Volume 19, Issue 6, June 2019, Page 44-46.

Social robotics attempts to build robots able to interact with humans and other robots. Philosophical and scientific research in social cognition can provide social robotics research with models of social cognition to implement those models in mechanic agents. The aim of this paper is twofold: firstly, I present and defend a framework in social cognition known as mindshaping. According to it, human beings are biologically predisposed to learn and teach cultural and rational norms and complex cultural patterns of behavior that (...) enhance social cognition. Secondly, I will highlight how this framework can open new research perspectives in the area of social robotics. (shrink)

Subjects experiencing thought insertion disown thoughts they are introspectively aware of. According to what I call “the rationality hypothesis”, thought-insertion reports are not merely intelligible, but also express, or potentially express, fully rational judgments in the light of highly disruptive experience. I argue that the hypothesis is ethically and theoretically motivated, and provides two insights into the philosophical significance of reports by subjects with schizophrenia. First, the reports can be seen as evidence that rational judgments of ownership of a thought (...) prioritize agency awareness over introspective awareness of it. This point fits with an integrative account of thought insertion at the personal and mechanistic levels. Second, rational and competent uses of the first person purely based on introspection do not necessarily involve a full-fledged first-person perspective over one’s thoughts. This suggests that agency awareness, and not introspection as such, is primarily involved in determining the reference of the first person featuring in the judgments. (shrink)

Muscle synergy analysis via surface electromyography is useful to study muscle coordination in motor learning, clinical diagnosis, and neurorehabilitation. However, current methods to extract muscle synergies in the upper limb suffer from two major issues. First, the necessary normalization of EMG signals is performed via maximum voluntary contraction, which requires maximal isometric force production in each muscle. However, some individuals with motor impairments have difficulties producing maximal effort in the MVC task. In addition, the MVC is known to be highly (...) unreliable, with widely different forces produced in repeated measures. Second, synergy extraction in the upper limb is typically performed with a multidirection reaching task. However, some participants with motor impairments cannot perform this task because it requires precise motor control. In this study, we proposed a new isometric rotating task that does not require precise motor control or large forces. In this task, participants maintain a cursor controlled by the arm end-point force on a target that rotates at a constant angular velocity at a designated force level. To relax constraints on motor control precision, the target is widened and blurred. To obtain a reference EMG value for normalization without requiring maximal effort, we estimated a linear relationship between joint torques and muscle activations. We assessed the reliability of joint torque normalization and synergy extraction in the rotating task in young neurotypical individuals. Compared with normalization with MVC, joint torque normalization allowed reliable EMG normalization at low force levels. In addition, the extraction of synergies was as reliable and more stable than with the multidirection reaching task. The proposed rotating task can, therefore, be used in future motor learning, clinical diagnosis, and neurorehabilitation studies. (shrink)

Cohen’s (2023) mapping exercise of possible bioethical issues emerging from the use of ChatGPT in medicine provides an informative, useful, and thought-provoking trigger for discussions of AI ethic...

Concept-individuating reference rules offer a well-known route for the explanation of immunity to error through misidentification in judgments involving first person or de se thought. However, the ‘outright’ version of this account—one that sanctions a one-to-one correspondence between the reference-fixing rule and immunity—cannot do justice to the unassailable ground-relativity of the target phenomenon. In this paper, I outline a version of the reference-rule account that circumvents this problem. I state a reference rule for the de se concept that makes space (...) for different non-reference-fixing ways of thinking or perspectives, yielding different grounds for judgment. The proposal and its ramifications, I argue, shed light on the variety of ways in which this kind of immunity has been proved to be present—and indeed absent—in de se thought. (shrink)

Western philosophers have generally neglected honor as a moral phenomenon worthy of serious study. Appiah’s recent work on honor in moral revolutions is an important exception, but even he is careful to separate honor from morality, regarding it as only “an ally” of morality. In this paper we take Appiah to be right about the psychological, social, and historical role honor has played in three notable moral revolutions, but wrong about the moral nature of honor. We defend two new theses: (...) First, honor is an emotional and moral form of recognition respect that can hinder or aid moral progress. Second, honor, so conceived, can play a rational role in progressive moral change, as it did among the working class in the British abolition of slave trade, when the pressure of moral consistency moved them to protest American slavery as an affront to their honor without change in their moral belief that slavery is wrong. (shrink)

Subjects suffering from extreme peripheral deafferentation can recruit vision to perform a significant range of basic physical actions with limbs they can’t proprioceptively feel. Self-ascriptions of deafferented action – just as deafferented action itself – fundamentally depend, therefore, on visual information of limb position and movement. But what’s the significance of this result for the concept of self patently at work in these self-ascriptions? In this paper, I argue that these cases show that bodily awareness grounding employment of the self-concept (...) in self-ascriptions of action can be fundamentally third-personal and concern a body that is not presented as one’s own, but as an object among others. (shrink)

Theorists of first person thought seem to be faced with a pervasive dilemma: either accept the view that varying reference and sense are bound up together in first person thought, but then reject person-to-person shareability; or else, maintain the shareability of first person thought or belief at the price of giving up the connection between sense and subject-to-subject changing reference. Here, the author will argue that this is, in fact, a spurious dilemma based largely upon a failure to appreciate, if (...) not the existence, at least the crucial importance of the distinction between types, instantiable types and instantiated types of thought or belief. Only the level of the instantiable type is relevant for a proper assessment of the question of whether two different subjects have the same first person thought. (shrink)

This book offers new essays exploring concepts and applications of nonideal theory in bioethics. Nonideal theory refers to an analytic approach to moral and political philosophy (especially in relation to justice), according to which we should not assume that there will be perfect compliance with principles, that there will be favorable circumstances for just institutions and right action, or that reasoners are capable of being impartial. Nonideal theory takes the world as it actually is, in all of its imperfections. Bioethicists (...) have called for greater attention to how nonideal theory can serve as a guide in the messy realities they face daily. Although many bioethicists implicitly assume nonideal theory in their work, there is the need for more explicit engagement with this theoretical outlook. A nonideal approach to bioethics would start by examining the sociopolitical realities of healthcare and the embeddedness of moral actors in those realities. How are bioethicists to navigate systemic injustices when completing research, giving guidance for patient care, and contributing to medical and public health policies? When there are no good options and when moral agents are enmeshed in their sociopolitical viewpoints, how should moral theorizing proceed? What do bioethical issues and principles look like from the perspective of historically marginalized persons? These are just a few of the questions that motivate nonideal theory within bioethics. This book begins in Part I with an overview of the foundational tenets of nonideal theory, what nonideal theory can offer bioethics, and why it may be preferable to ideal theory in addressing moral dilemmas in the clinic and beyond. In Part II, authors discuss applications of nonideal theory in many areas of bioethics, including reflections on environmental harms, racism and minority health, healthcare injustices during incarceration and detention, and other vulnerabilities experienced by patients from clinical and public health perspectives. The chapters within each section demonstrate the breadth in scope that nonideal theory encompasses, bringing together diverse theorists and approaches into one collection. (shrink)

At its core, nonideal theory is an attempt not only to address issues of justice, but it also provides us a lens through which we can articulate our limitations as knowers and reasoners, the ways in which we are relational in our autonomy needs, and the ways in which we are deeply dependent upon institutions and social supports for our agency and identities. Bringing this lens into bioethics means shifting our orientation in our scholarship and our practice. This shift will (...) have implications in how bioethical evaluations are taken up and played out in policies, institutional structures that inform the clinical encounter, and avenues for protection and redress for marginalized and vulnerable populations. It will also allow theorists and researchers to interrogate the status quo, revealing how many standard policies and practices are embedded in social and institutional arrangements that privilege the few or are built on exclusionary norms. The path forward, and the aim of this volume, is to extend the scholarship of nonideal approaches to bioethics. The volume is divided into two main parts. The first is focused on philosophically unpacking nonideal theory as an approach in bioethics. The second offers applications of nonideal theory in environmental ethics, healthcare ethics, public heath ethics, and genetic ethics. Our collective aim is to expand what has been considered nonideal bioethics. The history of nonideal theory has as its point of reference a turn away from Rawlsian justice, but the future of nonideal theory is ripe with possibilities. (shrink)

After more than twenty years of representational debate in the cognitive sciences, anti-representational dynamicism may be seen as offering a rival and radically new kind of explanation of systematicity phenomena. In this paper, I argue that, on the contrary, anti-representational dynamicism must face a version of the old systematicity challenge: either it does not explain systematicity, or else, it is just an implementation of representational theories. To show this, I present a purely behavioral and representation-free account of systematicity. I then (...) consider a case of insect sensorimotor systematic behavior: communicating behavior in honey bees. I conclude that anti-representational dynamicism fails to capture the fundamental trait of systematic behaviors qua systematic, i.e., their involving exercises of the same behavioral capacities. I suggest, finally, a collaborative strategy in pursuit of a rich and powerful account of this central phenomenon of high cognition at all levels of explanation, including the representational level. (shrink)

According to a widespread, broadly Humean consensus, desires and other conative attitudes seem as such to be free from any normative constraints of rationality. However, rational subjects are also required to be attitude-coherent in ways that prima facie hold sway for desire. I here examine the plausibility of this idea by proposing several principles for coherent desire. These principles parallel principles for coherent belief and can be used to make a case for a kind of purely conative normativity. I consider (...) several objections to a principle for consistent desiring and reply to them. I conclude that, if attitude-coherence is a mark of rationality, the broadly Humean consensus must be rejected. (shrink)

This paper assesses two different approaches to inner speech that can be found in the literature. One of them regards inner speech as a vehicle of conscious thought. The other holds that inner speech is better characterised as an activity derived from social uses of its outer counterpart. In this paper I focus on the explanatory power of each approach to account for the control of attention and behaviour in the context of executive tasks. I will argue that the vehicle (...) view cannot capture some central cases of inner speech in executive tasks because they cannot be described as cases of bringing thought into consciousness. Then I will offer a revised version of the activity view and I will apply it to some examples so as to show that it is better posited to account for them. I end by considering two objections to the activity view and a possible way to address them. (shrink)

According to a widespread, broadly Humean consensus, desires and other conative attitudes seem as such to be free from any normative constraints of rationality. However, rational subjects are also required to be attitude-coherent in ways that prima facie hold sway for desire. I here examine the plausibility of this idea by proposing several principlesfor coherent desire. These principles parallel principles for coherent belief and can be used to make a case for a kind of purely conative normativity. I consider several (...) objections to a principle for consistent desiring and reply to them. I conclude that, if attitude-coherence is a mark of rationality, the broadly Humean consensus must be rejected. (shrink)

Many historically-influential philosophers had profoundly wrong moral views or behaved very badly. Aristotle thought women were “deformed men” and that some people were slaves “by nature.” Descartes had disturbing views about non-human animals. Hume and Kant were racists. Hegel disparaged Africans. Nietzsche despised sick people. Mill condoned colonialism. Fanon was homophobic. Frege was anti-Semitic; Heidegger was a Nazi. Schopenhauer was sexist. Rousseau abandoned his children. Wittgenstein beat his young students. Unfortunately, these examples are just a start. -/- These philosophers are (...) famous for their intellectual accomplishments, yet they display serious moral or intellectual flaws in their beliefs or actions. At least, some of their views were false, ultimately unjustified and, perhaps, harmful. -/- How should we respond to brilliant-but-flawed philosophers from the past? Here we explore the issues, asking questions and offering few answers. Any insights gained here might be applicable to contemporary imperfect philosophers, scholars in other fields, and people in general. (shrink)

Coherence is a measure of how much our beliefs hang together. Understanding is achieved when we see that something is not just a brute, isolated fact. This suggests that it might be possible to use the extant probabilistic measures of coherence to formulate a measure of understanding. We attempt to do so, but it turns out that a coherence theory runs into trouble with the asymmetry of understanding. We identify four difficulties and show how they have been solved by a (...) unification approach to explanation. We also identify four advantages of the coherence approach, and assess the possibilities of reconciling the strengths of the two approaches.La coherencia es una medida sobre cuanta interdependencia hay entre nuestras creencias. La comprension se obtiene cuando vemos que algo no es un hecho bruto, aislado. Esto sugiere la posibilidad de usar las medidas probabilisticas de coherencia al uso para elaborar una medida de la comprension. Explorare esta posibilidad, a pesar de que una teoria de la coherencia tropieza con problemas aqui dado el caracter asimetrico de la comprension. Identifico cuatro dificultades al respecto y muestro como han sido resueltas mediante un enfoque de la explicacion basado en la nocion de unificacion. Tambien identifico cuatro ventajas en la aproximacion desde la coherencia y examino que perspectivas hay de reconciliar los puntos fuertes de ambos planteamientos. (shrink)

Although there has been significant attention in clinical ethics to when physicians should follow a parent’s wishes, there has been much less discussion of the obligation to solicit viewpoints and decisions from all caregivers who have equal moral and legal standing in relation to a pediatric patient. How should healthcare professionals respond when one caregiver dominates decision making? We present a case that highlights how these problems played out in an ethical bargain. Ethical bargaining occurs when the parties involved choose (...) not to pursue a morally preferable option for the sake of coming to a resolution. This case is not one of parental disagreement; rather, the medical team agreed to exclude the patient’s mother from decision making if the patient’s father promised to bring their son back to the hospital for necessary medical tests. We argue that there is an obligation to notice and acknowledge power asymmetries in the family unit, which, in this case, was manifested as the marginalization of the female decision maker by the male decision maker. In these scenarios, clinicians should be careful to avoid treating parents as one homogenous unit, and they should take action to enable caregivers’ autonomy and voice. While there are moral and practical limits to how and when physicians should intervene in family dynamics, we discuss the steps that the medical team should have taken in this case to avoid undermining the parental authority of the mother. We conclude by offering recommendations to address and enable caregivers’ autonomy at an institutional level, and we discuss the importance of tracking and responding to damaging family dynamics to prevent ethically impermissible bargaining. (shrink)

Las profundas raíces intencionales de los artefactos y sus tipos parecen apoyar intuitiva y filosóficamente una forma de privilegio epistémico de los hacedores con respecto a los objetos que crean. En este artículo examino críticamente la tesis del privilegio epistémico para los creadores de artefactos y presento un contraejemplo basado en el antiindividualismo. Se consideran diversas objeciones a las que se da respuesta. Concluyo que si el antiindividualismo es verdadero, entonces el supuesto privilegio epistémico de los creadores de artefactos o (...) bien es falso, o bien, una etiqueta explicativamente vacía. Defiendo, por último, que incluso si el antiindividualismo nos fuerza a rechazar el privilegio epistémico para tipos artefactuales, estos tipos aún pueden exhibir dependencia mental, tanto semántica como metafísica, algo que los continuaría distinguiendo de los tipos naturales y dejaría intacta su esencial naturaleza intencional. (shrink)

In the fall semester of 1772/73 at the Albertus University of Königsberg, Immanuel Kant, metaphysician and professor of logic and metaphysics, began lectures on anthropology, which he continued until 1776, shortly before his retirement from public life. His lecture notes and papers were first published in 1798, eight years after the publication of the _Critique of Judgment, _the third of his famous _Critiques. _The present edition of the _Anthropology _is a translation of the text found in volume 7 of _Kants (...) gesammelte Schriften, _edited by Oswald Külpe. Kant describes the _Anthropology _as a systematic doctrine of the knowledge of humankind. Kant’s lectures stressed the "pragmatic" approach to the subject because he intended to establish pragmatic anthropology as a regular academic discipline. He differentiates the physiological knowledge of the human race—the investigation of "what Nature makes of man"—from the pragmatic—"what man as a free being makes of himself, what he can make of himself, and what he ought to make of himself." Kant believed that anthropology teaches the knowledge of humankind and makes us familiar with what is pragmatic, not speculative, in relation to humanity. He shows us as world citizens within the context of the cosmos. Summarizing the cloth edition of the _Anthropology, Library Journal _concludes: "Kant’s allusions to such issues as sensation, imagination, judgment, taste, emotion, passion, moral character, and the character of the human species in regard to the ideal of a cosmopolitan society make this work an important resource for English readers who seek to grasp the connections among Kant’s metaphysics of nature, metaphysics of morals, and political theory. The notes of the editor and translator, which incorporate material from Ernst Cassirer’s edition and from Kant’s _marginalia _in the original manuscript, shed considerable light on the text.". (shrink)

This essay discusses a core tenet of pessimism, Afropessimism, in particular. Pessimism claims to be a metatheory analyzing the assumptive logics of the system it critiques. Afropessimists hold that a logical treatment of pessimism is unwarranted because pessimism does not employ a logical treatment of its object. We’ll discuss Afropessimism and, by extension, pessimism, in general, on their own terms as metatheory. We’ll see that a metatheory indirectly follows the logic its object follows directly. From this, a metatheory must hold (...) an assumptive logic of its own, even if superficially disavowed. Consequently, we’ll arrive at a puzzling result when, in this particular case, the metatheory’s claims empty its object of its content, hence the pessimism. (shrink)

This paper discusses Habermas’s characterization of Kierkegaard as a religious author in his main profession and as an existential philosopher on the side. I would like to argue that Kierkegaard is primarily an existential philosopher, also in his function as a religious author. At first, I would like to interpret his religious authorship as a form of indirect communication, and after that I discuss indirect communication as a method of existentialism. In this way, the article aims to demonstrate that Kierkegaard (...) becomes the precursor of existential philosophy not least by his religious authorship as a theory and practice of indirect communication. (shrink)

En este artículo se señala el rastreo conceptual que hace Honneth para explicar la manera en que la negatividad social que surge, a partir del progreso histórico de la razón, da cuenta de la atomización social impuesta por el capitalismo como práctica patológica que genera la cosificación del ser humano. Esta realidad social, en cuanto problema vigente, conduce a la necesidad de reactivar los postulados de la teoría crítica para explicar cómo lo patológico de la razón descrito por Hegel, se (...) constituye, desde la concepción marxista de la historia, en un problema práctico en el que las condiciones materiales, orientadas hacia la lógica de la división del trabajo, ocasionan, según Lukács, que los individuos asuman la costumbre y el hábito de percibirse entre sí como cosas. (shrink)

The present work contains an axiomatic treatment of some parts of the restricted version of intuitionistic mathematics advocated by G. F. C. Griss, also known as negationless intuitionistic mathematics.Formal systems NPC, NA, and FIMN for negationless predicate logic, arithmetic, and analysis are proposed. Our Theorem 4 in Section 2 asserts the translatability of Heyting's arithmetic HAinto NA. The result can in fact be extended to a large class of intuitionistic theories based on HAand their negationless counterparts. For instance, in Section (...) 3 this is shown for Kleene's system of intuitionistic analysis FIMand our FIMN. (shrink)

Seit Platons "Politeia" prägen Utopieentwürfe die europäische Ideengeschichte und spätestens seit Thomas Morus' "Utopia" ist der Terminus 'Utopie' fester Bestandteil der Geisteswissenschaften. Der interdisziplinäre Sammelband offenbart das breite Spektrum europäischer Utopiediskurse in geistes-, kultur- und ideengeschichtlichen Disziplinen. Im Mittelpunkt stehen Idealvorstellungen und Visionen sowie Fragen nach kultureller Identität und Projektionen einer möglichen Wertegemeinschaft. Die historische Schwerpunktsetzung untersucht dabei die Konstitution und Transformation utopischer Konzepte in Europa von der Antike bis in die Gegenwart.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Forms of Life and Cultural EndowmentsVictor Peterson IIYou know, honey, us colored folk is branches without roots and that makes things come round in queer ways.—Zora Neale Hurston (Their Eyes Were Watching God 15)what does it mean when we speak of a form of life? When speaking of a form of life, we consider one different from others by way of its mode of expression, that is, by its (...) means of construction. This interpretation lends itself to a functional analysis of the material put to use and whose operations jointly express the concept we are after. Modes of expression can be plotted between a rhetorical and semantic axis (Gates 48). As such, "[t]he level of connotation of the visual sign, of its contextual reference and positioning in different discursive fields of meaning and association, is the point where already coded signs intersect with the deep semantic codes of a culture and take on additional more active ideological dimensions" (Hall 56). Coordinates within this domain encode signifying practices, revitalizing the traditional concept of signification as a function of what's signified with respect to a signifier. The content of a syntagm in this coordinate system, a point in this plane, indexes its function with respect to others. As such, we will conceive of the content of modes of expression functionally.A function is defined by pairing an element from a domain and another from a sub/co-domain whereby that pair is an element of that function. In this way, we can treat functions as abstract objects. If we treat a domain as what determines the availability of an expression, and a sub/co-domain as representative of its range of application, then the function of applying some proposition maps a movement from a domain of selection to one of composition, that is, its use with respect to others. The function of an expression, then, represents an operation over the possible worlds of its appropriate application (Taylor 201–02, 269, 276). This becomes more interesting when considering assertions whereby one subject is known to be the case for another, a concept that's modeled when a proposition from one is appearing in the object position of another (Fara 65–73). Resultingly, a proposal for an [End Page 26] ontology constituted by modes of interaction rather than identity stipulations to physical entities arises. It follows that if a form of life is understood by way of its mode of expression, then its content is expressed as an ensemble of the functions of its operations. Let this ensemble of functions be called an endowment.There is a pervasive debate in cultural studies that obsesses over proprietary notions as well as the ability to locate an origin. With that in mind, let us consider a coordinate system where there are two perpendicular axes, and we define positions within the space provided at the intersection of lines drawn from each. Each axis is represented by an ordered series of markers. A line drawn from each axis indicates that the coordinates indexed at their intersection is a function of these two markers. This locates an individual at a point in that domain, indexing a relation between the axes framing that space. Therefore, that coordinate-wise space, here a domain of possible expression, is not "empty" as pessimists would claim, but is filled with functional-content, albeit functions yet applied and marked by a point in that plane.Although we are currently speaking of two-dimensional space, the same follows for as many dimensions as we want. A point's location is a function of three values in three dimensions, four in four dimensions, and so on. Forms of life, then, will be comprised of four dimensions. This allows for a space-time conception, wherein joint expressions bend space-time and that space dictates those individuals' possible movements. From this, we construct a geometrical model of space-time represented as a cube composed of two-dimensional slices with these slices extending in a particular direction like cards stacked one on top of the other to model time.We want our conception of a form of life to be spatial. After all, it... (shrink)

Inquiry will be made here into a specific challenge facing writers offabulae palliatae, namely the interior scene, which they had not always the same means to display as did the poets of the νέα they adapted. One of them, Terence, will be seen to have reacted by eliminating the interior scenes that he found in his models.

Loneliness has been reframed from a ‘social problem of old age’ into a major public health problem. This transformation has been generated by findings from observational studies of a relationship between loneliness and a range of negative health outcomes including dementia. From a public health perspective, key to evaluating the relationship between loneliness and dementia is examining how studies define and measure loneliness, the exposure variable, and dementia the outcome. If we are not consistently measuring these then building a body (...) of evidence for the negative health outcomes of loneliness is problematic. Three key criteria had to meet for studies to be included in our analysis. To test the proposition that loneliness is a cause of dementia we only included longitudinal studies. For inclusion studies had to measure loneliness at baseline, have samples free of dementia and assess dementia at follow up. We identified 11 papers published between 2000 and 2018 that meet these criteria. These studies included seven different countries and only one was specifically focused upon dementia: all other studies were cohort studies focused upon ageing and health and wellbeing. There was extensive heterogeneity in how studies measured loneliness and dementia and in the use of co-variates. Loneliness was measured by either self-rating scales or scales. Dementia was assessed by clinical tests, diagnostic/screening tools, cognitive function tests, and self-reported doctor diagnosis. Substantial variation in loneliness prevalence and dementia incidence. Six studies did not report a statistically significant relationship between loneliness and dementia. Significant excess risk of dementia among those who were lonely ranged from 15% to 64%. None of these studies are directly comparable as four different loneliness and dementia measures were used. We suggest that the evidence to support a relationship between loneliness and dementia is inconclusive largely because of methodological limitations of existing studies. If we wish to develop this evidence base, then using a consistent set of loneliness and dementia outcome measures in major longitudinal studies would be of benefit. (shrink)

Ausgehend von der Disparatheit diverser systematischer Definitions- und Konturierungsversuche zur Existenzphilosophie rekonstruiert die vorliegende Studie die philosophiehistorischen Prämissen dieser Strömung, um im Anschluss daran einheitsstiftende Momente herauszuarbeiten. Zentrale These der Untersuchung ist, dass Søren Kierkegaard und Friedrich Nietzsche die beiden ebenbürtigen Initialfiguren der Existenzphilosophie sind. Mittels der systematischen Schwerpunkte Metaphysik, Anthropologie, Ethik und Darstellungsformen von Philosophie werden die inhaltlichen Umbrüche, die Kierkegaard und Nietzsche im Denken des 19. Jahrhunderts vollzogen und die somit die Voraussetzungen für die Existenzphilosophie bilden, im Detail (...) analysiert. Waren Kierkegaard und Nietzsche zu ihren Lebzeiten noch „Unzeitgemäße“, so entfaltet ihr Denken im 20. Jahrhundert sein ganzes wirkungsgeschichtliches Potenzial, das in der Existenzphilosophie seinesgleichen sucht – beide werden zu „Zeitgemäßen“. Im Anschluss an diese philosophiehistorischen Analysen und unter Berücksichtigung des wirkungsgeschichtlichen Kontextes beider Initialfiguren erfolgt der Entwurf eines Katalogs sowohl historischer als auch systematischer Merkmale der Existenzphilosophie. (shrink)

A ampliação de políticas econômicas liberais desencadeará na democratização da China. Esse argumento repetido por artigos acadêmicos encontra suas expectativas frustradas diariamente por notícias de recrudescimento do poder do Partido Comunista da China sobre sua sociedade. O artigo analisa a construção da identidade nacional fundada na humilhação nacional como estratégia de difusão da legitimidade da elite política chinesa a partir de uma percepção do nacionalismo como essencial para manutenção da estabilidade do regime. Para isso estuda a formação da identidade nacional, (...) a constituição dos grupos dentro da elite política da China e a elaboração do conceito de Poder Nacional Compreensivo. (shrink)

Según la doctrina del “discurso del odio”, todo mensaje calificable como tal supondrá por definición un abuso del derecho fundamental a la libertad de expresión. Esta doctrina, elaborada en distintas etapas por el TEDH a lo largo de las últimas décadas, ha sido seguida por la jurisprudencia española como pauta interpretativa de los llamados “delitos apologéticos”. En atención a esta linea, la ratio legis de este grupo de delitos consistiría, simplemente, en la prohibición del discurso del odio. La vaguedad de (...) esta idea ha llevado a un sector doctrinal a abandonar el paradigma del bien jurídico, para defender como alternativa la distinción entre daño y ofensa. En el presente trabajo se expondrán y valorarán críticamente los presupuestos y efectos de la “doctrina del odio” y se relativizará la eficacia práctica del binomio “daño-ofensa”, para llegar a una conclusión común: ambas concepciones son tautológicas. (shrink)