Several clinical cases are presented to illustrate the phenomenon of discontinuity of personal narrative. These discontinuities are markedly and overtly present in the cases described, which include cases of bipolar disorder, incipient schizophrenia, dissociative disorder, and others. One of the patients suggests that they are also ubiquitous in people without psychiatric diagnoses.

Examines the role played by the Aristotelian logic in Neoplatonic philosophers. To start with, it is remarked that Aristotelian Organon was regarded not only as a corpus of logical texts but also as an introduction to philosophy. Focuses on several Neoplatonic Aristotelian commentators, from Alexander of Aphrodisias to Byzantine thinkers, presenting both the characteristics of their works and their lack of interest in discussing their own philosophical view. Finally, it is observed that, although not original, these commentaries provide a rather (...) reliable and correct investigation of Aristotle. (shrink)

In contrast with the different views of some recent scholars, Ch. 7 constitutes an important attempt to point out the importance played by non‐discursive thought in Plotinus and Proclus in several ways. Firstly, the differences between the doctrines of Plotinus and Proclus are investigated. Secondly, it is considered the role of the ‘Loving Intellect’ in both Plotinus’ and Proclus’ philosophy. Thirdly, it is indicated how the One plays a crucial role in the mystical experience and how this kind of experience (...) may be an evidence of the activity of the One. Finally, it is shown how some problems and difficulties of Plotinus’ philosophy may be explained through reference to the mystical experience. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ontological and Other AssumptionsLloyd A. Wells (bio) and Sandra J. Rackley (bio)Fahrenberg and Cheetham have conducted an immensely thought-provoking study of the assumptions about human nature made by 800 students and pose a question about the future impact of these assumptions on individuals’ practice in professions including medicine and psychotherapy.This work represents a branch of “philosophical anthropology,” which considers assumptions people make about human nature. The authors used a (...) questionnaire, much of which was newly designed, to assess the assumptions made by university students studying psychology, philosophy, sciences, and other disciplines. Most of the respondents were studying at Freiburg, but some were sampled at several other universities in both the former East and West Germanies. Questions involved consciousness and the brain, evolution, free will, belief in God, the meaning of life, and theodicy.Given the importance of these beliefs and assumptions in so many peoples’ lives, it is quite surprising that there are so few modern data available, and this study ventures an important first step in assessing these assumptions. However, there are many problems inherent in this study (and any like it).The first, for us, is the validity of the questionnaire itself, an issue that was not specifically addressed in the paper. Face validity is a problem even in the few questions quoted directly in the paper. For example, some statements contain two clauses, and one could well agree with one without agreeing with another: “I do not know whether a God exists and I do not believe it is possible to know.” This is the most relevant answer for a true agnostic, but the assumption that “I do not know whether a God exists” does not necessarily link at all with “I do not believe it is possible to know.” Similarly, a theist might have trouble with the two clauses, “I know God really exists” and “I do not doubt this.” (Technically, knowledge does imply a lack of doubt, but belief certainly does not.) Particularly in the trilemmas, where various patterns of response were analyzed, these multiple-clause statements may have led students to respond in a manner inconsistent with their true beliefs and assumptions. Furthermore, many of the questions contain terms that may have been unfamiliar to first-year university students. The authors explain their rationale in not defining terms, but the lack of clarity about definitions may have led some of the students to not fully understand the questions asked and to perhaps influence the answers they chose.Misunderstanding of the questions may account for some of the disparities reported in the results. Other apparent inconsistencies, however, do not seem to be a result of unclear questions. For example, sixty percent of the students agreed with the statement that “I believe in … existence after death,” whereas forty-seven percent agreed with the statement that “when my brain is dead my consciousness and my person cease to be.” These [End Page 203] findings do not add up, and this study has several similar sets of data. People contradict themselves in long and complex questionnaires, and this may be a simple explanation for these findings, but is this the only explanation? How seriously did the students take the questionnaire, often given as part of their class? How honest were their responses?How generalizable are the findings of this study? It is very difficult even to speculate about this. The statistics are incomprehensible in light of the data given, and one must essentially take them on faith, wherever one falls on the God/theodicy questions. The design has many flaws, but we do learn how a subsample of German university students rate important factors about the meaning of life. Statements are made in the paper that the students’ results correlate with similar results for the general population, but this assertion seems to be based on a very few questions. One would like much more delineation of this apparent correlation, because we wonder about the juxtaposition of developmental factors with the answers the students gave to this questionnaire. First-year university students are at a critical developmental point, and it would be fascinating to follow this large cohort of students over time to see whether... (shrink)

Devoted to the key Neoplatonic concepts of procession and emanation. The two terms are taken to express the same idea, although procession is preferred as more neutral. Points out how procession can be explained in Aristotelian terms. More specifically, it is demonstrated how Plotinus’ notion of procession uses the Aristotelian theory of the actualization of an activity by a potency in order to explain how a higher activity can actualize a lower one. Finally, considers the doctrine of Proclus who expresses (...) the procession, involving the theory of causal relation, in a way opposite to Plotinus. (shrink)

Focuses on Porphyry's semantic and more specifically on his theory of ‘imposition of names’, i.e. how names are related to things. Examines Porphyry's treatment of genus and species and also of individual, singular, and general terms to emphasize his peculiarity in Neoplatonic philosophy. Infers that Porphyry's attitude is not to develop a metaphysical and a logical semantics, but only a metaphysical one. Finally, considers how Porphyry's metaphysical approach towards semantics was maintained by eleventh and twelfth century Byzantine Neoplatonists.

The core of the third chapter is the study of the P‐series. This theory is presented after a detailed discussion of the relationship of individuals to species and genus. A P‐series is a sequence of terms classified according to priority and posteriority starting from the most universal one. This theory is the result of the evolution of the Aristotelian doctrine of pros en done in order to fit with the not strictly Aristotelian notion of ‘genus’ of some Neoplatonic philosophers.

The purpose of Ch. 6 is to outline the role played by the P‐series theory in Neoplatonic epistemology. To start with, it is explained that knowledge of a P‐series consists in an order of priority and posteriority of the terms: intellect, scientific knowledge, belief, presentation, and perception. In second place, some peculiar Neoplatonic epistemological issues, e.g. how can the divine possibly know temporal truths, are carefully examined. To conclude, some particular Neoplatonic rules, which allow higher entities to have knowledge of (...) lower ones, are investigated. (shrink)

Investigates how, given their ontological status between the One and animals, men can either ascend to the intellectual life or fall into the inferior kinds of life. Different issues involved in the doctrine of the rise to the intellectual life are considered. Firstly, the restriction to men of the possibility of an intellectual life is explained through the reference to Neoplatonists’ own personal experiences. Secondly, the experience of the ascent is defined by the term ‘inclination’ rather than the too broad (...) ‘reversion’ used by most of the scholars. The former term, indeed, seems to fit better in the case of men. Finally, the experience of inclination is explained in terms of logical necessity. (shrink)

Within child and adolescent psychiatry, there are a number of potential dilemmas pertaining to diagnosis, treatment, the protection of the child, as well as the child's own developing intelligence and moral judgement. Diagnostic Dilemmas in Child and Adolescent Psychiatry is the first in the IPPP series to explore this highly complex topic.

Like many collections of essays, this work is a veritable omnium-gatherum, both in terms of topics and quality. Structurally, the work is divided into four main sections: The Aristotelian Tradition; Modern Approaches; Normative Considerations; and finally Epistemological and Metaphysical Considerations. One should be aware, however, that some of the essays could, and perhaps should, be placed in other sections, while one in particular, although good in itself, had virtually nothing to say on the topic of categories. What follows is a (...) brief summary statement about each essay. (shrink)

In the first section, our anonymous author discusses sophistria as an art. Like other authors who wrote sophistria, the author first shows that sophistria is a demonstrative science, not indeed in the sense that one is taught how to make sophistical arguments, but a science in the sense that knowledge about sophistical arguments is taught through demonstrations. In the subsequent questions on this topic, he makes a number of distinctions, for example, between a new and an old division of sophistrie, (...) between sophistria utens and docens, and between scientia realis and scientia rationis, ultimately identifying the science in question as a scientia rationis. He ends this section by identifying the ways in which the four causes pertain to this science. Unfortunately, a number of lines are missing in these questions, making it impossible to identify some of the author’s arguments which lead him to some of his positions. For example, in question 5, which asks whether the division of sophistrie into an older part and a newer part is suitable, only two arguments to the opposite are given; in question 6, which asks about the distinction between utens and docens, nothing but the question has survived, while in question 7, which asks whether the new logic of sophistria is distinct from the other parts, only one opposing argument is given. (shrink)

Unlike some of the shorter, introductory commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories, such as those by Porphyry, Dexippus, or Simplicius’s teacher Ammonius, Simplicius’s commentary is, as he himself admits, a lengthy treatise that discusses Aristotle’s text lemma by lemma. As is customary, Simplicius begins his commentary with an introduction that includes two schemata of questions. The first situates the Categories within the larger context of Aristotle’s corpus and identifies the necessary qualities of good students and teachers. The second set of questions focuses (...) specifically on the Categories by addressing the goal of the work, its usefulness, its authenticity, its place within logic, the reason for its title, and its division into chapters. Most important in this introductory section is Simplicius’s discussion of the goal of Aristotle in writing the Categories, for at the time there was widespread disagreement as to whether the Categories is a work about words only, about things only, about concepts only, or somehow about all three. Of course, like many of the medievals who studied his commentary, Simplicius argues that it is about all three and contends that the goal “would be about the simple and most generic parts of speech which signify simple realities, and the simple notions which exist in conjunction with these simple realities”. (shrink)