The Spinozan theory of belief fixation holds that mentally representing truth-apt propositions leads to immediately believing them. In this paper, I explore how the theory fares as a defence of doxasticism about delusions (the view that they are beliefs). Doxasticism has been criticised on the grounds that delusions typically do not abide by rational standards that we expect beliefs to conform to. If belief fixation is Spinozan, I argue, these deviations from rationality are not just compatible with, but supportive of, (...) their status as beliefs. (shrink)

There is evidence indicating that the Capgras delusion is grounded in some kind of anomalous experience. According to the endorsement model, the content of the delusion is already encoded in the Capgras subject's experience, and the delusion is formed simply by endorsing that content as veridical. Elisabeth Pacherie and Sam Wilkinson have in different ways attempted to articulate a comprehensive defence of this strategy, but here I argue that the endorsement model cannot be defended along the lines envisioned by either (...) of them. I then offer a more promising way of spelling out the model, according to which the anomalous experience implicated in Capgras is metaphorical in character. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is that of discussing some recent antipositivist theses, with specific reference to the arguments that focus on the alleged incapability of legal positivism to understand and explain the complex normative structure of constitutional states. One of the central tenets of legal positivism (in its guise of ``methodological'' or ``conceptual'' positivism) is the theory of the separation between law and morality. On the assumption that in contemporary legal systems, constitutional law represents a point of intersection between (...) law and basic moral values, antipositivists contrast legal positivism with two main arguments. First, on a more general level, the positivist theory of the separation between law and morality is questioned; then, and consequently, the ``neutrality thesis'' in the juristic study of law is rejected. The author discusses both these antipositivist arguments, and offers a brief defence of methodological positivism. (shrink)

In this chapter we discuss the role of conscious and unconscious inference in theories of delusion formation. Two competing accounts aim to shed light on the formation of delusions: according to explanationism, the delusional belief is offered as an explanation for anomalous experience; according to the endorsement theory, the delusional belief is an acknowledgement that the anomalous experience is veridical. Whereas explanationists argue that the delusional belief is inferred from experience, endorsement theorists argue that there need be no inference from (...) the experience to the delusional belief. Here we put pressure on the idea that the two accounts can be distinguished on the basis of whether inference is involved in delusion formation and argue that they are both compatible with the increasingly influential idea that Bayesian inference is responsible for the adoption of the delusional belief. One of the models of delusion formation focusing on Bayesian inference is the Coltheart model (Coltheart, Menzies, and Sutton, 2010) which we discuss in detail in the chapter. We show that, given its features, the model does not fit neatly under either explanationism or the endorsement theory. (shrink)

A growing number of studies in both the scientific and the philosophical literature have drawn on a Bayesian predictive processing framework to account for the formation of delusions. The key here is that delusions form because of disrupted prediction error signalling. Parrott’s recent critique argues that the framework is incomplete in two respects: it leaves unclear why delusional hypotheses are selected over none at all or over more plausible alternatives; it leaves unclear how exactly it is that delusional hypotheses are (...) generated in the first place. In this paper, we defend the framework’s explanatory power by way of showing how it can go a long way in helping disentangle these concerns. We take up each of them in turn. As for the first, our argument turns on two claims: a) believing nothing, although possible in principle, may not be a viable procedure in the circumstances; b) alternative hypotheses may be rendered unavailable for selection, due to aberrant prediction errors. As for the second concern, we distinguish three ways in which delusional hypotheses may be initially acquired, all of which are based on experience broadly construed. (shrink)

A growing number of studies in both the scientific and the philosophical literature have drawn on a Bayesian predictive processing framework to account for the formation of delusions. The key here is that delusions form because of disrupted prediction error signalling. Parrott’s recent critique argues that the framework is incomplete in two respects: it leaves unclear why delusional hypotheses are selected over none at all or over more plausible alternatives; it leaves unclear how exactly it is that delusional hypotheses are (...) generated in the first place. In this paper, we defend the framework’s explanatory power by way of showing how it can go a long way in helping disentangle these concerns. We take up each of them in turn. As for the first, our argument turns on two claims: a) believing nothing, although possible in principle, may not be a viable procedure in the circumstances; b) alternative hypotheses may be rendered unavailable for selection, due to aberrant prediction errors. As for the second concern, we distinguish three ways in which delusional hypotheses may be initially acquired, all of which are based on experience broadly construed. (shrink)

Este análisis teórico busca analizar, por una parte, en la inmersión de la obra del pensador galés Raymond Williams y, por otro lado, el acercamiento a lo que podemos denominar como Estudios Culturales Británicos, una propuesta metodológica y política plausible en virtud de pensar nuestro presente con una mirada y una sensibilidad diferente a lo que ampliamente se ha caracterizado como «presentismo» o futuros cancelados. Para ello, retomar la obra de un pensador parcialmente olvidado en las últimas décadas, no solo (...) nos permitirá atisbar posibilidades de pensar futuros diversos, sino que nos obligará a tomar en consideración una caja de herramientas, sugerente, que terminó defendiendo con matices, contradicciones e incorporaciones hasta el final de su vida en 1988. (shrink)

The article analyzes the social representations of ICTs’ appropriation for community empowerment by social movements. The study includes two recent Latin American student social movements: the Mexican #YoSoy132 and the Chilean student movement. Discourse analysis was used to examine interviews with participants in these social movements as well as other texts associated with their episodes of collective action. The discourse analysis was focused on four main dimensions of the social representations of ICTs’ appropriation: (1) the interrelationships between the technological and (...) the socio-political and cultural dimensions; (2) the tension between a visibility-centered and an articulating-focused use of ICTs; (3) the tension between the individual and the collective dimensions; and (4) the articulation between ICTs-based collective action and offline one. The findings indicate that the online/offline and the visibility/articulation tensions are relevant dimensions, in an articulated way, of the social representation of ICTs’ appropriation for collective empowerment. The results also indicate that the sociopolitical goals of the social movements are a central mediation for the process of configuration of the social representation, as it is proved by the importance of the individual/collective tension for the process. (shrink)

This book examines the life and work of mathematician Giovanni Battista Guccia, founder of the Circolo Matematico di Palermo and its renowned journal, the Rendiconti del Circolo matematico di Palermo. The authors describe how Guccia, an Italian geometer, was able to establish a mathematical society in Sicily in the late nineteenth century, which by 1914 would grow to become the largest and most international in the world, with one of the most influential journals of the time. The book highlights the (...) challenges faced by Guccia in creating an international society in isolated Palermo, and places Guccia’s activities in the wider European context through comparisons with the formation of the London Mathematical Society and the creation of Mittag-Leffler’s Acta Mathematica in Stockholm. Based on extensive searches in European archives, this scholarly work follows both historical and scientific treads, and will appeal to those interested in the history of mathematics and science in general. (shrink)

In questo articolo si descrivono e discutono le caratteristiche principali della lingua quechua relative alla distinzione tra ‘maschio’ e ‘femmina’. La prima parte del testo indica il modo in cui il quechua codifica questa distinzione attraverso il lessico, ponendo l’attenzione sui termini di parentela; la seconda parte mostra i sostantivi, aggettivi e verbi indicanti persone, comportamenti e abitudini considerati come tipicamente femminili o maschili. Sia la prima parte che la seconda sono vòlte a evidenziare alcuni fattori di tipo socio-culturale associati (...) alla distinzione linguistica tra genere femminile e maschile. (shrink)

La interpretación es un proceso cognitivo peculiar: distinto, por una parte, de la explicación cientificopositiva; por otra, de la comprensión empática y también del entender en sus distintas formas. EI proceso interpretative tiene lugar por el sujeto, que en ese momento hace de intérprete, a partir de un objeto en un contexto determinado, pero sobre la imagen del objeto, que es en realidad el referencial; la dación de significados connotativos constituye el interpretado, el cual es devuelto al contexto como referido. (...) En la neointerpretación o en la reinterpretación, ese objeto referido es entonces neoreferencial. EI proceso interpretativo es estocástico y, por eso, con la finalidad de reducir la entropía del sistema, podría ser interminable. EI sistema compuesto por objeto, imagen del objeto, intérprete e interpretado es,siempre, en consecuencia, dishomeostático. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es criticar la representación tradicional del trabajo periodístico de Karl Marx, habitualmente olvidado por un canon engañoso que sólo asume sus artículos al precio de convertirlos en una obra menor. Uno de los problemas de esta concepción tradicional es que disocia sus contribuciones teóricas y económicas del desarrollo histórico del pensamiento del autor . Intentaremos señalar la importancia del periodismo maduro de Karl Marx en dos áreas: en la construcción de los conceptos centrales de su (...) crítica contra el capitalismo y en la producción de cartografías políticas para intervenir en el conflicto de clases. Este artículo plantea varias hipótesis y afirmaciones tentativas sobre el periodismo de Karl Marx que pueden servir como punto de partida de una investigación crítica. (shrink)

Belief merging aims at combining several pieces of information coming from different sources. In this paper we review the works on belief merging of propositional bases. We discuss the relationship between merging, revision, update and confluence, and some links between belief merging and social choice theory. Finally we mention the main generalizations of these works in other logical frameworks.

The fictional beings are another story ourselves, and tell us another way to recover what we, wanting to be what we want; Stories in which they live, not knowing that his life is a story, a story that does not live as if it were, as if they lived their lives. The fictions of the world show us, not necessarily, as others do not, who am not! But who still am not, because I have not discovered completely all myself, and (...) sometimes I am without be them in this otherness for myself it is mine, but not mine yet, I am part of stories that are not my history, the world of text, stories where I am another, even myself, intratextual entity and not intraworld, reowned those others who just the text opens so imaginary and that the actual closure and silent, to the point where it is discovered that about me are the many stories that tell me I have the me or other me, where the mirror the other gives me an identity different readings, Be-who-I-am-and-who-else-to be-said-that-I, because I have built my own history identity, but the pair, others tell my story as the story of another, stories over and over that overlap but without being the same but the same, the stories of others that I am for others, who suspect without built my otherness, my other identities. (shrink)

El presente escrito se propone presentar el modelo de tres niveles del conocimiento científico (datos, fenómenos y teorías) desde los recientes resultados de la filosofía de la ciencia obtenidos por dos perspectivas filosóficas particulares: el nuevo experimentalismo y el enfoque semántico de las teorías. Para ello contrasta los planteamientos principales de estas dos perspectivas con el modelo de dos niveles del conocimiento científico (observación y teoría) del positivismo lógico, que dominó el panorama de la filosofía de la ciencia en las (...) primeras seis décadas del siglo XX. (shrink)

En este estudio el autor comenta los significados del héroe Edipo según las interpretaciones que hizo Zambrano de las obras de Sófocles tituladas Edito Rey y Edipo en Colono. Se destacan sus aspectos filosóficos y su importancia en la historia del pensamiento.

En este artículo se traza una distinción clara y precisa entre geometría pura y geometría aplicada dentro del marco de las reflexiones sobre los fundamentos de la geometría promovidas por la aparición de geometrías no-euclidianas y en el contexto de las discusiones mantenidas por los empiristas lógicos sobre la estructura general de las teorías empíricas. De manera más particular, se defiende, tal y como proponen los empiristas lógicos, que una geometría pura es un sistema formal que no nos dice nada (...) sobre la realidad física, mientras que una geometría aplicada es una teoría empírica, una teoría física (una teoría del espacio) que resulta de dotar de significado a una geometría matemática. Para sostener esta tesis se recurre, en parte, a ciertas ideas expresadas por Einstein sobre la teoría general de la relatividad. Por último, si bien parece que esta imagen de la estructura de una geometría física es relativamente adecuada, se insiste en la tesis de que el error principal de los empiristas lógicos estaría entonces en pretender hacer de ella el carácter predominante de la estructura de las teorías científicas en general. (shrink)

ABSTRACT We consider in this work the problem of iterated belief revision. We propose a family of belief revision operators called revision with memory operators and we give a logical (both syntactical and semantical) characterization of these operators. They obey what we call the principle of strong primacy of update: when one revises his beliefs by a new evidence, then all possible worlds that satisfy this new evidence become more reliable than those that do not. We show that those operators (...) have a satisfying behaviour concerning the iteration of the revision process. Then we provide four particular operators of this family. (shrink)

In industrial societies workplace is the only battlefield where people can kill another without running the risk of facing the courts (Leynman, 1996). This picture of dehumanization work reveals that organizations stand as the scene of the permissibility and the justification of harassment at the workplace (mobbing), whichincreased gradually and adverse effects are alarming at the moment, without considering the quality of working life because so far few companies have woken to the fact that it can no longer continue explaining (...) the bankruptcy and instability of these causes as shrinking market, loss of investors, misguided government policies, strategies ineffective advertising and sale but the time has come to recognize that the conspiracies, sabotage, in a word, the struggle for power within each organization is a kind of silent and asymptomatic disease that eventually will kill to make their recovery process irreversible and even less hope of success, although some leaders unconscious be limited to talk about this as mere gossip, but envy is more professional than a potential threat is a lethal weapon that destroys companies from their foundations and from emerging as such. "Everyone against one !...¡ That is the question!". (shrink)

The essay discusses the import of the separability thesis both for legal positivism and for contemporary legal practice. First, the place of the separability thesis in legal positivism will be explored, distinguishing between “standard positivism” and “post‐Hartian positivism.” Then I will consider various kinds of relations between law and morality that are worthy of jurisprudential interest, and explore, from a positivist point of view, what kind of relations between law and morality must be rejected, what kind of such relations should (...) be taken into account, and what kind of such relations are indeed of no import at all. The upshot of this analysis consists in highlighting the distinction between two different dimensions of legal validity (formal validity and material validity respectively), and in pointing out that the positivist separability thesis can apply to formal validity only. On the other hand, when the ascertainment of material validity is at stake, some form of moral reasoning may well be involved (here and now, it isnecessarilyinvolved). The essay concludes with some brief remarks on the persisting importance of the positivist jurisprudential project. (shrink)

I will argue that the rule of recognition, as it has been conceived by Hart, is either a redundant, and hence mostly useless, concept, or a concept with limited explanatory potential —in either case, at best a concept whose scope is, in contemporary legal systems, much narrower than Hart envis- aged. I will also argue that the rule of recognition, in one of its possible (and plausible) reformulations, can nevertheless play a significant, non-redundant role, but only if employed in a (...) rather different way than the one proposed by Hart, as well as by much of post-Hartian positivist literatureResumen:En este artículo se argumenta que la regla de reconocimiento, tal como fuera concebida por Hart, es o bien un concepto redundante —y en consecuencia inútil— o un concepto limitado en su poder explicativo. En cualquier caso, se trata de un concepto cuyo alcance es, frente a los sistemas jurídicos contemporáneos, mucho más estrecho de lo que Hart pudo imaginar. De igual modo se argumenta que la regla de reconocimiento, en alguna de sus posibles (y plausibles) reformulaciones, puede tener a pesar de todo un papel significativo y no redundante, pero solamente si se emplea en un sentido radicalmente distinto al que propuso Hart o que se propone en buena parte de la literatura positivista posthartiana. (shrink)