Animal Captivity

When making decisions about action to improve animal lives, it is important that we have accurate estimates of how much animals are suffering under different conditions. The current frameworks for making comparative estimates of suffering all fall along the lines of multiplying numbers of animals used by length of life and amount of suffering experienced. However, the numbers used to quantify suffering are usually generated through unreliable and subjective processes which make them unlikely to be correct. In this paper, I (...) look at how we might apply principled methods from animal welfare science to arrive at more accurate scores, which will then help us in making the best decisions for animals. I argue that a combined use of both a whole-animal measure and a combination measurement framework for assessing welfare will give us the most accurate answers to guide our action. (shrink)

Guardians of companion animals killed wrongfully in the U.S. historically receive compensatory judgments reflecting the animal’s economic value. As animals are property in torts law, this value typically is the animal’s fair market value—which is often zero. But this is only the animal’s value, as it were, to a stranger and, in light of the fact that many guardians value their animals at rates far in excess of fair market value, legislatures and courts have begun to recognize a second value, (...) the animal’s value to her guardian. What is this noneconomic value, and how should guardians be compensated for it? In Part 1, I propose a novel method to answer this question. My method includes a third, even more controversial, value: the animal’s value to herself. The idea that an animal could invest in herself faces many criticisms. In Part 2, I defend the claim by examining the mental capacities of dogs (Canis familiaris). I rebut the central objection—that dogs lack the psychological capacities required for self-investment—by showing that dogs are autonomous, think about their futures, and inhibit their desires in light of their goals. I close by suggesting that whereas the approach has conservative implications for the valuation of companion animals, it has radical implications for the valuation of agricultural animals. -/- Keywords: companion animals, animal law, legal theory, value theory, practical ethics, economic value, noneconomic value, intrinsic value, instrumental value, animal welfare, dogs, animal rights, capital value, self-investment value, autonomy, wrongful death, philosophy of animal law, animal minds, moral standing of animals, legal standing of animals, agency, prospection, canine neurobiology, bereavement, replaceability, non-ideal ethics . (shrink)

Following recent arguments that cultural practices in wild animal populations have important conservation implications, we argue that recognizing captive animals as cultural has important welfare implications. Having a culture is of deep importance for cultural animals, wherever they live. Without understanding the cultural capacities of captive animals, we will be left with a deeply impoverished view of what they need to flourish. Best practices for welfare should therefore require concern for animals’ cultural needs, but the relationship between culture and welfare (...) is also extremely complex, requiring us to rethink standard assumptions about what constitutes and contributes to welfare. (shrink)

This paper considers the hotly debated issue of whether one should grant moral and legal personhood to intelligent robots once they have achieved a certain standard of sophistication based on such criteria as rationality, autonomy, and social relations. The starting point for the analysis is the European Parliament’s resolution on Civil Law Rules on Robotics and its recommendation that robots be granted legal status and electronic personhood. The resolution is discussed against the background of the so-called Robotics Open Letter, which (...) is critical of the Civil Law Rules on Robotics. The paper reviews issues related to the moral and legal status of intelligent robots and the notion of legal personhood, including an analysis of the relation between moral and legal personhood in general and with respect to robots in particular. It examines two analogies, to corporations and animals, that have been proposed to elucidate the moral and legal status of robots. The paper concludes that one should not ascribe moral and legal personhood to currently existing robots, given their technological limitations, but that one should do so once they have achieved a certain level at which they would become comparable to human beings. (shrink)

The distinctive feature of a hybrid view is that it divides moral patients into two classes: call them dersons and uersons. Dersons have a deontological kind of moral status: they have moral rights against certain kinds of optimific harms. Uersons, by contrast, have a utilitarian kind of moral status: their interests are morally important, but uersons do not have deontological moral rights or any other kinds of deontological protections. In this paper, we discuss and critically evaluate three ways of supporting (...) a hybrid view: a case-based argument; an autonomy-based rationale; and a rationale based in a capacity for what we call deep commitments. Finally, we discuss a way in which considerations about the moral significance of relationships might support an approximation of a hybrid view. (shrink)

Visiting the zoo is often a joyful part of childhood. Some people say that zoos help educate people about animals and can help with conservation. Other people say that animals should be able to live in the wild. Young readers may have never considered this issue before, so learning the arguments and facts can help open their mind to new ideas about a familiar situation. This book provides readers with tools-including clear arguments, fact boxes, and a graphic organizer-to make their (...) own informed opinion on the topic of zoo animals. Readers will gain a deep understanding of the topic in this introduction to critical thinking. (shrink)

Animal welfare theorists tend to assume that most animals in captivity—especially those living in our homes and in sanctuaries—can, with sufficient care and environmental enrichment, live genuinely good lives. This misguided belief stems from the view that animal well-being should be assessed only in terms of the felt experiences of animals. Against this view, I argue that in assessing how well an animal’s life is going, we ought to consider two distinct kinds of welfare: experiential welfare and subject welfare. Once (...) we take seriously the notion of subject welfare, which pertains to the non-sentient nature of animals, we will be forced to accept the unfortunate reality that most, if not all, animals in confinement—including those living in our homes and in sanctuaries—fare quite poorly and live lives that should be characterized as having overall ill-being. (shrink)

There are many examples of human speciesism prejudice toward their specie and neglect toward members of other species. This article will consider one example of speciesism, the keeping of animals in captivity in ZOOs. Legal norms concerning animal protection in ZOOs are described, emphasising criminal and misdemeanour charges brought up for animal negligence and/or animal torture and their euthanasia. Although the ZOO establishment and functioning, as well as animal protection within ZOO, is legally prescribed, the article affirmed Visković’s thought that (...) not even in the most prosperous societies “there is no real moral or legal discipline in keeping and exhibiting captive fauna”. Speciesism believes justifying ZOO existence will be morally and ethically reexamined. Speciesism could be found in malicious language constructions affirmed in semantical field zoological garden in the Croatian language. (shrink)

Our topic is food that is "local, ethical, and sustainable." We defend a surprising claim about such a conception (at least, on certain ways of specifying its three central components): namely, that it may lend support to some varieties of “conscientious carnivorism.” We focus on an especially illustrative instance of (potentially) moral meat-eating: the case of Cinta Senese, a once-endangered pig that holds a special place in the cultural and environmental landscape in Tuscany, Italy. In Tuscany, Cinta Senese constitute a (...) robustly local food product (in the genealogical sense of "local"), where plausibly they lead quite worthwhile lives (in a welfarist sense of "worthwhile"). Further, the recent revival of their dwindling populations seemingly represents a “sustainability success” (in a conservationist sense). Thus, we argue that locavores with welfarist and conservationist proclivities may actually find that they have considerable reason to support, rather than to oppose, this form of animal agriculture – as well as others relevantly like it. (shrink)

Those who claim to be committed to the moral equality of animals don’t always act as if they think all animals are equal. For instance, many animal liberationists spend hundreds, if not thousands, of dollars each year on food, toys, and medical care for their companion animals. Surely, more animals would be helped if the money spent on companion animals were donated to farmed animal protection organizations. Moreover, many animal liberationists feed their companion animals the flesh of farmed animals, and (...) some let their cats roam outdoors, foreseeing that they will kill wildlife. Maybe these companion-animal loving animal liberationists are moral hypocrites. Or maybe their behavior is justified. I defend the latter claim. By developing an ethic that emphasizes the moral significance of life-meaning and recognizes the important role that companion animals play in giving meaning to human lives, I argue that there are stringent side-constraints that apply to companion animals, but not to other animals. Consequently, it isn’t hypocritical to prioritize companion animals over other animals. We can have (and value) our carnivorous companions and be animal liberationists too. (shrink)

Should the law recognize an elephant’s right to be released from solitary confinement? The New York State Court of Appeals—the highest court in the State of New York—will consider this question on May 18. At issue is an Asian elephant named Happy. But happy she is not. Every human being has a right to bodily liberty because they have strong interests that this right protects. Since Happy has the same strong interests, the Court should recognize Happy’s right to be freed (...) from solitary confinement. (shrink)

Intense or industrial animal husbandry is morally bad. This consensus in animal ethics led to the emergence of veganism which is recently in decline in favour of ‘conscientious carnivorism’ which advocates eating animal products from animal-friendly animal husbandry in response to the moral problems of industrial farming. Advocates of animal-friendly husbandry justify rearing and killing ‘happy animals’ by highlighting that the animals live pleasant lives and would not have existed if not reared for human consumption. In this paper, I tackle (...) this ‘logic of the larder’ by showing that it serves as a purification strategy to conceal the harm that animals experience in this alleged animal-friendly type of farming. Defenders of ‘happy meat’ claim that animal-friendly animal husbandry is in the animals’ best interests and that it is in effect a ‘win-win situation’ for humans and farm animals alike. Departing from two critics of animal-friendly animal husbandry, I will show that the problem of this logic is that it evades the fact that moral residuals, which is the experienced harm by the animals, remain by engaging in this practice. Even if there may be strong reasons for the consumption of meat and derivatives of ‘happy animals’, the experienced harm for the animals will not be extinguished. I will denote the detachment that derives from the strategy of rendering the animals’ experienced harm in animal-friendly animal husbandry invisible as guilt. I will conclude that instead of purifying eating animals the ‘good way’, we should face the responsibility we have when killing ‘happy animals’ for ‘happy meat’. (shrink)

A standard argument for ethical vegetarianism contends that factory farming – the source of nearly all animal products – is morally wrong due to its extreme cruelty, and that it is wrong to buy products produced in an extremely immoral manner. This article defends this argument against objections based on appeal to libertarian political philosophy, the supposed benefit to animals of being raised for food, and nonhuman animals’ supposed lack of rights.

Photo by Ricky Kharawala on Unsplash INTRODUCTION When people think of biomedical research, they often envision rats kept in cages with scientists in white coats and blue gloves checking on them, taking notes, and injecting them with substances. The images make some people uncomfortable, evoking a twinge of guilt as they think of the rats suffering. However, the idea that the sacrifice of a few mice saves thousands of human lives may outweigh their guilty conscience. Based on arguments for and (...) against non-human primate use in research, this paper concludes that NHP use is scientifically necessary but would be more ethically sound if novel policies and regulations were added to existing measures. l. Arguments that the Use of NHPs is Ethically Unjustified On one end of the spectrum, bioethicist Peter Singer argues that animals, including rats, should not be used in biomedical research at all.[1] He states that the use of animals is an indicator of speciesism.[2] Like racism, speciesism condemns exploiting a group, here, animals. Singer also challenges differentiating humans and animals based on sentience. He claims that if sentience, autonomy, and self-consciousness provided the basis to deprive animals of the same rights and privileges as humans, then humans who lack such traits would, theoretically, not be entitled to the rights and privileges that other humans have.[3] Lastly, Singer argues that using animals in experimentation forces researchers to acknowledge similarities between animals and humans.[4] If a human were to be largely stressed by an experiment, it may be safe to assume that animals, such as rats, would be as well. Beyond Singer, other authors suggest that it may be ethically impermissible to use NHPs as animal models in biomedical research. They emphasize NHPs’ phylogenetic similarities to humans and their need for more complex social, behavioral, and psychological care in a laboratory environment.[5] It is difficult to meet these needs, as researchers do not have the resources or the time to devote to consistently fulfilling them.[6] In addition, NHP use in the US compromises the integrity of the animal model itself. Most NHPs are imported from Asia, Africa, and South America as[7] there are relatively few captive breeding sites in the US.[8] These journeys are long and tedious, causing considerable stress on the animal.[9] Housing conditions, weaning, and quarantine practices further jeopardize animal welfare.[10] Climate change, new patterns in light-dark cycles, and different diets can alter the physical and social integrity of the NHP.[11] Some argue that NHPs should not be used in research due to their long lifespan. NHPs can be used for multiple experiments throughout their lifespan.[12] This can be physically and emotionally taxing on the animals, who would spend years in captivity.[13] Subjecting NHPs to multiple experiments inflicting varying levels of harm can be seen as a form of abuse. Forcing these highly social and complex animals to live in captivity their whole life, often in inadequate living environments that do not satisfy their complex needs, can result in immense suffering. As anti-vivisection and animal welfare organizations argue, the close phylogenetic similarity of NHPs to humans highlights that they suffer in similar ways to humans.[14] NHPs respond to pain, and they reflect upon pain as well.[15] Painful memories endure after experimentation, magnifying the suffering of the animal.[16] NHPs also exhibit a level of sentience comparable to humans. This challenges Cohen’s belief that animals have no rights since NHPs theoretically exercise and respond to moral claims to a certain degree.[17] NHPs demonstrate reflective self-awareness, a rudimentary theory of mind, linguistic abilities, and deep emotional attachments.[18] Given their cognitive complexity and sociality, some would argue that the benefits to the NHP should also be taken into account. NHP use in research rarely, if ever, benefits the NHP. For an animal that expresses a level of sentience, NFT use violates the research principles of autonomy and beneficence. ll. Arguments Favoring Ethical Use On the other end of the spectrum, bioethicist Carl Cohen argues that animals have no rights and research should freely use them.[19] Cohen claims that animals are incapable of exercising, or responding to, moral claims.[20] Thus, they cannot engage in free moral judgment. He notes that humans kill millions of animals daily for consumption, despite scientific advancements that have made animal consumption largely unnecessary. Thus, humans kill and consume animals purely for taste and pleasure in the modern day. Cohen questions why it would be ethically permissible to recreationally kill animals without benefit but impermissible to use animals to serve medical science and human advancement.[21] If the rats in cages were to be altered and a dog was in the place of the rat, more would object to Cohen’s utilitarian idea. As dogs are social beings that form bonds with humans, their suffering to save human lives evokes different emotional reactions and is ethically problematic. The closer the bond between an animal and humans, the more unethical their research use seems to be. The ethical implications of animal use reach a pinnacle when the previous example uses a monkey. NHPs are the closest phylogenetic relatives of humans.[22] NHPs exhibit high levels of intelligence, reflective self-awareness, self-recognition, linguistic abilities, and distinct personalities.[23] Similar to humans, NHPs create social mechanisms in which they transmit learned behaviors and customs.[24] NHPs have proven valuable in the advancement of science and medicine. Approximately 100,000 to 200,000 NHP’s are used annually for research worldwide.[25] The use of NHPs has been rising due to increasing research on monoclonal antibodies, in which NHP’s are the only animal that can be used for preclinical safety studies.[26] lll. The Middle of the Spectrum: Permissible Use This paper argues that using NHPs as animal models in biomedical research is ethically permissible. NHPs are very phylogenetically similar to humans, making them the ideal models to represent humans in biomedicine.[27] The Weatherall Report, published in 2006, argues that the use of NHPs in research is “not only morally accepted, but morally required.”[28] However, the Report specifies that this argument is credible only if there are no more effective ways of pursuing the research in question.[29] The report outlines a utilitarian approach to the need for NHPs in research.[30] The report claims that, while NHPs are harmed in research, the harm is necessary to prevent harm to humans.[31] While relatively few NHPs are used in research, the number of humans that benefit from the harm decreases the net harm under a utilitarian approach.[32] Given an NHP’s long lifespan and ability to learn social tasks,[33] an NHP may be used for one study in which it learns a specific skill, then used in subsequent studies that require demonstration of the skill,[34] resulting in the sacrifice of fewer animals for medical research. The similarity of NHPs to humans both socially and cognitively may increase better animal welfare practices in the laboratory and a net reduction in harm to animal models in general. For example, positive reinforcement rather than physical restraint can be used with NHPs, encouraging researchers to treat NHPs with more respect than other animals. Exposure to signs of suffering may lead researchers to adopt research practices that are more humane and minimize the harm to animals.[36] To be ethical, scientists must consider the importance of the research and the inability to use other animals. If the research can be performed another way, the use of NHPs would not be morally justified. Despite the ethical dilemmas, utilitarianism is the best approach to animal research. NHPs’ expressing a cognitive and emotional complexity does not outweigh the benefit to humans as animal models in research. As with the rules surrounding human research subjects, research using NHPs requires protection of the research subjects and requires attention to the scientific benefits. Current policies guided by Russell and Burch’s “3 R’s Principle” reduce the harm to NHPs.[37] The Principle states that in research, there should be a “replacement of animals with non-animal methods;” “reduction of the number of animals used to obtain information of a given amount and precision;” and “refinement of scientific procedures and husbandry to minimize suffering and improve animal welfare.”[38] A stringent set of rules and regulations govern NHP use.[39] The 2000 Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance, and Protection Act legally prohibits the euthanasia of chimpanzees used in biomedical research.[40] The Act mandates the creation of sanctuaries where chimpanzees can be retired and cared for until their death.[41] Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees regulate the use of NHPs and serve as ethical regulatory committees similar to Institutional Review Boards overseeing human subjects research.[42] IACUCs prohibit academic or commercial research on NHPs unless researchers are appropriately trained, procedures for independent oversight are established, use of the specific species is justified, and the data’s significance is established.[43] The United Kingdom American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals has stated that NFT use can occur only if other species are unsuitable for reaching scientific gains.[44] [45] lV. Recommendations While the above policies build a strong foundation to ensure that the research setting ethically respects NPHs, more can be done. Limiting continuous research on one NFT and limiting the number of studies an NHP can participate in would protect the NFT and could consider the level of harm an NHP is exposed to per study. To meet the complex needs of NFTs, animal research labs should be created for NHP use only and should include comprehensive care and specialized captivity practices. [46] A ranking system for labs could help distinguish which labs have enough protective measures and a complex environment to be entitled to engage in NHP research. Similar to biosafety levels from one to four for research labs, with each level requiring unique sets of protective measures, animal research labs should be created for NHP use that requires the implementation of specific captivity practices. CONCLUSION NHPs have contributed greatly to the scientific community and the advancement of modern medicine. As emotionally and cognitively sophisticated beings, they need special protections in research contexts. As utilitarianism calls for their continued use to save human lives, improving their care in captivity is important to ethical research practices. Policies similar to those regulating human subjects in research should be implemented to protect them. This paper, therefore, sought to offer novel solutions, such as creating a ranking system for animal research laboratories and limiting the number of studies in which an animal can be used. - [1] Singer, Peter. “Equality for Animals?” In Practical ethics. Cambridge University Press, 2011. [2] Singer, “Equality for Animals?” [3] Singer, “Equality for Animals?” [4] Singer, “Equality for Animals?” [5] Prescott, Mark J. "Ethics of primate use." Advances in Science and Research 5, no. 1 : 11-22. https://doi.org/10.5194/asr-5-11-2010 [6] Tardif, Suzette D., Kristine Coleman, Theodore R. Hobbs, and Corrine Lutz. "IACUC review of nonhuman primate research." ILAR journal 54, no. 2 : 234-245. https://doi.org/10.1093/ilar/ilt040 [7] Prescott, Mark J. "Ethics of primate use." Advances in Science and Research 5, no. 1 : 11-22. https://doi.org/10.5194/asr-5-11-2010 [8] Prescott, “Ethics of primate use.” 11-22 [9] Prescott, “Ethics of primate use.” 11-22 [10] Prescott, “Ethics of primate use.” 11-22 [11] Carlsson, Hans‐Erik, Steven J. Schapiro, Idle Farah, and Jann Hau. "Use of Primates In Research: A Global Overview." American Journal of Primatology: Official Journal of the American Society of Primatologists 63, no. 4 : 225-237. https://doi.org/10.1002/ajp.20054 [12] Prescott, “Ethics of primate use.” 11-22 [13] Prescott, “Ethics of primate use.” 11-22 [14] Prescott, “Ethics of primate use.” 11-22 [15] Prescott, “Ethics of primate use.” 11-22 [16] Prescott, “Ethics of primate use.” 11-22 [17] Cohen, Carl. "The case for the use of animals in biomedical research.". https://www.wellbeingintlstudiesrepository.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=moreaexp [18] Prescott, Mark J. "Ethics of primate use." Advances in science and research 5, no. 1 : 11-22. https://doi.org/10.5194/asr-5-11-2010 [19] Cohen, Carl. "The case for the use of animals in biomedical research.". https://www.wellbeingintlstudiesrepository.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=moreaexp [20] Cohen, “The case for the use of animals in biomedical research.” [21] Cohen, “The case for the use of animals in biomedical research.” [22] Tardif, Suzette D., Kristine Coleman, Theodore R. Hobbs, and Corrine Lutz. "IACUC review of nonhuman primate research." ILAR journal 54, no. 2 : 234-245. https://doi.org/10.1093/ilar/ilt040 [23] Prescott, Mark J. "Ethics of primate use." Advances in science and research 5, no. 1 : 11-22. https://doi.org/10.5194/asr-5-11-2010 [24] Prescott, “Ethics of primate use.” 11-22 [27] Tardif, Suzette D., Kristine Coleman, Theodore R. Hobbs, and Corrine Lutz. "IACUC review of nonhuman primate research." ILAR journal 54, no. 2 : 234-245. https://doi.org/10.1093/ilar/ilt040 [28] Gardar, “The ethical justification for the use of non-human primates in research.” 328-331 [29] Gardar, “The ethical justification for the use of non-human primates in research.” 328-331 [30] Gardar, “The ethical justification for the use of non-human primates in research.” 328-331 [31] Gardar, “The ethical justification for the use of non-human primates in research.” 328-331 [32] Gardar, “The ethical justification for the use of non-human primates in research.” 328-331 [33] Tardif, Suzette D., Kristine Coleman, Theodore R. Hobbs, and Corrine Lutz. "IACUC review of nonhuman primate research." ILAR journal 54, no. 2 : 234-245. https://doi.org/10.1093/ilar/ilt040 [34] Tardif et al., “IACUC review of nonhuman primate research.” 234-235 [35] Olsson, I. Anna S., and Peter Sandøe. "“What’s wrong with my monkey?” Ethical perspectives on germline transgenesis in marmosets." Transgenic research 19, no. 2 : 181-186. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11248-009-9316-6 [36] Olsson et al., “What’s wrong with my monkey?” [37] Prescott, “Ethics of primate use.” 11-22 [38] Prescott, “Ethics of primate use.” 11-22 [39] Phillips, Kimberley A., Karen L. Bales, John P. Capitanio, Alan Conley, Paul W. Czoty, Bert A. ‘t Hart, William D. Hopkins et al. "Why primate models matter." American journal of primatology76, no. 9 : 801-827. https://doi.org/10.1002/ajp.22281 [40] Carlsson, Hans‐Erik, Steven J. Schapiro, Idle Farah, and Jann Hau. "Use of primates in research: a global overview." American Journal of Primatology: Official Journal of the American Society of Primatologists 63, no. 4 : 225-237. https://doi.org/10.1002/ajp.20054 [41] Prescott, Mark J. "Ethics of primate use." Advances in Science and Research 5, no. 1 : 11-22. https://doi.org/10.5194/asr-5-11-2010 [42] Tardif, Suzette D., Kristine Coleman, Theodore R. Hobbs, and Corrine Lutz. "IACUC Review of Nonhuman Primate Research." ILAR Journal 54, no. 2 : 234-245. https://doi.org/10.1093/ilar/ilt040 [43] Phillips, Kimberley A., Karen L. Bales, John P. Capitanio, Alan Conley, Paul W. Czoty, Bert A. ‘t Hart, William D. Hopkins et al. "Why primate models matter." American journal of primatology76, no. 9 : 801-827. https://doi.org/10.1002/ajp.22281 [44] Prescott, Mark J. "Ethics of primate use." Advances in Science and Research 5, no. 1 : 11-22. https://doi.org/10.5194/asr-5-11-2010 [45] Article 7 of Directive 86/609/EEC in the European Commission on the Protection of Animals Used for Experimental and Other Scientific Purposes states that “in a choice between experiments, those which use the minimum number of animals, involve animals with the lowest degree of neurophysiological sensitivity, cause the least pain, suffering, distress, or lasting harm, and which are most likely to provide satisfactory results, shall be selected.” [46] Tardif, Suzette D., Kristine Coleman, Theodore R. Hobbs, and Corrine Lutz. "IACUC review of nonhuman primate research." ILAR journal 54, no. 2 : 234-245. https://doi.org/10.1093/ilar/ilt040. (shrink)

Zoos and aquariums have an enormous global reach and hence an ability to craft meaningful conservation action for threatened species, implement educational strategies to encourage human engagement, development and behavior change, and conduct scientific research to enhance the husbandry, roles and impacts of the living collection. The recreational role of the zoo is also vast- people enjoy visiting the zoo and this is often a shared experience amongst family and friends. Evaluating how the zoo influences this “captive audience” and extending (...) its reach to include a compassionate approach to animals and people can further enhance the mission, value, and relevance of their work. The modern zoo’s current aims—Conservation, Education, Research and Recreation—provide useful foundations for the activities that zoos conduct at a local and national level. However, to improve sustainability of their actions and outcomes, we feel that Wellbeing should become the fifth aim of the modern zoo for the future- both from an animal perspective and from a human perspective. This paper provides discussion and review of how Wellbeing is already a substantial part of what zoos work on as well as posing the idea of altering the Recreation aim of the zoo to one of Engagement, which potentially is more measurable and therefore can allow zoo researchers and managers further options for the collection of evidence on the local and global reach of their zoo’s aims. Education, Engagement, Conservation, Research and Wellbeing provide a more complete picture of the roles of the modern zoo for the animals, human visitors and workforce, and to society more widely. (shrink)

We present ethical reasons that the court should grant the Nonhuman Rights Project’s (NhRP) request for habeas corpus relief for Happy, an elephant. Happy has a basic interest in not being confined, an interest that should be legally protected just as the human interest in not being confined is legally protected. Since the decision in The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v Breheny failed to weigh Happy’s interests properly, we ask this body to correct the error.

This book engages with some of the most pressing ethical issues that arise from the use of animals in various business practices, providing interdisciplinary approaches to improving the nonhuman and human lives in animal-related industries. The chapters in this volume provide conceptual, theoretical and practical analyses of these issues that will shape the future direction of business ethics to more fully reflect the impacts and implications of animal-based businesses on society, its members, and nature. The authors in this volume engage (...) with topics including animal suffering and emotions, the commodification of animals, vegetarian and vegan businesses and diets, technological innovations such as gene editing and lab-cultured meat, as well as captivity, corporate disclosure of animal welfare policies, and the possibility of humane jobs as well as the consideration of animals as stakeholders. (shrink)

We should conceive of illegal covert animal rescue as acts of “subrevolution” rather than as civil disobedience. Subrevolutions are revolutions that aim to overthrow some part of the government rather than the entire government. This framework better captures the relevant values than the opposing suggestion that we treat illegal covert animal rescue as civil disobedience. If animals have rights like the right not to be unjustly imprisoned and mistreated, then it does not make sense that an instance of animal rescue (...) will be justifiable only if it meets criteria for justified civil disobedience, e.g., the requirement that the civil disobedient not rescue more animals than would be necessary to communicate their message. Thus, the framework of subrevolution is a more apt way to analyze animal rescue. (shrink)

It is seemingly bad for animals to have their desires modified in at least some cases, for instance where brainwashing or neurological manipulation takes place. In humans, many argue that such modification interferes with our positive liberty or undermines our autonomy but this explanation is inapplicable in the case of animals as they lack the capacity for autonomy in the relevant sense. As such, the standard view has been that, despite any intuitions to the contrary, the modification of animals’ desires (...) is not harmful (at least not in itself). In this article, I offer a different perspective on this issue, laying the foundations of a novel argument in defence of the view that animals _can_ be harmed by desire modification directly. I suggest that the modification of an animal’s desires (under certain circumstances) is harmful for that animal because it undermines their agency. (shrink)

In response to my defense of house-based, free-roaming cats, Bob Fischer : 463–468, 2020) argues that cat guardians have a duty to permanently confine their felines to the indoors. His main argument is that house-based cats cause an all-things-considered harm to the animals they kill and that this harm is not outweighed by the harm cats endure as a consequence of feline imprisonment. He moreover claims that while we can justify the restriction of feline liberty because cats are not “full (...) agents” and are under our care, we cannot justify restricting the liberty of “full agents” who are not under our care. Against Fischer, I argue that even if cats cause an all-things-considered harm to wildlife, the harm of permanent confinement is a greater harm. Moreover, I challenge Fischer’s claim that cats are not full agents and his claim that we can justify permanently confining creatures under our care. Thus, as I previously argued, cat guardians have a duty to, under certain conditions, provide outdoor access to their felines. (shrink)

The keeping of captive animals in zoos and aquariums has long been controversial. Many take freedom to be a crucial part of animal welfare and, on these grounds, criticise all forms of animal captivity as harmful to animal welfare, regardless of their provisions. Here, we analyse what it might mean for freedom to matter to welfare, distinguishing between the role of freedom as an intrinsic good, valued for its own sake and an instrumental good, its value arising from the increased (...) ability to provide other important resources. Too often, this debate is conducted through trading intuitions about what matters for animals. We argue for the need for the collection of comparative welfare data about wild and captive animals in order to settle the issue. Discovering more about the links between freedom and animal welfare will then allow for more empirically informed ethical decisions regarding captive animals. (shrink)

We submit this brief in support of the Nonhuman Rights Project’s efforts to secure habeas corpus relief for the elephant named Happy. The Supreme Court, Bronx County, declined to grant habeas corpus relief and order Happy’s transfer to an elephant sanctuary, relying, in part, on previous decisions that denied habeas relief for the NhRP’s chimpanzee clients, Kiko and Tommy. Those decisions use incompatible conceptions of ‘person’ which, when properly understood, are either philosophically inadequate or, in fact, compatible with Happy’s personhood.

Commentary on Kyle Johannsen, Wild Animal Ethics (Routledge, 2020). I want to unpack what we should understand by wild animal well-being, and how different interpretations of what matters about it shape the sorts of interventions we endorse. I will not offer a theory of wild animal well-being or even take a stance on the best approach to theories of well-being as they pertain to wild animals. My aim is to bring into view a concern that WAE has largely overlooked: agency (...) and freedom. To Johannsen’s credit, the issue of liberties does feature in his Wild Animal Ethics (2020) (36–39, 41, 47). The interventions that he favors are those that, for a given amount of harm prevention, involve fewer liberty infringements. Liberties can act, to an extent, as constraints on permissible interventions. For all that, Johannsen’s primary focus remains welfare in a sense that does not appear to give much consideration to agency. Fortunately, his approach is open-ended enough to accommodate some of my concerns. My hope is that he sees them as possible ways of specifying the duties of beneficence, if not justice, that he rightly argues we have to wild animals. (shrink)

Animals who live in cities must coexist with us. They are, as a result, entitled to the conditions of their flourishing. This article argues that, as the boundaries of cities and urban areas expand, the boundaries of our conception of captivity should expand too. Urbanization can undermine animals’ freedoms, hence their ability to live good lives. I draw the implications of an account of “pervasive captivity” against the background of the Capabilities Approach. I construe captivity, including that of urban animals, (...) as affecting a range of animal capabilities, understood as freedoms, and I address some tensions within Nussbaum’s treatment of human-animal conflicts. Using the Capabilities Approach as a guide, I will attempt to motivate a convergence between habitat preservation in urbanized environments, urban design guided by justice, and the individual freedoms of animals. (shrink)

In this article, we develop and defend an account of the normative significance of nonhuman animal agency. In particular, we examine how animals’ agency interests impact upon the moral permissibility of our interactions with them. First, we defend the claim that nonhuman animals sometimes have rights to self-determination. However, unlike typical adult humans, nonhuman animals cannot exercise this right through the giving or withholding of consent. This combination of claims generates a puzzle about the permissibility of our interactions with nonhuman (...) animals. If animals sometimes have rights to self-determination, but lack the capacity to consent, then when, if ever, is it permissible for us to touch them, hold them, bathe them, or confine them? In the second half of the article, we develop a solution to this puzzle. We argue that while we cannot obtain animals’ consent, they can engage in authoritative communications of will through acts of “assent” and “dissent.”. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic once again confirmed that zoonotic diseases are a serious threat to humanity. These infectious diseases, transmitted from animals to humans, have the power to cause a global health crisis. Over time the risk on these outbreaks has increased. Some of the main drivers are global population growth, urbanization, worldwide transport, increased demand for animal protein, unsustainable agriculture, and climate change. This development has fueled a renewed interest in the relation between human, animal and environmental health. This was (...) framed in the concept of One Health: the integrative effort of multiple disciplines working locally, nationally, and globally to attain optimal health for people, animals, and the environment. At present, One Health is the worldwide standard to combat zoonotic diseases. In an ideal world such a strategy should lead to a better health for humans, animals and our environment. However, in practice it is not self-evident that a One Health approach in zoonotic disease control is actually in the interest of animals or the environment. From a holistic One Health perspective it can be difficult to accept the culling of healthy animals to protect public health. The same goes for long term confinement of free-range poultry, whose housing systems are often not suitable for this purpose, to prevent avian influenza outbreaks. Or antimicrobial reduction policies that lead to higher disease incidence and mortality in animals. These ethical considerations formed the start of this thesis. The aim of my research is to clarify the ethical assumptions of a One Health approach in zoonotic disease control, to explore how these can be coherently understood and justified and to indicate what this implies for policymaking. The outcome of my research contributes to the development of an ethic of One Health and will hopefully lead to a more socially acceptable zoonotic disease control. This project is related to the interdisciplinary Wageningen UR strategic research theme ‘Global One Health’. From my conceptual analysis, it follows that there is no universal interpretation of the One Health concept nor of a One Health approach in zoonotic disease control. Nevertheless, One Health has produced several successes in zoonotic disease control, surveillance and research. Due to its ambiguity, the One Health concept functions as a boundary object: by leaving room for interpretation to fit different purposes it facilitates cooperation. In many cases this results in the promotion of health of humans, animals and the environment. However, there are also situations in which this mutual benefit of a One Health approach is not that evident. For instance, when healthy animals are culled to protect public health. To address these moral dilemmas, it is important to develop an ethical framework. Such an ethic of One Health starts with acknowledging the moral status of animals and the indirect moral obligations we have towards ecosystems. Furthermore, it is necessary that we find an appropriate definition of health, which encompasses all three components of One Health. In chapter 3, I present the results of an empirical study on normative presuppositions of health professionals involved in zoonotic disease control policies in the Netherlands. This study reveals that in theory these professionals adhere to a holistic view of the One Health concept. However, in practice an anthropocentric approach was dominant. The study identified public health as a trumping moral value, which reveals an inherent field of tension with the core of One Health thinking. Furthermore, a lack of ethical expertise in control systems for zoonotic diseases can lead to misconception of ethical principles, like the precautionary principle. In chapter 4, I discuss that within a One Health strategy, that requires us to balance public health benefits against the health interests of animals and the environment, unrestricted use of the precautionary principle can lead to moral dilemmas. It must at least be clear that there is a harm and some scientific evidence for a cause and effect relation. Furthermore, precautionary measures should be effective, consistent, proportional and not counterproductive. An assessment of their effect should be integrated in the standard decision-models of public health authorities. Moreover, to ensure societal support these considerations should be transparent and open for dialogue. I present two possible conceptions of the precautionary principle. First, it is noticeable that because of the unpredictable nature of zoonotic diseases, public health authorities focus on the idea of ‘precaution as preparedness’. This reactive response leads to difficult trade-offs between human and animal health. I therefore argue that this policy should always be accompanied by a second policy: ‘precaution as prevention’. Addressing the underlying drivers of zoonotic diseases is a necessary condition to justify disease control measures that harm animals and ecosystems on the basis of the precautionary principle. In chapter 5, I elaborate the responsibilities of veterinarians within the One Health framework. Veterinarians are professionally responsible for the health and welfare of the animals under their care. Moreover, society expects veterinarians to safeguard food safety and public health. These societal expectations are sometimes overdemanding. A holistic perspective on One Health offers veterinarians a way out of the dichotomy between public and animal health, that is at the basis of many moral dilemmas in zoonotic disease control. This is explained with the ‘encapsulated health’ argument: the best way to safeguard human health is to promote the health of animals and the environment. In chapter 6, I conclude that before we decide to implement certain disease control measures, an ethic of One Health requires that we choose those interventions that have the least impact on the health of animals and ecosystems, while still effective enough to stop the disease. My research indicates that the contemporary conception of One Health is necessary but insufficient to address moral dilemmas related to emerging zoonotic diseases. A holistic interpretation of the One Health concept confronts us with underlying value conflicts but will ultimately promote human health more than the current anthropocentric conception. (shrink)

Ex-Machina and Morgan, two recent science-fiction films that deal with the creation of humanoids, also explored the relationship between artificial intelligence, spatiality and the lingering question mark regarding artificial consciousness. In both narratives, the creators of the humanoids have tried to mimic human consciousness as closely as possible, which has resulted in the imprisonment of the humanoids due to proprietary concerns in Ex-Machina and due to the violent behavior of the humanoid in Morgan. This article addresses the dilemma of whether (...) or not the humanoids in both films possess high levels of artificial consciousness and its possible consequences regarding focalization, a narrative term that presupposes subjectivity, as well as offer two new categories of posthuman focalization—X-focalization and A-focalization. The issue of captivity also has far-reaching ethical implications when considering the underlying assumption of artificial consciousness—if humanoids are indeed endowed with a subjective inner life, then they are entitled to be treated as moral agents, equivalent to humans rather than animals. (shrink)

YouTube hosts a vast number of videos featuring zoo animals and humans actively reacting to each other. These videos can be seen as a popular genre of online entertainment, but also as a significant visual artefact of our relations with animals in the age of humans. In this chapter we focus on two viral videos featuring captive orangutans interacting with zoo visitors. The interpretations of ape-human interactions arising from the extensive number of comments posted to the videos are ambivalent in (...) how they see the animals and their assumed capabilities. We argue that the YouTube Zoo could figure as a snapshot of human-animal relations in late modern times: mediating artificial conditions of animals suspended between the wild and the domestic, while offering a screened account of a deeply surprising interaction. The chapter shows the potential of close interactions between humans and animals to destabilise or reinforce the neat divisions between the human and the animal. It also shows the ethical potential of these interactions to either reinforce or question common practices of dealing with wild animals. (shrink)

A relatively recent form of animal activism is lawsuits intended to declare some animals as legal persons. A pioneer of this approach is the U.S.-based Nonhuman Rights Project. This organization’s primary strategy has been to invoke the writ of habeas corpus, which protects the right to personal freedom of “persons.” The article criticizes the notion of legal personhood that the NhRP is employing and explains how an alternative understanding of legal personhood could perhaps make nonhuman rights more palatable for courts.

In this paper, I examine the way humans interact with domestic companion animals, with a focus on ‘positive reward-based training’ methods, particularly for dogs. From a biosemiotic perspective, I discuss the role of animal training in today’s society and examine what binary reward- based reinforcement schedules communicate, semiotically. I also examine the extent to which reward-based training methods promote better welfare, when compared to the more traditional methods which rely on aversive stimuli and punishment, if and when they are relied (...) upon excessively. I conclude that when used as the primary means of communication, they have the potential to be detrimental to animal welfare, because the underlying social signal is control and resource dominance. As an alternative view to behaviourist-based learning theory and conditioning, I outline how enactivist theories of cognition support a semiotic approach to interspecific human-animal communication. I therefore propose a move toward a dynamic semiosis and mutual understanding based upon Peirce’s phenomenology, resulting in a more balanced merging of Umwelten. The aim is to create rich and more complex semiospheres around humans and domestic animals, which allow for individual agency and autonomy. (shrink)

In virtue of their capacity for political agency, political agents can possess special rights, powers, and responsibilities, such as rights to political participation and freedom of speech. Traditionally, political theorists have assumed that only cognitively unimpaired adult humans are political agents, and thus that only those humans can be the bearers of these rights, powers, and responsibilities. However, recent work in animal rights theory has extended the concept of political agency to nonhuman animals. In this article, I develop an account (...) of political agency that identifies the capacities that one must possess to be a political agent and captures the fact that political action is a distinctive type of action. Crucially, this account makes sense of the standard assumption that only some humans count as political agents, and explains why few nonhuman animals, human infants, and severely cognitively impaired humans are likely to possess the capacity for political agency. I go on to reject the view, recently advanced by Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, that nonhuman animals can be ‘nonintentional political agents’. I conclude by suggesting that most nonhuman animals, as well as human infants and humans with severe cognitive impairments, cannot straightforwardly be assigned rights to political participation. (shrink)

The COVID-19 crisis has left zoos especially vulnerable to bankruptcy, and the precarity of their financial situation threatens the lives and well-being of the animals who live in them. In this paper, we argue that while we and our governments have a responsibility to ensure the protection of animals in struggling zoos, it is morally impermissible to make private donations or state subsidies to zoos because such actions serve to perpetuate an unjust institution. In order to protect zoo animals without (...) perpetrating further injustice, governments should subsidize the transformation of zoos into sanctuaries and then facilitate the gradual closure of most of these sanctuaries. (shrink)

The conditions animals experience during the early developmental stages of their lives can have critical ongoing effects on their future health, welfare, and proper development. In this paper we draw on evolutionary theory to improve our understanding of the processes of developmental programming, particularly Predictive Adaptive Responses (PAR) that serve to match offspring phenotype with predicted future environmental conditions. When these predictions fail, a mismatch occurs between offspring phenotype and the environment, which can have long-lasting health and welfare effects. Examples (...) include metabolic diseases resulting from maternal nutrition and behavioral changes from maternal stress. An understanding of these processes and their evolutionary origins will help in identifying and providing appropriate developmental conditions to optimize offspring welfare. This serves as an example of the benefits of using evolutionary thinking within veterinary science and we suggest that in the same way that evolutionary medicine has helped our understanding of human health, the implementation of evolutionary veterinary science (EvoVetSci) could be a useful way forward for research in animal health and welfare. (shrink)

The prevalent views of animal liberty among animal advocates suggest that liberty is merely instrumentally valuable and invasive paternalism is justified. In contrast to this popular view, I argue that liberty is intrinsically good for animals. I suggest that animal well-being is best accommodated by an Objective List Theory and that liberty is an irreducible component of animal well-being. As such, I argue that it is good for animals to possess liberty even if possessing liberty does not contribute towards their (...) subjective well-being, and even in some cases where it has a negative effect upon their subjective well-being. To establish this view I argue that if animals are agents, as I assume they are, then like humans they must be able to determine the course of their own lives (to some extent). Further, having the opportunity to self-determine one’s life just is the very same thing as liberty, and having the opportunity to determine the course of one’s life is intrinsically good. Thus liberty has intrinsic value for humans and animals. So, in addition to the instrumental harms of having one’s liberty restricted, I claim that restricting animals’ liberty in principle harms them because it undermines their capacity for self-determination and fails to acknowledge their authority as agents to make their own choices. (shrink)

In a recent article, Corey Wrenn argues that in order to adequately address injustices done to animals, we ought to think systemically. Her argument stems from a critique of the individualist approach I employ to resolve a moral dilemma faced by animal sanctuaries, who sometimes must harm some animals to help others. But must systemic critiques of injustice be at odds with individualist approaches? In this paper, I respond to Wrenn by showing how individualist approaches that take seriously the notion (...) of group responsibility can be deployed to solve complicated dilemmas that are products of injustice. Contra Wrenn, I argue that to adequately address injustice, acting individually, often within groups, is significantly more important than thinking systemically. (shrink)

The ethics of using nonhuman animals in biomedical research is usually seen as a subfield of animal ethics. In recent years, however, the ethics of animal research has increasingly become a subfield within research ethics under the term “animal research ethics”. Consequently, ethical issues have become prominent that are familiar in the context of human research ethics, such as autonomy or self-determination, harms and benefits, justice, and vulnerability. After a brief overview of the development of the field and a discussion (...) of relevant theoretical ethical frameworks, I consider two of these issues, namely autonomy and self-determination on the one hand, and harms and benefits on the other hand. My concern is with philosophical and ethical issues, rather than animal research oversight. I focus my discussion on nonhuman primates, as the most plausible nonhuman candidates for this approach. I conclude that the approach, although promising, depends strongly on the moral status of nonhuman research subjects. (shrink)

Touch pools are popular open-topped fish tanks often found in aquariums where visitors may interact with animals, by touching and sometimes even feeding them, for educational and recreational purposes. However, although animal interactions are becoming increasingly popular in recent years, the welfare impact on the animals and the educational effectiveness of such interactions is under debate. Awareness concerning the different, and sometimes controversial, aspects connected with such interactions has spread. The aim of this paper is to investigate the ethical issues (...) arising from the presence of touch pools in aquariums and facilities alike. In particular, possible sources of moral conflicts between five interested parties will be identified and discussed: biodiversity; aquariums; staff involved with touch pools; individual animals used in the touch pools; visitors interacting with animals in touch pools. In order to assess the framework of ethical demands from different parties, it will be used an analytical tool provided by a revised version of the Ethical Matrix. (shrink)

The performance of natural behavior is commonly used as a criterion in the determination of animal welfare. This is still true, despite many authors having demonstrated that it is not a necessary component of welfare – some natural behaviors may decrease welfare, while some unnatural behaviors increase it. Here I analyze why this idea persists, and what effects it may have. I argue that the disagreement underlying this debate on natural behavior is not one about which conditions affect welfare, but (...) a deeper conceptual disagreement about what the state of welfare actually consists of. Those advocating natural behavior typically take a “teleological” view of welfare, in which naturalness is fundamental to welfare, while opponents to the criterion usually take a “subjective” welfare concept, in which welfare consists of the subjective experience of life by the animal. I argue that as natural functioning is neither necessary nor sufficient for understanding welfare, we should move away from the natural behavior criterion to an alternative such as behavioral preferences or enjoyment. This will have effects in the way we understand and measure welfare, and particularly in how we provide for the welfare of animals in a captive setting. (shrink)

One of the biggest ethical issues in animal agriculture is that of the welfare of animals at the end of their lives, during the process of slaughter. Much work in animal welfare science is focussed on finding humane ways to transport and slaughter animals, to minimise the harm done during this process. In this paper, we take a philosophical look at what it means to perform slaughter humanely, beyond simply reducing pain and suffering during the slaughter process. In particular, we (...) will examine the issue of the harms of deprivation inflicted in ending life prematurely, as well as shape of life concerns and the ethical implications of inflicting these harms at the end of life, without the potential for future offsetting through positive experiences. We will argue that though these considerations may mean that no slaughter is in a deep sense truly ‘humane’, this should not undermine the importance of further research and development to ensure that while the practice continues, animal welfare harms are minimised as far as possible. (shrink)

This paper addresses the biosemiotic dimensions of human relationship with captive animals and aims to uncover how these factors influence handling practices and human-animal interactions within zoological gardens. Zoological gardens are quintessential hybrid environments, and as such, they are places of interspecies interactions and mutual influences. These interactions are profoundly shaped by human attitudes towards animals. The roots of these attitudes can be found at the cultural and institutional levels as well as at the biosemiotic level. Previous studies have suggested (...) that keepers’ attitudes towards animals have direct influences on their handling style and, consequently, have an impact on animals’ perception of keepers and other humans. This suggests that the type of relationship between keepers and animals can translate into handling styles that may affect animals’ perceptions of humans and worsen or improve their welfare. In this paper, we present a case study involving chimpanzees’ keepers at the Tallinn Zoological Gardens. A series of interviews were conducted, which aimed to uncover the way keepers understand their relationships with captive animals and how this influences handling. This work offers a comparative approach by bringing forward the experiences of keepers who work with various animal species belonging to different taxa and class. Such an approach aims to highlight the biosemiotic factors behind the emergence of different types of keeper-animal relationships. We expect to uncover whether extremely different Umwelten may shape human-animal bonds. By highlighting the agency of animals in daily activities and work routine, we also aim to initiate a discussion on the way animals influence handling practices within zoological gardens. Our objective is to understand how individual animals influence handling practices within zoological gardens. (shrink)

We submit this brief in support of the Nonhuman Rights Project’s efforts to secure habeas corpus relief for the elephant named Happy. We reject arbitrary distinctions that deny adequate protections to other animals who share with protected humans relevantly similar vulnerabilities to harms and relevantly similar interests in avoiding such harms. We strongly urge this Court, in keeping with the best philosophical standards of rational judgment and ethical standards of justice, to recognize that, as a nonhuman person, Happy should be (...) released from her current confinement and transferred to an appropriate elephant sanctuary, pursuant to habeas corpus. (shrink)

Conducting research on animals is supposed to be valuable because it provides information on how human mechanisms work. But for the use of animal models to be ethically justified, it must be epistemically justified. The inference from an observation about an animal model to a conclusion about humans must be warranted for the use of animals to be moral. When researchers infer from animals to humans, it’s an extrapolation. Often non-human primates are used as animal models in laboratory behavioral research. (...) The target populations are humans and other non-human primates. I argue that the epistemology of extrapolation renders the use of non-human primates in laboratory behavioral research unreliable. If the model is relevantly similar to the target, then the experimental conditions introduce confounding variables. If the model is not relevantly similar to the target, then the observations of the model cannot be extrapolated to the target. Since using non-human primates in as animal models in laboratory behavioral research is not epistemically justified, using them as animal models in laboratory behavioral research is not ethically justified. (shrink)

Urban animals can benefit from living in cities, but this also makes them vulnerable as they increasingly depend on the advantages of urban life. This article has two aims. First, I provide a detailed analysis of the concept of captivity and explain why it matters to nonhuman animals—because and insofar as many of them have a (non-substitutable) interest in freedom. Second, I defend a surprising implication of the account—pushing the boundaries of the concept while the boundaries of cities and human (...) activities expand. I argue for the existence of the neglected problem of pervasive captivity, of which urban wildlife is an illustration. Many urban animals are confined, controlled and dependent, therefore often captive of expanding urban areas. While I argue that captivity per se is value-neutral, I draw the ethical and policy implications of harmful pervasive captivity. (shrink)

Dressing up animals in ridiculous costumes, shaming dogs on the internet, playing Big Buck Hunter at the local tavern, feeding vegan food to cats, and producing and consuming “knockout” animals, what, if anything, do these acts have in common? In this article, I develop two respect-based arguments that explain how these acts are morally problematic, even though they might not always, if ever, affect the experiential welfare of animals. While these acts are not ordinary wrongs, they are animal dignitary wrongs.

There is a widespread belief that for their own safety and for the protection of wildlife, cats should be permanently kept indoors. Against this view, I argue that cat guardians have a duty to provide their feline companions with outdoor access. The argument is based on a sophisticated hedonistic account of animal well-being that acknowledges that the performance of species-normal ethological behavior is especially pleasurable. Territorial behavior, which requires outdoor access, is a feline-normal ethological behavior, so when a cat is (...) permanently confined to the indoors, her ability to flourish is impaired. Since cat guardians have a duty not to impair the well-being of their cats, the impairment of cat flourishing via confinement signifies a moral failing. Although some cats assume significant risks and sometimes kill wild animals when roaming outdoors, these important considerations do not imply that all cats should be deprived of the opportunity to access the outdoors. Indeed, they do not, by themselves, imply that any cat should be permanently kept indoors. (shrink)

:Human and animal research both operate within established standards. In the United States, criticism of the human research environment and recorded abuses of human research subjects served as the impetus for the establishment of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, and the resulting Belmont Report. The Belmont Report established key ethical principles to which human research should adhere: respect for autonomy, obligations to beneficence and justice, and special protections for vulnerable individuals and (...) populations. While current guidelines appropriately aim to protect the individual interests of human participants in research, no similar, comprehensive, and principled effort has addressed the use of animals in research. Although published policies regarding animal research provide relevant regulatory guidance, the lack of a fundamental effort to explore the ethical issues and principles that should guide decisions about the potential use of animals in research has led to unclear and disparate policies. Here, we explore how the ethical principles outlined in the Belmont Report could be applied consistently to animals. We describe how concepts such as respect for autonomy and obligations to beneficence and justice could be applied to animals, as well as how animals are entitled to special protections as a result of their vulnerability. (shrink)

C. E. Abbate (2019) argues that, under certain conditions, cat guardians have a moral duty to allow their feline companions to roam freely outdoors. She contends that outdoor access is crucial to feline flourishing, which means that, in general, to keep cats indoors permanently is to harm them. She grants that, in principle, we could justify preventing cats from roaming based on the fact that some cats kill wildlife. However, she points out that not all cats are guilty of this (...) charge, and she argues that, in any case, cats don’t cause more harm to wildlife—and may actually cause less—than those animals would suffer anyway. I criticize both of these replies, arguing that cat guardians have a responsibility not to let their cats harm wildlife, that cat guardians usually don’t know whether their cats kill wildlife, and that, on balance, cat-caused harms to wildlife may well outweigh the harms that cats suffer when confined. (shrink)

Abbate argues that, under certain conditions, cat guardians have a moral duty to allow their feline companions to roam freely outdoors. She contends that outdoor access is crucial to feline flourishing, which means that, in general, to keep cats indoors permanently is to harm them. She grants that, in principle, we could justify preventing cats from roaming based on the fact that some cats kill wildlife. However, she points out that not all cats are guilty of this charge, and she (...) argues that, in any case, cats do not cause more harm to wildlife—and may actually cause less—than those animals would suffer anyway. I criticize both of these replies, arguing that cat guardians have a responsibility not to let their cats harm wildlife; that cat guardians usually do not know whether their cats kill wildlife; and that, on balance, cat caused harms to wildlife may well outweigh the harms that cats suffer when confined. (shrink)