RESUMEN La identidad humana puede ser interpretada de muy diversas maneras. El artículo explora, en primer lugar, los fundamentos de la crítica heideggeriana a la idea de "sujeto" como categoría apropiada para la existencia humana; en segundo lugar, y al hilo de esa crítica, señala algunos momentos relevantes que configuran la identidad pensada no ya como subiectum, sino como unidad histórico-acontecida. ABSTRACT Human identity may be interpreted in very different ways. The article starts out by examining the foundations of Heidegger's (...) critique of the idea of "subject" as an appropriate category for human existence. In line with that critique, it then goes on to point out some of the relevant moments that constitute identity, no longer conceived as subiectum, but rather as a historical unity that has come into being as an event. RESUMO A identidade humana pode ser interpretada de diversas maneiras. Em primeiro lugar, este artigo explora os fundamentos da crítica heideggeriana à ideia de "sujeito" enquanto categoria apropriada para a existência humana; em segundo lugar, consonante a essa crítica, indica alguns momentos relevantes que configuram a identidade pensada não como subiectum, mas sim como unidade histórico-acontecida. (shrink)

La identidad humana puede ser interpretada de muy diversas maneras. El artículo explora, en primer lugar, los fundamentos de la crítica heideggeriana a la idea de “sujeto” como categoría apropiada para la existencia humana; en segundo lugar, y al hilo de esa crítica, señala algunos momentos relevantes que configuran la identidad pensada no ya como subiectum, sino como unidad histórico-acontecida.

El trabajo investiga los diversos tropos de Carta sobre el humanismo, no como simples expresiones metódicamente indiferentes, sino como formas de prosecución de las tendencias hermenéuticas de la filosofía heideggeriana. La casa, el pastor y el claro constituyen tropos que no solo intentan superar cualquier rastro de la lógica del sujeto _y por lo mismo superar también el humanismo y la metafísica_ sino, además, se conforman y funcionan como verdaderos "tropos hermenéuticos". The paper investigates the various figures of speech contained (...) in Letter on Humanism, not as mere expressions indifferent to method, but as ways to continue the hermeneutic trends of Heideggerian philosophy. The house, the shepherd, and the clearing are figures of speech intended not only to leave behind all traces of logic in the subject _and by the same token also rise above humanism and metaphysics_ but in addition to take shape and function as true "hermeneutic tropes". (shrink)

Al hilo de la estética kantiana, de sus supuestos y de los problemas que ella deja sin resolver, este trabajo intenta despejar el concepto de apariencia estética en Schiller. La definición schilleriana de la belleza como "libertad en la apariencia", no solamente constituye una original prosecución del primado de la razón práctica y de la libertad en Kant, sino que además constituye una peculiar reinvindicación de la apariencia sobre la misma "realidad". Sin embargo, Schiller se esfuerza en mantener y conciliar (...) la específica ambigüedad del término "apariencia": libertad en la apariencia es, al mismo tiempo, libertad aparente y libertad aparecida. (shrink)

El artículo explora la forma estética de las ruinas como una poética del tiempo donde se articulan fuerzas contrapuestas que configuran una singular vivencia de la historicidad humana. Orientándose por las indicaciones de Martin Heidegger y Georg Simmel, reflexiona acerca de valor estético-existencial de las ruinas y su réplica subjetiva en el sentimiento de nostalgia, así como su importancia para el reconocimiento de la unidad narrativa de la existencia humana.

Hegel’s definition of music as Kunst des Gemüts do not refer to the simple expression of feelings, but to the fact that only the music is directed to the self, the self as such, absolutely. That music is not only expression of particular feelings, but of pure feeling or subjectivity itself, is based on the most decisive feature that share music and soul: the temporality. Music expresses the self in its radically temporal essence. It is not necessary to emphasize the (...) metaphysical function that follows from this conception of music. Far from the romantic origins of Wackenroder, E.T.A. Hoffmann or F. Schlegel, Hegel holds a romantic conception of music. (shrink)

El presente artículo pretende dar cuenta de la concepción heideggeriana de la muerte, para ello se articula en cuatro momentos. En primer lugar se establece en qué sentido la muerte es un fenómeno de la vida, y no su mero término. En segundo lugar se explica la muerte como posibilidad, como un "aún no", fundado en un pertenecer. En tercer lugar, se establece que la proyección existenciaria de la propia muerte revela a ésta en su verdad irreductible. Finalmente, la libertad (...) para la muerte es comprendida como una abrirse a ella, por cuanto "libertad" debe ser interpretada en el sentido de "liberar", "abrir". (shrink)

El artículo explora la forma estética de las ruinas como una poética del tiempo donde se articulan fuerzas contrapuestas que configuran una singular vivencia de la historicidad humana. Orientándose por las indicaciones de Martin Heidegger y Georg Simmel, reflexiona acerca de valor estético-existencial de las ruinas y su réplica subjetiva en el sentimiento de nostalgia, así como su importancia para el reconocimiento de la unidad narrativa de la existencia humana.

The present article is the third part of a trilogy of papers, devoted to analysing the influence of semantic Platonism on contemporary philosophy of language. In Part I (Picazo 2021), the discussion was set out by examining a number of typical traces of Platonism in semantic theory since Frege. In Part II (Picazo 2021a), additional illustrations of such traces were provided, taken from a collection of recent commissioned essays on the philosophy of language (Schantz 2012). The present part is devoted (...) to providing yet additional illustrations of such traces, taken from a collection of classic essays on the subject: the book Modern Philosophy of Language, edited by Maria Baghramian in 1998. We shall, thus, describe a number of examples in which the influence of semantic Platonism on these essays can be felt. Prominent among these examples are the confusion between sentences and propositions (and related confusions), the avoidant attitude with respect to basic aspects of linguistic meaning, the overuse of analytic methodology for semantic research, the adoption of a background Platonic metaphysics of meanings and the overreaction against semantic Platonism and germane views, witnessing an inverse influence (‘by opposition’) from these views. (shrink)

Previously, the author tried to show that some arguments in one of the two versions of Nicholas of Autrecourt’s Quaestio de intensione visionis are taken almost verbatim from the anonymous Tractatus de sex inconvenientibus. This paper concentrates on the arguments themselves in order to consider two main issues: the ‘translatability’ of limit decision problems, manifest in Autrecourt’s juxtaposition of questions de maximo et minimo, de primo et ultimo instanti, and the intension and remission of forms; the importance of Parisian discussions (...) of limit decision problems prior to the adoption of the new analytical languages developed at Oxford. Thus, the paper is divided in two sections, the first concerning some arguments of Autrecourt’s question, the second focusing on the link between one of Autrecourt’s arguments and the medieval tradition of commentaries on Aristotle’s De caelo, in which it is possible to find some antecedents of the analytical approach that later Parisian scholars would apply to these problems. (shrink)

The present article is the first of a trilogy of papers, devoted to analysing the influence of semantic Platonism on contemporary philosophy of language. In the present article, I lay out the discussion by contrasting semantic Platonism with two other views of linguistic meaning: the socio-environmental conception of meaning and semantic anti-representationalism. Then, I identify six points in which the impregnation of semantic theory with Platonism can be particularly felt, resulting in shortcomings and inaccuracies of various kinds. These points are (...) the following: the limitations of regarding logico-philosophical analysis as the only working methodology; the tendency to avoid investigating a number of aspects of linguistic meaning; the recurring confusion between sentences, statements, and propositions; the weakness of transcendent assumptions about meaning; the weakness of meaning assumptions adopted on the basis of pure intuition; and inconsistencies caused by some over-eager attempts to escape semantic Platonism. (shrink)

The present article is the second part of a trilogy of papers, devoted to analysing the influence of semantic Platonism on contemporary philosophy of language. In Part I (Picazo 2021), the discussion was set out by examining a number of typical traces of Platonism in semantic theory since Frege. In a subsequent paper that shall be published elsewere, additional illustrations of such traces will be provided, taken from a collection of classic texts in the philosophy of language, also from Frege (...) onwards (Baghramian 1998). Then, the present paper is devoted to providing yet additional illustrations of those traces, but this time taken from a collection of recent commissioned essays on the subject: the book Prospects for Meaning, edited by Richard Schantz in 2012. We shall, thus, describe a considerable number of examples in which the influence of semantic Platonism on these essays can be felt. Prominent among these examples are the adhesion to pseudo-Platonism in the form of semantic mentalism; the typical limitations of avoidant and trivializing semantic accounts; the confinement to logico-philosophical analysis as the only methodology for semantic research; the excesses committed by some radical semantic anti-representationalists and some radical semantic biologists; and the adhesion to hardcore semantic Platonism itself. (shrink)

Nos deteremos aqui sobre a crítica de Matthew Kramer em relação à interpretação de Quentin Skinner sobre o conceito de “liberdade” em Hobbes contida em seu artigo “On the Unavoidability of Actions: Quentin Skinner, Thomas Hobbes, and the Modern Doctrine of Negative Liberty” (2001). Nele, Kramer trata do então crescente interesse do projeto intelectual de Skinner pelo pensamento hobbesiano, algo já evidenciado desde a publicação de seu livro Liberdade Antes do Liberalismo (1998). Kramer toma como referência central de sua resposta (...) o artigo de Skinner intitulado “Thomas Hobbes on the Proper Signification of Liberty”, criticando a sua posição e contrastando com algumas de suas próprias ideias sobre “liberdade” e “não-liberdade”. Através dessas considerações, Kramer reavalia a noção da liberdade em Hobbes, tomando-a como o protótipo liberal da liberdade negativa por excelência, demonstrando assim os supostos equívocos contidos na interpretação de Skinner sobre ela. Buscamos defender aqui, contudo, que a proposta interpretativa de Kramer carece da devida fundamentação metodológica que correlaciona o neorrepublicanismo de Skinner no campo da filosofia política com certos princípios oriundos de sua historiografia que não são devidamente considerados pelo primeiro. A sua crítica estaria, assim, comprometida por uma abordagem desconectada do pensamento e das intenções de Hobbes enquanto um agente político inserido em um determinado contexto linguístico e social, quadro que seria posteriormente resgatado de maneira primorosa por Skinner em seu estudo Hobbes and Republican Liberty (2008). (shrink)

In this article, I explore the consequences of two commonsensical premises in semantics and epistemology: (1) natural language is a complex system rooted in the communal life of human beings within a given environment; and (2) linguistic knowledge is essentially dependent on natural language. These premises lead me to emphasize the process-socio-environmental character of linguistic meaning and knowledge, from which I proceed to analyse a number of long-standing philosophical problems, attempting to throw new light upon them on these grounds. In (...) particular, I criticize the use of expressions such as ‘absolute truth’, ‘absolute existence’ and ‘the thing in itself’, arguing that they lead to what I call ‘the ultralinguistic paradox’ (a fatal antinomy). In the same way, I review a number of mainstream topics in philosophical semantics, epistemology and metaphysics, reformulating them in terms much more naturalistic – and less mysterious – than usual. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is commonly characterized as the method for assessing and improving our representational devices. Little has been said, however, on how best to construe these representational devices—in other words, on what conceptual engineering should be all about. This paper tackles this problem with a basic strategy: First, by presenting a taxonomy of the different possible subject matters for conceptual engineering; then, by comparatively assessing them and selecting the most conducive one with a view to making conceptual engineering an actionable (...) method, that is, a method that can be applied effectively and consistently to specific case studies. The outcome is that conceptual engineering should be all about concepts on pain of pragmatic inconsistencies otherwise. (shrink)

In _Metaphysics_ A.4, Aristotle provides crucial information about fundamental aspects of the chemistry and microphysics of the atomic theory of Leucippus and Democritus of Abdera. Besides the plenum and the void, which he identifies as the elements of the atomic theory, he presents what he himself names as _differences_. These fundamental differences are named so because they ought to be responsible for the emergence of all other differences in the physical world, and especially the ones that hit our senses. Aristotle (...) provides a list of three differences both in what is recognized as autochthonous terminology from Leucippus and Democritus, and in a translation to terms apparently more intelligible to Aristotelian listeners. Among those differences there is one in particular that is harder to comprehend than the other ones: _rhysmos_. Aristotle’s translation of _rhysmos_ into _sch__ēma_ has led most interpreters to acknowledge that it referred solely to atoms individually, while the other two differences would refer to relations between atoms. In this paper, I want to propose an interpretation in which _rhysmos_ actually refers to several aspects of the chemistry and microphysics of the atomic theory. (shrink)

This textbook presents the basics of philosophy that are necessary for the student and researcher in science in order to better understand scientific work. The approach is not historical but formative: tools for semantical analysis, ontology of science, epistemology, and scientific ethics are presented in a formal and direct way. The book has two parts: one with the general theory and a second part with application to some problems such as the interpretation of quantum mechanics, the nature of mathematics, and (...) the ontology of spacetime. The book addresses questions such as "What is meaning?", "What is truth?", "What are truth criteria in science?", "What is a theory?", "What is a model?" "What is a datum?", "What is information?", "What does it mean to understand something?", "What is space?", "What is time?", "How are these concepts articulated in science?" "What are values?" "What are the limits of science?", and many more. The philosophical views presented are "scientific" in the sense that they are informed by current science, they are relevant for scientific research, and the method adopted uses the hypothetical-deductive approach that is characteristic of science. The results and conclusions, as any scientific conclusion, are open to revision in the light of future advances. Hence, this philosophical approach opposes to dogmatic philosophy. Supported by end-of-chapter summaries and a list of special symbols used, the material will be of interest for students and researchers in both science and philosophy. The second part will appeal to physicists and mathematicians. (shrink)

In recent years, Cesar Chavez’s life and legacy have been subjected to increased scrutiny. The ensuing reevaluations of Chavez, wittingly or not, are matters of ethical, as well as historical and biographical, concern. This article has two aims. First, it reconstructs Chavez’s account of exemplarity and uses it to assess his legacy. Second, it provides an account of exemplarity situated within social practices. As I argue, exemplarity operates through social practices, rather than mystically as posited by a contagion model. The (...) end result is an ethically nuanced reassessment of Chavez and an account of exemplarity that includes its social dimension. (shrink)

This paper discusses the logical space of alternative conceptual engineering projects, with a specific focus on (1) the processes, (2) the targets and goals, and (3) the methods of such projects. We present an overview of how these three aspects interact in the contemporary literature and discuss those alternative projects that have yet to be explored based on our suggested typology. We show how choices about each element in a conceptual engineering project constrain the possibilities for the others, thereby giving (...) rise to distinct groupings of possible projects under the banner of conceptual engineering. We conclude with a critical reflection on the potential ethical issues that arise as a result of effectively putting conceptual engineering into practice. (shrink)

It is well known that the modern atomists assumed the ancient thesis that things are composed of simple entities. It is also known that Leibniz went beyond atomism, since he affirmed that the true substances on which things are founded, the so-called monads, cannot be divisible or extended, for they are souls. For Christian Wolff, the elements of bodies are not extended; these elements have no figure and no magnitude whatsoever, they fill no space and are indivisible. In the Monadologia (...) physica, published in 1756, Kant also argues that the ultimate principles of bodies are the monads or simple substances. The goal of this work is to reconcile the confronted positions of “metaphysics” and “geometry”. (shrink)

There are communities in which disadvantaged groups experience severe inequality. For instance, poor and indigent families face many difficulties accessing their social rights. Their condition is largely the consequence of the wrong choices of those in power, either historical or more recent choices. The lack of opportunities of these deprived citizens is due to state omissions. In such communities, it is not unusual for homeless members of these particular groups to occupy abandoned lands and build their shelters there. However, almost (...) everywhere, these actions constitute a crime. The typical response to this situation is prosecution and punishment. In this paper, I will defend the occupation of public places as a consequence of the failure of governments to solve the problem of housing, and I will argue that we must distinguish a social claim from a crime and avoid the use of criminal law in these “occupation cases”. I will also argue that our right—as a community—to blame and punish these “squatters” is eroded by the fact that we perpetrated their situation of injustice. (shrink)

In 1925, David Katz published an influential monograph on touch, Der Aufbau der Tastwelt, which was translated into English in 1989. Although it is called “the world of touch,” it also discusses the thermal and the nociceptive senses, albeit briefly. In this chapter, we will follow this approach, but we will speak about “somatosensory senses” in general in order to remind ourselves that perceptions of temperatures and pains should also be considered together in this context.

Neste texto, proponho-me a acompanhar as linhas fundamentais da interpretação de Hegel no livro Homo modernus, de Denise Ferreira da Silva. A interpretação de Hegel oferecida pela autora é profunda e original, mas é completamente ignorada na literatura sobre Hegel a nível nacional e internacional. Tentarei mostrar o papel central que o pensamento de Hegel desempenha no contexto do projeto de Ferreira da Silva em Homo modernus e destacarei dois temas de refl exão que me parecem relevantes dentro do âmbito (...) dos estudos hegelianos. (shrink)

In this paper, I suggest that Hegel’s concept of sensation can be fruitfully read against the background of the recent distinction between state vs. content nonconceptualism. I) I provide a brief outline of the distinctions that characterize the debate between state and content nonconceptualism. II) I discuss Hegel’s concept of sensation, arguing that Hegel’s concept of sensation is compatible with a certain version of content conceptualism that is combined with a ‘weak’ state nonconceptualism for adult, rational subjects and with a (...) ‘strong’ state nonconceptualism for non-rational animals and infants. III) I conclude my paper by illustrating some features of Hegel’s conception of mental content starting from distinctions that characterize the debate on state vs. content nonconceptualism. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall investigate whether Hegel can be considered as a sort of ancestor of McDowell’s disjunctivism. If this hypothesis turns out to be plausible, then the paper offers two gains. On the one hand, it offers an innovative interpretation of the way in which Hegel conceives of our sensible epistemic access to the world. On the other hand, McDowell's own claim that his own theoretical proposal has a Hegelian sound is supported by a previously unexplored argument. I (...) organize my analysis into three parts: I sketch McDowell’s version of disjunctivism (Section 2); I analyze some passages from Hegel that I believe are important for showing some similarities between his and McDowell’s argumentative strategy (Section 3); in the conclusion (Section 4), I highlight a number of core features that Hegel seems to share with McDowell’s disjunctivism and I submit that they are sufficient to label Hegel the “grandfather” of McDowell's disjunctivism. (shrink)

RESUMO:É notório que, em sua discussão da questão da verdade, Hegel distingue dois termos técnicos, correção (Richtigkeit) e verdade (Wahrheit). É notório também que, entre os dois conceitos, Hegel considera o conceito de verdade como aquele filosoficamente mais relevante. Por este motivo, diferentemente do conceito de verdade, tem sido objeto dedebate se Hegel teria considerado o conceito de correção como possuindo alguma função teórica positiva no contexto do seu pensamento maduro. Neste artigo defenderei a tese segundo a qual Hegel teria (...) formulado uma série de reflexões coerentes acerca do conceito de correção que resultam relevantes no contexto do seu pensamento maduro, mesmo concedendo que tais reflexões não tenham sido desenvolvidas na forma de umateoria explícita, autônoma e separada da teoria da verdade. O meu objetivo é tentar resgatar a significação positiva das considerações hegelianas acerca da correção sem superestimar seu alcance e seu estatuto teórico. Abstract:It is known that, in his discussion of the question about truth, Hegel distinguishes between two technical terms: correctness (Richtigkeit) and truth (Wahrheit). It is also known that Hegel considers the concept of truth as being philosophically more relevant than the concept of correctness. For this reason, scholars have asked themselves whether or not Hegel considered his concept of correctness as having any theoretical value within the context of his mature system. In this paper I will claim that Hegel puts forward a series of coherent views about correctness thatare relevant for his mature thinking, even though he did not develop these views as an explicit, autonomous theory of correctness which is separated from his theory of truth. My aim is to try to highlight the positive meaning of Hegel’s reflections about correctness without overestimating its reach. (shrink)

I present a discussion of some issues in the ontology of spacetime. After a characterisation of the controversies among relationists, substantivalists, eternalists, and presentists, I offer a new argument for rejecting presentism, the doctrine that only present objects exist. Then, I outline and defend a form of spacetime realism that I call event substantivalism. I propose an ontological theory for the emergence of spacetime from more basic entities. Finally, I argue that a relational theory of pre-geometric entities can give rise (...) to substantival spacetime in such a way that relationism and substantivalism are not necessarily opposed positions, but rather complementary. In an appendix I give axiomatic formulations of my ontological views. (shrink)

The aim of this research is to ascertain whether a firm’s environmental motivations may help to predict how complete or incomplete its environmental management will be, understanding incomplete management to be that which neglects one or more of the three keys aspects of such management, namely, monitoring, action and results. We specifically posit that while motivations based on the search for legitimation lead to more incomplete styles of environmental management, competitive motivations entail a more complete management. The analyses conducted with (...) a sample of 1,902 plants provide empirical evidence in favour of such reasoning. The contribution this research makes, therefore, is not restricted solely to showing the effect motivations have on the environmental performance of organisations, as it also introduces a new dimension of environmental management—the degree of completeness, which needs to be considered when understanding and evaluating this effect. (shrink)

I present a formal ontological theory where the basic building blocks of the world can be either things or events. In any case, the result is a Parmenidean worldview where change is not a global property. What we understand by change manifests as asymmetries in the pattern of the world-lines that constitute 4-dimensional existents. I maintain that such a view is in accord with current scientific knowledge.

The idea of a moving present or ‘now’ seems to form part of our most basic beliefs about reality. Such a present, however, is not reflected in any of our theories of the physical world. I show in this article that presentism, the doctrine that only what is present exists, is in conflict with modern relativistic cosmology and recent advances in neurosciences. I argue for a tenseless view of time, where what we call ‘the present’ is just an emergent secondary (...) quality arising from the interaction of perceiving self-conscious individuals with their environment. I maintain that there is no flow of time, but just an ordered system of events. (shrink)