It has been argued that, on Kantian grounds, pedophiles, rapists and murderers are morally obligated to take their own lives prior to committing a violent action that will end their moral agency. That is, to avoid destroying the agent's moral life by performing a morally suicidal action, the agent, while he still is a moral agent, should end his body's life. Although the cases of dementia and the morally reprehensible are vastly different, this Kantian interpretation might be useful in the (...) debate on the permissibility of suicide for those facing dementia's effects. If moral agents have a duty to act as moral agents, then those who will lose their moral identity as moral agents have an obligation to themselves to end their physical lives prior to losing their dignity as persons. (shrink)

Most discussions about someone terminating her own life tend to focus either on utilitarian considerations or rights. For the latter, a number of people argue over whether we have a right to die, which I take to mean an entitlement to choose to end one’s own life. I see at least two problems with the right to die approach. Unfortunately, many arguments and positions are based primarily on the intuitions of those engaged, and therefore often turn into intuition pump battles. (...) Secondly, basing arguments on rights gets us mired in the same problems that any rights talk encounters including, but not limited to, whether they are positive or negative, whether they can be overridden, and what justifies such a right. In this chapter, I am going to argue for a position that makes worries about a right to die moot. If there is an obligation at certain times and in certain circumstances to die, then a right to die is irrelevant. Moreover, if an obligation to die is possible, then it necessarily follows that choosing to die is morally right on some occasions. Doing what is right generally cannot be proscribed by others so it does not matter if there is a right to die. (shrink)

Genetic engineering often generates fear of out of control scientists creating Frankenstein creatures that will terrorize the general populace, especially in the cases of human-animal chimeras. While sometimes an accurate characterization of some researchers, this belief is often the result of repugnance for new technology rather than being rationally justified. To facilitate thoughtful discussion the moral issues raised by human-animal chimeras, ethicists and other stakeholders must develop a rational ethical framework before raw emotion has a chance of becoming the dominating (...) justification for public opinion and policy. Derek Parfit’s work on lives worth living for human beings can provide valuable insight into the morality of creating chimeras. As long as their lives are overall good, then bringing them into existence does not harm them even if they are used for medical research or procedures, or they are created to carry on the homo sapiens’ “family” line. (shrink)

No one would deny that sustainability is necessary for individual, business, and national survival. How this goal is to be accomplished is a matter of great debate. In this article I will show that the United States and other developed countries have a duty to create sustainable cities, even if that is against a notion of private property rights considered as an absolute. Through eminent domain and regulation, developed countries can fulfill their obligations to current and future generations. To do (...) so, the governments must reject perfectly competitive free market capitalism and the absolute right to private property, and more fully adopt social welfare capitalism as their economic system. The result will be a sustainable society that balances democracy, individual rights and individual flourishing with the community’s flourishing. (shrink)

Over the past two years, much has been made by some governments and the media about the possible callous and racist distribution of Quinacrine by two Americans to sterilize women in the Third World. The main criticism of the practice is that though Quinacrine is unapproved by the developed world's health regulatory agencies for this particular use in the developed world due to inadequate testing for long-term side effects, it is used on defenseless women in the developing world.I argue that (...) the distribution of unapproved medical and other products is morally permissible if it satisfies two conditions: agent-centered utilitarianism and Kant's Categorical Imperative. Roughly, I contend that if the situation will probably improve and no one is treated as a mere means, then it is ethical either to give or to sell the products to those who choose to have them, regardless of where in the world they live. (shrink)

If Solomon is correct in labeling businesses as community citizens because they “are part and parcel of the communities in which they live and flourish, and the responsibilities that they bear are ... intrinsic to their very existence as social entities,” then it follows that other community citizens have reciprocal duties toward them that they, as community citizens, have to any other community citizen. One of these duties is not to harm needlessly another community citizen without its permission. One issue (...) affecting business is genetically engineering children to have characteristics, e.g., deafness, which render them disabled in work environments. Since business is a very large part of society, citizen responsibilities toward it in regard to intentionally creating deaf children should be examined. It is my contention that designing disabled offspring is unethical on the grounds that it causes undue injury to businesses without their permission in any form. (shrink)

Despite the best efforts of utilitarians, justice remains a serious problem for consequentialism. Many counterexamples have been described which show that an agent may be obligated to do a gross injustice, according to hedonic utilitarianism, just because it maximizes utility. Fred Feldman attempts to avoid this result by adjusting utility for justice.In this paper, I examine Feldman’s axiology and his normative theory of world utilitarianism, and show that, ultimately, he is not successful in his endeavor. Though Feldman’s theories may not (...) fall prey to exactly the same counterexamples that others do, they are still susceptible to versions of them. (shrink)

The topic of abortion has been extensively researched, and the research has produced a large number of arguments and discussions. Missing in the literature, however, are discussions of practices in some areas of the Developing or Third World. In this paper, we examine the morality of sex selection abortions in Kazakhstan's Kazakh culture, and argue that such abortions can be ethically justified based, in part, on the unique perspectives of Kazakh culture.

Many people, such as Adam Smith, Milton Friedman, Irving Fisher, and William Sharpe, assume that free markets full of rational people automatically lead to ethical actions and outcomes. After all, at its equilibrium point, a perfectly competitive free market maximizes utility, respects autonomy, and fulfills justice’s dictates. Unfortunately, in some technology markets, there are a significant number of people who have undergone epistemic closure. Epistemic closure entails that all reliable evidence that would challenge deeply held beliefs is dismissed as corrupted, (...) whereas all supporting evidence, no matter how unreliable, is accepted as incontrovertible. Those who have the condition act irrationally within that domain. As a result, business decisions become much more difficult than they would be in a rational market. In this article, epistemic closure’s ethical issues are developed. First, although they are acting irrationally within the closure’s domain, those with epistemic closure can still be held accountable for their actions. Second, to deal ethically with epistemic closure and its consequences, then it is vital to know what it is and its root causes, as well as to have a practical principle that can assist in making pragmatic decisions. Because some new technologies face epistemic closure, then focusing on a particular representative case of it will help to illustrate the issue’s ethical dimensions. (shrink)

It has been argued that, on Kantian grounds, pedophiles, rapists and murderers are morally obligated to take their own lives prior to committing a violent action that will end their moral agency. That is, to avoid destroying the agent's moral life by performing a morally suicidal action, the agent, while he still is a moral agent, should end his body's life. Although the cases of dementia and the morally reprehensible are vastly different, this Kantian interpretation might be useful in the (...) debate on the permissibility of suicide for those facing dementia's effects. If moral agents have a duty to act as moral agents, then those who will lose their moral identity as moral agents have an obligation to themselves to end their physical lives prior to losing their dignity as persons. (shrink)