ZusammenfassungDieser Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit den öffentlichen Debatten über die Genealogie der polnischen Sozialwissenschaften nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Es wird gezeigt, wie sich in der Periode zwischen dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges (1945) und der Stalinisierung der polnischen Wissenschaft im Rahmen des „Ersten Kongresses der polnischen Wissenschaft“ (1951) die Grenzen des Erlaubten in öffentlichen Diskussionen über die wissenschaftliche Identität der Soziologie verschoben haben. Der Artikel, der vor allem auf der Analyse der öffentlichen Haltung des Organisators der soziologischen Gruppe Józef (...) Chałasiński basiert ist, beschreibt die Entwicklungsetappen des öffentlichen Diskurses über die akademische Tradition der Sozialwissenschaften, die den zunehmenden Einfluss der politischen Agenda auf die wissenschaftliche Praxis widerspiegeln. Obwohl unmittelbar nach dem Krieg die Kontinuität mit der Zwischenkriegstradition und der „limitierte Charakter“ des marxistischen Ansatzes betont wurden, hat die beginnende Stalinisierung des öffentlichen Raums 1948 dazu geführt, dass die politische Rolle der Soziologie, die zusammen mit dem Marxismus dem progressiven Lager angehörte, zum zentralen Punkt ihrer eigenen Genealogie wurde. Die Schließung der soziologischen Abteilungen und Zeitschriften zwischen 1950 und 1951 markierten dabei die neue Etappe im Rahmen der Vorbereitungssitzungen zum ersten wissenschaftlichen Kongress. Eine der Hauptaufgaben für die Sozialwissenschaften im Rahmen dieses Kongresses bestand darin, gemeinsam mit den Philosophen eine progressive wissenschaftliche Tradition Polens zu konstruieren. Der Kongress wurde für die polnischen Wissenschaftler zur Aufgabe mit bekanntem Ergebnis und mehreren obligatorischen Elementen wie einer „fortschrittlichen nationalen Tradition“, dem „Marxismus-Leninismus“ und einem „Sechsjahresplan“ zu verfassen. Trotz des starken Drucks von Seiten der Politik konnten die Teilnehmer der Diskussionen keinen Kompromiss im Hinblick auf die progressive Tradition der polnischen Sozialwissenschaften finden und so die notwendige „Einheit“ erreichen. (shrink)

This article deals with the public debates on the genealogy of Polish social sciences after the Second World War. The author shows how the changes in political conditions in the period between the end of the war (1945) and the ‘Stalinisation’ of Polish science at the First Congress of Polish Science (1951) influenced the ‘limits of the permissible’ in public discussions about the scientific identity of sociology. The article describes the stages in the development of public discourse on the genealogy (...) of the social sciences and thematises the increasing influence of the political agenda on the public practices of academics. When, immediately after the war, continuity with inter-war tradition, and the limited character of the Marxist approach, were particularly emphasised in the public discourse on the genealogy of social sciences, the beginning of the ‘Stalinisation’ of public space in 1948 forced the scholars to put emphasis on the political role of sociology, which, according to them, belonged to the ‘progressive camp’ together with Marxism. The closing of the sociological departments, and a journal, between 1950 and 1951 started a new stage of the debates within the preparatory meetings for the scientific congress. At this congress, the task of the social scientists was to construct, together with philosophers, a ‘progressive scientific tradition’ in Poland. For the Polish social scientists, the congress was a task to write a ‘mathematical equation’ with a known result and several mandatory elements such as ‘the progressive national tradition,’ ‘Marxism-Leninism,’ and ‘six-year plan.’ However, even under strong political pressure, the participants in the discussions did not come to a compromise concerning the progressive tradition of the Polish social sciences, and did not achieve the necessary ‘unity.’. (shrink)

Author: Sójka Jacek Title: STUDIES IN CULTURE AND THEIR ORIGINS (Kulturoznawstwo i jego źródła) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.12, number: 2011/1, pages: 171-181 Keywords: STUDIES IN CULTURE, CULTURAL STUDIES, PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE, SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE, JÓZEF CHAŁASIŃSKI, JERZY KMITA Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:In this paper the author traced the origins of studies in culture (in Polish: kulturoznawstwo). The first part deals with the philosophical tradition out of (...) which several philosophies of culture had emerged, esp. within German philosophy at the beginning of the 20th century. The second part is dedicated to the tradition of British cultural studies which has influenced considerably today’s reflection on culture. Finally, the third part points at the Polish sociology of culture of the last century. A special emphasis was put on the work of Józef Chałasiński who tried to work out a “science of culture in its totality”. His “American culture” from 1962 can be seen as a project of cultural studies in today’s sense of the word. In conclusion the author tries to relate all three sources of studies in culture to the theory of Jerzy Kmita, a founder of studies in culture developed at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. (shrink)

After the unexpected death of Professor Józef Kałuża at the age of 74 on the 26th of July 2003, not only Polish neuropathology but also Polish philosophy of medical investigations lost one of its most renowned minds. Beginning in 1949, Professor Kałuża studied medical sciences for five years at the Medical Faculty of the Jagiellonian University in Cracow. He did his Ph.D. thesis in neuropathology in the Department of Neuropathology of the Polish Academy of Science. In 1962 he received (...) a Rockefeller Foundation scholarship and spent one year at the National Institutes of Health. In 1981 Professor Kaluza was promoted to a tenured professorship in neuropathology. He is the author of more than 110 articles published in medical periodicals and coauthor of many chapters in medical handbooks. (shrink)

Where you have freedom, the meaning of the word increases, where the word is meaningful, you presuppose freedom." Józef Tischner.

After the unexpected death of Professor Józef Kałuża at the age of 74 on the 26th of July 2003, not only Polish neuropathology but also Polish philosophy of medical investigations lost one of its most renowned minds. Beginning in 1949, Professor Kałuża studied medical sciences for five years at the Medical Faculty of the Jagiellonian University in Cracow. He did his Ph.D. thesis in neuropathology in the Department of Neuropathology of the Polish Academy of Science. In 1962 he received (...) a Rockefeller Foundation scholarship and spent one year at the National Institutes of Health. In 1981 Professor Kaluza was promoted to a tenured professorship in neuropathology. He is the author of more than 110 articles published in medical periodicals and coauthor of many chapters in medical handbooks. (shrink)

The article reviews the book Śmierć, nieśmiertelność, sens życia. Egzystencjalny wymiar filozofii Ludwiga Wittgensteina [Death, Immortality, the Meaning of Life: The Existential Dimension of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophy], by Ireneusz Ziemiński.

The presented paper focuses on the analysis of strategic documents at the level of the European Union concerning the regulation of artificial intelligence as one of the so-called disruptive technologies. In the first part of the article, we outline the basic terminology. Subsequently, we focus on the summarizing and systemizing of the key documents adopted at the EU level in terms of artificial intelligence regulation. The focus of the paper is devoted to issues of personal data protection and cyber security (...) included in these strategic documents. The final part contains recommendations for future research and evaluation of its key features. (shrink)

The great vision of logical empiricism brought up a hope for ultimate solving the problem of understanding our knowledge. Starting, for the first time in the history of empiricism, from a point of view typical for mathematicians not empiricists, i.e. from the program of logicism, the philosophers of Vienna Circle aimed at creating a consistent philosophy which makes possible both mathematics and empirical knowledge. Today, after more than a half century, their efforts seem to be completely futile. The topic of (...) the paper is to find out the reasons why the program failed. It seems that the deepest reason for the failure lies in the philosophy of mathematics adopted by logical empiricists - namely logicism. The main problem of the contemporary methodology is to find a remedy for this ilness. the paper suggests some ideas in this direction. One of them is more serious approach to the philosophy of mathematics. Another is the recognition of the crucial role epistemic and other values play in scientific research. (shrink)

I argue that on Aristotle’s account practical thinking is thinking whose origin (archē) is a desire that has as its object the very thing that one reasons about how to promote. This feature distinguishes practical from productive reasoning since in the latter the desire that initiates it is not (unless incidentally) a desire for the object that one productively reasons about. The feature has several interesting consequences: (a) there is only a contingent relationship between the desire that one practically reasons (...) about how to satisfy and the action one decides on; (b) practical thinking and action cannot be separated from the agent, whereas productive thinking and production can be outsourced to someone else. The view has consequences also for the distinction between action and production. Finally, I illustrate the usefulness and correctness of my account of practical thinking by using it to shed new light on Aristotle’s claim that the virtuous agent must decide on her virtuous actions ‘for themselves’. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the widely held view that Aristotle's vicious agent is a principled follower of a wrong conception of the good whose soul, just like the soul of the virtuous agent, is marked by harmony between his reason and non-rational desires is an exegetical mistake. Rather, Aristotle holds – consistently and throughout the Nicomachean Ethics – that the vicious agent lacks any real principles of action and that his soul lacks unity and harmony even more than (...) the soul of the uncontrolled agent. (shrink)

The Struggle for Nature outlines and examines the main aspects of current environmental philosophy including deep ecology, social and political ecology, eco-feminism and eco-anarchism. It criticizes the dependency on science of these philosophies and the social problems engendered by them. Jozef Keulartz argues for a post-naturalistic turn in environmental philosophy. The Struggle for Nature presents the most up-to-date arguments in environmental philosophy, which will be valuable reading for anyone interested in applied philosophy, environmental studies or geography.

Stephen Clark’s article The Rights of Wild Things from 1979 was the starting point for the consideration in the animal ethics literature of the so-called ‘predation problem’. Clark examines the response of David George Ritchie to Henry Stephens Salt, the first writer who has argued explicitly in favor of animal rights. Ritchie attempts to demonstrate—via reductio ad absurdum—that animals cannot have rights, because granting them rights would oblige us to protect prey animals against predators that wrongly violate their rights. This (...) article navigates the reader through the debate sparked off by Clarke’s article, with as final destination what I consider to be the best way to deal with the predation problem. I will successively discuss arguments against the predation reductio from Singer’s utilitarian approach, Regan’s deontological approach, Nussbaum’s capability approach, and Donadson and Kymlicka’s political theory of animal rights. (shrink)

The subject of comparison of Husserl’s category of “now” with the category of “now” functioning in recentivism constitutes the notion of “living reality” in the sense of embroiling “now” into the activity of the stream of consciousness. In Husserl’s conception, this „living reality” falls apart into retention and protention. Hence, we deal with the passage of subsequent “nows”, taking nunc stans, which creates all other time- and logic-delayed objects for granted. This lack of an ontological foundation of the category of (...) “now” in Husserl’s conception removes recentivism. In recentivism, though, the category of “now” constitutes punctum saliens on the one hand, and characterises being as newly formed each time, that is an event which in its new “now” is continually taking on the new otherness on the other hand. It is enough for an event to “be”, but “the way” it is is no longer dependent on the event, but a phenomenon which phenomenology would like to ignore. At best, it would like to eliminate it as insignificant. (shrink)

The paper defends three claims about Aristotle’s theory of uncontrolled actions (akrasia) in NE 7.3. First, I argue that the first part of NE 7.3 contains the description of the overall state of mind of the agent while she acts without control. Aristotle’s solution to the problem of uncontrolled action lies in the analogy between the uncontrolled agent and people who are drunk, mad, or asleep. This analogy is interpreted as meaning that the uncontrolled agent, while acting without control, is (...) still in possession of her knowledge but she is unable to use it as knowledge due to the temporary disablement of her reason by appetite. Due to this disablement, the uncontrolled agent is temporarily unable to be motivated to act by her knowledge and acts merely on her appetite. Second, I argue that the second part of NE 7.3 provides an analysis of the particular mental state from which the uncontrolled action issues. Its central passage is a description of the uncontrolled agent’s state of mind before the uncontrolled action and not, as it has been traditionally understood, a description of her state of mind during the uncontrolled action. Third, I argue that, on Aristotle’s view, the transition from the state before the uncontrolled action to the state in which the agent already acts without control does not involve any psychological state that would constitute the agent’s choice to abandon her decision and give in to her desires but proceeds on a purely physiological level. (shrink)

I defend two main theses. First, I argue that Aristotle’s account of voluntary action focuses on the conditions under which one is the cause of one’s actions in virtue of being (qua) the individual one is. Aristotle contrasts voluntary action not only with involuntary action but also with cases in which one acts (or does something) due to one’s nature (for example, in virtue of being a member of a certain species) rather than due to one’s own desires (i.e. qua (...) individual). An action can be attributed to one qua individual in two distinct ways depending on whether one is a rational or a non-rational animal. One is responsible for one’s action in both cases, but only in the former case is one also responsible for being the sort of individual that performs it. Aristotle also distinguishes two ways in which an action can be compelled while still being an action of the agent. In the first case, one is compelled by (physically) external forces or circumstances to act against one’s internal impulse. In the second case, one is compelled to act on (internal) impulses that are fixed by one’s nature against one’s own individual impulse. This latter kind of compelled action is only possible in the case of rational agents. Secondly, I argue that Aristotle’s conception of what it is to be a cause of an action inevitably brings in certain normative features which support evaluative judgments and the practice of praise and blame. On Aristotle’s view, any goal-directed behavior that is properly attributable to an individual is (normally) subject to standards that pertain to behavior of that sort. At the most basic level, these standards establish what counts as a successful realization of the goal that one aims at. Thus even in the case of non-rational animals (or children), one can judge the success of what they are doing and encourage (or discourage) similar behavior by praise or blame. These standards are applicable to one’s conduct simply insofar as one is the controlling origin (or efficient cause) of one’s action qua individual. In the case of rational agents the practice of praise and blame can involve a further normative layer since they can be praised or blamed not only for acting in a certain way so as to encourage or discourage them with a view to the future, but also for being – and having become – individuals of a certain sort. Nevertheless, the applicability of such evaluative judgments and of praise and blame is still warranted by one’s being the controlling origin of one’s actions qua the individual one is (in this case, qua rational individual). (shrink)

This paper illuminates a variety of issues that speak to the question of whether ‘captivity for conservation’ can be an ethically acceptable goal of the modern zoo. Reflecting on both theoretical disagreements and practical challenges , the paper explains why the ‘Noah’s Ark’ paradigm is being replaced by an alternative ‘integrated approach.’ It explores the changes in the zoo’s core tasks that the new paradigm implies. And it pays special attention to the changes that would have to be made in (...) zoos’ collection policies: connection with in situ projects, emphasizing local species and the local biogeographical region, exchange of animals among zoos and between zoos and wildlife, and a shift towards smaller species. Finally the question will be addressed whether the new paradigm will achieve a morally acceptable balance between animal welfare costs and species conservation benefits. (shrink)

I argue that, for Aristotle, virtue of character is a state of the non-rational part of the soul that makes one prone to making and acting on decisions in virtue of that part’s standing in the right relation to (correct) reason, namely, a relation that qualifies the agent as a true self-lover. In effect, this central feature of virtue of character is nothing else than love of practical wisdom. As I argue, it not only explains how reason can hold direct (...) authority over non-rational desires but also why Aristotle defines virtue of character as hexis prohairetikē. (shrink)

The paper addresses the following question: why do human beings, on Aristotle’s view, have an innate tendency to badness, that is, to developing desires that go beyond, and often against, their natural needs? Given Aristotle’s teleological assumptions (including the thesis that nature does nothing in vain), such tendency should not be present. I argue that the culprit is to be found in the workings of rationality. In particular, it is the presence of theoretical reason that necessitates the limitless nature of (...) human non-rational desires. (shrink)

The development of hormonal contraception introduced a new era in medical practice, marked by the suppression of female fertility by interventions in the hormonal system. The interventions are very grave, as sex hormones are of existential importance both to preserve human life and to preserve the human species. This article conducts an ethical evaluation of the use of hormonal contraception through two ethical theories: natural law theory and virtue ethics. Based on philosophical reflection, the author examines what effects hormonal contraception (...) has on primary goods and whether its use is congruent with the cardinal virtues. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 14.3 : 491–524. (shrink)

Jan Patočka became politically active for the first time as a spokesperson of the dissident movement Charter 77. In this capacity he wrote several essays, the first of which, entitled "On the Matters of The Plastic People of the Universe and DG 307", I interpret as the explanation and justification of his turn toward political engagement. The following article is a reading of Patočka's essay that pays particular attention to a peculiar formal feature of the essay – namely that it's (...) presented as a reversal of Dostoevsky's short story "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man". In reversing this story, Patočka shows us the two basic ways of human life and explains his political engagement as an action taken on behalf of the properly human way of life, which he calls "life in truth" or "the responsible life". The purpose of his political engagement thus wasn't defending human rights, but defending life in truth, to which human rights provide suitable conditions. "On the Matters…" also presents Patočka's assessment of the Communist regime with clarity and severity not seen elsewhere in his writings, and shows a shift in his views of youth and youthful rebellion. (shrink)

Socrates’ final argument in the Protagoras is premised on the surprising identification of the pleasant with the good and argues that virtue is the “art of measurement” that can be easily taught to the Many. The view that virtue can be taught is also espoused by Socrates elsewhere, notably in the Phaedrus. However, while the Protagoras identifies virtue with the art of calculating the greatest pleasure, which is identified with the greatest good, in the Phaedrus virtue is shown to consist (...) in the ceaseless search for the good. I argue that the picture of virtue presented in the Protagoras is in agreement with that of the Phaedrus in that the Protagoras depicts the first stage of the process of learning genuine virtue, which is outlined as a whole in the Phaedrus. The argument of the Protagoras then works as a protreptic: it teaches an elementary way of thinking about the ends of one’s actions and opens up the way toward genuine virtue. (shrink)