About this topic
Summary This category covers philosophical discussions of the ethics of captivity, ranging from what captivity is to whether and why it is wrong to keep animals captive. Works included here also discuss the specific conditions under which captivity is harmful or not, whether and which animals have an interest in freedom or liberty, and the ethics of particular forms of confinement, e.g., for animals kept for research, food, entertainment or as companions.
Key works Gruen 2014
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96 found
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1 — 50 / 96
  1. added 2019-01-07
    Won’T Somebody Please Think of the Mammoths? De-Extinction and Animal Welfare.Heather Browning - forthcoming - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics:1-19.
    De-extinction is the process through which extinct species can be brought back into existence. Although these projects have the potential to cause great harm to animal welfare, discussion on issues surrounding de-extinction have focussed primarily on other issues. In this paper, I examine the potential types of welfare harm that can arise through de-extinction programs, including problems with cloning, captive rearing and re-introduction. I argue that welfare harm should be an important consideration when making decisions on de-extinction projects. Though most (...)
  2. added 2018-11-05
    Zoo Studies: A New Humanities.Tracy McDonald & Daniel Vandersommers (eds.) - 2019 - Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    Do both the zoo and the mental hospital induce psychosis, as humans are treated as animals and animals are treated as humans? How have we looked at animals in the past, and how do we look at them today? How have zoos presented themselves, and their purpose, over time? In response to the emergence of environmental and animal studies, anthropologists, sociologists, philosophers, theorists, literature scholars, and historians around the world have begun to explore the significance of zoological parks, past and (...)
  3. added 2018-10-22
    Animal Confinement and Use.Robert Streiffer & David Killoren - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-21.
  4. added 2018-10-05
    Animal Agency, Captivity, and Meaning.Nicolas Delon - 2018 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 25:127-146.
    Can animals be agents? Do they want to be free? Can they have meaningful lives? If so, should we change the way we treat them? This paper offers an account of animal agency and of two continuums: between human and nonhuman agency, and between wildness and captivity. It describes how a wide range of human activities impede on animals’ freedom and argues that, in doing so, we deprive a wide range of animals of opportunities to exercise their agency in ways (...)
  5. added 2018-06-23
    The Moral Basis of Animal-Assisted Therapy.Tzachi Zamir - 2006 - Society and Animals 14 (2):179-199.
    Is nonhuman animal-assisted therapy a form of exploitation? After exploring possible moral vindications of AAT and after establishing a distinction between "use" and "exploitation," the essay distinguishes between forms of animal-assisted therapy that are morally unobjectionable and those modes of it that ought to be abolished.
  6. added 2018-06-05
    Virtue, Vice, and "Voracious" Science: How Should We Approach the Ethics of Primate Research?Rebecca L. Walker - 2018 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 61 (1):130-146.
    From the late 1950s through the early 1970s, Harry F. Harlow's primate laboratory at the University of Wisconsin–Madison undertook a series of studies on infant rhesus macaque monkeys that gained the attention of both animal welfare advocates and the scientific community.1 Establishing one of the first primate research laboratories in 1932, Harlow began his career as a primate researcher by studying primate learning capabilities and shredding previous assumptions within psychology that primates were restricted to the conditioned learning of a rat. (...)
  7. added 2018-04-20
    Chasing Secretariat's Consent: The Impossibility of Permissible Animal Sports.James Rocha - 2018 - Between the Species 21 (1).
    Tom Regan argued that animal sports cannot be morally permissible because they are cruel and the animals do not voluntarily participate. While Regan is correct about actual animal sports, we should ask whether substantially revised animal sports could be permissible. We can imagine significant changes to certain animal sports, such as horse racing, that would avoid cruelty and even allow the animals to make their own choices. Where alternative options are freely available, we can consider the horses to have preference (...)
  8. added 2018-04-11
    Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers' Brief.Kristin Andrews, Gary Comstock, G. K. D. Crozier, Sue Donaldson, Andrew Fenton, Tyler John, L. Syd M. Johnson, Robert Jones, Will Kymlicka, Letitia Meynell, Nathan Nobis, David M. Pena-Guzman & Jeff Sebo - 2018 - London: Routledge.
    In December 2013, the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) filed a petition for a common law writ of habeas corpus in the New York State Supreme Court on behalf of Tommy, a chimpanzee living alone in a cage in a shed in rural New York (Barlow, 2017). Under animal welfare laws, Tommy’s owners, the Laverys, were doing nothing illegal by keeping him in those conditions. Nonetheless, the NhRP argued that given the cognitive, social, and emotional capacities of chimpanzees, Tommy’s confinement constituted (...)
  9. added 2018-03-26
    The Philosophers' Brief on Chimpanzee Personhood.Kristin Andrews, Gary Comstock, Gillian Crozier, Sue Donaldson, Andrew Fenton, Tyler John, L. Syd M. Johnson, Robert Jones, Will Kymlicka, Letitia Meynell, Nathan Nobis, David Pena-Guzman, James Rocha, Bernard Rollin, Jeff Sebo, Adam Shriver & Rebecca Walker - 2018 - Proposed Brief by Amici Curiae Philosophers in Support of the Petitioner-Appelllant Court of Appeals, State of New York,.
    In this brief, we argue that there is a diversity of ways in which humans (Homo sapiens) are ‘persons’ and there are no non-arbitrary conceptions of ‘personhood’ that can include all humans and exclude all nonhuman animals. To do so we describe and assess the four most prominent conceptions of ‘personhood’ that can be found in the rulings concerning Kiko and Tommy, with particular focus on the most recent decision, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc v Lavery.
  10. added 2018-03-12
    Deprivation as Un-Experienced Harm?Külli Keerus, Mickey Gjerris & Helena Röcklinsberg - forthcoming - Society and Animals.
    Tom Regan encapsulated his principle of harm as a prima facie direct duty not to harm experiencing subjects of a life. However, his consideration of harm as deprivation, one example of which is loss of freedom, can easily be interpreted as a harm, which may not be experienced by its subject. This creates a gap between Regan’s criterion for moral status and his account of what our duties are. However, in comparison with three basic paradigms of welfare known in nonhuman (...)
  11. added 2018-02-05
    Freedom in Captivity: Managing Zoo Animals According to the ‘Five Freedoms’.Nelly Mäekivi - 2018 - Biosemiotics 11 (1):7-25.
    Animal welfare is a complex matter that includes scientific, ethical, economic and other dimensions. Despite the existence of more comprehensive approaches to animal welfare and the obvious shortcomings of the ‘Five Freedoms’, for zoological gardens the freedoms still constitute the general guidelines to be followed. These guidelines reflect both, an ethical view and a science based approach. Analysis reveals that the potential ineptitude of the ‘Five Freedoms’ lies in the manifold perceptions that people have of other animals. These perceptions are (...)
  12. added 2017-12-25
    In Defence of Backyard Chickens.Bob Fischer & Josh Milburn - 2017 - Journal of Applied Philosophy.
    Suppose that animals have rights. If so, may you go down to your local farm store, buy some chicks, raise them in your backyard, and eat their eggs? You wouldn't think so. But we argue, to the contrary, that you may. Just as there are circumstances in which it's permissible to liberate a slave, even if that means paying into a corrupt system, so there are circumstances in which it's permissible to liberate chickens by buying them. Moreover, we contend that (...)
  13. added 2017-12-25
    Essere o Non-Essere Animali. L’Ontologia in Cattività.Renata Rallo - unknown
    TO BE OR NOT TO BE ANIMALS. ONTOLOGY IN CAPTIVITY In the past few years, philosophy studies regarding environmental and animal ethics have focused more and more on the relationship between animals and humans. Specifically, the contemporary scientific discussion also centres on using animals as entertainment and its moral issues. By capturing animals, exposing and training them, places like zoos, dolphinaria and circuses cause radical changes in the animal nature. The living conditions have consequential effects on the animal itself, for (...)
  14. added 2017-11-27
    On Respecting Animals, or Can Animals Be Wronged Without Being Harmed?Angela K. Martin - 2019 - Res Publica 25 (1):83-99.
    There is broad agreement that humans can be wronged independently of their incurring any harm, that is, when their welfare is not affected. Examples include unnoticed infringements of privacy, ridiculing unaware individuals, or disregarding individuals’ autonomous decision-making in their best interest. However, it is less clear whether the same is true of animals—that is, whether moral agents can wrong animals in situations that do not involve any harm to the animals concerned. In order to answer this question, I concentrate on (...)
  15. added 2017-10-30
    Elephants and Ethics: Toward a Morality of Coexistence.Christen M. Wemmer & Catherine A. Christen (eds.) - 2008 - Johns Hopkins University Press.
    The entwined history of humans and elephants is fascinating but often sad. People have used elephants as beasts of burden and war machines, slaughtered them for their ivory, exterminated them as threats to people and ecosystems, turned them into objects of entertainment at circuses, employed them as both curiosities and conservation ambassadors in zoos, and deified and honored them in religious rites. How have such actions affected these pachyderms? What ethical and moral imperatives should humans follow to ensure that elephants (...)
  16. added 2017-10-23
    Ape Autonomy? Social Norms and Moral Agency in Other Species.Kristin Andrews - 2013 - In Klaus Petrus & Markus Wild (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Animals: Mind, Ethics, Morals. Transcript. pp. 173-196.
    Once upon a time, not too long ago, the question about apes and ethics had to do with moral standing—do apes have interests or rights that humans ought to respect? Given the fifty years of research on great ape cognition, life history, social organization, and behavior, the answer to that question seems obvious. Apes have emotions and projects, they can be harmed, and they have important social relationships.
  17. added 2017-10-23
    Concepts of Animal Health and Welfare in Organic Livestock Systems.Mette Vaarst & Hugo F. Alrøe - 2012 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 25 (3):333-347.
    In 2005, The International Federation of Organic Agricultural Movements (IFOAM) developed four new ethical principles of organic agriculture to guide its future development: the principles of health, ecology, care, and fairness. The key distinctive concept of animal welfare in organic agriculture combines naturalness and human care, and can be linked meaningfully with these principles. In practice, a number of challenges are connected with making organic livestock systems work. These challenges are particularly dominant in immature agro-ecological systems, for example those that (...)
  18. added 2017-10-23
    Animal Rights Without Liberation: Applied Ethics and Human Obligations.Alasdair Cochrane - 2012 - Columbia University Press.
    Moving beyond theory to the practical aspects of applied ethics, this pragmatic volume provides much-needed perspective on the realities and responsibilities of the human-animal relationship.
  19. added 2017-10-23
    Ownership and Justice for Animals.Alasdair Cochrane - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (4):424-442.
    This article argues that it is not necessary to abolish all incidents of animal ownership in order to achieve justice for them. It claims that ownership does not grant owners a right to absolute control of their property. Rather, it argues that ownership is a much more qualified concept, conveying different rights in different contexts. With this understanding of ownership in mind, the article argues that it is possible for humans to own animals and at the same time to treat (...)
  20. added 2017-10-23
    Endangered Species and the Right to Die.Frank Chessa - 2005 - Environmental Ethics 27 (1):23-41.
    Assuming that both humans and nonhuman organisms have intrinsic value, the concept of a “death with dignity” should extend to the natural world. Recently, an effort has been undertaken to save the razorback sucker, an endangered species of fish in the Colorado River. Razorback are bred and raised in captivity and transferred to the river only when large enough to survive predation by nonnative fish. While this effort is well-intentioned, there is little chance that the razorback will again live unassisted (...)
  21. added 2017-10-23
    Animal Rights, One Step at a Time.Steven M. Wise - 2004 - In Cass R. Sunstein & Martha Craven Nussbaum (eds.), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions. Oxford University Press. pp. 19.
  22. added 2017-10-23
    Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions.Cass R. Sunstein & Martha Craven Nussbaum (eds.) - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    Cass Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum bring together an all-star cast of contributors to explore the legal and political issues that underlie the campaign for animal rights and the opposition to it. Addressing ethical questions about ownership, protection against unjustified suffering, and the ability of animals to make their own choices free from human control, the authors offer numerous different perspectives on animal rights and animal welfare. They show that whatever one's ultimate conclusions, the relationship between human beings and nonhuman animals (...)
  23. added 2017-10-23
    Drawing Lines.James Rachels - 2004 - In Cass R. Sunstein & Martha Craven Nussbaum (eds.), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions. Oxford University Press. pp. 162--174.
  24. added 2017-10-23
    Animal Rights: Legal, Philosophical, and Pragmatic Perspectives.Richard A. Posner - 2004 - In Cass R. Sunstein & Martha Craven Nussbaum (eds.), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions. Oxford University Press. pp. 51--66.
  25. added 2017-10-23
    A Kantian Defense of Self-Ownership.Robert S. Taylor - 2004 - Journal of Political Philosophy 12 (1):65-78.
    Many scholars, including G. A. Cohen, Daniel Attas, and George Brenkert, have denied that a Kantian defense of self-ownership is possible. Kant's ostensible hostility to self-ownership can be resolved, however, upon reexamination of the Groundwork and the Metaphysics of Morals. Moreover, two novel Kantian defenses of self-ownership (narrowly construed) can be devised. The first shows that maxims of exploitation and paternalism that violate self-ownership cannot be universalized, as this leads to contradictions in conception. The second shows that physical coercion against (...)
  26. added 2017-10-23
    Born to Be Wild.Irene Klaver, Jozef Keulartz & Henk van den Belt - 2002 - Environmental Ethics 24 (1):3-21.
    With the turning of wilderness areas into wildlife parks and the returning of developed areas of land to the forces of nature, intermediate hybrid realms surface in which wild and managed nature become increasingly entangled. A partitioning of environmental philosophy into ecoethics and animal welfare ethics leaves these mixed territories relatively uncharted—the first dealing with wild, the second with the welfare of captive or domestic animals. In this article, we explore an environmental philosophy that considers explicitly these mixed situations. We (...)
  27. added 2017-10-23
    Born to Be Wild.Henk van den Belt - 2002 - Environmental Ethics 24 (1):3-21.
    With the turning of wilderness areas into wildlife parks and the returning of developed areas of land to the forces of nature, intermediate hybrid realms surface in which wild and managed nature become increasingly entangled. A partitioning of environmental philosophy into ecoethics and animal welfare ethics leaves these mixed territories relatively uncharted—the first dealing with wild (animals), the second with the welfare of captive or domestic animals. In this article, we explore an environmental philosophy that considers explicitly these mixed situations. (...)
  28. added 2017-10-23
    The Reintroduction and Reinterpretation of the Wild.Eileen O'Rourke - 2000 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 13 (1):144-165.
    This paper is concerned with changing social representations of the ``wild,'' in particular wild animals. We argue that within a contemporary Western context the old agricultural perception of wild animals as adversarial and as a threat to domestication, is being replaced by an essentially urban fascination with certain emblematic wild animals, who are seen to embody symbols of naturalness and freedom. On closer examination that carefully mediatized ``naturalness'' may be but another form of domestication. After an historical overview of the (...)
  29. added 2017-09-06
    Liberty for Corvids.Mark Wells, Scott Simmons & Diana Klimas - 2017 - Public Affairs Quarterly 31 (3):231-254.
    We argue that at least some corvids morally ought to be granted a right to bodily liberty in the US legal system and relevantly similar systems. This right would grant immunity to frivolous captivity and extermination. Implementing this right will require new legislation or the expansion of existing legislation including the elimination of various "pest" clauses. This paper proceeds in three parts. First, we survey accounts of the moral grounds of legal rights. Second, to establish an overlapping consensus supporting corvid (...)
  30. added 2017-08-28
    Persons or Property – Freedom and the Legal Status of Animals.Andreas T. Schmidt - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (1):20-45.
    Is freedom a plausible political value for animals? If so, does this imply that animals are owed legal personhood rights or can animals be free but remain human property? Drawing on different conceptions of freedom, I will argue that while positive freedom, libertarian self-ownership, and republican freedom are not plausible political values for animals, liberal ‘option-freedom’ is. However, because such option-freedom is in principle compatible with different legal statuses, animal freedom does not conceptually imply a right to legal self-ownership. Nonetheless, (...)
  31. added 2017-08-28
    Agency and Moral Status.Jeff Sebo - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (1):1-22.
    According to our traditional conception of agency, most human beings are agents and most, if not all, nonhuman animals are not. However, recent developments in philosophy and psychology have made it clear that we need more than one conception of agency, since human and nonhuman animals are capable of thinking and acting in more than one kind of way. In this paper, I make a distinction between perceptual and propositional agency, and I argue that many nonhuman animals are perceptual agents (...)
  32. added 2017-08-28
    You Don’T Know What Pain Is: Affect, the Lifeworld, and Animal Ethics.Donovan O. Schaefer - 2017 - Studies in Christian Ethics 30 (1):15-29.
    Affect theory is a subfield that encourages us to think about how we interact with each other and the world along registers that are not reducible to language. This has suggested to some scholars that affect theory can also be used to better understand the experience of animals. This article explores a merger between affect theory, animal studies and the lifeworld tradition of phenomenology. The upshot of this is a way of seeing how animals, like humans, have rich religious worlds (...)
  33. added 2017-08-28
    How Good? Ethical Criteria for a ‘Good Life’ for Farm Animals.James W. Yeates - 2017 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 30 (1):23-35.
    The Farm Animal Welfare Council’s concept of a Good Life gives an idea of an animal’s quality of life that is over and above that of a mere life worth living. The concept needs explanation and clarification, in order to be meaningful, particularly for consumers who purchase farm animal produce. The concept could allow assurance schemes to apply the label to assessments of both the potential of each method of production, conceptualised in ways expected to enhance consumers’ engagement such as (...)
  34. added 2017-08-28
    Thinking About Animals: James, Wittgenstein, Hearne.Russell B. Goodman - 2016 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 5 (1):9-29.
    In this paper I reconsider James and Wittgenstein, not in the quest for what Wittgenstein might have learned from James, or for an answer to the question whether Wittgenstein was a pragmatist, but in an effort to see what these and other related but quite different thinkers can help us to see about animals, including ourselves. I follow Cora Diamond’s lead in discussing a late paper by Vicki Hearne entitled “A Taxonomy of Knowing: Animals Captive, Free-Ranging, and at Liberty”, which (...)
  35. added 2017-08-28
    Modelling Ex Situ Animal Behaviour and Communication.Nelly Mäekivi - 2016 - Biosemiotics 9 (2):207-226.
    Communication and behaviour of animals living ex situ has been one of the major sources of knowledge about wild animals. Nevertheless, it is also acknowledged that depending on the environment that the animals inhabit, there are differences in their communication and behaviour. With some species it is difficult to reproduce their natural environment to an extent that excludes deviations from the behaviour and communication exhibited by animals living in situ. In zoological gardens, welfare measures are introduced in order to counteract (...)
  36. added 2017-08-28
    Captivity for Conservation? Zoos at a Crossroads.Jozef Keulartz - 2015 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 28 (2):335-351.
    This paper illuminates a variety of issues that speak to the question of whether ‘captivity for conservation’ can be an ethically acceptable goal of the modern zoo. Reflecting on both theoretical disagreements and practical challenges , the paper explains why the ‘Noah’s Ark’ paradigm is being replaced by an alternative ‘integrated approach.’ It explores the changes in the zoo’s core tasks that the new paradigm implies. And it pays special attention to the changes that would have to be made in (...)
  37. added 2017-08-28
    Review The Ethics of Captivity Gruen Lorri Oxford University Press New York, NY.Randy Malamud - 2015 - Journal of Animal Ethics 5 (2):219-222.
  38. added 2017-08-28
    Corporal Compassion: Animal Ethics and Philosophy of Body.Ralph R. Acampora - 2014 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
    Most approaches to animal ethics ground the moral standing of nonhumans in some appeal to their capacities for intelligent autonomy or mental sentience. _Corporal Compassion _emphasizes the phenomenal and somatic commonality of living beings; a philosophy of body that seeks to displace any notion of anthropomorphic empathy in viewing the moral experiences of nonhuman living beings. Ralph R. Acampora employs phenomenology, hermeneutics, existentialism and deconstruction to connect and contest analytic treatments of animal rights and liberation theory. In doing so, he (...)
  39. added 2017-08-28
    Nussbaum and the Capacities of Animals.T. J. Kasperbauer - 2013 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 26 (5):977-997.
    Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach emphasizes species-specific abilities in grounding our treatment of animals. Though this emphasis provides many action-guiding benefits, it also generates a number of complications. The criticism registered here is that Nussbaum unjustifiably restricts what is allowed into our concept of species norms, the most notable restrictions being placed on latent abilities and those that arise as a result of human intervention. These restrictions run the risk of producing inaccurate or misleading recommendations that fail to correspond to the (...)
  40. added 2017-08-28
    Foucault and Critical Animal Studies: Genealogies of Agricultural Power.Chloë Taylor - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (6):539-551.
    Michel Foucault is well known as a theorist of power who provided forceful critiques of institutions of confinement such as the psychiatric asylum and the prison. Although the invention of factory farms and industrial slaughterhouses, like prisons and psychiatric hospitals, can be considered emblematic moments in a history of modernity, and although the modern farm is an institution of confinement comparable to the prison, Foucault never addressed these institutions, the politics of animal agriculture, or power relationships between humans and other (...)
  41. added 2017-08-28
    Inconvenient Desires: Should We Routinely Neuter Companion Animals?Clare Palmer - 2012 - Anthrozoos 25 (1):153-172.
    Influential parts of the veterinary profession, and notably the American Veterinary Medicine Association, are promoting the routine neutering of cats and dogs that will not be used for breeding purposes. However, this view is not universally held, even among representatives of the veterinary profession. In particular, some veterinary associations in Europe defend the view that when reproduction is not an issue, then neutering, particularly of dogs, should be decided on a case-by-case basis. However, even in Europe the American view is (...)
  42. added 2017-08-28
    The Moral Relevance of the Distinction Between Domesticated and Wild Animals.Clare Palmer - 2011 - In Tom Beauchamp & R. G. Frey (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 701-725.
    This article considers whether a morally relevant distinction can be drawn between wild and domesticated animals. The term “wildness” can be used in several different ways, only one of which (constitutive wildness, meaning an animal that has not been domesticated by being bred in particular ways) is generally paired and contrasted with“domesticated.” Domesticated animals are normally deliberately bred and confined. One of the article's arguments concerns human initiatives that establish relations with animals and thereby change what is owed to these (...)
  43. added 2017-08-28
    Competing Conceptions of Animal Welfare and Their Ethical Implications for the Treatment of Non-Human Animals.Richard Haynes - 2011 - Acta Biotheoretica 59 (2):105-120.
    Animal welfare has been conceptualized in such a way that the use of animals in science and for food seems justified. I argue that those who have done this have appropriated the concept of animal welfare, claiming to give a scientific account that is more objective than the sentimental account given by animal liberationists. This strategy seems to play a major role in supporting merely limited reform in the use of animals and seems to support the assumption that there are (...)
  44. added 2017-08-28
    Live Free or Die. [REVIEW]Joel Marks - 2010 - Animal Law 17 (1):243-250.
    In On Their Own Terms (Darien, CT: Nectar Bat Press, 2010), Lee Hall articulates a theory that wild animals, due to their autonomous nature, are endowed with rights, but domesticated animals lack rights because they are not autonomous. Hall then argues that the rights of wild animals require that humans let them alone, and that, despite the fact that domestic animals lack rights, humans are required to take care of them because it is humans who brought them into existence. While (...)
  45. added 2017-08-28
    Talking About Horses: Control and Freedom in the World of "Natural Horsemanship".Lynda Birke - 2008 - Society and Animals 16 (2):107-126.
    This paper explores how horses are represented in the discourses of "natural horsemanship" , an approach to training and handling horses that advocates see as better than traditional methods. In speaking about their horses, NH enthusiasts move between two registers: On one hand, they use a quasi-scientific narrative, relying on terms and ideas drawn from ethology, to explain the instinctive behavior of horses. Within this mode of narrative, the horse is "other" and must be understood through the human learning to (...)
  46. added 2017-08-28
    Corporal Compassion: Animal Ethics and Philosophy of Body.Ralph R. Acampora - 2006 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
    Most approaches to animal ethics ground the moral standing of nonhumans in some appeal to their capacities for intelligent autonomy or mental sentience. _Corporal Compassion _emphasizes the phenomenal and somatic commonality of living beings; a philosophy of body that seeks to displace any notion of anthropomorphic empathy in viewing the moral experiences of nonhuman living beings. Ralph R. Acampora employs phenomenology, hermeneutics, existentialism and deconstruction to connect and contest analytic treatments of animal rights and liberation theory. In doing so, he (...)
  47. added 2017-08-28
    History and Ethics of Keeping Pets: Comparison with Farm Animals. [REVIEW]Stuart Spencer, Eddy Decuypere, Stefan Aerts & Johan De Tavernier - 2006 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 19 (1):17-25.
    Perhaps the commonest reasons for the keeping of pets are companionship and as a conduit for affection. Pets are, therefore, being “used” for human ends in much the same way as laboratory or farm animals. So shouldn’t the same arguments apply to the use of pets as to those used in other ways? In accepting the “rights” of farm animals to fully express their natural behavior, one must also accept the “right” of pets to express their intrinsic natural behavior. Dogs (...)
  48. added 2017-08-28
    Human and Animal Subjects of Research: The Moral Significance of Respect Versus Welfare.Rebecca L. Walker - 2006 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 27 (4):305-331.
    Human beings with diminished decision-making capacities are usually thought to require greater protections from the potential harms of research than fully autonomous persons. Animal subjects of research receive lesser protections than any human beings regardless of decision-making capacity. Paradoxically, however, it is precisely animals’ lack of some characteristic human capacities that is commonly invoked to justify using them for human purposes. In other words, for humans lesser capacities correspond to greater protections but for animals the opposite is true. Without explicit (...)
  49. added 2017-08-28
    Zoo Animal Welfare.Dita Wickins-Drazilova - 2005 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 19 (1):27-36.
    The continuing existence of zoos and their good purposes such as conservation, science, education, and recreation, can be ethically justified only if zoos guarantee the welfare of their animals. The usual criteria for measuring animal welfare in zoos are physical health, long life, and reproduction. This paper looks at these criteria and finds them insufficient. Additional criteria are submitted to expand the range of welfare considerations: natural and abnormal behavior; freedom and choice; and dignity. All these criteria should play a (...)
  50. added 2017-08-28
    Zoos and Eyes: Contesting Captivity and Seeking Successor Practices.Ralph Acampora - 2005 - Society and Animals 13 (1):69-88.
    This paper compares the phenomenological structure of zoological exhibition to the pattern prevalent in pornography. It examines several disanalogies between the two, finds them lacking or irrelevant, and concludes that the proposed analogy is strong enough to serve as a critical lens through which to view the institution of zoos. The central idea uncovered in this process of interpretation is paradoxical: Zoos are pornographic in that they make the nature of their subjects disappear precisely by overexposing them. The paper asserts (...)
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