From the desire to find support and confirmation for our personal sensory observations, and from the human interest in sharing our experiences with others, there emerges a basic principle of scientific method: We demand the possibility of intelligible communication and agreement concerning individuals' sensory perceptions in particular and their experiences in general. This requirement is made both for the natural and social sciences. The raw material offered for logical organization must be capable of exhibiting an inter-subjective character—such material, or protocols, (...) must be acceptable in common to all concerned. And it must be acceptable for logical organization or systematization in some science. (shrink)

In the Bayesian approach to quantum mechanics, probabilities—and thus quantum states—represent an agent’s degrees of belief, rather than corresponding to objective properties of physical systems. In this paper we investigate the concept of certainty in quantum mechanics. Particularly, we show how the probability-1 predictions derived from pure quantum states highlight a fundamental difference between our Bayesian approach, on the one hand, and Copenhagen and similar interpretations on the other. We first review the main arguments for the general claim that probabilities (...) always represent degrees of belief. We then argue that a quantum state prepared by some physical device always depends on an agent’s prior beliefs, implying that the probability-1 predictions derived from that state also depend on the agent’s prior beliefs. Quantum certainty is therefore always some agent’s certainty. Conversely, if facts about an experimental setup could imply agent-independent certainty for a measurement outcome, as in many Copenhagen-like interpretations, that outcome would effectively correspond to a preexisting system property. The idea that measurement outcomes occurring with certainty correspond to preexisting system properties is, however, in conflict with locality. We emphasize this by giving a version of an argument of Stairs [(1983). Quantum logic, realism, and value-definiteness. Philosophy of Science, 50, 578], which applies the Kochen–Specker theorem to an entangled bipartite system. (shrink)

(2013). Disrespectful Care in the Treatment of Sickle Cell Disease Requires More Than Ethics Consultation. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 12-14. doi: 10.1080/15265161.2013.768857.

This article shows how descriptive imagery can be used to hijack evolved psychological instincts and prejudice the judgment of others, particularly in the legal and political domains. By mimicking the cues that represented threats to our ancestors, those wishing to color the perception of others can subtly trigger the affective responses that evolved to help navigate ancestral threats. When this happens, logic may be unseated in favor of deep-seated instinctual responses, often to a problematic degree. In this way, lawyers, politicians, (...) and activists, taking a page out of the playbook of novelists and other storytellers, can weaponize words, images, descriptions, and narratives to, often improperly, sway the opinions of others. (shrink)

Research is increasingly suggesting that human intuitions form the core of many laws. Laws, therefore, can serve as one potential testing ground for new theories about the content and structure of intuitions. Here the model of ownership psychology as an evolved cognitive adaptation is evaluated against long-standing features of property law.

In Bergson and Intensive Magnitude: Dismantling his Critique, Florian Vermeiren argues that Bergson’s critique of intensive magnitude in Time and Free Will is inconsistent with his later philosophy, and even inconsistent with the role of a “difference in degrees of freedom” in Time and Free Will. I argue that it is rather Vermeiren’s analysis which mischaracterizes Bergson’s critique and therefore the interpretation of an inconsistency cannot stand. In the first two sections I reevaluate Bergson’s critique, showing what, according to Bergson, (...) are the good and bad senses of intensity, and how this critique allowed Bergson to institute a new conception of difference as expressed in concrete continuity. In the final section I examine the importance of infinitesimal thought in Bergson’s good sense of intensity. (shrink)

Theories of Truth introduces readers to issues that have been connected with truth—the only book of its kind. Richard Kirkham has an easy writing style and a good sense of what needs to be explained to students new to the literature. These facts make Theories of Truth a serious contender for use in the classroom. As with most introductions, use of the book should be supplemented with readings from the major authors covered. Beyond that supplementation, however, the text still needs (...) to be used with some caution, for there are shortcomings that could seriously mislead students. (shrink)

In a number of influential articles published since 1972, Dorothy Grover has developed the prosentential theory of truth. Brought together and published with a new introduction, these essays are even more impressive as a group than they were as single contributions to philosophy and linguistics. Denying that truth has an explanatory role, the prosentential theory does not address traditional truth issues like belief, meaning, and justification. Instead, it focuses on the grammatical role of the truth predicate and asserts that (...) “it is true” is a prosentence, functioning much as a pronoun does. Grover defends the theory by indicating how it can handle notorious paradoxes like the Liar, as well as by analyzing some English truth-usages. The introduction to the volume surveys traditional theories of truth, including correspondence, pragmatic, and coherence theories. It discusses the essays to come and, finally, considers the implications of the prosentential theory for other theories. Despite the fact that the prosentential theory dismisses the “nature of truth” as a red herring, Grover shows that there are important aspects of traditional truth theories that prosentential theorists have the option of endorsing. (shrink)

It is essentially a truism that the natural sciences have little or no place for dogmatism; to the contrary, there is an underlying skepticism pervading all scientific propositions. Any philosophy which pretends to provide an adequate philosophy of science, should, it seems to me, exhibit epistemologically a corresponding skepticism. At the very least, such a philosophy should demonstrate a skepticism in its views of the “truth” of scientific statements.