This work intends to be a generalization and a simplification of the techniques employed in [2], by the proposal of a general strategy to prove satisfiability theorems for NLGM-s (= normal logics with graded modalities), analogously to the well known technique of the canonical models by Lemmon and Scott for classical modal logics.

In this work we extend results from [4], [3] and [2] about propositional calculi with graded modalities to the predicative level. Our semantic is based on Kripke models with a single domain of interpretation for all the worlds. Therefore the axiomatic system will need a suitable generalization of the Barcan formula. We haven't considered semantics with world-relative domains because they don't present any new difficulties with respect to classical case. Our language will have, as in [1], constant and function symbols, (...) but they will have a rigid interpretation. In this instance the terms will be considered rigid designators, that is, their interpretations will be the same in all possible worlds (cfr. [5]). Nevertheless we will not consider languages with identity: in this way we avoid the problems of identity in modal contexts. On the other hand, we think that in that context would arise essentially the same problems which occur in classical predicative modal logic. Finally we will consider only denumerable languages because the extension to non denumerable ones isn't conceptually problematic. (shrink)

The automated identification of national implementations of European directives by text similarity techniques has shown promising preliminary results. Previous works have proposed and utilized unsupervised lexical and semantic similarity techniques based on vector space models, latent semantic analysis and topic models. However, these techniques were evaluated on a small multilingual corpus of directives and NIMs. In this paper, we utilize word and paragraph embedding models learned by shallow neural networks from a multilingual legal corpus of European directives and national legislation (...) to develop unsupervised semantic similarity systems to identify transpositions. We evaluate these models and compare their results with the previous unsupervised methods on a multilingual test corpus of 43 Directives and their corresponding NIMs. We also develop supervised machine learning models to identify transpositions and compare their performance with different feature sets. (shrink)

The automated identification of national implementations of European directives by text similarity techniques has shown promising preliminary results. Previous works have proposed and utilized unsupervised lexical and semantic similarity techniques based on vector space models, latent semantic analysis and topic models. However, these techniques were evaluated on a small multilingual corpus of directives and NIMs. In this paper, we utilize word and paragraph embedding models learned by shallow neural networks from a multilingual legal corpus of European directives and national legislation (...) to develop unsupervised semantic similarity systems to identify transpositions. We evaluate these models and compare their results with the previous unsupervised methods on a multilingual test corpus of 43 Directives and their corresponding NIMs. We also develop supervised machine learning models to identify transpositions and compare their performance with different feature sets. (shrink)

The strict-tolerant approach to paradox promises to erect theories of naïve truth and tolerant vagueness on the firm bedrock of classical logic. We assess the extent to which this claim is founded. Building on some results by Girard we show that the usual proof-theoretic formulation of propositional ST in terms of the classical sequent calculus without primitive Cut is incomplete with respect to ST-valid metainferences, and exhibit a complete calculus for the same class of metainferences. We also argue that the (...) latter calculus, far from coinciding with classical logic, is a close kin of Priest’s LP. (shrink)

There is a view on consciousness that has strong intuitive appeal and empirical support: the intermediate-level theory of consciousness, proposed mainly by Ray Jackendoff and by Jesse Prinz. This theory identifies a specific “intermediate” level of representation as the basis of human phenomenal consciousness, which sits between high-level non-perspectival thought processes and low-level disjointed feature-detection processes in the perceptual and cognitive processing hierarchy. In this article, we show that the claim that consciousness arises at an intermediate-level is true of some (...) cognitive systems, but only in virtue of specific constraints on their active interactions with the environment. We provide ecological reasons for why certain processing levels in a cognitive hierarchy are privileged with respect to consciousness. We do this from the perspective of a prediction-error minimization model of perception and cognition, relying especially on the notion of active inference: the privileged level for consciousness depends on the specific dispositions of an organism concerned with inferring its policies for action. Such a level is indeed intermediate for humans, but this depends on the spatiotemporal resolution of the typical actions that a human organism can normally perform. Thus, intermediateness is not an essential feature of consciousness. In organisms with different action dispositions the privileged level or levels may differ as well. (shrink)

Prominent theories in moral psychology maintain that a core aspect of moral competence is the ability to distinguish moral norms, which derive from universal principles of justice and fairness, from conventional norms, which are contingent on a specific group consensus. The present study investigated the psychological bases of the moral-conventional distinction by manipulating the framing of the test question, the authority’s license, and the historical context. Participants evaluated moral and conventional transgressions by answering an ‘okay for you’ test question (i.e., (...) judging according to their opinion) or an ‘okay in context’ test question (i.e., judging by imagining being a contemporary of the story protagonist). In evaluating moral transgressions that happened in a distant context or with the authority’s license, most of the participants condemned the violations when responding to the ‘okay for you’ test question, but did not do so when responding to the ‘okay in context’ test question. A similar effect of the question framing was found also on scenarios presenting conventional violations suggesting that subtle changes in the framing of the test question can influence people’s evaluations of both moral and conventional prototypical transgressions. We propose that these effects indicate the presence of moral and conventional construals of social actions that are highly flexible and context-sensitive. (shrink)

The paper discusses some formal difficulties concerning the theory of universals of Trope-Only ontologies, from which the formal theory of predication advanced by Trope-Only theorists seems to be irremediably affected. It is impossible to lay out a successful defense of a Trope-Only theory without Russellian types, but such types are ontologically inconsistent with tropes’ nominalism. Historically, Tropists’ first way to avoid the problem is appealing to the supervenience claim, which however fails on its terms and, thus, fails as a ground (...) for a solution to the higher-order or ‘type’ problem. A later solution involves the invariance of primitive equivalence relations in order to make universals ontologically innocuous. However, I argue that this latter solution fails to meet the requirements imposed on an ontologically unbiased nominalist attitude. So, this paper discusses how Trope-Only theories alter standard formal moves in Nominalism, and also is interested in clarifying further the formal assumptions for these problems. (shrink)

In this article, we show how the phenomenon of self-deception when adequately analyzed, can be incorporated into a predictive processing framework. We describe four strategies by which a subject may become self-deceived to account for typical cases of self-deception. We then argue that the four strategies can be modeled within this framework, under the assumption that a satisfying account of motivation is possible within predictive processing. Finally, we outline how we can ground this assumption by discussing how such a systematic (...) model of motivation may be developed using the distinction between a world-model and a self-model. (shrink)

The connection between economics and ethics is as old as economics itself, and central to both disciplines. It is an issue that has recently attracted much interest from economists and philosophers. The connection is, in part, a result of the desire of economists to make policy prescriptions, which clearly require some normative criteria. More deeply, much economic theory is founded on the assumption of utility maximization, thereby creating an immediate connection between the foundations of economics and the philosophical literature on (...) utilitarianism and reasons for action. In fact, some influential contemporary approaches to ethics advocate decision-theoretic or game-theoretic foundations of some sort for moral principles, while several economic theorists are now prepared to take into account the ethical dimensions of rational decisions. As a result, it appears that economics and ethics are somehow inextricably linked through theories of rational decision-making. Most of us would probably find it disturbing to concede that there are contradictions between the prescriptions of rationality and the requirements of moral `rightness'. The essays included in the present volume provide a detailed analysis of the connections between ethics and economics as viewed from several different - sometimes conflicting - perspectives. This book, the outcome of a joint meeting of philosophers and economists, has three main themes: the validity of utilitarianism much used by economists, the notion of fairness and equity, and the coherence of the rationality postulate of economics. The book does not reach any final conclusions, but it greatly illuminates the exact areas of possible disagreement and indeed the open-ended nature of ethical reasoning. There is much that economists, and especially welfare economists, can learn from these papers - not least circumspection. (shrink)

In this book we offer a theory of the self, whose core ideas are that the self is a process of self-representing, and this process aims mainly at defending the self-conscious subject against the threat of its metaphysical inconsistence. In other words, the self is essentially a repertoire of psychological manoeuvres whose outcome is a self-representation aimed at coping with the fundamental fragility of the human subject. Our picture of the self differs from both the idealist and the eliminative approaches (...) widely represented in contemporary discussion. Against the idealist approach, we deny that the self is something primitive and logically prior. Rather, we take it to be the result of a process of construction that starts with subpersonal unconscious processes. On the other hand, we also reject the anti-realistic, eliminative argument that, from the non-primary, derivative nature of the self, infers its status as an illusory by-product of real neurobiological events, devoid of any explanatory role. (shrink)

This paper aims at investigating the vocabulary of thingness in the thought of Henry of Ghent. The paper features two main parts: in the first part we try to clarify the statement and the implications of the distinction between the concept of res a reor, reris and the concept of res a ratitudine. On the subject the thesis argued that this distinction has essentially an epistemological function in Henry of Ghent's thought. The second part of the paper, instead, takes into (...) consideration the concept of realitas as it is formulated by Henry in some sections of his Quodlibeta. The argued thesis is that realitas is not a synonym of being, but rather designates the inner foundation of every ontological attribution. (shrink)

How can we investigate the foundations of consciousness? In addressing this question, we will focus on the two main strategies that authors have adopted so far. On the one hand, there is research aimed at characterizing a specific content, which should account for conscious states. We may call this the content approach. On the other hand, one finds the processing approach, which proposes to look for a particular way of processing to account for consciousness.. Our aim, in this paper, is (...) to develop arguments for the latter approach. We focus on a criticism of Jesse Prinz’s AIR theory of consciousness. We have chosen Prinz’s theory because it incorporates features of both the content and processing approaches, and discussing it will therefore allow us to compare the advantages and downsides of both. Our argument will focus in particular on the notion of intermediate-level. We will discuss how Prinz characterizes the intermediate-level according to a content approach, and argue that such a characterization is inadequate. Finally, we will argue in favor of processing approach to the problem of consciousness, which also accounts for the massive interaction of top-down and bottom-up processes in the brain. Even though consciousness remains an unsolved riddle, we claim that this is the best path towards a solution. (shrink)

In Soph. 237b7–239a11 Plato lays out a sequence of arguments that are generally considered homogenous. An analysis of each argument can shed light on the need to differentiate their respective nature. Firstly, it will be shown that the arguments do not work only at the linguistic level, contrary to the way these passages are interpreted by most of commentators. The meta–linguistic nature of the third argument will be particularly emphasised. Secondly, it will be argued that the three arguments follow each (...) other according to a crescendo. The implications of this argumentative structure will be specifically appreciated. Both these results of the analysis induce to attribute a crucial importance to the notion of medamos on: the arguments do not aim to definitively exclude the possibility of a Parmenidean non–being; they play a positive role within the inquiry of the Stranger of Elea, inasmuch the thematisation of Parmenidean non–being is seriously taken into account and embraced at this stage of the dialogue. In fact it is only through this dialectical step that the Stranger gains the chance to proceed in the direction of a relational ontology and a new concept of non–being. The positive role played by the medamos on presupposes that this expression and the equivalent ones are not mere absurdities and can find place in the Platonic use of language; this implies that the notion of medamos on must have a justification in the framework of Platonic relational ontology and conception of language. The consideration of this aspect eventually gives the opportunity to return to the three arguments and present an explanation of their positioning in that stage of the dialogue. (shrink)

Adams & Kveraga argue that social visual perception is cognitively penetrable by extending a top-down model for visual object recognition to visual perception of social cues. Here I suggest that, in their view, a clear link between the top-down contextual influences that modulate social visual perception and the perceptual experience of a subject is missing. Without such a link their proposal is consistent with explanations that need not involve cognitive penetration of perceptual experience but only modifications of perceptual judgments formed (...) on the basis of that experience. I review two experiments that may provide initial evidence for the link and discuss why we can best explain the results with cognitive penetration, compared to modification of judgment. Finally, I show that the compound social-cue integration theory A. & K. propose fits naturally with the cases I discuss. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between brain and language in terms of coevolution. Nowadays, the thesis of coevolution is defended by the exponents of the neoculturalist paradigm to claim that language is the product of cultural evolution. In our opinion, this claim is misleading. From our point of view, in fact, we can refer to the relationship between brain and language in terms of coevolution only if we are prepared to maintain that language is (...) the product of natural selection. In our opinion, in other words, the coevolution thesis involves the idea of language as biological adaptation. (shrink)

The desire of knowledge constitutes, as it is well known, the opening ‘theme’ of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. This article focuses on the figure of Dominic of Flanders, one of the commentators of Aristotle’s Metaphysics who much developed this topic. Dominicus deals with it in the second question of the first book of his commentary. What makes the interest of Dominic’s account is its originality, in so far as, according to him, the beginning of Aristotle’s Metaphysics aims to stress the very primacy (...) of Metaphsyics, and not only, the primacy of science in general. In this sense, the desire of knowledge constitutes for Dominic the most efficacious argument for the primacy of Metaphsyics. However, this is possible only if the desiderium sciendi is related to two other principles: the first is that desirability entails perfection, and the second is that the desirability of an object depends on its intelligibility. (shrink)

Quaestio, Volume 20, Issue, Page 257-288, January 2020.

Zubiri’s thought can be qualified as an attempt to reconsider the assumptions and contents of the history of metaphysics from a new perspective. In almost all his writings, Zubiri targets the tradition of Western metaphysics and its fundamental concepts from heterogeneous perspectives and with different methods. Among his mature writings there is one that is exemplary in this regard: Los problemas fundamentales de la metafisíca occidental (1969-1970). This paper examines the peculiar definition of metaphysics that Zubiri formulates in this work, (...) paying particular attention to the transcensus of the first science, to the notion of the transcendental and, finally, to the distinction, elaborated by Zubiri, between the object of metaphysics and the things that constitute the object of ordinary knowledge. (shrink)

Riassunto: Questo lavoro mira a un confronto tra la psicologia morale di Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche e l’approccio socio-intuizionista al giudizio morale proposto da Jonathan Haidt. Questo confronto metterà in luce somiglianze notevoli tra i due modelli. Il lavoro intende inoltre chiarire quali implicazioni Nietzsche trae dalla sua descrizione della psicologia umana e quali cambiamenti di prospettiva egli esorta a operare rispetto alla comprensione di noi stessi come “esseri morali”. Parole chiave: Giudizio morale; Sviluppo morale; Intuizionismo; Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche; Jonathan Haidt (...) The Dawn of Moral Psychology. Nietzsche’s Moral Psychology and some Recent Empirical Investigations: Comparing Nietzsche’s moral psychology and the social intuitionist approach to moral judgment proposed by Jonathan Haidt, this paper reveals remarkable similarities between the two models. It also clarifies what implications Nietzsche drew from his description of human psychology and the perspective changes these entail for understanding ourselves as “moral beings”. Keywords: Moral Judgment; Moral Development; Intuitionism; Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche; Jonathan Haidt. (shrink)

Can we speak about animal enunciation? More, can we learn something about the formal structure of the enunciation looking at the animal way to staring us and addressing to us with their glances? This contribution tries to describe some real cases of glances exchange between animals and humans in order to extract some reflections about the way in which we construct the role of the enunciator in the interspecific relationship. Are animals subjects in their relation with humans? And what “subject” (...) means exactly? A semiotic definition of subject is both narrative and enunciative, and the question is: can we interpretate animal glances as good expressions of subjectivity? (shrink)

In this article we review the basic idea of the “intermediate level” hypothesis about consciousness as proposed by Ray Jackendoff, then developed by Crick and Koch and finally by Prinz. According to this hypothesis, consciousness arises only at an intermediate-level, which lies between rough sensory inputs and the more abstract representations used, e.g., in object recognition. We aim at formulating a more specific hypothesis about a suitable conception of consciousness relative to the experience of language. We claim that “linguistic consciousness”, (...) namely an individual’s conscious experience engendered by the processing of linguistic information, cannot be identified only in the phenomenal role played by the phonological structure of language, contrary to what Jackendoff holds. Instead, we hypothesize that the top-down computational structure required for the very possibility of linguistic consciousness is determined by syntax. This hypothesis, we believe, avoids two problems with Jackendoff’s original account. (shrink)

Due to its innovative content, Duns Scotus’ thought spread rapidly, thanks above all to the contribution of his pupils and disciples, who immediately undertook to edit his writings and to rework and disseminate his thought. In this process of dissemination of Scotism, a very important role was played by Antonius Andreae, a Spanish Franciscan and a Scotist. His importance is mainly historical. The widespread diffusion of Scotus’ metaphysical thought - at least in a first phase - is essentially linked to (...) his name: many authors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries will know Duns Scotus’ metaphysical thought through the mediation of his Questiones in xii libros Metaphisice. This paper examines Andreae’s discussion concerning the subject of metaphysics (Questiones, I, q. 1), trying to show in what sense and in what way he contributed to providing a simplified yet systematic formulation of some of Duns Scotus’ doctrines. (shrink)

: In this article I discuss Athanasios Raftopoulos’ view on the epistemic role of attention and early vision, as outlined in his most recent book. I start by examining his view on attention, which he illustrates during his discussion of structured cognitive contents and their interactions with perceptual contents, as well as during his discussion of selection effects. According to Raftopoulos, attention not only operates pre-perceptual input selection, but also influences perceptual processing during late vision biasing the sampling of the (...) iconic image for perceptual hypotheses-testing. Afterwards, I critically assess Raftopoulos’ conclusions about the epistemic role of early vision, which are based on his view about the role of attention. From this assessment, I raise a potential concern for his proposal in the form of a new problem of selection: the interesting epistemic consequences of cognitive penetrability either follow or do not follow from selection effects, depending on how these selection effects are construed, but regardless of the stage of visual processing in which they take place. Keywords: Cognitive Penetration; Attention; Constructivism; Selection Effects; Perceptual Epistemology Il ruolo epistemico della visione primaria: penetrazione cognitiva e selezione attentiva Riassunto: In questo articolo discuto la proposta di Athanasios Raftopoulos riguardo al ruolo epistemico dell’attenzione e della early vision, contenuta nella sua recente monografia. La mia discussione comincia da un esame delle sue idee riguardo all’attenzione, che illustra sia durante la sua discussione dei contenuti cognitivi strutturati e delle loro interazioni con i contenuti percettivi, sia durante la sua discussione degli effetti di selezione. Secondo Raftopoulos, l’attenzione non opera solamente una selezione pre-percettiva degli input, ma influenza anche i processi percettivi di late vision orientando il processo di valutazione delle ipotesi percettive sulla base dell’immagine iconica. Successivamente, valuto criticamente le conclusioni di Raftopoulos’ riguardo al ruolo epistemico di early vision, fondate sulla sua concezione del ruolo dell’attenzione. Da questo esame, evidenzio una potenziale criticità nella sua proposta costituita da un nuovo problema della selezione: le conseguenze epistemiche della penetrabilità cognitiva seguono o non seguono dai processi di selezione, a seconda di come tali effetti sono concepiti, ma indipendentemente dal livello nella serie dei processi visivi nel quale si verificano. Parole chiave: Penetrabilità cognitiva; Attenzione; Costruttivismo; Effetti di Selezione; Epistemologia percettiva. (shrink)

Le présent volume sur Dionysos est issu d’un colloque qui a eu lieu à l’université de Varsovie en janvier 2019, dans le cadre du National Programme for the Development of Humanities financé par le ministère polonais de la Science et de l’Éducation supérieure. Il se concentre sur un aspect spécifique du dieu grec, celui de son rapport avec la politique et l’autorité. Dans une brève introduction (p. 1–5), Filip Doroszewski et Dariusz Karlowicz rappellent que, par-delà l’imaginaire nietzschéen d...