Einleitung: Da Costa und das Marranenproblem. Die Gründung der Sephardischen Gemeinde in Amsterdam. Die Spaltung des Bewusstseins. Das Schicksal da Costas. Da Costa und Spinoza.--Propostas contra a tradição. Thesen gegen die Tradition.--Sobre a mortalidade da alma. Über die Sterblichkeit der Seele.--Exemplar humanae vitae. Ein Beispiel menschlichen Lebens.--Regesten.--Anmerkungen.

Consciousness and Mind presents David Rosenthal's influential work on the nature of consciousness. Central to that work is Rosenthal's higher-order-thought theory of consciousness, according to which a sensation, thought, or other mental state is conscious if one has a higher-order thought that one is in that state. The first four essays develop various aspects of that theory. The next three essays present Rosenthal's homomorphism theory of mental qualities and qualitative consciousness, and show how that theory fits with (...) and helps sustain the HOT theory. A crucial feature of homomorphism theory is that it individuates and taxonomizes mental qualities independently of the way we're conscious of them, and indeed independently of our being conscious of them at all. So the theory accommodates the qualitative character not only of conscious sensations and perceptions, but also of those which fall outside our stream of consciousness. Rosenthal argues that, because this account of mental qualities makes no appeal to consciousness, it enables us to dispel such traditional quandaries as the alleged conceivability of undetectable quality inversion, and to disarm various apparent obstacles to explaining qualitative consciousness and understanding its nature. Six further essays build on the HOT theory to explain various important features of consciousness, among them the complex connections that hold in humans between consciousness and speech, the self-interpretative aspect of consciousness, and the compelling sense we have that consciousness is unified. Two of the essays, one an extended treatment of homomorphism theory, appear here for the first time. There is also a substantive introduction, which draws out the connections between the essays and highlights their implications. (shrink)

In response to your kind offer to read through portions of the typescript of my thesis pertaining to your views on intentionality, I am sending you a copy of an introductory section to such a chapter.{1} The enclosed typescript represents a first draft, for which I apologize, but I thought it might be useful to get any comments you might have in at the ground floor, so to speak.

Uriel Weinreich was of the innovative and creative thinkers in the field of semantics in the twentieth century. This volume contains all of Weinreich's writings on semantics, including a number of papers that were not published in his lifetime. It includes the first paper on the universals of semantic theory, an analysis of the fundamental concepts of semantics and semiotics, and a critique of lexicography.

Modern political thought arrived on the heels of two revolutionary realizations: We are not at the center of the universe (Copernicus), which was not created for us (Darwin). How might political theory respond to a third revolutionary realization, that we are not alone, that other creatures, sentient and highly intelligent, share our vast universe? We explore answers through a dialogue between two political theorists, a human and an alien. Rather than superimposing astropolitics upon anthropolitics, we use the encounter to ask (...) new questions, e.g., should PT foster bridges between humans and aliens, or harden the boundaries? Pitting Dark Forest Theory against the Campfire Theory, we outline the coming existential and existentialist turns in political theory, complementing Earth politics with exopolitics. (shrink)

En el actual contexto en reorganización por la influencia del ciberespacio cruzado, entre otras, por las contradicciones entre control y comunicación y por el impacto de las inteligencias artificiales damos cuenta del curso dirigido por Jesús Zamora Bonilla y titulado Filosofía del Futuro y el Futuro de la Filosofía (enero de 2023). En el mismo se ha dibujado el campo de los estudios del futuro y se ha reflexionado sobre el papel que en ellos pudiera jugar la filosofía. También se (...) ha vuelto a plantear el problema de sus condiciones de supervivencia. (shrink)

All mental states, including thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations, often occur consciously. But they all occur also without being conscious. So the first thing a theory of consciousness must do is explain the difference between thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations that are conscious and those which are not.

_ Source: _Volume 24, Issue 2, pp 300 - 317 This article examines R. Zvi Yehudah Kook’s reading of two earlier thinkers who were influential in the formulation of his thought—the Maharal of Prague and R. Avraham Azulai. I argue that his creative and unique reading of these texts exemplifies a fascinating dialogue he held with earlier sources, which he interpreted and infused with his own theological postulates. Here I explore his theory of the unique nature of the Jewish soul, (...) in both its collective and individual manifestations. The connection between R. Zvi Yehudah’s approach to interpreting earlier Jewish theological texts and that of his father, R. Avraham Itzhak HaCohen Kook, will also be discussed. (shrink)

Die Buchreihe Konzepte der Sprach- und Literaturwissenschaft gibt Aufschluss über Prinzipien, Probleme und Verfahrensweisen philologischer Forschung im weitesten Sinne und dient einer Bestimmung des Standorts der Linguistik und Literaturwissenschaft. Die Reihe übergreift Einzelsprachen und Einzelliteraturen. Sie stellt sich in den Dienst der Reflexion und Grundlegung einer allgemeinen Sprach- und Literaturwissenschaft. Die Bände sind zum Teil informierende Einführungen, zum Teil wissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge.

Mientras que desde una perspectiva islámica los musulmanes debían ofrecer lealtad primordial a Dios y a Su mensaje, los lazos de parentesco podían poner en tela de juicio ese compromiso. Los ideales islámicos, articulados a través de diversos géneros literarios, reflejan esta tensión, presentando una priorización de la comunidad religiosa sobre la familia. Al mismo tiempo, sin embargo, los sentimientos de parentesco se utilizaban a menudo para inculcar ideales religiosos e identidad entre los miembros de la comunidad. La percepción islámica (...) primitiva y medieval de la autoridad materna ilustra bien este punto, ya que las madres musulmanas desempeñan un papel crucial en la formación de la identidad islámica de sus hijos. Sin embargo, en circunstancias opuestas, cuando la autoridad materna no musulmana estaba presente en entornos familiares dominados por el islam, se hacía necesaria una adaptación de las normas y reglamentos. En este ensayo, examino una serie de posturas islámicas relativas a los casos en que las madres, tanto musulmanas como no musulmanas, podían influir en las inclinaciones religiosas de sus hijos durante conflictos o diferencias interreligiosas. Estas posturas arrojan luz sobre una faceta adicional de los esfuerzos islámicos por preservar la integridad religiosa de los creyentes musulmanes, en particular de los niños musulmanes pequeños, dentro de un contexto religioso socialmente diverso. Aparecen en diversos géneros literarios con programas normativos, como el Corán, la exégesis coránica, las tradiciones proféticas, los compendios jurídicos, las biografías de los primeros musulmanes (ṣaḥāba), y literatura sobre etiqueta social (adab), que abarca desde el siglo I/VII al VII/XIII. (shrink)

Standing at the edge of life's abyss, we seek meaningful order. We commonly find this 'symbolic immortality' in religion, civilization, state and nation. What happens, however, when the nation itself appears mortal? The Mortality and Morality of Nations seeks to answer this question, theoretically and empirically. It argues that mortality makes morality, and right makes might; the nation's sense of a looming abyss informs its quest for a higher moral ground, which, if reached, can bolster its vitality. The book investigates (...) nationalism's promise of moral immortality and its limitations via three case studies: French Canadians, Israeli Jews, and Afrikaners. All three have been insecure about the validity of their identity or the viability of their polity, or both. They have sought partial redress in existential self-legitimation: by the nation, of the nation and for the nation's very existence. (shrink)

All mental states, including thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations, often occur consciously. But they all occur also without being conscious. So the first thing a theory of consciousness must do is explain the difference between thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations that are conscious and those which are not.

Este trabajo tiene como objetivo realizar una reconstrucción teórica sobre la figura de Abraham como categoría central en la constitución de la subjetividad en el pensamiento judío y mostrar cómo se convierte en referente filosófico en la obra levinasiana. Para ello, se indagan las raíces judías de Levinas y de su obra, en la que la figura de Abraham aparece como principio de subjetivación ética en el proceso de constitución del pueblo de la alianza, en contraste con la figura griega (...) de Ulises. Entre los hallazgos de este estudio se encuentra a Abraham como la presencia de un yo que se abre al llamado del Otro, no para absorberlo en su mismidad, sino para constituirse como un ser-para-el-Otro y reconocer el obligatorio cumplimiento de las responsabilidades ineludibles con su existencia. Se describe, además, la metáfora como apertura y salida de sí que lleva al ser humano más allá de sí mismo. El artículo llega a la conclusión de que el pensamiento filosófico de Levinas, centrado principalmente en la ética, ha contribuido significativamente a nuestra comprensión del ser humano como un Otro esencial en las relaciones intersubjetivas. Esta concepción encuentra su fundamento directamente en la tradición judía, en contraposición a la tradición griega que ha estado en la base de gran parte de los desarrollos de la filosofía occidental. (shrink)

It’s often held that undetectable inversion of mental qualities is, if not possible, at least conceivable. It’s thought to be conceivable that the mental quality your visual states exhibit when you see something red in standard conditions is literally of the same type as the mental quality my visual states exhibit when I see something green in such circumstances. It’s thought, moreover, to be conceivable that such inversion of mental qualities could be wholly undetectable by any third-person means. And since (...) first- person access is limited to a single individual, and so could not reveal a disparity in mental quality between us, third-person undetectability means undetectability tout court. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Psychological or political criticism of the parent‐child relation presupposes a normative account of that relation. Such an account is here provided. The normative account can shed most light when the parent‐child relation is presented recognizably, not in Utopian disguise. The purposes of reasonable people partly depend on their interpretations of those of their parents. This is so whether such people accept or reject any particular parental purposes. The filial art sticks to the project of working out the enacted interpretation—until (...) it gets it approximately right. There is a corresponding parental art, neither compensatory nor sacrificial. (shrink)

The American and some other constitutions entrench property rights by requiring super majoritarian voting as a condition for amending or revoking their own provisions. Following Buchanan and Tullock [The Calculus of Consent, Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor), 1962], this paper analyzes individuals' interests behind a veil of ignorance, and shows that under some standard assumptions, a (simple) majoritarian rule should be adopted. This result changes if one assumes that preferences are consistent with the behavioral (...) phenomenon known as the endowment effect. It then follows that (at least some) property rights are best defended by super majoritarian protection. The paper then shows that its theoretical results are consistent with a number of doctrines underlying American Constitutional Law. (shrink)

El presente artículo discute los conceptos de «autoconservación» y «trabajo» en Lo que aprendemos de los lirios del campo y las aves del cielo. El análisis del discurso edificante escrito por Kierkegaard en 1847 permite definir la perspectiva que el danés asume ante el proyecto filosófico de la Modernidad. A partir de una crítica a las concepciones estéticas y éticas de la vida, el autor edificante propone un modelo de existencia religiosa que combina la autoconservación y la dependencia.

El presente artículo discute la obra pseudónima de Kierkegaard “El reflejo de lo trágico antiguo en lo trágico moderno”. El joven esteta A traza una distinción entre la “culpa antigua” y la “culpa moderna”. A utiliza esta distinción para formular una potente crítica a la ética moderna. No obstante, dicha polémica contra los conceptos éticos de la Modernidad no implican un retorno a la moralidad trágica antigua.

No mental phenomenon is more central than consciousness to an adequate understanding of the mind. Nor does any mental phenomenon seem more stubbornly to resist theoretical treatment. Consciousness is so basic to the way we think about the mind that it can be tempting to suppose that no mental states exist that are not conscious states. Indeed, it may even seem mysterious what sort of thing a mental state might be if it is not a conscious state. On this way (...) of looking at things, if any mental states do lack consciousness, they are exceptional cases that call for special explanation or qualification. Perhaps dispositional or cognitive states exist that are not conscious, but nonetheless count as mental states. (shrink)

Conscious mental states are states we are in some way aware of. I compare higher-order theories of consciousness, which explain consciousness by appeal to such higher-order awareness (HOA), and first-order theories, which do not, and I argue that higher-order theories have substantial explanatory advantages. The higher-order nature of our awareness of our conscious states suggests an analogy with the metacognition that figures in the regulation of psychological processes and behaviour. I argue that, although both consciousness and metacognition involve higher-order psychological (...) states, they have little more in common. One thing they do share is the possibility of misrepresentation; just as metacognitive processing can misrepresent one’s cognitive states and abilities, so the HOA in virtue of which one’s mental states are conscious can, and sometimes does, misdescribe those states. A striking difference between the two, however, has to do with utility for psychological processing. Metacognition has considerable benefit for psychological processing; in contrast, it is unlikely that there is much, if any, utility to mental states’ being conscious over and above the utility those states have when they are not conscious. (shrink)

MS, under submission, derived from a Powerpoint presentation at a Conference on Consciousness, Memory, and Perception, in honor of Larry Weiskrantz, City University, London, September 15, 2006.

A touchstone of much modern theorizing about the mind is the idea, still tac- itly accepted by many, that a state's being mental implies that it's conscious. This view is epitomized in the dictum, put forth by theorists as otherwise di-.

This anthology brings together readings mainly from contemporary philosophers, but also from writers of the past two centuries, on the philosophy of mind. Some of the main questions addressed are: is a human being really a mind in relation to a body; if so, what exactly is this mind and how it is related to the body; and are there any grounds for supposing that the mind survives the disintegration of the body?

Christians and Others in the Umayyad State. Edited by Antoine Borrut and Fred M. Donner. Late Antique and Medieval Islamic Near East, vol. 1. Chicago: riental Institute, University of Chicago, 2016. Pp. ix + 213. $24.95.

We’re often unsure what morality requires, but we need to act anyway. There is a growing philosophical literature on how to navigate moral uncertainty. But much of it asks how to rationally pursue the goal of acting morally, using decision-theoretic models to address that question. I argue that using these popular approaches leaves some central and pressing questions about moral uncertainty unaddressed. To help us make sense of experiences of moral uncertainty, we should shift away from focusing on what it’s (...) rational to do when facing moral uncertainty, and instead look directly at what it’s moral to do about moral uncertainty—for example, how risk averse we morally ought to be, or which personal sacrifices we’re morally obligated to make in order to reduce our risk of moral wrongdoing. And orthodox, expectation-maximizing, decision-theoretic models aren’t well-suited to this task—in part because they presuppose the answers to some important moral questions. For example, if approaching moral uncertainty in a moral way requires us to “maximize expected moral rightness,” that’s, itself, a contentious claim about the demands of morality—one that requires significant moral argument, and that I ultimately suggest is mistaken. Of course, it’s possible to opt, instead, for a variety of alternative decision-theoretic models. But, in order to choose between proposed decision-theoretic models, and select one that is well-suited to handling these cases, we first would need to settle more foundational, moral questions—about, for example, what we should be willing to give up in order to reduce the risk that we’re acting wrongly. Decision theory may be able to formalize the conclusions of these deliberations, but it is not a substitute for them, and it won’t be able to settle the right answers in advance. For now, when we discuss moral uncertainty, we need to wade directly into moral debate, without the aid of decision theory’s formalism. (shrink)

This book deals with more than political philosophy in medieval Islam. The Islamic community was a religio-political unity, and as a consequence Islamic thought drew no clearcut distinction between what was strictly religious and what was political or legal. This makes it impossible to study its political ideas without delving into its thought in general and the evolution of its institutions and legal systems. This delving Mr. Rosenthal has done well, and by doing so he has produced a book (...) which not only outlines the political philosophy of Islam... but gives us also an idea of its general thought and the development of its principal institutions. - American Historical Review. (shrink)

I begin by discussing an objection often lodged against higher-order theories of consciousness. The objection is that those theories do not preclude consciousness from misrepresenting the mental properties of our conscious states. I argue that there are several reasons why this objection cannot succeed. Sam Coleman agrees that the objection fails, but sees it as pointing to a related objection, which he argues poses difficulties the higher-order theorist cannot avoid. His solution is a variant theory of consciousness that invokes mental (...) quotation in the content of a higher-order awareness. I’ll argue that mental quotation cannot be understood in any way that helps with the objection. I’ll argue also that the objection Coleman articulates is question begging, since it in effect simply channels a first-order approach to consciousness, and has no independent basis apart from that. Resumo: Começo por discutir uma objeção muitas vezes apresentada contra as teorias da consciência de ordem superior. A objeção é que essas teorias não impedem a consciência de representar de modo errôneo as propriedades mentais de nossos estados conscientes. Eu argumento que existem várias razões pelas quais essa objeção não pode ter sucesso. Sam Coleman concorda que a objeção falha, mas a vê como apontando para uma objeção relacionada, que ele argumenta apresentar dificuldades que o teórico do pensamento de ordem superior não pode evitar. Sua solução é uma variante desta teoria, que invoca a “citação mental” como conteúdo da consciência de ordem superior. Eu argumentarei que a citação mental não pode ser entendida de alguma forma que satisfaça tal objeção. Argumentarei também que a objeção que Coleman articula incorre em petição de princípio, uma vez que, na prática, ela simplesmente escolhe uma abordagem de primeira ordem para a consciência, e não tem nenhuma justificativa independente para isso. (shrink)

Ned BlockÕs influential distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness has become a staple of current discussions of consciousness. It is not often noted, however, that his distinction tacitly embodies unargued theoretical assumptions that favor some theoretical treatments at the expense of others. This is equally so for his less widely discussed distinction between phenomenal consciousness and what he calls reflexive consciousness. I argue that the distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, as Block draws it, is untenable. Though mental states that (...) have qualitative character plainly differ from those with no mental qualities, a mental stateÕs being conscious is the same property for both kinds of mental state. For one thing, as Block describes access consciousness, that notion does not pick out any property that we intuitively count as a mental stateÕs being conscious. But the deeper problem is that BlockÕs notion of phenomenal consciousness, or phenomenality, is ambiguous as between two very different mental properties. The failure to distinguish these results in the begging of important theoretical questions. Once the two kinds of phenomenality have been distinguished, the way is clear to explain qualitative consciousness by appeal to a model such as the higher-order-thought hypothesis. Ó 2002 Elsevier Science . All rights reserved. (shrink)

This book investigates the relationship between liberal democracies and ontology, that is, philosophical claims about the constitution of agents and the social world. Many philosophers argue that ontology needs to be avoided in political and legal philosophy. In fact, political liberalism, a highly influential paradigm founded by the philosopher John Rawls, makes the avoidance of ontology a core ambition of its 'political, non-metaphysical' programme. In contrast to political liberalism, this book argues that attending to ontological disputes is essential to political (...) and legal philosophy. Illuminating, criticising and developing ontological arguments does not only enhance our understanding of justice, but also highlights key features of democratic citizenship. The argument is built up by bringing together three traditions of thought that have so far not been confronted with one another: political liberalism, the work of Michel Foucault, and the psychoanalytic theories of Sigmund Freud and Donald Winnicott. The book also investigates more concrete implications of ontological disputes by drawing on several case studies: a Dutch political-legal debate about greeting rituals; an American conflict about the legalisation of religious freedom; and the struggles for resilience of two American social movement groups. (shrink)