The interaction interpretation of special relativity theory (elaborated in Part I) is discussed in relation to quantum theory. The relativistic transformations (Lorentz processes) of physical variables, on the interaction interpretation, are observation-interaction dependent, just as are the physical values (eigenvalues) of systems described by quantum-theoretic state functions; a common, basic structure of the special relativity and quantum theories can therefore be presented. The constancy of the light speed is shown to follow from interaction-transformations of (...) frequency and wavelength variables. A parallelism is suggested between, on the one hand, the Lorentz-Clausius distinction for relativistic transformations, and, on the other, the distinction between observation-dependent and observation-independent natural processes. The empirical study of rates of macroscopic clocks can provide a critical test of the interaction interpretation and of a possible extension to gravitational time changes; the role of time as prior determinant of natural process is at issue. The Hafele-Keating observations are of general relativity effects on clocks in accelerated motion. (shrink)

In the established space-time coordinate-transformation (STCT) interpretation of special relativity theory, relativistic changes are consequent upon the Lorentz transformation of coordinate clocks and rods between relatively moving systems. In the proposed alternative interpretation, relativistic changes occur only in association with physical interactions, and are direct alterations in the variables of the observed system. Since space-time and momentum-energy are conjugate four-vectors, transformation of a space or time variable of a system is to be expected only if there is (...) a concomitant transformation of the corresponding momentum or energy variable. The Lorentz invariance of the scalar entropy functionS supports the interaction interpretation; timet=f(S) of a macroscopic, entropy clock should give a Lorentz-invariant time measure, and an illustrative entropy clock is discussed. Noninteracting physical processes may be called Clausius processes, in contrast to Lorentz processes for which there is interaction and associated Lorentz transformation. Changes of energy and frequency, withE=hv, are instances of the parallel relativistic transformations. Likewise, the variation with velocity in decay time of mesons follows directly from the relativistic energy transformation of decay products; this relationship is shown for muons by a simple calculation with β-decay theory. (shrink)

It will be shown that, in comparison with the pre-relativistic Galileo-invariant conceptions, special relativity tells us nothing new about the geometry of spacetime. It simply calls something else "spacetime", and this something else has different properties. All statements of special relativity about those features of reality that correspond to the original meaning of the terms "space" and "time" are identical with the corresponding traditional pre-relativistic statements. It will be also argued that special relativity and (...) Lorentz theory are completely identical in both senses, as theories about spacetime and as theories about the behavior of moving physical objects. (shrink)

Neither special nor general relativity make any use of a notion of absolute simultaneity. Since A-Theories about time do make use of such a notion, it is natural to suspect that relativity and A-Theory are inconsistent. Many authors have argued that they are in fact not inconsistent, and I agree with that diagnosis here. But that doesn’t mean, as these authors seem to think, that A-Theory and relativity are happy bedfellows. I argue that (...) class='Hi'>relativity gives us good reason to reject the A-Theory, even though strict inconsistency isn’t that reason. (shrink)

Summary The present paper constitutes an elaboration of a previous work by one of us which, among other things, proposed some modifications of Popper's tetradic schema. Here, in the first part, we consider critically and develop further these modifications and elaborate on methods which prove more satisfactory for the mapping of the problem solving processes in Physics. We also find the opportunity to make some comments on Physics and on its relation to Mathematics. In the second part, there is an (...) attempt to test the above ideas on the genesis and development of the Special Relativity Theory. In doing this, we concentrate mainly on Einstein's 1905 paper and try to explicitate its relation with the situation Physics found itself in that period as well as to clarify the epistemological status of Einstein's two postulates. (shrink)

To comprehend the special relativity genesis, one should unfold Einstein’s activities in quantum theory first . His victory upon Lorentz’s approach can only be understood in the wider context of a general programme of unification of classical mechanics and classical electrodynamics, with relativity and quantum theory being merely its subprogrammes. Because of the lack of quantum facets in Lorentz’s theory, Einstein’s programme, which seems to surpass the Lorentz’s one, was widely accepted as soon as (...) quantum theory became a recognized part of physics. A new approach to special relativity genesis enables to broaden the bothering “Trinity” group of its creators to include Gilbert N. Lewis. Notwithstanding that the links necessarily existing between all the 1905 papers were obscured by Einstein himself due to the reasons discussed below, Lewis revealed from the very beginning the connections between special relativity and quasi-corpuscular theory of light, as he punctuated: “The consequences which one of us obtained from a simple assumption as to the mass of a beam of light, and the fundamental conservation of mass, energy and momentum, Einstein has derived from the principle of relativity and the electromagnetic theory” (Lewis G.N.& Tolman R.C. “The Principle of Relativity and Non-Newtonian Mechanics”, Philosophical Magazine, 1908). (shrink)

This white paper aims to identify an open problem in 'Quantum Physics and the Nature of Reality' -namely whether quantum theory and special relativity are formally compatible-, to indicate what the underlying issues are, and put forward ideas about how the problem might be addressed.

In this paper I expound an argument which seems to establish that probabilism and special relativity are incompatible. I examine the argument critically, and consider its implications for interpretative problems of quantum theory, and for theoretical physics as a whole.

Special relativity is based on the apparent contradiction between two postulates, namely, Galilean vs. c-invariance. We show that anomalies ensue by holding the former postulate alone. In order for Galilean invariance to be consistent, it must hold not only for bodies’ motions, but also for the signals and forces they exchange. If the latter ones do not obey the Galilean version of the Velocities Addition Law, invariance is violated. If, however, they do, causal anomalies, information loss and conservation (...) laws’ violations are bound to occur. These anomalies are largely remedied by introducing waves and fields that disobey Galilean invariance. Therefore, from these inconsistencies within classical mechanics, electromagnetism could be predicted before experiment proved its existence. Special relativity, it might be argued, would then follow naturally, either as a resolution of the resulting conflict or as an extrapolation of the path between the theories. We conclude with a review of earlier attempts to base SR on a single postulate, and point out the originality of the present work. (shrink)

Endurantism is not inconsistent with the theory of special relativity, or so I shall argue. Endurantism is not committed to presentism, and thus not committed to a metaphysics that is at least prima facie inconsistent with special relativity. Nor is special relativity inconsistent with the idea that objects are wholly present at a time just if all of their parts co-exist at that time. For the endurantist notion of co-existence in terms of which (...) “wholly present” is defined, is not, I will argue, a notion according to which co-existence is transitive. Although an absence of absolute simultaneity presents some problems for the endurantist claim that objects are wholly present whenever they exist, there are a number of ways that the endurantist can respond to this difficulty. Thus, I conclude, considerations pertaining to the theory of special relativity certainly do not rule out endurantism as a metaphysics of persistence. (shrink)

Are special relativity and probabilism compatible? Dieks argues that they are. But the possible universe he specifies, designed to exemplify both probabilism and special relativity, either incorporates a universal "now" (and is thus incompatible with special relativity), or amounts to a many world universe (which I have discussed, and rejected as too ad hoc to be taken seriously), or fails to have any one definite overall Minkowskian-type space-time structure (and thus differs drastically from (...) class='Hi'>special relativity as ordinarily understood). Probabilism and special relativity appear to be incompatible after all. What is at issue is not whether "the flow of time" can be reconciled with special relativity, but rather whether explicitly probabilistic versions of quantum theory should be rejected because of incompatibility with special relativity. (shrink)

This book gives an excellent introduction to the theory of special relativity. Professor Resnick presents a fundamental and unified development of the subject with unusually clear discussions of the aspects that usually trouble beginners. He includes, for example, a section on the common sense of relativity. His presentation is lively and interspersed with historical, philosophical and special topics (such as the twin paradox) that will arouse and hold the reader's interest. You'll find many unique features (...) that help you grasp the material, such as worked-out examples,summary tables,thought questions and a wealth of excellent problems. The emphasis throughout the book is physical. The experimental background, experimental confirmation of predictions, and the physical interpretation of principles are stressed. The book treats relativistic kinematics, relativistic dynamics, and relativity and electromagnetism and contains special appendices on the geometric representation of space-time and on general relativity. Its organization permits an instructor to vary the length and depth of his treatment and to use the book either with or following classical physics. These features make it an ideal companion for introductory courses. (shrink)

In a comparison of the principles of special relativity and of quantum mechanics, the former theory is marked by its relative economy and apparent explanatory simplicity. A number of theorists have thus been led to search for a small number of postulates - essentially information theoretic in nature - that would play the role in quantum mechanics that the relativity principle and the light postulate jointly play in Einstein's 1905 special relativity theory. The (...) purpose of the present paper is to resist this idea, at least in so far as it is supposed to reveal the fundamental form of the theory. It is argued that the methodology of Einstein's 1905 theory represents a victory of pragmatism over explanatory depth; and that its adoption only made sense in the context of the chaotic state state of physics at the start of the 20th century - as Einstein well knew. (shrink)

Within Special Relativity accelerated systems can be described as those systems in which standard clock synchronism does not hold. Therefore, the ε -generalized Lorentz equations derived by Winnie are the equations governing accelerated systems. The ε -generalized equation for time is used in analyzing two cases of the clock paradox: (1) the case in which a clock travels in a straight line, stops, and returns, and (2) the case in which a clock travels with uniform velocity in a (...) circular path. The treatment of case (1) of the paradox within this generalization of the Special Theory is compared with Møller's treatment of it within the General Theory. (shrink)

Withdrawn by the author! The main content of this paper has been moved into "Szabó, László E., Does special relativity theory tell us anything new about space and time? (ID Code:1321)".

In recent work, David Chalmers argues that “Edenic shapes”—roughly, the shape properties phenomenally presented in spatial experience—are not instantiated in our world. His reasons come largely from the theory of Special Relativity. Although Edenic shapes might have been instantiated in a classical Newtonian world, he maintains that they could not be instantiated in a relativistic world like our own. In this essay, I defend realism about Edenic shape, the thesis that Edenic shapes are instantiated in our world, (...) against Chalmers’s challenge from Special Relativity. I begin by clarifying the notion of an Edenic shape by reference to Chalmers’s notion of the “Edenic” content of perceptual experience. I then reconstruct Chalmers’s argument that Edenic shapes could not be instantiated in a relativistic world. His reasoning proceeds from two assumptions. The first is that the only shape properties instantiated in a relativistic world are those which somehow involve relations to frames of reference. This is thought to follow from the phenomenon of Lorentz contraction, a consequence of Special Relativity. The second assumption is that Edenic shapes do not involve relations to frames of reference. One reason to accept the second assumption is that it seems that Edenic shapes could be instantiated in a classical Newtonian world, where the notion of a frame-relative shape has no meaningful application. I then proceed to defend RES against Chalmers’s argument by arguing that Special Relativity, properly understood, provides no support for Chalmers’s first assumption. More generally, I argue, by way of a careful analysis of the geometric structure of Minkowski space–time and Galilean space–time Newtonian physics), that Edenic shapes are no less at home in a relativistic world than in a classical Newtonian world. (shrink)

Are probabilism and special relativity compatible? Dieks argues that they are. But the possible universe he specifies, designed to exemplify both probabilism and special relativity, either incorporates a universal “now”, or amounts to a many world universe, or fails to have any one definite overall Minkowskian-type space-time structure. Probabilism and special relativity appear to be incompatible after all. What is at issue is not whether “the flow of time” can be reconciled with special (...) relativity, but rather whether explicitly probabilistic versions of quantum theory should be rejected because of incompatibility with special relativity. (shrink)

We present a streamlined axiom system of special relativity in first-order logic. From this axiom system we "derive" an axiom system of general relativity in two natural steps. We will also see how the axioms of special relativity transform into those of general relativity. This way we hope to make general relativity more accessible for the non-specialist.

To make out in what way Einstein’s 1905 ‘annus mirabilis’ writings hang together one has to hang on Einstein’s strive for unity evinced in his stubborn attempts to coordinate with one another the basic research traditions of classical physics. Light quanta hypothesis and special theory of relativity turn out to be mere milestones of maxwellian electrodynamics and statistical thermodynamics reconciliation programme. The conception of luminiferous ether was an insurmountable stumbling block for Einstein’s statistical thermodynamics programme in which (...) the leading role was played by the light quanta paper . (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the case of Einstein׳s special relativity vs. Hendrik Lorentz׳s ether theory can be decided in terms of empirical evidence, in spite of the predictive equivalence between the theories. In the historical and philosophical literature this case has been typically addressed focusing on non-empirical features. I claim that non-empirical features are not enough to provide a fully objective and uniquely determined choice in instances of empirical equivalence. However, I argue that if we (...) consider arguments proposed by Richard Boyd, and by Larry Laudan and Jarret Leplin, a choice based on non-entailed empirical evidence favoring Einstein׳s theory can be made. (shrink)

B- theorists frequently argue that the A- theoretic views are incompatible with the Special Theory of Relativity (STR) and that this is a problem for the A- theoretic views. however, the B- theory needs to be revised in light of implications of STR. in particular, it follows from STR that some events stand in genuine temporal relations to each other while others do not. Consequently, there isn’t a single temporal order of all events. instead, there are (...) multiple B- series. Some B- theorists defend a view of the passage of time according to which passage is simply temporal succession. This paper argues that, in Minkowski spacetime, time passes in each of the multiple B- series, but there is no passage spanning across all events because some events stand in no genuine temporal relations to each other. (shrink)

It has been repeatedly argued, most recently by Nicholas Maxwell, that the special theory of relativity is incompatible with the view that the future is in some degree undetermined; and Maxwell contends that this is a reason to reject that theory. In the present paper, an analysis is offered of the notion of indeterminateness (or "becoming") that is uniquely appropriate to the special theory of relativity, in the light of a set of natural (...) conditions upon such a notion; and reasons are given for regarding this conception as (not just formally consistent with relativity theory, but also) philosophically reasonable. The bearings upon Maxwell's program for quantum theory are briefly considered. (shrink)

A recent paper suggested that if Galilean covariance was extended to signals and interactions, the resulting theory would contain such anomalies as would have impelled physicists towards special relativity even without empirical prompts. I analyze this claim. Some so-called anomalies turn out to be errors. Others have classical analogs, which suggests that classical physicists would not have viewed them as anomalous. Still others, finally, remain intact in special relativity, so that they serve as no impetus (...) towards this theory. I conclude that Galilean covariance is insufficient to derive special relativity. (shrink)

The first completely geometric approach to relativity theory, based on the space-time geometries of Loedel and Brehme.

The two-component spinor theory of van der Waerden is put into a convenient matrix notation. The mathematical relations among various types of matrices and the rule for forming covariant expressions are developed. Relativistic equations of classical mechanics and electricity and magnetism are expressed in this notation. In this formulation the distinction between time and space coordinates in the four-dimensional space-time continuum falls out naturally from the assumption that a four-vector is represented by a Hermitian matrix. The indefinite metric of (...) tensor analysis is a derived result rather than an arbitrary ad hoc assumption. The relation to four-component spinor theory is also discussed. (shrink)

N. Maxwell (1985) has claimed that special relativity and "probabilism" are incompatible; "probabilism" he defines as the doctrine that "the universe is such that, at any instant, there is only one past but many alternative possible futures". Thus defined, the doctrine is evidently prerelativistic as it depends on the notion of a universal instant of the universe. In this note I show, however, that there is a straightforward relativistic generalization, and that therefore Maxwell's conclusion that the special (...) theory of relativity should be amended is unwarranted. I leave open the question whether or not probabilism (or the related doctrine of the flow of time) is true, but argue that the special theory of relativity has no fundamental significance for this question. (shrink)

It is widely believed that the principal difference between Einstein's special relativity and its contemporary rival Lorentz-type theories was that while the Lorentz-type theories were also capable of “explaining away” the null result of the Michelson-Morley experiment and other experimental findings by means of the distortions of moving measuring-rods and moving clocks, special relativity revealed more fundamental new facts about the geometry of space-time behind these phenomena. I shall argue that special relativity tells us (...) nothing new about the geometry of space-time, in comparison with the pre-relativistic Galileo-invariant conceptions; it simply calls something else "space-time", and this something else has different properties. All statements of special relativity about those features of reality that correspond to the original meaning of the terms "space" and "time" are identical with the corresponding traditional pre-relativistic statements. It will be also argued that special relativity and Lorentz theory are completely identical in both senses, as theories about space-time and as theories about the behavior of moving physical objects. (shrink)

Recently we presented a new special relativity theory for cosmology in which it was assumed that gravitation can be neglected and thus the bubble constant can be taken as a constant. The theory was presented in a six-dimensional hvperspace. three for the ordinary space and three for the velocities. In this paper we reduce our hyperspace to four dimensions by assuming that the three-dimensional space expands only radially, thus one is left with the three dimensions of (...) ordinary space and one dimension of the radial velocity. (shrink)

The Special Theory of Relativity and the Theory of the Electron have had an interesting history together. Originally the electron was studied in a non-relativistic context and this opened up the interesting possibility that lead to the conclusion that the mass of the electron could be thought of entirely in electromagnetic terms without introducing inertial considerations. However the application of Special Relativity lead to several problems, both for an extended electron and the point electron. (...) These inconsistencies have, contrary to popular belief not been resolved satisfactorily to date, even within the context of Quantum Theory. Thus they are not merely of historical interest. Nevertheless these and subsequent studies bring out the interesting result that Special Relativity (and the theory of the electron) breaks down within the Compton scale or when the Compton scale is not neglected. This again runs contrary to an uncritical notion that Special Relativity is valid for point particles. Furthermore, it is pointed out that experiments have been recently suggested to test these ideas. These considerations lead to a characterization of the Planck constant in classical terms. (shrink)

It is shown that the combination of unitary quantum theory and special relativity may lead to a contradiction when considering the EPR correlations in different inertial frames in a Gedankenexperiment. This result seems to imply that either unitary quantum theory is wrong or if unitary quantum theory is right then there must exist a preferred Lorentz frame.

The axiomatic bases of Special Relativity Theory (SRT) are thoroughly re-examined from an operational point of view, with particular emphasis on the status of Einstein synchronization in the light of the possibility of arbitrary synchronization procedures in inertial reference frames. Once correctly and explicitly phrased, the principles of SRT allow for a wide range of “theories” that differ from the standard SRT only for the difference in the chosen synchronization procedures, but are wholly equivalent to SRT in (...) predicting empirical facts. This results in the introduction, in the full background of SRT, of a suitable synchronization gauge. A complete hierarchy of synchronization gauges is introduced and elucidated, ranging from the useful Selleri synchronization gauge (which should lead, according to Selleri, to a multiplicity of theories alternative to SRT) to the more general Mansouri–Sexl synchronization gauge and, finally, to the even more general Anderson–Vetharaniam–Stedman’s synchronization gauge. It is showed that all these gauges do not challenge the SRT, as claimed by Selleri, but simply lead to a number of formalisms which leave the geometrical structure of Minkowski spacetime unchanged. Several aspects of fundamental and applied interest related to the conventional aspect of the synchronization choice are discussed, encompassing the issue of the one-way velocity of light in inertial and rotating reference frames, the global positioning system (GPS)’s working, and the recasting of Maxwell equations in generic synchronizations. Finally, it is showed how the gauge freedom introduced in SRT can be exploited in order to give a clear explanation of the Sagnac effect for counter-propagating matter beams. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend a theory of local temporality, sometimes referred to as a point-present theory. This theory has the great advantage that it allows for the possibility of an open future without requiring any alterations to our standard understanding of special relativity. Such theories, however, have regularly been rejected out of hand as metaphysically incoherent. After surveying the debate, I argue that such a transformation of temporal concepts (i) is suggested by the indexical (...) semantics of tense in a relativistic universe, (ii) when properly understood easily withstands the usual accusations of metaphysical incoherence and (iii) leads naturally to a meta-philosophical position from which we can understand and escape the increasing sterility of debates between radical Parmenideans and radical Heracliteans in the philosophy of time. (shrink)

Roy Wood Sellars (1880–1973) is often reduced to his role as father of Wilfrid Sellars. This is unfair because during the 1920s, ‘30s, and ‘40s, Roy Wood was one of the leading figures of the then prevailing American realist movement. In the present paper, I will focus on one particular facet of R. W. Sellars’ philosophical approach: his continual examination of Albert Einstein’s special theory of relativity. I shall primarily reconstruct his discussion of Einstein’s theory, as (...) it can be found in his seminal The Philosophy of Physical Realism (1932). In contrast to authors such as Bertrand Russell or Émile Meyerson, Sellars refused to interpret special relativity in a realist vein. In his view, it should be seen as an “ars mensurandi” and thus being interpreted purely operationally. As with Einstein himself, the concept of simultaneity was his paradigm case in point. However, Sellars opined that besides the physical (mensurational) concepts of time and simultaneity there also exists an ontological understanding of these notions. “Real” time and “absolute” simultaneity are, according to Sellars, the indispensable non-relativistic counterparts to Einstein’s respective relativistic conceptions. They are to be interpreted realistically since they prove, Sellars maintains, to be explanatory regarding events in Einstein-Minkowski’s world. In the course of the paper, I shall compare this view with the one defended by Henri Bergson. Furthermore, Sellars’ later approach from the 1940s and ‘50s will be briefly considered and critically discussed by confronting it with more recent attempts at ontologically ‘grounding’ special relativistic kinematics. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to show that the Elementary Process Theory (EPT) agrees with the knowledge of the physical world obtained from the successful predictions of Special Relativity (SR). For that matter, a recently developed method is applied: a categorical model of the EPT that incorporates SR is fully specified. Ultimate constituents of the universe of the EPT are modeled as point-particles, gamma-rays, or time-like strings, all represented by integrable hyperreal functions on Minkowski space. This (...) proves that the EPT agrees with SR. -/- Edit: this preprint differs significantly from the published chapter. (shrink)

Exponential mappings into an imaginary space or number field for the axioms of a theory, which are in the form of propositional constants and variables, make possible: (a) an understanding of the meaning and differences between the Lorentz transformation constants, such that their product is still equal to one, but the axioms at each end of the transformations are logically inverse and separately consistent; (b) an interpretation of the psi function phase factor which is part of the axiomE=hf; (c) (...) the unification of the quantum-mechanical psi function and the electromagnetic wave function. Thus, those statements whose mechanisms are unknown (the axioms of the theory) are to be assigned the axiom propositional number symbol ϑ and are to be associated with the complex probability eiϑ, which is a uniform factor of the energy equations expressing the physical state. Such probabilistic axiom functions can be associated with both the special theory of relativity and the quantum-electromagnetic theory. (shrink)

The Reichenbach-Grunbaum thesis of the conventionality of simultaneity is clarified and defended by developing the consequences of the Special Theory when assumptions are not made concerning the one-way speed of light. It is first shown that the conventionality of simultaneity leads immediately to the conventionality of all relative speeds. From this result, the general-length-contraction and time-dilation relations are then derived. Next, the place of time-dilation and length-contraction effects within the Special Theory is examined in the light (...) of the conventionality thesis. The slow-transport method of synchrony is then examined in the light of these results and is shown not to provide an adequate method of uniquely determining the one-way speed of light. Finally, the general ε -Lorentz transformations for events along the x-axis are derived from three principles: the round-trip light principle, the principle of equal passage times, and the linearity principle. These principles are shown to be independent of one-way velocity assumptions, and thus may form the basis of a Special Theory of Relativity without simultaneity assumptions. (shrink)

Ernst Mach is the only person whom Einstein included on both the list of physicists he considered his true precursors, and the list of the philosophers who had most affected him. Einstein scholars have been less generous in their estimation of Mach's contributions to Einstein's work, and even amongst the more generous of them, Mach's great achievements in physics are seldom mentioned in this context. This is odd, considering Mach was nominated for the Nobel Prize in Physics three times. In (...) this paper, I examine some of Mach's work in physics that bears conceptually on Einstein's 1905 paper on Special Relativity ("On The Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies"). Mach was the first to give the correct explanation of the Doppler Effect, and he presented it in a way that Einstein echoes in his 1905 paper: laying out two apparently contradictory principles and showing how both can be retained. It is also notable that Mach's explanation was explicit about not relying on the existence of a medium of transmission for the propagation of light waves. In his work on supersonic shock waves, Mach invokes the constancy of the velocity of sound (i.e., its independence of the motion of the sound source) , just as he had invoked the constancy of the velocity of light in his work on the Doppler Effect for Light. I examine the analogies between light and sound that were drawn upon by Einstein and Mach, as well as one analogy that Einstein could have, but did not make: Cherenkov radiation, or "singing electrons", i.e., cases in which the sound of light in the medium of transmission is exceeded, which results in an optical analogue of supersonic shock waves. (shrink)

With the interaction interpretation, the Lorentz transformation of a system arises with selection from a superposition of its states in an observation-interaction. Integration of momentum states of a mass over all possible velocities gives the rest-mass energy. Static electrical and magnetic fields are not found to form such a superposition and are to be taken as irreducible elements. The external superposition consists of those states that are reached only by change of state of motion, whereas the internal superposition contains all (...) the states available to an observer in a single inertial coordinate system. The conjecture is advanced that states of superposition may only be those related by space-time transformations (Lorentz transformations plus space inversion and charge conjugation). The continuum of external and internal superpositions is examined for various masses, and an argument for the unity of the super-positions is presented. (shrink)

By deriving the Lorentz transformation from the absolute speed of light, Einstein demonstrated the relativistic variability of space and time, enabling him to explain length contraction and time dilation without recourse to a "luminiferous ether" or preferred frame of reference. He also showed that clocks synchronized at a distance via light signals are not synchronized in a frame of reference differing from that of the clocks. However, by mislabeling the relativity of synchrony the "relativity of simultaneity," Einstein implied (...) that this effect concerns an actual difference in times from one frame to another rather than merely a failure of clock synchronization across frames. As a theory of length contraction and time dilation on the basis of relative motion in the context of the absolute speed of light, special relativity is the definitive interpretation of the Lorentz transformation and the correct explanation of relativistic phenomena. The relativity of simultaneity, as I demonstrate, plays no role in this explanation but instead provides apparent justification for a view of time in which the present moment is frame-dependent. In contrast to its legitimate application, special relativity fails as a theory of time on the basis of the relativity of simultaneity. (shrink)

The Reichenbach-Grunbaum thesis of the conventionality of simultaneity is clarified and defended by developing the consequences of the Special Theory when assumptions are not made concerning the one-way speed of light. It is first shown that the conventionality of simultaneity leads immediately to the conventionality of all relative speeds. From this result, the general-length-contraction and time-dilation relations are then derived. Next, the place of time-dilation and length-contraction effects within the Special Theory is examined in the light (...) of the conventionality thesis. The slow-transport method of synchrony is then examined in the light of these results and is shown not to provide an adequate method of uniquely determining the one-way speed of light. Finally, the general ε -Lorentz transformations for events along the x-axis are derived from three principles: the round-trip light principle, the principle of equal passage times, and the linearity principle. These principles are shown to be independent of one-way velocity assumptions, and thus may form the basis of a Special Theory of Relativity without distant simultaneity assumptions. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Howard Stein makes a number of criticisms of an earlier paper of mine ('Are Probabilism and Special Relativity Incompatible?', Phil. Sci., 1985), which explored the question of whether the idea that the future is genuinely 'open' in a probabilistic universe is compatible with special relativity. I disagree with almost all of Stein's criticisms.

In 1905 Albert Einstein, in a paper entitled “On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies”, as a solution to the disagreement between classical mechanics and the results of the Michelson's experiment, who showed the invariance of the speed of light in vacuum measured in different inertial reference systems, developed the theory of special relativity. In this essay Einstein expounded a theory that, instead of introducing a privileged system, required the revision of the concepts of space and time (...) of classical physics. Combining the principle of Galilean relativity, according to which the laws of physics are invariant in all inertial reference systems, with the physics of electromagnetism, according to which the speed of light in a vacuum is constant, Einstein concluded that time is no more than a relative measure, namely that whenever we have to do with speed equal to or close to that of light, time is no longer a variable absolute and independent of the reference system adopted, but depends on the variable position. This is what Einstein shows through the critical examination of the concept of simultaneity. The abandonment of the traditional conception of space and time based on the idea of a spatial continuum flowing through a temporal continuum coherently leads to the assumption of a space-time continuum in which distances and time intervals vary with the changing the reference system, and together vary, of course, all other sizes to those connected. (shrink)