The text, after an introduction on the arrangements conceived by Marcel Duchamp during the Thirties, focuses on the exhibitions organized by the Nouveau Réalisme between the end of the Fifties and the 1970. All these occasions, based on a chaos of the objects, created a positive confusion but allowed also a “visual revolution” in contemporary art.

Some naturalistic philosophers of mind subscribing to the predictive processing theory of mind have adopted a realist attitude towards the results of Bayesian cognitive science. In this paper, we argue that this realist attitude is unwarranted. The Bayesian research program in cognitive science does not possess special epistemic virtues over alternative approaches for explaining mental phenomena involving uncertainty. In particular, the Bayesian approach is not simpler, more unifying, or more rational than alternatives. It is also contentious that the Bayesian approach (...) is overall better supported by the empirical evidence. So, to develop philosophical theories of mind on the basis of a realist interpretation of results from Bayesian cognitive science is unwarranted. Naturalistic philosophers of mind should instead adopt an anti-realist attitude towards these results and remain agnostic as to whether Bayesian models are true. For continuing on with an exclusive focus and praise of Bayes within debates about the predictive processing theory will impede progress in philosophical understanding of scientific practice in computational cognitive science as well as of the architecture of the mind. (shrink)

A widely shared view in the cognitive sciences is that discovering and assessing explanations of cognitive phenomena whose production involves uncertainty should be done in a Bayesian framework. One assumption supporting this modelling choice is that Bayes provides the best approach for representing uncertainty. However, it is unclear that Bayes possesses special epistemic virtues over alternative modelling frameworks, since a systematic comparison has yet to be attempted. Currently, it is then premature to assert that cognitive phenomena involving uncertainty are best (...) explained within the Bayesian framework. As a forewarning, progress in cognitive science may be hindered if too many scientists continue to focus their efforts on Bayesian modelling, which risks to monopolize scientific resources that may be better allocated to alternative approaches. (shrink)

According to a growing trend in theoretical neuroscience, the human perceptual system is akin to a Bayesian machine. The aim of this article is to clearly articulate the claims that perception can be considered Bayesian inference and that the brain can be considered a Bayesian machine, some of the epistemological challenges to these claims; and some of the implications of these claims. We address two questions: (i) How are Bayesian models used in theoretical neuroscience? (ii) From the use of Bayesian (...) models in theoretical neuroscience, have we learned or can we hope to learn that perception is Bayesian inference or that the brain is a Bayesian machine? From actual practice in theoretical neuroscience, we argue for three claims. First, currently Bayesian models do not provide mechanistic explanations; instead they are useful devices for predicting and systematizing observational statements about people's performances in a variety of perceptual tasks. That is, currently we should have an instrumentalist attitude towards Bayesian models in neuroscience. Second, the inference typically drawn from Bayesian behavioural performance in a variety of perceptual tasks to underlying Bayesian mechanisms should be understood within the three-level framework laid out by David Marr ( [1982] ). Third, we can hope to learn that perception is Bayesian inference or that the brain is a Bayesian machine to the extent that Bayesian models will prove successful in yielding secure and informative predictions of both subjects' perceptual performance and features of the underlying neural mechanisms. (shrink)

Can facts about subpersonal states and events be constitutively relevant to personal-level phenomena? And can knowledge of these facts inform explanations of personal-level phenomena? Some philosophers, like Jennifer Hornsby and John McDowell, argue for two negative answers whereby questions about persons and their behavior cannot be answered by using information from subpersonal psychology. Knowledge of subpersonal states and events cannot inform personal-level explanation such that they cast light on what constitutes persons? behaviors. In this paper I argue against this position. (...) After having distinguished between enabling and constitutive relevance, I defend the claim that at least some facts about subpersonal states and events are constitutively relevant to some personal-level phenomenon, and therefore can, and sometimes should, inform personal-level explanations. I draw some of the possible consequences of my claim for our understanding of personal-level behavior by focusing on the phenomenon of addiction. (shrink)

The rise of Bayesianism in cognitive science promises to shape the debate between nativists and empiricists into more productive forms—or so have claimed several philosophers and cognitive scientists. The present paper explicates this claim, distinguishing different ways of understanding it. After clarifying what is at stake in the controversy between nativists and empiricists, and what is involved in current Bayesian cognitive science, the paper argues that Bayesianism offers not a vindication of either nativism or empiricism, but one way to talk (...) precisely and transparently about the kinds of mechanisms and representations underlying the acquisition of psychological traits without a commitment to an innate language of thought. (shrink)

The rise of Bayesianism in cognitive science promises to shape the debate between nativists and empiricists into more productive forms—or so have claimed several philosophers and cognitive scientists. The present paper explicates this claim, distinguishing different ways of understanding it. After clarifying what is at stake in the controversy between nativists and empiricists, and what is involved in current Bayesian cognitive science, the paper argues that Bayesianism offers not a vindication of either nativism or empiricism, but one way to talk (...) precisely and transparently about the kinds of mechanisms and representations underlying the acquisition of psychological traits without a commitment to an innate language of thought. (shrink)

Can facts about subpersonal states and events be constitutively relevant to personal-level phenomena? And can knowledge of these facts inform explanations of personal-level phenomena? Some philosophers, like Jennifer Hornsby and John McDowell, argue for two negative answers whereby questions about persons and their behavior cannot be answered by using information from subpersonal psychology. Knowledge of subpersonal states and events cannot inform personal-level explanation such that they cast light on what constitutes persons’ behaviors. In this paper I argue against this position. (...) After having distinguished between enabling and constitutive relevance, I defend the claim that at least some facts about subpersonal states and events are constitutively relevant to some personal-level phenomenon, and therefore can, and sometimes should, inform personal-level explanations. I draw some of the possible consequences of my claim for our understanding of personal-level behavior by focusing on the phenomenon of addiction. (shrink)

Bayesian cognitive science is a research programme that relies on modelling resources from Bayesian statistics for studying and understanding mind, brain, and behaviour. Conceiving of mental capacities as computing solutions to inductive problems, Bayesian cognitive scientists develop probabilistic models of mental capacities and evaluate their adequacy based on behavioural and neural data generated by humans (or other cognitive agents) performing a pertinent task. The overarching goal is to identify the mathematical principles, algorithmic procedures, and causal mechanisms that enable cognitive agents (...) to take uncertainty into account and weigh it appropriately in producing adaptive behaviour. -/- The appeal of Bayesian cognitive science derives from its transparency, normativity, and unifying power. Resources from Bayesian statistics allow cognitive scientists to characterise transparently, in terms of random variables and probabilistic dependencies between them, the inductive problems that many mental capacities are presumed to solve. Given this characterisation, researchers can define an upper bound on one’s performance on that problem and use it as a benchmark for interpreting experimental results, formulating hypotheses about why and when deviations from optimal performance should be expected, and seeking explanations of mental capacities within one encompassing theoretical framework. -/- Although critics question the testability, explanatory power, and plausibility of Bayesian models of mental capacities, Bayesian cognitive science has proved itself to be an incredibly fruitful research programme. Fuelled by empirical and theoretical results from psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, computer science, artificial intelligence, and evolution, Bayesian cognitive science has: advanced our understanding of why cognitive systems should keep track of uncertainty and use it to facilitate adaptive behaviour; clarified how the brain might encode information about the uncertainty of its stimuli and perform computations with probability distributions; and crystallised the insight that cognitive agents’ management of uncertainty might be grounded in predictive processes aimed at avoiding surprising exchanges with the environment. (shrink)

According to a growing body of studies, people’s ability to forecast future emotional experiences is generally biased. Nonetheless, the existing literature has mainly explored affective forecasting in relation to specific events, whereas little is still known about the ability to make general estimations of future emotional states. Based on existing evidence suggesting future-oriented disposition as a key factor for mental health, the aims of the current study were (1) to investigate the relationship between negative (NA) and positive (PA) affective forecasting (...) biases and perceived psychological well-being, and (2) to explore whether positively biased predictions are associated with resilience and foster one’s skills to cope with stressful events. To do so, we asked 85 undergraduate students to forecast PA and NA over two weeks, as well as to report their daily affect through a web-based Ecological Momentary Assessment. According to the results, positively biased PA forecasting (i.e., overestimating positive emotional states) was associated with greater perceived psychological well-being and higher resilience. When high levels of stress were experienced, participants holding an optimistic, yet biased, estimation of future PA were more likely to successfully manage stressors, thus maintaining lower levels of NA and higher levels of positive emotions. We suggest that positively biased PA forecasting is an adaptive cognitive distortion that boosts people’s resilience and mental health, thus opening new avenues for the promotion of psychological well-being. (shrink)

BackgroundInformed consent forms for clinical research are several and variable at international, national and local levels. According to the literature, they are often unclear and poorly understood by participants. Within the H2020 project CORBEL—Coordinated Research Infrastructures Building Enduring Life-science Services—clinical researchers, researchers in ethical, social, and legal issues, experts in planning and management of clinical studies, clinicians, researchers in citizen involvement and public engagement worked together to provide a minimum set of requirements for informed consent in clinical studies.MethodsThe template was (...) based on a literature review including systematic reviews and guidelines searched on PubMed, Embase, Cochrane Library, NICE, SIGN, GIN, and Clearinghouse databases, and on comparison of templates gathered through an extensive search on the websites of research institutes, national and international agencies, and international initiatives. We discussed the draft versions step-by-step and then we referred to it as the “matrix” to underline its modular character and indicate that it allows adaptation to the context in which it will be used. The matrix was revised by representatives of two international patient groups.ResultsThe matrix covers the process of ensuring that the appropriate information, context and setting are provided so that the participant can give truly informed consent. It addresses the key topics and proposes wording on how to clarify the meaning of placebo and of non-inferiority studies, the importance of individual participants’ data sharing, and the impossibility of knowing in advance how the data might be used in future studies. Finally, it presents general suggestions on wording, format, and length of the information sheet.ConclusionsThe matrix underlines the importance of improving the process of communication, its proper conditions (space, time, setting), and addresses the participants’ lack of knowledge on how clinical research is conducted. It can be easily applied to a specific setting and could be a useful tool to identify the appropriate informed consent format for any study. The matrix is mainly intended to support multicentre interventional randomized clinical studies, but several suggestions also apply to non-interventional research. (shrink)

For millennia it has been discussed whether literature appropriately can or should be used in education for a moral purpose. Taking as a premise that it can actually be educative and not merely moralising, we tackle the case made against such use, based on the claim that it would be perverting the aesthetic nature of literature as a form of art, as it would be instrumentalised. Given that this claim is based on a dichotomy between an aesthetically educative approach and (...) a morally educative approach to literature, we examine how warranted such a formulation of this dichotomy is. We argue that, at least on some occasions, those two educative approaches to literature—the aesthetic and the moral—can actually be mutually reinforcing in such a way that aesthetic appreciation will suffer if the moral is not deeply examined with both mind and heart, and vice versa. This does not mean, however, that this relation of mutual contribution will always obtain in a neat way. It may actually be the case that just in a few cases, and only if carried out in a pedagogically appropriate manner, it will be correct to use literature with a morally educative purpose. (shrink)

How does other people’s opinion affect judgments of norm transgressions? In our study, we used a modification of the famous Asch paradigm to examine conformity in the moral domain. The question we addressed was how peer group opinion alters normative judgments of scenarios involving violations of moral, social, and decency norms. The results indicate that even moral norms are subject to conformity, especially in situations with a high degree of social presence. Interestingly, the degree of conformity can distinguish between different (...) types of norms. (shrink)

We review evidence for Macphail’s (1982, 1985, 1987) Null Hypothesis, that nonhumans animals do not differ either qualitatively or quantitatively in their cognitive capacities. Our review supports the Null Hypothesis in so much as there are no qualitative differences among nonhuman vertebrate animals, and any observed differences along the qualitative dimension can be attributed to failures to account for contextual variables. We argue species do differ quantitatively, however, and that the main difference in “intelligence” among animals lies in the degree (...) to which one must account for contextual variables. (shrink)

Tanto Michel Foucault como Michel Henry han dedicado una parte importante de sus investigaciones a estudiar el enfoque cristiano de la carne. Sin embargo, sus perspectivas filosóficas son netamente diversas, aunque ambas tienen puntos de contacto significativos, en particular respecto de la crítica y de la alternativa a la fenomenología que los dos proponen. ¿En qué medida el paralelo y el contraste entre sus investigaciones sobre la carne permiten obtener una nueva perspectiva sobre la crítica que ambos realizan al enfoque (...) fenomenológico de la subjetividad? ¿Y de qué manera el “diálogo” entre ambos pone en evidencia el problema de la libertad, que constituye un tema clave en la reflexión que los dos filósofos realizan sobre la carne? Respondiendo estas preguntas, el artículo pone en relieve las paradojas que suscitan los enfoques de la carne propuestos por Foucault y Henry respecto del tema de la acción, entendido como puesta en práctica de la libertad del sujeto, subrayando así su importancia como tema clave en el campo de la filosofía contemporánea. (shrink)

Los cuidados paliativos son una forma de atención integral del paciente, considerando su carácter antropológico y ontológico, como un ser biopsicosocioespiritual, en donde la muerte y el sufrimiento son características que lo definen y lo separan de otra especie. Los principios bioéticos nos dan una aproximación para entender el porqué es importante atender al paciente desde todos los ámbitos, más allá de la intención curativa. Nos permite visualizar la verdadera meta de los cuidados paliativos.

Where does a probabilistic language-of-thought (PLoT) come from? How can we learn new concepts based on probabilistic inferences operating on a PLoT? Here, I explore these questions, sketching a traditional circularity objection to LoT and canvassing various approaches to addressing it. I conclude that PLoT-based cognitive architectures can support genuine concept learning; but, currently, it is unclear that they enjoy more explanatory breadth in relation to concept learning than alternative architectures that do not posit any LoT.

In this paper, I examine Reinforcement Learning modelling practice in psychiatry, in the context of alcohol use disorders. I argue that the epistemic roles RL currently plays in the development of psychiatric classification and search for explanations of clinically relevant phenomena are best appreciated in terms of Chang’s account of epistemic iteration, and by distinguishing mechanistic and aetiological modes of computational explanation.

En el trabajo se propone difundir la teoría y los enfoques referidos a la ciencia de la sostenibilidad, con especial énfasis en el contexto académico cubano, al relacionar su emergencia a las urgencias que surgen en los vínculos entre la ciencia, la naturaleza y la sociedad, así como mostrar las articulaciones de la Ciencia de la Sostenibilidad con la política científica, la educación universitaria y la salud pública. In this paper, the theory and the approaches of the science of sustainability (...) is promoted. Special emphasis is put on the academic Cuban context, when relating its emergence to the urgencies that appear within the links among science, nature and society. The interconnections of the science of sustainability with the scientific policy, the university education and the public health is shown as well as. (shrink)

Partiendo de una serie de casos-ejemplo de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires de los últimos 30 años, nos proponemos mostrar que, de manera dominante, el reconocimiento público de la legitimidad y necesidad de una “puesta en valor” o de una “reactivación patrimonial” no depende tanto del valor que pueda otorgarse a un edificio, a una zona o a una institución, en función de alguna de sus cualidades intrínsecas, sino que radica en la eficacia que esa patrimonialización posea en la construcción (...) de una imagen de lugar o de barrio “atractivo”, “auténtico”, y en la intensificación de la ampliación de circuitos de consumos turísticos, culturales e inmobiliarios. El objetivo del trabajo es mostrar cómo este reconocimiento y esta duración de la atribución de valor patrimonial se sustentan en el hecho de que la puesta de relieve de esos rasgos de autenticidad e identidad logre entramarse con procesos más amplios de recualificación del área en que se emplazan. Como veremos, en algunos casos, los procesos de patrimonialización operan como punta de lanza de dichas recualificaciones; en otros, como refuerzos. Para ello se presentan algunos casos de lugares, áreas y prácticas que resultaron “exitosos” en los términos planteados, es decir, que fueron públicamente reconocidos como “patrimonio” aun independientemente de sus cualidades históricas o culturales y que lograron durar en el tiempo de la mano de su propia revalorización económica o de su impacto simbólico sobre el área circundante. A modo de contraejemplo, luego se presentan otros casos que, a pesar de poseer algunas características que los harían susceptibles de ser reconocidos públicamente como “patrimonio” (antigüedad, reconocimiento comunitario de su carácter significativo, entre otros), fueron invisibilizados, destruidos o transformados sin apelar a su condición patrimonial, en el marco de otras dinámicas o temporalidades de recualificación urbana. (shrink)

The issue of whether the writings of Thomas Aquinas show internal contradictions has not only stirred readers from his earliest, often critical, reception, but also led to the emergence of a literary genre that has crucial relevance to the history of medieval Thomism. Concordances were drawn up which listed Thomas' contradictory statements and, in most cases, tried to disguise the appearance of contradiction by exegesis. But what was at stake in this interpretive endeavor? What role did the concordances play in (...) shaping Thomism? What tensions did they reveal in the works of Thomas? The book aims to investigate these questions and puts the concordance of Peter of Bergamo (1482), which represents the most important example of this type of text, at the center of the investigation. Contributors are Marieke Abram, Kent Emery, Jr., Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, Isabel Iribarren, Thomas Jeschke, Catherine König-Pralong, Mario Meliadò, Silvia Negri, Zornitsa Radeva, and Peter Walter. (shrink)

Medical decision-making on behalf of intellectually and developmentally disabled (IDD) patients amounts to a critical challenge, one which has been widely discussed by bioethicists, medical, and le...

Drug misuse is a complex social and health problem. People who use drugs have very specific profiles according to their life cycle and sociocultural circumstances. For this reason, contextualized approaches are needed in addiction interventions that take on board the particularities of consumption patterns and their circumstances. The storytelling technique as a narrative communication strategy can serve as the main methodological intervention component that enhances this contextualized approach.

En este artículo se problematiza la relación entre espacio, tiempo y memoria, a partir de la puesta en diálogo de los desarrollos teóricos en torno al espacio relacional que ha realizado David Harvey y los estudios sobre rememoración de Walter Benjamin. Se tomará la obra de teatro de Juan Mayorga: _El cartógrafo. Varsovia, 1:400.000 _como disparadora de estas problemáticas.

Aboitiz et al. suggest that the mammalian isocortex is derived from the dorsal cortex of reptiles and birds, and that there has been a major divergence in the connectivity patterns (and hence function) of the mammalian and reptilian/avian hippocampus. There is considerable evidence to suggest, however, that the avian hippocampus serves the exact same function as the mammalian hippocampus.

Bryce Huebner’s Macrocognition is a book with a double mission. The first and main mission is “to show that there are cases of collective mentality in our world” . Cases of collective mentality are cases where groups, teams, mobs, firms, colonies or some other collectivities possess cognitive capacities or mental states in the same sense that we individually do. To accomplish this mission, Huebner develops an account of macrocognition, where “the term ‘macrocognition’ is intended as shorthand for the claim that (...) system-level cognition is implemented by an integrated network of specialized computational mechanisms” .The second mission of Huebner’s book is to elaborate an account of cognitive architecture that could set the groundwork for identifying under what conditions groups, and individuals indeed, are fruitfully and justifiably said to be minded. To this end, Huebner tackles several foundational issues in cognitive science, including traditional philosophical questions a .. (shrink)