinematics. (shrink)

Ernest Nagel was one of the first philosophers of science who reflected systematically on the methodology of the social sciences. His cooperation with Paul F. Lazarsfeld at Columbia University proved to be instructive in this regard. Moreover, Nagel stood in close contact with representatives of sociological functionalism and published, in 1956, a contribution on the prospects of a formalization of functionalism. In his seminal The Structure of Science from 1961, Nagel devoted two long chapters to methodological and explanatory problems of (...) the social sciences. The aim of the present chapter is to rationally reconstruct this 1961 account. I will proceed in three steps: first, I shall shed some light on Nagel’s discussion of the problem of a clear-cut demarcation between the natural and the social sciences; then Nagel’s interpretation of the presumptive ‘immaturity’ of the social sciences will be taken into account; finally, two case studies will be provided in order to illustrate the implications of Nagel’s particular analysis. (shrink)

“Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they believed, taking the holy water, having masses said, etc.” The well-known lines from Pascal’s much-discussed fragment “infini rien” have been much commented on. In this context, the keyword self-deception comes up surprisingly often, partly as a criticism of Pascal’s presumed strategy, partly in an attempt to make these lines fruitful for the current discussion on self-deception. I remind the latter attempts to consider an important condition for the success (...) of the “regimen”, which becomes clear when one reflects on the internal characterisation of Pascal’s interlocutor. For if we take into account the kind of self-knowledge we must ascribe to her, we cannot regard her as someone whom acting-as-if naturally leads to faith, but as someone who has already been touched by the grace of God. (shrink)

In der Studie geht Matthias Neuber der Frage nach, in welchem Verhältnis das Konzept des Realismus und der logische Empirismus des Wiener Kreises, eine der dominanten Strömungen der deutschsprachigen theoretischen Philosophie des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts, zueinander stehen. Diese Fragestellung ist in der philosophiehistorischen Forschung bislang nur am Rande behandelt worden. Das ist umso erstaunlicher, als die neuere wissenschaftsphilosophische Realismusdebatte gerade durch den logischen Empirismus maßgeblich mitbestimmt worden ist. Der Autor geht aber noch einen Schritt weiter: Er begründet in dem (...) Band die These, dass es innerhalb des logischen Empirismus selbst Strömungen gab, die mit dem wissenschaftlichen Realismus kompatibel sind. Damit bezieht er eine Gegenposition zum Mainstream in der Deutung der wissenschaftsphilosophischen Realismusdebatte des 20. Jahrhunderts, denn der versteht den wissenschaftlichen Realismus als Gegenprogramm zum logischen Empirismus. Neuber liefert mit seiner philosophiehistorischen Studie nicht weniger als eine Neubewertung des Verhältnisses von Realismus und logischem Empirismus. Ein Werk, das sich insbesondere an Wissenschaftler, aber auch an fortgeschrittene Studierende auf dem Gebiet der Geschichte der Wissenschaftsphilosophie richtet. (shrink)

Pierre Duhem gilt ais einer der wichtigsten Reprüsentanten der franzosischen Wissenschaftsphilosophie um 1900. Seine Konzeption physikalischer Theorien wird üblicherweise ais moderne Umsetzung des antiken – proto-positivistischen – Programms der „Rettung der Phänomene‟ angesehen. Diese Sicht ist richtig, bedarf aber der Ergänzung, indem der diskursive Kontext der Duhemschen Position berücksichtigt wird. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird dargelegt, dass Duhems philosophischer Zeitgenosse Abel Rey eine zentrale Rolle in diesem Zusammenhang spielte.

This article considers the evolution of Feigl's attempt at establishing a stable form of scientific realism. I will argue that Feigl's work in that area should be appreciated for two reasons: it represents a telling case against the view of there being an unbridgeable ‘analytic-continental divide’ in the context of twentieth-century philosophy; it contradicts the idea that scientific realism is at odds with logical empiricism. It will be shown that Feigl developed his scientific realist position from within the logical empiricists’ (...) Vienna Circle. This, in turn, necessitates a fresh approach toward the contemporary scientific realism debate. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that the French philosopher and historian of science Abel Rey played a more influential role in the formative phase of the Vienna Circle than hitherto supposed. On the whole, it will be argued that Rey's contribution had political impact. His interpretation of "modern physics" in 1907 in the face of the alleged "bankruptcy of science" should be appreciated as a masterpiece of applied enlightenment thought. As such, it was especially paradigmatic for Philipp (...) Frank's "positivist" defense of the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics against the irrationalist tendencies of the 1920s and 1930s. (shrink)

This chapter provides an overview of the life and philosophy of Ernest Nagel, as well as a summary of the chapters in this volume. Regarding Nagel's philosophy, we focus on his role and activities to stabilize analytic philosophy and make it a profession, his views about the role and nature of history and sociology of science, naturalism, and socially engaged philosophy, and finally his understanding of the relation between science, society, and philosophy.

Rudolf Carnap’s role in the debate over scientific realism is fairly unclear. In a certain sense, Carnap must be regarded as the one who rendered the whole issue irrelevant. However, it cannot be ignored that Carnap sometimes spoke of himself as an ‘empirical realist.’ So the question to be answered is: in what sense, if at all, did Carnap play a constructive role in the scientific realism debate. It is the aim of the present paper to tackle this question by (...) investigating the relationship between Carnap’s approach toward the realism issue, on the one hand, and the realist positions defended by his logical empiricist fellows Hans Reichenbach and Eino Kaila, on the other. It will be shown that Carnap agreed with Reichenbach that realism has essentially to do with language, but that he disagreed with him over the significance of probability in defending the scientific realist stance. My point will be that realism is not a ‘problem of language.’ Furthermore, it will be argued that Carnap was correctly criticized by Reichenbach for neglecting the role of probability in science. Nevertheless, what can be learned from Carnap’s approach toward the realism issue is that scientific realism cannot be defended in the way that Reichenbach himself suggested, namely by arguing inductively for the adequacy of the realistic ‘language form.’ Rather, scientific realism can only be defended on the ground that language itself is dependent on the ‘structure of the world.’ And this is exactly the point where, eventually, Kaila will enter the scene. (shrink)

The problem of measurement can be reformulated as the problem of measurability: What are the conditions under which measurement becomes possible at all? And what is the ontological status of concrete measurement outcomes? It will be shown in the course of this article that what Joel Michell deemed the ‘representational theory’ of measurement provides an adequate framework for answering these questions. However, contrary to Michell, I will point out that Hermann von Helmholtz should be seen as an important forerunner of (...) the representational view. Furthermore, it will be argued that the Finnish logical empiricist Eino Kaila carried on Helmholtz’s approach by combining it with a certain form of ontological invariantism. On the whole, a ‘structural realist’ account of measurement will be suggested. (shrink)

Wilhelm Ostwald’s program of a physical energetics is the attempt at a comprehensive description of nature on the basis of the concept of energy. In his book Energetische Grundlagen der Kulturwissenschaft, first published in 1909, Ostwald applies this conception to the area of culture. His central assumption is that cultural phenomena should be described by the energetic notion of “efficiency relation” (Güteverhältnis). His systematic thesis is that science, when organized according to the Machian “principle of economy,” proves as the highest (...) form of cultural expression, since it instantiates the notion of quality relation most efficiently, that is, “with the lowest energy expenditure.” This view echoes August Comte’s “law of the three stages” and is intended to supply it with a scientific, i.e., energetic foundation. Max Weber regarded Ostwald’s energetic theory of culture as a misguided attempt at an absolutization of the methods of concept formation within the natural sciences. As he wrote in his devastating review essay “’Energetische’ Kulturtheorien” (1909), Ostwald transformed a certain world view (Weltbild) into a scientifically frivolous ideology (Weltanschauung). In particular, Ostwald’s adherence to the Comtean law of three stages and the associated hierarchy of the sciences were criticized by Weber as outdated and completely beside the point. According to Weber, the concepts of the cultural sciences are not at all dependent on natural scientific concepts such as ‘energy.’ In his view, culture cannot be reduced to nature. But exactly this seemed to be the principal aim of Ostwald’s program. In this paper, I will critically investigate Weber’s critique of that program. I shall argue that Ostwald’s assumption of a natural basis of culture can be ‘rescued’ as a methodological device, but that Ostwald’s – thoroughly substantialist – view of energy should be discarded as a metaphysical relict of ancient ‘stuff ontology.’ . (shrink)

American critical realism was defended in two versions, an “essentialist” and an “empirical.” The main proponent of the essentialist version was George Santayana, who in his Scepticism and Animal Faith (1923) outlined a critical realist account of epistemology based substantially on an articulate doctrine of essences. In the present paper, an attempt is made to critically examine the resulting approach, particularly in relation to perception. It will be argued that Santayana failed to develop a sufficiently convincing essentialist view of perception, (...) and that his actual significance in terms of the impact of the critical realist movement was, contrary to what is often claimed, quite limited. (shrink)

Logical empiricism is commonly seen as a counter-position to scientific realism. In the present paper it is shown that there indeed existed a realist faction within the logical empiricist movement. In particular, I shall point out that at least four types of realistic arguments can be distinguished within this faction: Reichenbach’s ‘probabilistic argument,’ Feigl’s ‘pragmatic argument,’ Hempel’s ‘indispensability argument,’ and Kaila’s ‘invariantist argument.’ All these variations of arguments are intended to prevent the logical empiricist agenda from the shortcomings of radical (...) positivism, instrumentalism, and other forms of scientific antirealism. On the whole, it will be seen that logical empiricism and scientific realism are essentially compatible with each other. Especially Kaila’s invariantist approach to science (and nature) comes quite close to what nowadays is discussed under the label ‘structural realism.’ This, in turn, necessitates a fundamental reevaluation of Kaila’s role in the logical empiricist movement in particular and in twentieth-century philosophy of science in general. (shrink)

Critical realism is a frequently mentioned, but not very well-known, late nineteenth-/early twentieth-century philosophical tradition. Having its roots in Kantian epistemology, critical realism is best characterized as a revisionist approach toward the original Kantian doctrine. Its most outstanding thesis is the idea that Kantian things-in-themselves are knowable. This idea was—at least implicitly—suggested by thinkers such as Alois Riehl, Wilhelm Wundt, and Oswald Külpe. Interestingly enough, the philosophical position of the early Moritz Schlick stands in the critical realist tradition as well. (...) As will be outlined in the course of this paper, both Schlick’s magnum opus General Theory of Knowledge (1918) and his seminal Space and Time in Contemporary Physics (1917) are based on the assumption that the objects of science are relations and that relations have the status of Kantian things-in-themselves. By way of conclusion, I shall point out that this— more or less directly—leads to the current debate over ‘structural’ realism. (shrink)

It is shown that Külpe’s critical realism anticipates several elements of modern scientific realism. Furthermore, a comparison with contemporary American critical realism is drawn. On the whole, it is argued that more intensive relevant research in the future is needed.

"Die Grenzen des Revisionismus" befasst sich mit den erkenntnis- und wissenschafttheoretischen Positionen des frühen Moritz Schlick und des frühen Ernst Cassirer.

Eino Kaila's thought occupies a curious position within the logical empiricist movement. Along with Hans Reichenbach, Herbert Feigl, and the early Moritz Schlick, Kaila advocates a realist approach towards science and the project of a “scientific world conception”. This realist approach was chiefly directed at both Kantianism and Poincaréan conventionalism. The case in point was the theory of measurement. According to Kaila, the foundations of physical reality are characterized by the existence of invariant systems of relations, which he called structures. (...) In a certain sense, these invariant structures, he maintained, are constituted in the act of measuring. By “constitution”, however, Kaila meant neither the dependency of the objects of measurement on a priori concepts (or Kantian categories) nor their being effected by conventional stipulations in a Poincaréan sense. He held that invariant structures are, quite literally, real: they exist prior to and independently of our theoretical capacity. By executing measurements, invariant structures are detected and objectively determinable by laws of nature. (shrink)

This volume is dedicated to the life and work of Ernest Nagel counted among the influential twentieth-century philosophers of science. Forgotten by the history of philosophy of science community in recent years, this volume introduces Nagel’s philosophy to a new generation of readers and highlights the merits and originality of his works. Best known in the history of philosophy as a major American representative of logical empiricism with some pragmatist and naturalist leanings, Nagel’s interests and activities went beyond these limits. (...) His career was marked with a strong and determined intention of harmonizing the European scientific worldview of logical empiricism and American naturalism/pragmatism. His most famous and systematic treatise on, The Structure of Science, appeared just one year before Thomas Kuhn’s even more renowned, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. As a reflection of Nagel’s interdisciplinary work, the contributing authors’ articles are connected both historically and systematically. The volume will appeal to students mainly at the graduate level and academic scholars. Since the volume treats historical, philosophical, physical, social and general scientific questions, it will be of interest to historians and philosophers of science, epistemologists, social scientists, and anyone interested in the history of analytic philosophy and twentieth-century intellectual history. (shrink)

The late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century debate over ‘internal’ and ‘external’ relations is well explored, as far as its course in Britain is concerned. F. H. Bradley’s idealistic internalism, on the one hand, and Bertrand Russell’s realistic externalism, on the other, were at the center of this debate. Less well known, however, is that there was also a discussion about relations in the United States at the time. The central figures in this discussion were Edward Gleason Spaulding and John Dewey. (...) Like Russell, Spaulding advocated a realist-inspired externalism, while Dewey criticized this viewpoint from a pragmatist perspective. The aim of the present paper is to reconstruct the exchange between Spaulding and Dewey and to elaborate the specifics of this exchange. In doing so it will emerge, among other things, that, in contrast to Bradley’s idealist rejection of externalism, Dewey’s pragmatist attempt at a refutation was more in line with common sense and science and that Spaulding’s version of externalism differed markedly from Russell’s in its strong empirical orientation. Overall, an undeservedly forgotten chapter in the history of early twentieth-century American philosophy is revisited and reassessed. (shrink)

Helmholtz's theory of space had significant impact on Schlick's early ?critical realist? point of view. However, it will be argued in this paper that Schlick's appropriation of Helmholtz's ideas eventually lead to a rather radical transformation of the original Helmholtzian position.

Torsten Wilholt’s book on the freedom of research is a remarkable contribution to a long-standing debate over an issue which is becoming increasingly important today. As Wilholt points out in the preface, the topic ‘freedom of research’ has a twofold face: On the one hand, freedom of research is the presupposition of an engaged and unprejudiced search for knowledge; on the other hand, it implies the risk of borderless and ‘untamed’ research. In considering this contradiction, Wilholt makes recourse to the (...) history of ideas, his central thesis being that freedom of research still has “a meaningful normative function” (11).After briefly discussing the various forms of freedom of research in current debates, Wilholt, in chapter 2, elaborates on what he calls the “argument from reasons of autonomy”. This type of argument for freedom of research can be found in the respective writings of such diverse authors as Eugene Wigner, Hilary Putnam and Immanuel Kant. Its most important pioneer, thou. (shrink)

This paper shows that Cassirer’s philosophy of mathematics underwent a significant transformation by the end of the 1920s. This transformation was due to Cassirer’s reception of the ‘foundational crisis’ within mathematics itself. David Hilbert’s conception of the ‘ideal elements’ of mathematics attracted Cassirer’s particular attention. Indeed, he sought a ‘transcendental deduction’ of these elements. Reflection on this issue is therefore essential to providing an adequate interpretation of the later Cassirer’s enterprise in the philosophy of mathematics.

This paper scrutinizes and chronologically reconstructs Hans Vaihinger’s impact on contemporary Kant research. It provides an account of his engagement at both the exegetical and the institutional level. More broadly, it allows us to appreciate – for the first time, and in a comprehensive way – Vaihinger’s significance to the assessment of Kant’s legacy.

Among the “Ernest Nagel Papers 1930–1988” at Columbia University’s Rare Book & Manuscript Library, there is a file at Box 7, entitled “The Philosophy of Science: University of Delaware 1961”. This is the edited text with some editorial comments and polishing.