The act of animal killing affects the human psyche in manners that are culturally contingent. Throughout history, societal attitudes towards the taking of animal lives have mostly been based on deference and/or dominion. Postdomestic societies have evolved in fundamentally different ways. Meat production is abundant yet concealed, animals are categorized and stereotyped, and slaughter has become a highly disquieting activity. Increased awareness of postdomestic meat production systems raises a moral polemic and provokes disgust in some consumer segments. Overall, a heterogeneous (...) set of solutions has emerged to deal with the societal upset and cognitive dissonance caused by animal slaughter. This includes the so-called carnism approach, a rise in animal welfare programs, a market demand for reassuring narratives, a rehabilitation of the metier of farmers and butchers, crowd butchering, neo-ritualism and home slaughter, the biotechnological exploration of “cultured meat” and “pain-free meat”, entomophagy, “meatless meat”, and the increasing proliferation of vegan and vegetarian lifestyles. (shrink)

In 1848 Frederic Bastiat wrote an article in the Journal des Debats in which he said, Man struggles against pain and suffering. However, he is condemned by nature to suffering and to privation if he does not take upon himself the effort of work. Hence he has only the choice between two evils….Up to now, however, no remedy has been found for it, except for one man to avail himself of the work of others…so that all work is for (...) the one and all enjoyment is for the other. Hence [we have] slavery and robbery.[Today] the oppressor no longer directly compels the oppressed through his own strength. There is still a tyrant and a victim, but now the state, i.e. the law itself, is placed as a mediator between the two. What could be better for the purpose of stifling our doubts and vanquishing all resistance? We turn to the state and say to it: I find that between my enjoyment and my work there exists no relation that satisfies me. In order to bring about the desired balance, I would like to take away a little from others. However, that would be dangerous were I to do it myself. Can you, state, facilitate matters for me? Can you not assign me to a favorable position, or assign a more unfavorable one to my competitor? Can you not grant me a special “protection” and, not without plausible reason, lend me capital which you have taken from its possessors? Or, can you not educate my children at public expense? or guarantee me a carefree life from age 50 onwards?… In this case the law would be acting for me, and I would have all the advantages of exploitation without its risks and its onus. (shrink)

One of intuitions driving the acceptance of a neat structured tree of life is the assumption that organisms and the lineages they form have somewhat stable spatial and temporal boundaries. The phenomenon of symbiosis shows us that such ‘fixist’ assumptions does not correspond to how the natural world actually works. The implications of lateral gene transfer (LGT) have been discussed elsewhere; I wish to stress a related point. I will focus on lateral function transfer (LFT) and will argue, using examples (...) of what many would call ‘superorganisms’, that the emergence of symbiotic individuals revives the importance of functional and adaptationist thinking in how we conceptualize the lineages of biological individuals. The consequence of the argument is that, if we really want to hold onto tree of life thinking, we had better accept that new saplings appear and disappear all the time. (shrink)

E. O. Wilson (1974: 54) describes the problem that social organisms pose: “On what bases do we distinguish the extremely modified members of an invertebrate colony from the organs of a metazoan animal?” This framing of the issue has inspired many to look more closely at how groups of organisms form and behave as emergent individuals. The possible existence of “superorganisms” test our best intuitions about what can count and act as genuine biological individuals and how we should study them. (...) As we will discuss, colonies of certain organisms display many of the properties that we usually reserve only to individual organisms. Although there is good reason to believe that many social insects form genuine emergent biological individuals, the conclusion offered here is of a slightly different sort. I will argue that to understand some social insects' interactions and the emergent traits they give rise to, it may be helpful to shift our understanding from a community-level approach to an ecosystem-level approach. I will argue that viewing certain insect colonies (termites) as parts of ecosystems allows us to better understand some of the adaptations that have emerged from their evolution. (shrink)

Given the complexity of most phenomena, we have to delegate much epistemic work to other knowers and we must find reasons for relying on these specific knowers and not others. In our societies, these other knowers are often called experts and we rely on their epistemic authority more and more. For many complex phenomena such as climate change, genetically modified crops, and immunization, the experts that are called upon are scientific experts. For that reason, finding good reasons and justification for (...) deferring to their knowledge is of paramount societal importance. As we shall see, many have analyzed this epistemic dependence on scientific experts and have tried to show in what contexts are there good... (shrink)

From a close reading of Frantz Fanon's “The North African Syndrome” (1952), this article draws out Fanon's understanding of “death in life” to suggest that a concept of unlivability in the present must account for the temporal duration of racialized and colonized experiences of pain and trauma. It is thus critical of Judith Butler's and Frédéric Worms's discussion of unlivability in The Livable and The Unlivable (2023) for not centering a phenomenological study of the testimonies of the oppressed. (...) I argue for a greater engagement with Fanon on the longue durée of racial and colonial violence enacted on the bodies, psyches, and histories of racialized and colonized peoples. This article concludes by pointing to possibilities for a shared unlivability in a shared temporality, with potential to move beyond refusal and toward resistance to the colonial control over time. (shrink)

1891. The recovered manuscript of Aristotle's Constitutional History of Athens, now for the first time given to the world from the unique text in the British...

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

L’article explore les méandres de la théorie humienne du contrat. Hume en effet refuse de penser la société à partir du schème du contrat social. Naturaliste, il est beaucoup plus proche de Machiavel ou de Montesquieu que de Rousseau à cet égard. Pourtant on trouve chez lui tout un réseau de notions constitutives de sa pensée politique : la convention, l’obligation, la promesse. Il s’agit de restituer la cohérence de sa théorie complexe du lien social.

Cet article a pour but de mettre en regard l’analyse de l’esprit de Hume avec les critiques de l’associationnisme qu’on faites William James et Henri Bergson à la fin du XIXe siècle, lorsqu’ils proposèrent de renverser l’ordre des genèses psychologiques : non pas association d’éléments atomiques séparés (les impressions et idées), mais dissociation de touts vagues confus (les expériences pures). Il cherche à montrer sur l’exemple de la perception de la ressemblance que Hume est sauf du reproche d’avoir ainsi « (...) atomisé » la vie mentale, ce que montre notamment la fonction sélective et donc discriminante du principe de ressemblance. Le commentaire de Deleuze qui voit dans le dualisme de l’atomisme et de l’associationnisme chez Hume le critère même de définition de l’empirisme en général s’en trouve de ce fait contesté. (shrink)

La physique sociale commence, dans le Cours, par prendre acte du cercle où s’enferme la modernité: l’esprit critique refuse toute perspective d’organisation sociale; l’esprit rétrograde refuse l’idée même de progrès. Comte, progressiste, considère que l’on ne pourra sortir de ce cercle qu’en assumant l’héritage des rétrogrades, de manière à dépasser le danger qu’enveloppe la critique. Notre époque, totalement révolutionnaire, n’a d’autre horizon que sa propre critique. Or, ce qu’enseigne le Moyen-Âge interprété par les rétrogrades, c’est que sans horizon positif, la (...) critique nécessairement en vient à faire le jeu de la force, et en ce sens à détruire la société. C’est donc la comparaison des rétrogrades et des révolutionnaires qui, non seulement justifie le recours au concept de pouvoir spirituel, mais permet de mesurer ce que devient une société qui prétend s’en passer. (shrink)

This paper examines the correspondence and contacts between Galileo and a number of French intellectuals. It demonstrates that exchanges between Galileo and those Frenchmen did much to stimulate an interest in new scientific ideas in France, especially in astronomy; for example, Galileo provided a number of good telescopic lenses that did much to establish observational astronomy in France. The Frenchmen for their part provided Galileo with considerable useful information. Several were very active in his support after the condemnation of 1633 (...) and in publishing his later works. The paper further demonstrates the extent of the network of intellectuals who corresponded with Galileo and each other across Europe in the early seventeenth century. (shrink)

It is argued that, despite the neglect which Heidegger’s writings on science have generally received, the “fundamental ontology” of Being and Time reveals certain structures of experience crucial for our understanding of science; and that, as these insights cast considerable doubt upon the validity of the empiricist/positivist conception of science, Heidegger deserves considerably better treatment as an incipient philosopher of science than has been the case thus far. His arguments for the distortive effects of the alleged “change over” from praxis (...) to theoria, for the circularity of all human understanding (including scientific understanding), for the necessity of interpreting scientific method in terms of the hermeneutic circle, and for viewing scientific “crises” in ontological terms, are examined and evaluated. The article concludes with some reflections on the later Heidegger’s views on the limits of his earlier idea of science. (shrink)

It is argued that, despite the neglect which Heidegger’s writings on science have generally received, the “fundamental ontology” of Being and Time reveals certain structures of experience crucial for our understanding of science; and that, as these insights cast considerable doubt upon the validity of the empiricist/positivist conception of science, Heidegger deserves considerably better treatment as an incipient philosopher of science than has been the case thus far. His arguments for the distortive effects of the alleged “change over” from praxis (...) to theoria, for the circularity of all human understanding (including scientific understanding), for the necessity of interpreting scientific method in terms of the hermeneutic circle, and for viewing scientific “crises” in ontological terms, are examined and evaluated. The article concludes with some reflections on the later Heidegger’s views on the limits of his earlier idea of science. (shrink)

Interpretation of the development of merleau-ponty's attitude toward phenomenological reflection. first, ``the phenomenology of perception'' is shown to be a critique of the transcendental idealism of husserl's works prior to the ``crisis''. second, ``the visible and the invisible'' is shown to be an imminent critique of the ``lifeworld phenomenology'' of the ``crisis'' and of ``the phenomenology of perception'', leading to the view that phenomenological reflection, like reflective philosophy in general, must be superseded by a new approach which would articulate our (...) truly immediate relation with the world. (shrink)

L’importance des sources néoplatoniciennes de la philosophie première de Jankélévitch s’inscrit dans la lignée de l’enseignement de Bréhier qui le met sur la voie d’une « négation libératrice ». La fidélité à Bergson et la lecture de Schelling ne pouvaient néanmoins que reconduire la tentative de dépassement de la logique qui en résulte à une forme d’expérience pure qui recherche la plénitude dans une adéquation à la vie. Ainsi, « l’évanouissante entrevision » à laquelle Jankélévitch nous condamne à tendre sans (...) jamais l’atteindre, rivés que nous sommes à notre finitude, marque-t‑elle tout autant une forme de distance vis-à-vis de la philosophie de Plotin. La compréhension de cet héritage critique pourra ainsi nous permettre de mieux cerner ce qui sépare le vitalisme de Jankélévitch de l’idéalisme néoplatonicien, c’est-à-dire ce qui demeure incompatible entre la logique de la vie et la dialectique de la pensée. (shrink)

Série de l’ère #MeToo, I May Destroy You de Michaela Coel montre que la violence est une potentialité inhérente à la relation sexuelle. Le viol n’est pas le problème spécifique de la série, mais plutôt le cas extrême et paradigmatique qui donne lieu à une problématisation plus générale de la sexualité ordinaire, en une famille de cas hétérogènes. Le point culminant de la série est la manière dont elle transmue le genre du « Rape and Revenge », en substituant à (...) la vengeance des formes politiques d’action, par la puissance du récit et de la parole publique. (shrink)

Cette nouvelle de politique-fiction imagine un avenir proche où le populisme deviendrait le paradigme du discours politique. Une nouvelle modernité assiste à l’expansion d’une multiplicité de peuples virtuels. Les populismes de droite et de gauche entrent en rivalité : quel est le vrai Peuple? Mais les peuples n’ont pas besoin de populisme, ils ont besoin d’agencement. Qu’est-ce qu’agencer les peuples virtuels qui déchirent nos vies?

Résumé Le 3 octobre 2011, les zombies ont marché sur Wall Street. Cette parade carnavalesque, inspirée par les films de George A. Romero, agite les fantômes des laissés pour compte du capitalisme global. Mais le mythe du zombie est aussi le symbole d’une force politique informe, qui résiste à toute organisation, et sur laquelle se réfléchissent les désirs morts-vivants d’une société.

This article defends a Platonist view of streaming. It is opposite to the mainstream representation that streaming has “liquidated” the structure both objective and collective of musical experience. On the contrary, streaming is the support of a new kind of musical object, which is distinct both from the allographic notational objects and from the phonographic ones. This third kind of object has to be characterized as a flux-object. The way it is diffused and accessible implies a new kind of experience. (...) Cyberspace in which this experience takes place is characterized as an “hyperobjective noosphere”: the relation of streaming with the subjects of musical experience is akin to the relation of atmosphere or biosphere to the living beings. This article invites to an ascetic exercise: the everyday experience of the listener has to become mindful of the “swarm community” in which s/he participates by streaming. Thus it develops a renewed musical Platonism, as a kind of response to “object-oriented ontologies”. According to this renewed Platonism, dispositional properties are essential to the objects. Objects have no sense apart from the relation to individual and collective subjectivations that are potential parts of them. (shrink)

Cette nouvelle d’anticipation fantaisiste imagine un futur proche où notre vie quotidienne serait peuplée de robots anthropomorphes entièrement dédiés à l’usage sexuel. Elle spécule sur la manière dont ces robots pourraient peu à peu transformer en profondeur les relations sociales et conditionner l’avènement d’une humanité « post-biologique ». La place des sexo-robots dans la vie quotidienne divise les féministes. Elle révèle des lignes de fracture idéologiques entre le vieil humanisme et une nouvelle métaphysique plus généreuse du rapport homme-machine.