Neoliberal educational reforms include extensive use of standardized tests. We examine the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) initiated and developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Examining previous research on teachers’ reactions to neoliberal reforms altering their work context, we have identified three theoretical frameworks in use: labour process theory, derived from structural Marxism; post-structuralism, relying primarily on Foucault’s conceptualizations; and ‘new professionalism’, which has emerged from the theory of professions. A major weakness in these frameworks (...) is their inability to account for different reactions to the same structural and cultural conditions. Therefore, we suggest utilizing Archer’s theories of reflexivity and reflexive modes to understand these reactions. Presenting one Norwegian lower secondary school teacher’s reflexive engagement with PISA in the Norwegian school context as an example, our mixed methods case study indicates autonomous reflexivity as the prevailing mode. Meta-reflexivity rates second in prevalence. (shrink)

Experiences of absence are common in everyday life, but have received little philosophical attention until recently, when two positions regarding the nature of such experiences surfaced in the literature. According to the Perceptual View, experiences of absence are perceptual in nature. This is denied by the Surprise-Based View, according to which experiences of absence belong together with cases of surprise. In this paper, I show that there is a kind of experience of absence—which I call frustrating absences—that has been overlooked (...) by the Perceptual View and by the Surprise Based-View and that cannot be adequately explained by them. I offer an alternative account to deal with frustrating absences, one according to which experiencing frustrating absences is a matter of subjects having desires for something to be present frustrated by the world. Finally, I argue that there may well be different kinds of experiences of absence. (shrink)

Some Molinists claim that a perfectly good God would actualize a world that is salvifically optimal, that is, a world in which the balance between the saved and damned is optimal and cannot be improved upon without undesirable consequences. I argue that given some plausible principles of rationality, alongside the assumptions Molinists already accept, God’s perfect rationality necessarily would lead him to actualize a salvifically optimal world; I call this position “Optimistic Molinism.” I then consider objections and offer replies, concluding (...) that Optimistic Molinism is undefeated and merits further exploration. (shrink)

This book presents a comprehensive and detailed exploration of the relationship between the thought of G.W.F. Hegel and that of John McDowell, the latter of whom is widely considered to be one of the most influential living analytic philosophers. It serves as a point of entry in McDowell’s and Hegel’s philosophy, and a substantial contribution to ongoing debates on perceptual experience and perceptual justification, naturalism, human freedom and action. The chapters gathered in this volume, as well as McDowell’s responses, make (...) it clear that McDowell’s work paves the way for an original reading of Hegel’s texts. His conceptual framework allows for new interpretive possibilities in Hegel’s philosophy which, until now, have remained largely unexplored. Moreover, these interpretations shed light on various aspects of continuity and discontinuity between the philosophies of these two authors, thus defining more clearly their positions on specific issues. In addition, they allow us to see Hegel’s thought as containing a number of conceptual tools that might be useful for advancing McDowell’s own philosophy and contemporary philosophy in general. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between a prominent version of the relational view of memory and recent work on forms of unsuccessful remembering or memory errors. I argue that unsuccessful remembering poses an important challenge for the relational view. Unsuccessful remembering can be divided into two kinds: misremembering and confabulating. I discuss each of these cases in light of a recent relational account, according to which remembering is characterized by an experiential relation to past events, and I argue that experiential (...) relations do not adequately distinguish between remembering and unsuccessful remembering. This is because there are, on the one hand, cases of remembering that do not instantiate the relevant experiential relations, and, on the other hand, cases of confabulation and misremembering that do instantiate the relevant experiential relations. I conclude by suggesting that any successful relationalist attempt to explain remembering needs to come to grips with unsuccessful remembering. (shrink)

One of the current debates in philosophy of mind is whether the content of perceptual experiences is conceptual or nonconceptual. The proponents of nonconceptual content, or nonconceptualists, typically support their position by appealing to the so-called Fineness of Grain Argument, which, in rough terms, has as its conclusion that we do not possess concepts for everything we perceive. In his Mind and World, John McDowell tried to give a response to the argument, and show that we do possess concepts for (...) everything we perceive. His response is based on the idea that we have a capacity to recognize all that we perceive. However, a good number of people took this proposal as being empirically false. My aim in this paper is to show that McDowell’s proposal is not only not empirically false, but likely to be empirically true. We do have the capacity to recognize all that we perceive, but such recognition capacity is dependent on information stored in short-term memory, and not in longterm memory, as McDowell’s critics have mistakenly supposed. (shrink)

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo apresentar dois distintos projetos formativos: a paideia grega e a Bildung do esclarecimento alemão representada por Kant e Hegel, bem como o desenvolvimento desta última em Halbbildung no século XX. Para compreender os sentidos e contornos históricos em que essas formulações estavam postas, tornou-se necessário inseri-las no contexto mais geral das formações sociais em que elas estavam inseridas, revelando suas contradições.

The interplay between computability and randomness has been an active area of research in recent years, reflected by ample funding in the USA, numerous workshops, and publications on the subject. The complexity and the randomness aspect of a set of natural numbers are closely related. Traditionally, computability theory is concerned with the complexity aspect. However, computability theoretic tools can also be used to introduce mathematical counterparts for the intuitive notion of randomness of a set. Recent research shows that, conversely, concepts (...) and methods originating from randomness enrich computability theory.The book covers topics such as lowness and highness properties, Kolmogorov complexity, betting strategies and higher computability. Both the basics and recent research results are desribed, providing a very readable introduction to the exciting interface of computability and randomness for graduates and researchers in computability theory, theoretical computer science, and measure theory. (shrink)

According to philosophers such as McDowell and Brewer, the contents of perceptual experience are conceptual. This view came to be known as Conceptualism. However, a number of critics have argued that they are wrong in thinking this, for they claim that there is an argument, the so-called Fineness of Grain Argument, which is valid and sound, and has as its consequence the falsity of Conceptualism. Although McDowell and Brewer seem to acknowledge that the Fineness of Grain Argument, if valid and (...) sound, has as its consequence the falsity of Conceptualism, they have ways of answering to the argument. In this paper, I will grant the proponents of Conceptualism that one of their ways of answering to the Fineness of Grain Argument is successful, and that the argument can be blocked. But I will argue that, even if this is the case, we have good reasons to think that Conceptualism is false. For there is another argument, that I will call the Constitution Argument, that has as its conclusion the falsity of Conceptualism. I show that the Constitution Argument is valid and sound, in which case we have good reasons to think that Conceptualism is false. (shrink)

Nous sommes dans une société où se multiplient les techniques de communication. Quelles sont-elles ? Quelles nouvelles formes de lien social accompagnent-elles ? Comment penser le rapport entre techniques et société ? Telles sont les interrogations avancées et qui s’appuient sur la demande sociale latente propre à nos sociétés et qui est à la source des progrès techniques, ceux-ci, ensuite, imposant leur propre logique.In our society, techniques of communication increase in number. What are they ? What new forms of social (...) link go with them ? How are we supposed to think the relationship between techniques and society ? Such are the questions we have to ask. They imply a social unconscious characteristic of modern societies and, in feed-back, the effects of the technical logic. (shrink)

There is evidence of persistent inequalities in household financial protection of health and drugs spending in Latin America. Despite the expansion of coverage, strong inequalities persist in access to health and family spending on drugs in the region. Out-of-pocket spending in medicines is regressive in greater need for affordable medicines.

In honour of Detlef Dürr, we report on a mathematical rigorous computation of the electric vacuum polarisation current and extract the well-known expression for the second order perturbation. Intermediate steps in the presented calculation demonstrate, to the knowledge of the authors for the first time, mathematical rigorous versions of the combined dimensional and Pauli-Villars regularisation schemes. These are employed as computational tools to infer convenient integral representations during the computation. The said second order expression is determined up to a remaining (...) degree of freedom of a real number–without ill-defined terms from start to end. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Was Hume An Atheist? Shane Andre Hume's philosophy of religion, as expressed in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the Natural History of Religion, and sections 10 and 11 ofthe Enquiry ConcerningHuman Understanding,1 invites a number of diverse interpretations. At one extreme are those who see Hume as an "atheist"2 or "anti-theist."3 At the other extreme are those who see Hume as some kind of theist, though not a classical (...) or orthodox one.4 In between are others for whom Hume is an "agnostic* or "ironic skeptic."6 Still a fourth interpretation can be found, according to which Hume "seems to vacillate hopelessly" in his view ofreligion;7 in other words, no coherent philosophy ofreligion can be found in his work and so it is futile to look for one. Ofthe four alternatives, it seems to me that the fourth, being less interesting philosophically and less to Hume's credit as a major philosopher, should be rejected unless by default no coherent case can be made for one of the other three. Since I believe that Hume's views about the nature and existence of God are complex, somewhat unconventional, but still coherent, I will concentrate on the title question. Before tackling that question directly, however, we need to clarify the meaning of the term "atheist" and its cognates. While an atheist is popularly defined as one who does not believe in God, this definition is inadequate for two reasons. First, while the absence of belief is sometimes treated as a synonym for disbelief, it is clear that the two are not the same. An infant does not believe in God, but that does not make him an atheist,8 for, as yet, he does not have the linguistic competence to reflect on the question, Does God exist? Neither is the agnostic an atheist, for, though he has reflected on the question, he has not found reason to answer it affirmatively, Uke the theist, or negatively, like the atheist. For this reason, the atheist must be characterized more strongly, as one who disbelieves that God exists. But even this stronger characterization is insufficient, for, as is well-known but perhaps less widely takeninto account, there are many different conceptions ofGod, ranging from monotheism to polytheism, from beUef in a perfect being to belief in a being who shares some human limitations, from deism to pantheism, and so on. Accordingly, it has become commonplace in philosophy to recognize at least two senses ofthe term "God": a narrow sense, signifying "a supremely good being, creator of but separate from and independent of the world, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal and self-existent";9 and a wide sense, Volume XLX Number 1 141 SHANE ANDRE signifying one or more divine beings, personal or otherwise, manifesting extraordinarybut perhaps not superlative properties. For short, we could call the narrow sense the standard concept ofGod, and beliefin the existence ofsuch a being standard theism.10 And we could call the broad sense, applicable to any concept of the divine, the extended concept of God, and belief in the existence of such a being(s) extendedtheism. On this account, standard theists will alsobe extended theists, but of course someone could be an extended theist without being a standard theist. Let us call such a person (for example, Epicurus, who denied, not that the Gods exist, but that they intervene in human affairs) a limited theist. It is important to note that the limited theist rejects standard theism but is not an atheist simpliciter. How does recognition of these different forms oftheism affect our understanding of atheism? There seem to be two major possibilities. One is to characterize atheism in the narrow sense as disbeUef in standard theism; the other is to characterize it in the broad sense as disbeliefin any form of theism, including limited theism. While either option is open, it seems to me that the latter is preferable. For ifwe say that anyone who rejects standard theism is an atheist, we will end up with the paradoxical result that many distinguished theists will turn out to be atheists. For example, while Charles Hartshorne is not a standard theist, insofar as he rejects the... (shrink)

The Antecedent-Behavior-Consequence (ABC)-analysis is a tool for analyzing behavior and stems from the field of psychology where it is used as a tool for the understanding of behavior in general and organizational behavior in particular. In this paper the ABC-analysis is implemented as a tool to understand why people behave ethically in organizations, through the identification of key environmental factors that cause such behavior. This analysis can be the first step to recognizing the complexity of circumstances determining ethical behavior, as (...) well as trigger for changing that behavior. This will be elaborated in the implementation process of an ethical code. The working of the ABC-analysis will be illustrated with an example derived from field research concerning the reorganization of a department of a chemical company. (shrink)

We explore the notion that culture influences people’s values, and their subsequent ideologies and ethical behaviors. We present the idea that culture itself changes with time, and explore the influence of culture and generational markers on consumer ethics by examining differences in these ethical dimensions between Australians, Indonesians, and Indonesian Migrants in Australia, as well as differences between Generation X versus Generations Y and Z. The present study addresses the need to investigate the role that culture plays in consumer ethics, (...) and the interaction between culture and generational attitudes in determining consumer ethics. Results established a distinct multiculturality in our three cultural samples, including a generational cohort differences. This suggests that culture and generational markers influence ethical beliefs, ideologies, and consumer ethics. It further indicates that Indonesian Migrants have acculturated to Australian society both in terms of their values and consumer behaviors, illustrating a crossvergence effect; scores indicate that these Migrants have the highest cultural intelligence among our samples. Implications of the findings for consumer ethics theory and practice are considered and future directions identified. (shrink)

Les douze articles ici rassemblés entrent dans la série de ce que j'appelle, pensant à Schubert, mes 'impromptus' : des textes brefs, résolument subjectifs, écrits 'sur le champ et sans préparation' (comme dit le Dictionnaire de Littré), qui s'adressent au grand public et sont le plus souvent, malgré l'éventuelle légèreté de l'écriture, d'une tonalité quelque peu grave ou mélancolique. C'est encore le cas dans ce recueil, et d'autant plus, s'agissant de ce dernier point, que la plupart de ces minuscules essais (...) (pour reprendre cette fois le mot de Montaigne) portent sur des sujets en effet sombres ou douloureux : le pessimisme, le tragique, la mort des enfants, le handicap, l'agonie, le bagne, le suicide... J'ose croire qu'ils ne seront pas pour autant cause de tristesse, mais aideront plutôt à accepter, aussi joyeusement que possible, la part en toute vie de deuil, de chagrin ou de détresse. C'est la joie qui est bonne, mais d'autant plus méritoire et belle qu'elle est souvent difficile. Quant au dernier texte ('Maman'), qui est sans doute ce que j'ai publié de plus intime, il ne doit d'exister qu'aux lecteurs (et plus souvent aux lectrices) qui m'ont expressément demandé de l'écrire. Qu'ils en soient remerciés."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

The biinterpretability conjecture for the r.e. degrees asks whether, for each sufficiently large k, the [Formula: see text] relations on the r.e. degrees are uniformly definable from parameters. We solve a weaker version: for each k ≥ 7, the [Formula: see text] relations bounded from below by a nonzero degree are uniformly definable. As applications, we show that Low 1 is parameter definable, and we provide methods that lead to a new example of a ∅-definable ideal. Moreover, we prove that (...) automorphisms restricted to intervals [d, 1], d ≠ 0, are [Formula: see text]. We also show that, for each c ≠ 0, can be interpreted in [0, c] without parameters. (shrink)

We investigate the upper semilattice Eq* of recursively enumerable equivalence relations modulo finite differences. Several natural subclasses are shown to be first-order definable in Eq*. Building on this we define a copy of the structure of recursively enumerable many-one degrees in Eq*, thereby showing that Th has the same computational complexity as the true first-order arithmetic.

Most professionals have the arduous task of managing their own dual loyalty: in one contextual relationship, they are members of a profession while simultaneously they are employed as members of a locally established organisation. This sense of a dual loyalty has to be taken into account when professional bureaucracies develop ethics programmes. This article focuses on universities. Accounting for the dual loyalty of academic professionals, it is the objective of the study to contribute to the most appropriate ethics programmes in (...) such an academic context. Based on a review of the literature, we identify which ethical issues commonly emerge in educational and research activities. Then we offer a conceptual analysis of the conditions required for each different strategy of ethics management. We argue that none of the four theoretically derived strategies is applicable solely on its own. For universities it is most promising to design ethics programmes based on the guiding values of the academic community, including integrity measures for universities and corrective measures for students. The argument developed in this article is assumed to be widely applicable in assessing the appropriateness of ethics management strategies in other professional settings. (shrink)

§1. Introduction. Natural sets that can be enumerated by a computable function always seem to be either actually computable or of the same complexity as the Halting Problem, the complete r.e. set K. The obvious question, first posed in Post [1944] and since then called Post's Problem is then just whether there are r.e. sets which are neither computable nor complete, i.e., neither recursive nor of the same Turing degree as K?Let be the r.e. degrees, i.e., the r.e. sets modulo (...) the equivalence relation of equicomputable with the partial order induced by Turing computability. This structure is a partial order with least element 0, the degree of the computable sets, and greatest element 1 or 0′, the degree of K. Post's problem then asks if there are any other elements of.The solution of Post's problem by Friedberg [1957] and Muchnik [1956] was followed by various algebraic or order theoretic results that were interpreted as saying that the structure was in some way well behaved:Theorem 1.1. Every countable partial ordering or even uppersemilattice can be embedded into.Theorem 1.2. For every nonrecursive r.e. degreeathere are r.e. degreesb, c < asuch thatb ∨ c = a.Theorem 1.3. For every pair of nonrecursive r.e. degreesa < bthere is an r.e. degreecsuch thata < c < b. (shrink)

Pierre André,Michel Bourban | : Dans un contexte d’urgence, les philosophes ne peuvent plus se contenter d’élaborer des théories idéales de la justice climatique fondées sur des motivations purement morales. Il est désormais nécessaire d’envisager des approches non idéales. Nous proposons ici de prendre au sérieux le problème de la motivation à l’action et nous mettons en avant certains motifs prudentiels pour lutter contre le changement climatique, en vue non pas de remplacer, mais de renforcer les motivations morales existantes, (...) mais insuffisantes. Nous commençons par présenter trois grandes approches idéales qui ont prévalu jusqu’ici dans la recherche sur la justice climatique et sont fondées respectivement sur l’éthique déontologique, sur l’éthique des vertus et sur l’utilitarisme. Nous mettons en évidence leurs limites pratiques, en ciblant le problème de la motivation à l’action. Nous proposons ensuite quelques pistes pour résoudre ce problème en esquissant une approche non idéale de la justice climatique. Cette approche est centrée sur les motivations amorales ressortant de l’examen attentif des perturbations systémiques globales et des contextes nationaux et locaux spécifiques. Elle est à notre sens incontournable pour motiver les États-nations, les entreprises et les individus. Il s’agit cependant moins de la substituer totalement aux théories idéales de la justice climatique que de compléter celles-ci pour établir une vision plus compréhensive qui distingue le problème de la justification morale de celui de la motivation. | : In a situation of urgency, philosophers can no longer rely exclusively on ideal theories of climate justice grounded on purely moral motives. It has become necessary to build nonideal approaches. We propose to give serious consideration to the problem of motivation to act by putting forward some prudential reasons for tackling climate change—with the aim not of replacing existing but inadequate moral motivations, but of strengthening them. First, we identify three major ideal approaches that have so far prevailed in climate justice research, grounded respectively on deontological ethics, on virtue ethics, and on utilitarianism. We highlight their practical limitations, particularly with regards to the problem of motivation to act. Second, we open the way for an alternative nonideal approach to climate justice based on amoral motivations issuing from a careful examination of global systemic disruptions as well as of specific national and local situations. This approach cannot be ignored if one wishes to motivate nation-states, corporations, and individuals to act. However, our goal is not to replace ideal theory with nonideal theory, but rather to complete the former with the latter for a more comprehensive account of climate justice that distinguishes the problem of moral justification from the problem of motivation. (shrink)

Em Parmênides 132b-c é afirmado que se as Ideias fossem pensamentos, então as coisas que participam nelas também seriam pensamentos. A afirmação soa estranha dentro da dinâmica,apresentada no corpus platonicum, da “participação” dos entes sensíveis nas Ideias; todavia, não parece simples determinar o motivo desta estranheza. A chave do problema pode ser uma identificação dos tipos de qualidades das Ideias ou Formas nteligíveis que estão implicados na “participação”. Vários especialistas trataram da matéria na segunda metade do século XX (OWEN, 1968; (...) KEYT, 1969 e 1971; VLASTOS, 1972), tendo sempre como ponto de partida a distinção de qualidades das Ideias traçada no texto dos Tópicos de Aristóteles (137b3-13). Nesse sentido, o presente artigo: i) apresenta os conceitos utilizados no tratamento desta matéria pelos exegetas: “atributos ideais”, “atributos próprios”, “Distinção-P”, “Predicação Paulina”, “Predicação Ordinária” e “Autopredicação”; ii) explica a incompatibilidade da distinção aristotélica de qualidades das Ideias (“Distinção-P”) com a ontologia apresentada nos próprios diálogos platônicos (VLASTOS, 1972 e 1973; CHERNISS, 1944); iii) sugere uma nova “Distinção-P”, mostrando sua compatibilidade com essa ontologia; iv) aplica-a ao caso daquela afirmação sobre as Ideias de Parmênides 132b-c, demonstrando a utilidade dessa distinção pela elucidação que ela promove da dinâmica da “participação” nessa passagem. (shrink)

We show that the elementary theory of the recursively enumerable tt-degrees has the same computational complexity as true first-order arithmetic. As auxiliary results, we prove theorems about exact pairs and initial segments in the tt-degrees.

Two ways of describing a group are considered. 1. A group is finite-automaton presentable if its elements can be represented by strings over a finite alphabet, in such a way that the set of representing strings and the group operation can be recognized by finite automata. 2. An infinite f.g. group is quasi-finitely axiomatizable if there is a description consisting of a single first-order sentence, together with the information that the group is finitely generated. In the first part of the (...) paper we survey examples of FA-presentable groups, but also discuss theorems restricting this class. In the second part, we give examples of quasi-finitely axiomatizable groups, consider the algebraic content of the notion, and compare it to the notion of a group which is a prime model. We also show that if a structure is bi-interpretable in parameters with the ring of integers, then it is prime and quasi-finitely axiomatizable. (shrink)

We use Demuth randomness to study strong lowness properties of computably enumerable sets, and sometimes of Δ20 sets. A set A⊆N is called a base for Demuth randomness if some set Y Turing above A is Demuth random relative to A. We show that there is an incomputable, computably enumerable base for Demuth randomness, and that each base for Demuth randomness is strongly jump-traceable. We obtain new proofs that each computably enumerable set below all superlow Martin-Löf random sets is strongly (...) jump traceable, using Demuth tests. The sets Turing below each ω2-computably approximable Martin-Löf random set form a proper subclass of the bases for Demuth randomness, and hence of the strongly jump traceable sets. The c.e. sets Turing below each ω2-computably approximable Martin-Löf random set satisfy a new, very strong combinatorial lowness property called ω-traceability. (shrink)

During medical training students and residents reconstruct their view of the world. Patients become bodies; both the faults and the virtues of the medical profession become exaggerated. This reconstruction has moral relevance: it is in part a moral blindness. The pain of medical training, together with its narrowness, contributes substantially to these faulty reconstructions. Possible improvements include teaching more social science, selecting chief residents and faculty for their attitudes, helping students acquire communication skills, and helping them deal with their own (...) pain. Most importantly, clearer moral vision requires time and scope for reflection. (shrink)