ZusammenfassungEthik-Cafés in der geriatrischen Langzeitpflege dienen auch der ethischen Weiterbildung und sollen den Beteiligten in ungezwungener Atmosphäre einen offenen Diskurs über moralische Fragen mit Bezug zum Arbeitsalltag ermöglichen. In der Literatur werden ihnen diverse Eigenschaften wie Verbesserung der Analysefähigkeit und der Kommunikation, Erhöhung der ethischen Sensibilität und der Entscheidungskompetenz und weitere zugeschrieben. Diese Eigenschaften resultieren vorwiegend aus theoriegeleiteten Modellen. Gegenstand dieser Studie ist die empirische Untersuchung der Wirksamkeit von Ethik-Cafés innerhalb der Pflegezentren Mattenhof-Irchelpark, Zürich. Des Weiteren geht die Studie der (...) Frage nach, ob sich die subjektiven Einschätzungen der Eigenschaften von Pflegenden und anderen Berufsgruppen unterscheiden. Zur Erfassung der Eigenschaften wurde ein Fragebogen konstruiert, in dem die Teilnehmenden während der Erhebungszeit 16 Aussagen zu bewerten hatten. Die Bewertung konnte mittels einer 5-stufigen Likert-Skala angegeben werden. In einer Untergruppe wurde zwischen „Pflege“ und „Nicht-Pflege“ unterschieden. Zusammenfassend konnte festgestellt werden, dass die postulierten Eigenschaften mit einer sehr hohen Zustimmung bestätigt werden. Die Ethik-Cafés leisten nach Meinung der Befragten einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Befähigung des Personals, schwierige Situationen klarer zu analysieren, ethisch sensibler zu entscheiden und die getroffene Entscheidung zu begründen. Die Interdisziplinarität der Ethik-Cafés fördert das Verständnis für die Sichtweisen und Argumentationen der verschiedenen Bereiche und Hierarchien. Die Unterschiede der Berufsgruppen sind teilweise hoch-signifikant. Es kann festgehalten werden, dass die im Fragebogen attribuierten Eigenschaften von der Pflege generell stärker und bedeutsamer wahrgenommen werden. (shrink)

Ethical egoism, when summarized into a single ethical principle, is the position that a person ought, all things considered, to do an action if and only if that action is in his overall self-interest. The criticisms standardly advanced against this view try to show either that it is subject to some fatal logical flaw or else that, even if logically coherent, it can give no account of the basic parts of morality. Both these objections are mistaken, however, and it is (...) the point of this paper to make this clear. Central to my argument is the distinction drawn in Section 1 between two kinds of moral reasoning and hence two kinds of moral reasons. I call these ‘traditional’ and ‘nontraditional’. Both are present in the writings of contemporary moral philosophers but have not been emphasized or seen as crucial. (shrink)

Kant’s remark that the first Kritik should be read as a treatise on method rather than a system of doctrine lends support to recent forays against his theory of proof, for the comment promotes the mistaken supposition that his method can be studied independently of his commitments in ontology and other areas. Irony infects the criticisms in question because they set transcendental logic against a standard that Kant repudiates. The point will be illustrated by showing how Kant anticipates and blunts (...) a strong attack against his position on method. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Assuming that withdrawal is ontological, no method of inquiry will breach the “essence” of an object. As such, this article raises a question of onto-epistemological access to complicate the development of recent rhetorical theories and rhetorical method/ologies informed by object-oriented ontologies and new materialisms. This article wonders about the drive to know and to feel forwarded in these rhetorical method/ologies without discussing how things hide from other things and from themselves, how things elude critics, and how scholars access others (...) through ethnographic and embodied methodologies. Explicating epistemist and anti-epistemist approaches to the question of onto-epistemological access, this article makes a modest proposal for rhetoric scholars to conjure rhetorics of unavailable diversities to remake the gap between knowledge and reality again and again. (shrink)

In Rhetoric as a Posthuman Practice, Casey Boyle—or rather, the habitual practice referred to as Casey Boyle—participates in rhetorical studies' recurring concern with relations between humanism and posthumanism. Boyle's posthumanist project crafts another space within the field to think about what rhetoric is, what it does, and what it may become. Rhetoric as a Posthuman Practice recalls the purpose of rhetorical education in the Isocrates and Quintilian traditions—"to become a certain kind of person", but with a posthuman return: Whereas classical (...) rhetorical education aimed at ethically stable character formation—the humanist subject—Boyle's posthuman practice enacts character as in-formation... (shrink)

The terms ‘unity’, ‘integration’ and ‘diversity’ have multiple layers of meaning in the religious context. While religions emphasize unity and integrity, they also address the issues of diversity. When understood properly, unity does not mean uniformity and thus does not invite oppression and closure. By the same token, diversity does not mean chaos and lack of order. Both unity and diversity have a function within the larger context of things. But this context is not confined to the socio-political dimension alone. (...) A broader understanding of these terms will help us understand the religious discourses of unity, diversity and integration. It will also lead to a more critical assessment of the Enlightenment and western modernity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Jesse Kai.in THE INTENT OF ROMANTICISM: KANT, WORDSWORTH, AND TWO FILMS Great Kant, As a believer calls to his God, I call upon you for help, for solace, or for counsel to prepare me for death. The reasons you gave in your books were sufficient to convince me of a future existence — that is why I have recourse to you — only I found nothing at all for (...) this life, nothing that could replace the good I have lost.... my heart splits into a thousand pieces. If I hadn't read so much of your work I would certainly have taken my own life by now. But the conclusion I had to draw from your theory stops me — it is wrong for me to die because my life is tormented, and I am instead supposed to live because of my being. Now put yourself in my place and either damn me or give me solace. Maria von Herbert, August, 1791 ' This ESSAY is an attempt to describe a kind of thoughtfulness that has its origins in the beginnings of the Romantic movement and is of ethical relevance today. I will first locate the moral problematic that this thoughtfulness responds to as it arises within the framework established by Kant's moral philosophy. It is that of despair in the face of life and, while this is a problematic Kant himself would consider invalid, the solution it calls for, were he to try to provide it, involves the kind of thinking he considers in the Critique of Judgement, though not in quite the way he understands it. I will then suggest that the Wordsworth of the 1802 "Preface" can be taken as sketching out the sort of response to this problematic that Kant himself refuses to give or even recognize as philosophically needed. This will be a kind of artwork which is at the same time a certain process of thinking. The intent of Romanticism referred to in my title is thus both the concern to resolve this Kantian problem and the goal of achieving this Wordsworthian artwork. What I shall finally propose is that this kind of artwork is ofcurrent interest to moral philosophy and will 121 122Philosophy and Literature elaborate this claim through the discussion of two recent instances, both films — Margarethe von Trotta's The SecondAwakening ofChrista Klages and J.J. Murphy's Print Generation. I Kant sets a complicated and multifaceted background for both Romanticism and modern moral philosophy. His positions are complex and even convoluted and some of his most important ideas are both obscure and presented only obliquely. The problem ofdespair which comes to be at the heart of Romanticism develops out of the two Kantian themes of thoughtful autonomy (enlightenment) and the purposive unity of man and the world. Kant argues that practical reason must affirm these ideas as the Postulates of Freedom and God. In taking this position, however, Kant is implicitly committed to the existence of things good in themselves other than, and finally coordinate to, the Good Will, though he gives no direct account of such goods. Despair in the face of life is grounded in the inability or failure to appreciate these goods, and while Kant provides hints, he is never able to recognize or articulate a means of evidential access to them. Both the need of such goods and the appropriation of them remain submerged and latent themes in his writings. Let us begin with the question ofGod and the wholeness of all things. It would be a disaster, Kant says, if we could not, no matter how hard we tried, accomplish the purpose set for us by the Moral Law which is happiness in accord with virtue. It would be intolerable if the virtuous were always to be unhappy, or the vicious always to have their peace. However, since happiness is only marginally in our control, we need to postulate both immortality of the soul and existence of God as moral author of the world to assure that this purpose, or the summum bonum, can be achieved. What we cannot do, God will. This is the so-called moral argument for the existence of God and its outcome... (shrink)

The paper presents a cross-country analysis of the second generation of currency boards introduced in three East European countries: Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania. We focus on their institutional, legal and political characteristics which are closely associated with the operation of the automatic mechanism of currency boards. The presence of an automatic mechanism within the framework of the currency board is often cited as a major counterpoint to the “discretion and subjectivity” of a classical central bank. Since there is no precise (...) definition of automatic mechanisms in the literature, we define it as: “the presence of a positive cointegration relationship between the balance of payments and the reserve money and absence of discretionary variables in the model.” When discretionary variables are present in the model in one form or another, we may speak of a “mechanism for adjustment through discretion – conscious or unconscious.” Within the framework of the second generation of currency boards, we reduce the channel of discretion to the presence of atypical balance sheet items and employment of a number of monetary policy instruments. We seek in this article to compare currency board automatic mechanism in Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania.L’article procède d’une analyse transversale par pays de la deuxième génération des “bureaux d’émission” introduits dans trois pays de l’Europe de l’Est. L’accent est mis sur les caractéristiques institutionnelles, juridiques et politiques qui sont étroitement associées à l’opération du mécanisme automatique des bureaux d’émission. L’existence d’un mécanisme automatique dans la structure d’un bureau d’émission est souvent mise en avant comme l’argument majeur à l’encontre de la “discrétion” et la “subjectivité” d’une banque centrale classique. Parce qu’il n’existe aucune définition précise du mécanisme automatique dans la littérature, nous la définissons comme “la présence d’une relation positive de cointégration entre la balance des paiements et les réserves monétaires et l’absence de variables discrétionna- ires dans le modèle”. Quand des variables discrétionnaires sont présentes dans le modèle sous une forme ou une autre, nous pouvons parler d’un “mécanisme d’ajustement discrétionnaire – conscient ou inconscient”. Au sein de la structure de la deuxième génération des bureaux d’émission, la discrétion se réduit à la présence de postes atypiques dans le bilan et à l’emploi d’un certain nombre d’instruments de politique monétaire.L’article propose une comparaison du mécanisme automatique en Bulgarie, Estonie et Lithuanie. (shrink)

Mulla Sadra (ca. 1572-1640) is one of the most prominent figures of post-Avicennan Islamic philosophy and among the most important philosophers of Safavid Persia. He was a prolific writer whose work advanced the fields of intellectual and religious science in Islamic philosophy, but arguably his most important contribution to Islamic philosophy is in the study of existence (wujud) and its application to such areas as cosmology, epistemology, psychology, and eschatology. Sadra represents a paradigm shift from the Aristotelian metaphysics of fixed (...) substances, which had dominated Islamic philosophy, to an analysis of existence as the ultimate ground and dynamic source of things. He posits that all beings derive their reality and truth from their wujud and that a proper philosophical analysis must therefore start and eventually end with it. The present work's focus on Sadra's gradational ontology provides a strong foundation for the reader to understand Sadra's other works and later texts by other philosophers working in the same field. This edition contains parallel English-Arabic texts and a new translation by preeminent scholar of Islamic philosophy Seyyed Hossein Nasr. (shrink)

In memoriam of Vernon Venable, American philosopher who for four decades was a master teacher in the history of Western philosophy, author of an important study of Marx, and the seminal spirit in the development and flourishing of the program in philosophy at Vassar College.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:1 1 6 Philosophy and Literature 1.Jesse Kalin, "Philosophy Needs Literature: John Barth and Moral Nihilism,"Philosophy and Literature 1(1977): 170-82. 2.Kalin states, in summary fashion, that in argument by "exhibition" we are made aware that Jake's concern for Rennie is a "case of relative value which is genuinely reason giving" (p. 176). But he does not defend this claim, so we can only note it and pass (...) on. 3.A. C. Bradley, "Poetry for Poetry's Sake," Oxford Lectures On Poetry (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 24. 4.On the "heresy of the separable substances," see Bradley, p. 12 ff., where he defends the claim that "subject is the opposite... of the whole poem. Substance is within the poem." Recall also Robert Frost's dictum that the poem is what remains after translation. 5.J. Glenn Gray, On Understanding Violence Philosophically and Other Essays (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 79. 6.Cf. Eliseo Vivas, "Critical Assizes," The Blue Guitar 1 (1975):84. "... The critic who is interested in going through literature to moral philosophy, political thought, social theory, or the rest, is a man the seriousness of whose interest in any of these disciplines can be questioned. As a moral philosopher, no novelist or literary critic can tie Kant's shoes or those of Bishop Butler; I know of no novelist or literary critic who as a political thinker can hold a candle to Edmund Burke or Michael Oakeshott, or who as a sociologist can rival Karl Marx or Max Weber. A literary critic who thinks he can go through literature to a well established discipline cultivated by the men I have mentioned or others of lesser stature is a dilettante in the pejorative sense of the term. He can't take his drink at the bar and take it straight; he sits in a booth and sweetens his bourbon with gingerale, or, God forbid, with Coca-Cola." 7.William Gass, Fiction and the Figures of Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), p. 11. "An idea must be thought before it can be tested, but a principle encased in fiction has, most likely, not been thought at all. It has been used." HOW WIDE THE GULF? a rejoinder by Jesse Kalin Several rather loosely related but important theses can be abstracted from Curtler's remarks. First, that philosophy and literature are so different in character that it is hard to see how they can seriously have anything to do with each other. Second, that the main thesis of my paper—that philosophy at least sometimes needs literature as an essential stage in its program—is false. And third, that my interpretation of Barth's novels is, if not incorrect, only one of several conflicting readings and hence not able to support the claims I base upon it. I shall discuss each of these in turn. Jesse Kalin117 Throughout, Curtler tries to draw the difference between philosophy and literature as sharply as possible. He concludes that not only do they have no need for each other, but to the degree that one "succeeds as a poet he fails as a philosopher" (p. 115). What might appear to be overstatement (and thus most unphilosophical) is supported by a series of contrasts. Philosophy is a matter of proof, not intuition, of argumentation, not persuasion, of concepts, not images, and so on. However, this rigid and rather positivistic picture of philosophy, resting on a supposedly clear and unbridgeable distinction between philosophy and literature made in terms of method and style, is mistaken, and with it the corollary that the two have nothing to contribute to one another.1 If we look at the actual practice of major philosophers, especially modern ones, we will find that their styles are not readily describable in the terms Curtler suggests they should be to count as philosophy. Imagination, intuition, images, makings, even the actual construction of characters and "dramatic action," are in many cases central. Descartes, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Sartre are all cases in point. The essence of this supposed gulf between philosophy and literature is brought out when Curtler says "the way of... (shrink)

The terms ‘unity’, ‘integration’ and ‘diversity’ have multiple layers of meaning in the religious context. While religions emphasize unity and integrity, they also address the issues of diversity. When understood properly, unity does not mean uniformity and thus does not invite oppression and closure. By the same token, diversity does not mean chaos and lack of order. Both unity and diversity have a function within the larger context of things. But this context is not confined to the socio-political dimension alone. (...) A broader understanding of these terms will help us understand the religious discourses of unity, diversity and integration. It will also lead to a more critical assessment of the Enlightenment and western modernity. (shrink)

This study looks at how the seventeenth-century philosopher Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi, known as Mulla Sadra, attempted to reconcile the three major forms of ...

U nastavnim programima i udžbenicima filozofije teorija relativnosti zastupljena je u malo navoda, a javlja se uvijek u kontekstu onih dijelova programa filozofije koji se odnose na pojam znanosti i na odnos filozofije i znanosti. Primjereno prirodi filozofije, ti navodi, dakako, ne upućuju na zadatak izlaganja i propitivanja sadržaja i problema teorije relativnosti , nego na filozofske implikacije što ih pojava teorije relativnosti ima na trajni problem odnosafilozofije i znanosti, na filozofiju znanosti, i na razvoj kritičkog pojma znanosti i na (...) teoriju znanosti uopće.U nastavnim programima fizike teorija relativnosti zastupljena je u 3. razredu gimnazije u dvjema sustavno raščlanjenim inačicama . Jasno su naznačeni obvezni sadržaji i izborni sadržaji. Isto je tako i u udžbenicima. Valja naglasiti da su to metodički suvremenokoncipirani, radni i problemski usmjereni udžbenici, koji se ujedno kontinuirano dorađuju i usavršavaju.U ovom pregledu programa i udžbenika autor nije bio u mogućnosti da sa sigurnošću točno utvrdi kada se i u kojem obliku prvi put javljaju sadržaji koji se odnose na teoriju relativnosti. Dijelom je to zato što ne raspolažemo potpunom bibliografijom udžbenika, a ni Zavod za školstvo ne raspolaže potpunim i pouzdanim pregledom svih progama fizike od 1941. godine do danas. Posebno ne za 3. i 4. razred gimnazije, za ono vrijeme kada su škole dijelom samostalno oblikovale te programe »prema zahtjevima struke«. Ostaju tako zadaci za daljnja istraživanja koja će provesti pojedinci i odgovarajuće ustanove .In high school curricula and philosophy textbooks, the theory of relativity is mentioned in veryfew entries, and always in the context of those sections of the philosophy syllabus which refer tothe concept of knowledge and the relationship between philosophy and science. According to thenature of philosophy, these entries certainly do not present and question the subject matter andproblems of the theory of relativity , but lead to the discussionof the philosophical implications of the theory of relativity on the perennial problem of the relationship between philosophyand science, on the philosophy of science, and on the development of the critical concept ofscience and the theory of science in general. In the high school physics curriculum, the theory ofrelativity is included in the 11th grade syllabus in two systematically decomposed versions . Mandatory and optional subject matter is clearly indicated. The same goes for textbooks.It is necessary to stressthat these aremethodologically contemporarily concipated, workandproblemoriented textbooks, which areregularlyimprovedand perfected. In our reviewsofhigh school curricula and textbooks, the authors could not with certainty determine at whattimeand in which form the first contents regardingthe theory of relativitywereincluded. Thisispartly due to the fact that we do not have access to the entirebibliography of the textbooksandthe Institute for Education does not have access to a complete and reliableoverview of allthephysics curricula from1941 to the present.This is particularly true for the junior and senioryearsof high school during the period when schools partially modeled their curricula independentlyaccordingto the »requirementsof the profession«.Asa result,further investigation is requiredwhich will be conducted by individuals and the appropriate institutions. (shrink)

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