Volume 47, Issue 3, November 2018, Page 403-427.

Etye Steinberg has recently raised a problem for Joseph Heath’s Market Failures Approach. In this paper we consider a response by Heath. We argue that Heath’s response not only leaves the original problem intact, but also raises a second one, analogous to stakeholder theory’s so-called “identification problem.”.

Works of literature that are too overtly instructive are commonly faulted for being didactic. For so-called literary cognitivists, who believe that instruction is an important literary value, this seems to pose a problem: if we value literature for the instruction it affords, why would we ever object to overt instruction? In this paper I propose the following answer: overt instruction can arouse suspicion of intellectual vices in the author, such as intellectual arrogance, dogmatism, and prejudice, which can make the lessons (...) the author seeks to convey less rationally acceptable. Overt instruction in a work of literature is sometimes a fault, therefore, precisely because it makes the work less valuable as a source of instruction. (shrink)

Many people claim that we can gain knowledge from reading novels and other forms of narrative fiction. In a trivial sense, this claim seems uncontroversial. There is no doubt that reading Pride and Prejudice can teach me, for example, what the novel is about or give me some insight into the character of Regency English. This is because a novel, like any other text, constitutes direct evidence for propositions about its own content and language. But it is widely questioned whether (...) such a work could ever give us knowledge of any of the general propositions it expresses about the world outside the text, for it is commonly held that fictional narratives do not have the resources to justify such propositions, however.. (shrink)

Coherence is a term of art in both epistemology and literary criticism, and in both contexts judgments of coherence carry evaluative significance. However, whereas the epistemic use of the term picks out a property of belief sets, the literary use can pick out properties of various elements of a literary work, including its plot, characters, and style. For this reason, some have claimed that literary critics are not concerned with the same concept of coherence as epistemologists. In this article I (...) argue against this claim. Although various nonepistemic notions of coherence figure in literary criticism, the epistemic concept has a mirror image in the literary–critical concept of thematic coherence. Moreover, evidence from literary criticism suggests that thematic coherence can be valuable from a literary-evaluative standpoint because it can be valuable from an epistemic standpoint, in particular by enhancing the credibility of a work's themes or author. My analysis of the notion of thematic coherence thus provides novel support for literary cognitivism, the view that a work's literary-aesthetic merits can depend on its epistemic merits. (shrink)

Cities are inextricably bound to their human denizens, although this human dimension is complicated by the emphasis on scale, speed, and progress that often dominates the semiotics and discourses of urban competition. In a profoundly ambivalent movement, various aspects of human “livability” are highlighted in the “quality of life” components of cities rankings and planning, while at the same time the “megacity” trend in planning and semiosis constantly threatens to overwhelm precisely that human livability. We can thus detect two broad (...) and fundamentally-opposed semiotic trends, namely, the confidently cosmopolitan trend that emphasizes urban growth and the positive effects these are assumed to have on quality of life; and the dehumanizing trend that emphasizes the human cost of urban growth and its technological components. The profound ambivalence that this indicates, needs to be figured into urban discourses towards a more holistic and balanced account. (shrink)

The Christian philosopher Muto Kazuo contributed substantially to the predominantly Buddhist “Kyoto School of Philosophy.” Through critical exchange with its representatives, he opened up new perceptions of Christian faith, enabled mutual understanding between Buddhism and Christianity, and challenged the Western dialectical method.

Professor Geoffrey Lewis Lewis was a pioneer in Turkish Studies in Britain and an internationally admired scholar in the field. In considering the body of his work as a whole, two consistent themes emerge, two driving forces behind it: first, a deep, continuing fascination with language, and now especially with Turkish; and second, a rooted and constantly developing love of Turkey and its people and a concomitant desire to bring its language, history, and culture to the attention of the English-speaking (...) world by a variety of means, all of them grounded in a thorough scholarly engagement with his subject. (shrink)

Ensemble musicians play in synchrony despite expressively motivated irregularities in timing. We hypothesized that synchrony is achieved by each performer internally simulating the concurrent actions of other ensemble members, relying initially on how they would perform in their stead. Hence, musicians should be better at synchronizing with recordings of their own earlier performances than with others’ recordings. We required pianists to record one part from each of several piano duets, and later to play the complementary part in synchrony with their (...) own or others’ recordings. The pianists were also asked to identify their own recordings. The pianists were better at synchronizing with their own than with others’ performances, and they were able to recognize their own recordings. Furthermore, synchronization accuracy and recognition were correlated: Pianists who were relatively accurate at synchronizing with their own performances were also good at recognizing them. Thus, action simulation may underlie both synchronization and self-recognition. (shrink)

Questions about the meaning of life are widely assumed to be much older than the phrase itself. Many philosophers see nothing anachronistic, for instance, in talking about Aristotle's view on the meaning of life or looking to Ecclesiastes for evidence of what makes life meaningless, though neither Aristotle nor Ecclesiastes mentions meaning or meaninglessness as such. On this common way of thinking, nothing very philosophically important hangs on the fact that we now attach the term meaning to the idea. So, (...) it's no real surprise that the question of when and why meaning ever came to be used in this way has received little attention among philosophers. For those who think it deserves more, Steven Cassedy's new book What Do We Mean When We Talk About Meaning? will be welcome. Though it may not be obvious from the title, which to a philosopher is likely to signal a theory or conceptual analysis of meaning, the book is in fact an historical study of the word meaning (and close synonyms thereof) as used in connection with the term life (and close synonyms thereof). According to Cassedy, the book's aim is to explain how a word that ‘fundamentally has to do with signs, words, stories, and other things that, well, mean or signify something’ (p. 4) came to acquire its modern-day ‘metaphysical’ sense—i.e., that sense in which it is now used to gesture portentously toward something like the purpose or value of life. The book's focus on the language of meaning distinguishes it from the type of historical approach found, for example, in Michael Ruse's On Purpose, which tracks the history of some metaphysical idea associated with the term (teleology in Ruse's case) rather than the term itself. Indeed, in this respect, Cassedy's book may be the first of its kind. (shrink)

This paper follows Part I of our essay on case-intensional first-order logic (CIFOL; Belnap and Müller (2013)). We introduce a framework of branching histories to take account of indeterminism. Our system BH-CIFOL adds structure to the cases, which in Part I formed just a set: a case in BH-CIFOL is a moment/history pair, specifying both an element of a partial ordering of moments and one of the total courses of events (extending all the way into the future) that that moment (...) is part of. This framework allows us to define the familiar Ockhamist temporal/modal connectives, most notably for past, future, and settledness. The novelty of our framework becomes visible in our discussion of substances in branching histories, i.e., in its first-order part. That discussion shows how the basic idea of tracing an individual thing from case to case via an absolute property is applicable in a branching histories framework. We stress the importance of keeping apart extensionality and moment-definiteness, and give a formal account of how the specification of natural sortals and natural qualities turns out to be a coordination task in BH-CIFOL. We also provide a detailed answer to Lewis’s well-known argument against branching histories, exposing the fallacy in that argument. (shrink)

This paper follows Part I of our essay on case-intensional first-order logic ). We introduce a framework of branching histories to take account of indeterminism. Our system BH-CIFOL adds structure to the cases, which in Part I formed just a set: a case in BH-CIFOL is a moment/history pair, specifying both an element of a partial ordering of moments and one of the total courses of events that that moment is part of. This framework allows us to define the familiar (...) Ockhamist temporal/modal connectives, most notably for past, future, and settledness. The novelty of our framework becomes visible in our discussion of substances in branching histories, i.e., in its first-order part. That discussion shows how the basic idea of tracing an individual thing from case to case via an absolute property is applicable in a branching histories framework. We stress the importance of keeping apart extensionality and moment-definiteness, and give a formal account of how the specification of natural sortals and natural qualities turns out to be a coordination task in BH-CIFOL. We also provide a detailed answer to Lewis’s well-known argument against branching histories, exposing the fallacy in that argument. (shrink)

The present article aims to explain Kamala??la’s understanding of the nature of insight, specifically considering it as the ‘discernment of reality’ -- a technical term identified with insight in the author’s well known Bh?van?krama? texts. I approach my analysis of bh?ta-pratyavek?? from three different angles. I begin by providing a rationale for its translation. This is followed by an account of Kamala??la’s reading of key passages in the La?k?vat?ra S?tra describing the process to which the term refers. Here the aim (...) is to illustrate Kamala??la’s understanding of bh?ta-pratyavek?? as it is actually experienced in meditation. The final section examines bh?ta-pratyavek?? in relation to other important technical terminology employed in the course of making arguments against his historical rival in debate, the Ch’an monk Mo ho yen. By providing these three different perspectives on the same process it is my hope that both scholars and practitioners will be able to more fully comprehend and benefit from the instructions provided by the ancient master Kamala??la. (shrink)