There is currently great controversy over the contribution antimicrobial use in animal agriculture has made to antimicrobial resistance in pathogenic bacteria with negative consequences for human health. In light of this, the approval process for antimicrobials used in US animal agriculture, known as New Animal Drug Application or NADA, is currently being revised by the federal government. We explore the public deliberations over the development of these new policies focusing our attention on the interaction between pharmaceutical companies and the U.S. (...) Food and Drug Administration. What appears to be an antagonistic public discourse is examined in terms of its ability to simultaneously legitimate the roles of the Food and Drug Administration as the official arbiter of policy on antimicrobial use in animal agriculture and as a protector of the public welfare, as well as the role of pharmaceutical companies as the producers of safe and effective products necessary for the protection of public well-being. (shrink)

The purpose of this text is to draw attention to eight forgotten heroes: William C. Bagley, Charles DeGarmo, David Felmley, William Torrey Harris, Isaac L. Kandel, Charles McMurry, William C. Ruediger, and Edward Austin Sheldon. They have been marginalized from our profession, and drawing upon their legacy is the best hope for restoring the profession of teaching today. This work also includes a chapter at the end of the book entitled "John Dewey's Forgotten Essays." The audience for this book includes: (...) 1) classroom teachers, 2) school administrators, 3) teacher educators, 4) deans and other university administrators, 5) college and university presidents, 6) legislators, 7) historians of education, 8) curriculum specialists, 9) specialists in teacher training, and 10) the general public. (shrink)

William Dean is a tireless proponent of a public role for religion in American society, most recently in his American Academy of Religion award winning book The Religious Critic in American Culture . He writes there about the importance of, and need for, both a common American spiritual culture and public intellectuals who would understand, criticize, and innovatively rework that shared American religion. Dean represents a metaphysical strand of American pragmatism. His thought is rooted in William James’s radical (...) empiricism, Bernard Meland’s and Bernard Loomer’s empirical theology, and Alfred North Whitehead’s process metaphysics. He takes seriously what I will call the problem of cosmic estrangement. The American public religion that he advocates, among other things, is supposed to resolve that problem. Its theoretical core is Dean’s version of Whiteheadian panpsychism, which he calls ontological conventionalism. (shrink)

Sheila Davaney’s Pragmatic Historicism provides yet another opportunity for us to discuss disagreements between two kinds of pragmatism. One, which I espouse, is a non-metaphysical pragmatism. It is rooted in James’s and Dewey’s appropriation of Darwinian biology for philosophical purposes and, more recently, Donald Davidson’s philosophy of language. Richard Rorty is its most influential contemporary spokesman. The other is a metaphysical pragmatism. It is rooted in James’s radical empiricism and Whitehead’s process philosophy. In the Highlands Institute, William Dean and (...) now Davaney, among others, advocate versions of metaphysical pragmatism. (shrink)

It is a privilege to be invited to contribute to the Festschrift dedicated to Professor Johan Buitendag, Emeritus Dean, Faculty of Theology and Religion at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. While his own work often examined the relationship between theology and natural science, he was also passionate about ecumenism and, in that spirit, the present essay utilised what might be described as an inductive approach to an important ecumenical question, the unity between Methodists and Catholics. Ecumenical dialogue is (...) often undertaken from a theological and dogmatic perspective. This essay took a different approach in that it sought to inductively examine what might be described as the inner logic of two ecclesial systems (Methodist and Catholic). In doing so, it was premised upon an Aristotelian philosophical principle, epistemic fit, in that it presupposed that both these ecclesial bodies possess an intrinsic logic that can be brought to the surface in order to exhibit parallel contours in the wider ecclesial terrain.Contribution: This article fits well within the scope of HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies in that it contributed to a new subdiscipline in epistemology, which explores the conceptual and epistemological dimensions of ecclesiology. Using the concept of epistemic fit, the article offered an inductive approach to some of the practical issues that emerge in ecumenical dialogue. (shrink)

What is spacetime? General relativity and quantum field theory answer this question in very different ways. This collection of essays by physicists and philosophers looks at the problem of uniting these two most fundamental theories of our world, focusing on the nature of space and time within this new quantum framework, and the kind of metaphysical picture suggested by recent developments in physics and mathematics. This is a book that will inspire further philosophical reflection on recent advances in modern physics.

In this paper I wish to make some headway on understanding what \emph{kind} of problem the ``problem of time'' is, and offer a possible resolution---or, rather, a new way of understanding an old resolution. The response I give is a variation on a theme of Rovelli's \emph{evolving constants of motion} strategy. I argue that by giving correlation strategies a \emph{structuralist} basis, a number of objections to the standard account can be blunted. Moreover, I show that the account I offer provides (...) a suitable ontology for time in both classical and quantum canonical general relativity. (shrink)

I argue that, under the glitz, dual theories are examples of theoretically equivalent descriptions of the same underlying physical content: I distinguish them from cases of genuine underdetermination on the grounds that there is no real incompatibility involved between the descriptions. The incompatibility is at the level of unphysical structure. I argue that dual pairs are in fact very strongly analogous to gauge- related solutions even for dual pairs that look the most radically distinct, such as AdS/CFT.

‘Quantum Gravity’ does not denote any existing theory: the field of quantum gravity is very much a ‘work in progress’. As you will see in this chapter, there are multiple lines of attack each with the same core goal: to find a theory that unifies, in some sense, general relativity (Einstein’s classical field theory of gravitation) and quantum field theory (the theoretical framework through which we understand the behaviour of particles in non-gravitational fields). Quantum field theory and general relativity seem (...) to be like oil and water, they don’t like to mix—it is fair to say that combining them to produce a theory of quantum gravity constitutes the greatest unresolved puzzle in physics. Our goal in this chapter is to give the reader an impression of what the problem of quantum gravity is; why it is an important problem; the ways that have been suggested to resolve it; and what philosophical issues these approaches, and the problem itself, generate. This review is extremely selective, as it has to be to remain a manageable size: generally, rather than going into great detail in some area, we highlight the key features and the options, in the hope that readers may take up the problem for themselves—however, some of the basic formalism will be introduced so that the reader is able to enter the physics and (what little there is of) the philosophy of physics literature prepared. I have also supplied references for those cases where I have omitted some important facts. Hence, this chapter is intended primarily as a catalyst for future research projects by philosophers of physics, both budding and well-matured. (shrink)

Background independence is generally considered to be ‘the mark of distinction’ of general relativity. However, there is still confusion over exactly what background independence is and how, if at all, it serves to distinguish general relativity from other theories. There is also some confusion over the philosophical implications of background independence, stemming in part from the definitional problems. In this paper I attempt to make some headway on both issues. In each case I argue that a proper account of the (...) observables of such theories goes a long way in clarifying matters. Further, I argue, against common claims to the contrary, that the fact that these observables are relational has no bearing on the debate between substantivalists and relationalists, though I do think it recommends a structuralist ontology, as I shall endeavour to explain. (shrink)

The dominance of string theory in the research landscape of quantum gravity physics (despite any direct experimental evidence) can, I think, be justified in a variety of ways. Here I focus on an argument from mathematical fertility, broadly similar to Hilary Putnam’s ‘no miracles argument’ that, I argue, many string theorists in fact espouse in some form or other. String theory has generated many surprising, useful, and well-confirmed mathematical ‘predictions’—here I focus on mirror symmetry and the mirror theorem. These predictions (...) were made on the basis of general physical principles entering into string theory. The success of the mathematical predictions are then seen as evidence for the framework that generated them. I shall attempt to defend this argument, but there are nonetheless some serious objections to be faced. These objections can only be evaded at a considerably high (philosophical) price. (shrink)

"Introducing the reader to the very latest developments in the philosophical foundations of physics, this book covers advanced material at a level suitable for ...

How do we know what other speakers say? Perhaps the most natural view is that we hear a speaker's utterance and infer what was said, drawing on our competence in the syntax and semantics of the language. An alternative view that has emerged in the literature is that native speakers have a non-inferential capacity to perceive the content of speech. Call this the perceptual view. The disagreement here is best understood as an epistemological one about whether our knowledge of what (...) speakers say is epistemically mediated by our linguistic competence. The present paper takes up the question of how we should go about settling this issue. Arguments for the perceptual view generally appeal to the phenomenology of speech comprehension. The present paper develops a line of argument for the perceptual view that draws on evidence from empirical psychology. The evidence suggests that a speaker's core syntactic and semantic competence is typically deployed sub-personally. The point is not just that the competence is tacit or unconscious, but that the person is not the locus of the competence. I argue that standing competence can enter into the grounds for knowledge only if it is subject to a certain sort of epistemic assessment, an assessment that is appropriate only if the person is the locus of that competence. If the person is not the locus of a speaker's core linguistic competence, as the psychological evidence suggests, then that competence does not enter into the grounds for our knowledge of what speakers say. If this line of argument is right, it has implications for the epistemology of perception and for our understanding of how empirical psychology bears on epistemology generally. (shrink)

Higher-Order Perception (HOP) theories in the philosophy of mind are offered as explanations of what it is that makes a mental state a conscious state. According to HOP, a mental state is conscious just in case it is itself represented in a quasi-perceptual way by an internal monitor or scanning device. We start with one of the more popular objections to HOP and a seemingly innocuous concession to it: identifying the internal monitor with the faculty of attention. We show how (...) this concession undermines HOP. (shrink)

The propagation of causal influences through space-time seems to play a fundamental role in scientific explanation. Taking as a point of departure a basic distinction between causal interactions (which are localized in space-time) and causal processes (which may extend through vast regions of space-time), this paper attempts an analysis of the concept of causal propagation on the basis of the ability of causal processes to transmit "marks." The analysis rests upon the "at-at" theory of motion which has figured prominently in (...) the resolution of Zeno's arrow paradox. It is argued that this explication does justice to the concept of the ability of causal processes to transmit causal influence without invoking anti-Humean "powers" or "necessary connections.". (shrink)

Speculations about the role of consciousness in physical systems are frequently observed in the literature concerned with the interpretation of quantum mechanics. While only three experimental investigations can be found on this topic in physics journals, more than 800 relevant experiments have been reported in the literature of parapsychology. A well-defined body of empirical evidence from this domain was reviewed using meta-analytic techniques to assess methodological quality and overall effect size. Results showed effects conforming to chance expectation in control conditions (...) and unequivocal non-chance effects in experimental conditions. This quantitative literature review agrees with the findings of two earlier reviews, suggesting the existence of some form of consciousness-related anomaly in random physical systems. (shrink)

Interpreting physical theories -- General concepts of physics -- Symmetries in physics -- Getting philosophy from symmetry -- Further adventures in space and time -- Linking micro to macro -- Quantum philosophy -- On the edge : a snapshot of advanced topics.

A deeper meaning for quantum theory is presented, integrating recent developments in participatory realist approaches to quantum mechanics with older ideas involving ineffability and nothingness. I argue that Schelling's notion of the Godhead serves as a useful way of interpreting a superposition which then grounds both our freedom and the indeterminacy of quantum phenomena that makes the theory function.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Health Care Ethics: A Comprehensive Christian Resource by James R. ThobabenPaul D. SimmonsHealth Care Ethics: A Comprehensive Christian Resource by James R. Thobaben Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2009. 429pp. $28.00In recent years, a stir has been created by the vocal and aggressive involvement of evangelicals in such issues as abortion, homosexuality, and end-of-life decisions. James Thobaben, the dean of Asbury Seminary, provides what he calls a (...) [End Page 203] “comprehensive resource” for evangelicals, and promises better understandings of their perspectives and commitments for those who are baffled or frustrated by the actions and claims of those on the religious right.Thobaben casts a wide net when defining those he includes as “evangelicals”—Southern Baptists, members of Campus Crusade, Pentecostals, the Holiness movement, neoevangelicals, charismatics, and Anabaptists. These diverse groups are evangelicals because of their “consistency on moral choices,” doctrinal orientation, and styles of social advocacy (24). Although they differ in a number of ways, they all share having been influenced in some way by John and Charles Wesley, Jonathan Edwards, and the Reformation. All stress conversion in that “one must say yes to the divine Jesus Christ” and become identified with the community of faithful believers (57). And in recent decades, they have become a potent political force with regard to the issues of abortion and homosexuality.Thobaben covers a wide range of topics in this book: from a general discussion of theodicy and healing to bioethics, disability, sickness, family and congregational care, professional truthfulness, managing care, end-of-life decisions, assisted reproduction, organ donation, and death. Yet, although he claims to provide a “comprehensive resource” on evangelical Christian health care ethics, he fails to provide a thorough examination of his subject matter. For example, Thobaben pays little attention to the historic beginnings of the religious right. One misses any mention of political action groups or the coalitions formed with or by conservative Christian groups to pursue social reforms, or of why such disparate groups have cooperated for political or social goals under the same umbrella. He focuses solely on identifying and articulating the consensus among those who embrace certain moral values on the current scene. Thobaben’s uncritical approach to his subject matter leaves the impression that this book is essentially an apology for evangelical, right-wing Christian social thought. One searches in vain for any critical discussion of the beliefs and values he presents or any thoughtful engagement with those who might view the stances he presents as an assault against women’s rights or an attack on the rights of gays, lesbians, and transsexuals.Moreover, in a book like this, one would have expected a more careful assessment of biblical passages and historical precedents. Thobaben does not provide much rationale for his method for moving from the Bible to current social issues. For example, no prohibition against abortion is found in the Bible and the few passages about homosexual practices hardly add up to the fierce opposition to gays found among strident evangelicals. Moreover, Thobaben does not mention that in 1965 laws against contraceptives were declared unconstitutional by the Griswold vs. Connecticut decision, the Supreme Court’s rejection of a ban supported by an evangelical crusade led by Anthony Comstock. [End Page 204]It is interesting to note that Thobaben holds a strongly qualified commitment to religious liberty and only a “thin” version of the social contract basic to the Bill of Rights (37). He argues that in at least some situations “intolerance is not only morally understandable but strongly preferable,” as in the examples of the “abolition of slavery and prolife/antiabortion advocacy” (29) or, in another context—where he distinguishes between tolerance toward those outside the church and intolerance toward those within it—with regard to homosexuality and alcohol intoxication (30).The task of Christian ethics is to enlighten believers and the general citizenry by a careful exposition of the sources of wisdom available to those who want to think and think morally about issues of importance to human flourishing. That task is especially important in an age of demagogic hostility toward unpopular groups. Sadly, this book does not engage such critical questions. It may prove... (shrink)

In this paper I examine the connection between symmetry and modality from the perspective of `reduction' methods in geometric mechanics. I begin by setting the problem up as a choice between two opposing views: reduction and non-reduction. I then discern four views on the matter in the literature; they are distinguished by their advocation of distinct geometric spaces as representing `reality'. I come down in favour of non-reductive methods.

I examine the early history of quantum gravity and comment on its suitability as an episode that demands an integrated approach to history and philosophy of science.

In this chapter I consider what recent work on background independent physics can do for structuralism, and what structuralism can do for background independent physics. I focus on the problems of time and observables in gravitational physics. The ‘frozen’ character of the observables of general relativity is usually considered to constitute a serious problem for the theory. I argue that by invoking correlations between physical quantities we can provide a natural explanation of the appear- ance of time and change in (...) timeless structures. I argue that this response can resolve a problem with Max Tegmark’s ‘extreme structuralist’ position. I then consider what bearing the mathematical representation used has on the debate over the nature of structure in discussions of structural realism. I argue that it has both the resources to ground the notion of structure in physics and to answer the ‘no relations without relata’ objection. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Religion within the Limits of History Alone: Pragmatic Historicism and the Future of Theology by Demian WheelerNancy FrankenberryReligion within the Limits of History Alone: Pragmatic Historicism and the Future of Theology. Demian Wheeler. Albany: SUNY Press, 2020. ix+511pp. $95.00 hardcover.The history of Christian theology since the Enlightenment has been a series of unsuccessful attempts to evade a stark dilemma: either fundamentalism or atheism. Contemporary liberal theologians have argued (...) that this dilemma is [End Page 97] entirely too stark, too eliminative of the creative possibilities of revisionism. Liberal theology has wanted to revise and reinterpret Christian faith in conformity with history, reason, a scientific worldview, and a sophisticated grasp of the significance of symbol, analogy, and metaphor in the lives of religious practitioners. Eliminating both supernaturalism and anthropomorphism, liberal theology would make Christianity more intellectually tenable, rescuing it from the literalist hands of fundamentalists, without collapsing it into the equally literalist arms of atheism.The extreme difficulty of evading the either-or dilemma of choosing either fundamentalism or atheism landed liberal theology in a catch-22: either it rejected the intellectually untenable elements of belief, in which case it eliminated just those beliefs that constituted its appeal to popular piety, or it retained certain supernaturalistic and anthropomorphic beliefs, understood as “symbolic,” in which case it forfeited intellectual intelligibility and any appeal to sophisticated moderns. The first version is far too weakened for ordinary American Christians, and the second is still too religious for the masters of suspicion and their followers.It is for this reason that the history of American religious thought reveals a grave irony that complicates the hopes of pragmatic historicists, the protagonists of this superbly clear and rich, deep dive into authors that most readers of this journal will have read, but perhaps not have synthesized as thoroughly as has Demian Wheeler. That irony, as Wheeler knows, is that the more intellectual changes pragmatic historicists make to traditional Christian belief, the more they help to make unbelief viable. The question then arises as to whether pragmatic historicism is simply a half-way house on the road to an atheistic destination. Or, if the word “atheism” sounds too old-fashioned, like something that went out with steamships and girdles, then “agnosticism.” Or, if “agnosticism” still smacks too much of stale debates, why not “pantheism,” as recently revived by Mary-Jane Rubenstein?The detailed development, the verbal bravura, and the measured knowledge in this book are astonishingly impressive. Wheeler’s initial thesis is that liberal theology, particularly of the early Chicago School, and American pragmatism, particularly C. S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, provide important resources for meeting the challenges posed by the rise of historical consciousness. Sheila Davaney has designated this tradition “pragmatic historicism,” and Wheeler aims to show its compelling import for the future of theology itself. A good deal of the book is devoted to exposition and defense of the views of: Ernst Troeltsch, James, Dewey, George Burman Foster, Shirley Jackson Case, Shailer Matthews, and Gerald Birney Smith, down to Delwin Brown, Sheila Davaney, and William Dean (Wheeler’s teachers at Iliff), along with Gordon [End Page 98] Kaufman and Sallie McFague. In the last chapter, Wheeler draws expertly on the theological views of Bernard Loomer, Michael Hogue, Donald Crosby, and Wesley Wildman. Such an all-star cast deserves to receive all the attention they can get. Wheeler’s occasional emendations come as glittering nuggets of constructive engagement. He does not simply call for a pragmatic historicist approach to theology, but he executes one as well, showing in more detail than his predecessors what it means for such topics as religious diversity (chapters 3 and 4), the nature of authority (chapter 5), the meaning of critical realism, fallibilism, and an altered correspondence theory of truth (chapters 6 and 7), and the doctrine of God (chapter 8). With the same exhaustive treatment that his doktorvater Gary Dorrien has devoted to liberal theology’s history and contemporary expressions, Wheeler carefully saves pragmatic historicism from relativism, expertly critiques all the leading theologians of the “inclusivist,” “exclusivist,” and “pluralist” theologies of religions, while arguing the superiority of his own “particularist” corrective to pluralistic... (shrink)

Stephen Wolfram has recently outlined an unorthodox, multicomputational approach to fundamental theory, encompassing not only physics but also mathematics in a structure he calls The Ruliad, understood to be the entangled limit of all possible computations. In this framework, physical laws arise from the the sampling of the Ruliad by observers (including us). This naturally leads to several conceptual issues, such as what kind of object is the Ruliad? What is the nature of the observers carrying out the sampling, and (...) how do they relate to the Ruliad itself? What is the precise nature of the sampling? This paper provides a philosophical examination of these questions, and other related foundational issues, including the identification of a limitation that must face any attempt to describe or model reality in such a way that the modeller-observers are included. (shrink)

In Kantian Consequentialism, David Cummiskey argues that the central ideas of Kant's moral philosophy provide claims about value which, if applied consistently, lead to consequentialist normative principles. While Kant himself was not a consequentialist, Cummiskey thinks he should have been, given his fundamental positions in ethics. I argue that Cummiskey is mistaken. Cummiskey's argument relies on a non-Kantian idea about value, namely that value can be defined, and objects with value identified, conceptually prior to and independent of the choices that (...) a rational agent would make. The contrasting Kantian concept of value is that to possess value is to be the object of of rational choice. Inasmuch as Cummiskey gives no reason to reject the Kantian account of value in favour of his own account, his argument does not establish that Kant's ethics inevitably leads to normative consequentialism. (shrink)

Why do women have more difficulty pursuing research careers than men? Although this topic has been extensively investigated in industrialized countries, prior studies provide little comparative evidence from less-developed areas. Based on a survey of 293 scientists in Ghana, Kenya, and the Indian state of Kerala, this article examines gender differences on a variety of individual, social, and organizational dimensions. The results show small or nonexistent differences between women and men in individual characteristics, professional resources, and the organizational conditions under (...) which research is conducted. The article argues that a combination of educational and research localism increases the likelihood of restricted professional networks for women. Gender inequality in the research systems of the developing world may be based on systemic deficits in the acquisition of social rather than material resources. The most important implication is that educational policy for development should focus on international opportunities for women in the near future. (shrink)

Many of the advances in string theory have been generated by the discovery of new duality symmetries connecting what were once thought to be distinct theories, solu- tions, processes, backgrounds, and more. Indeed, duality has played an enormously important role in the creation and development of numerous theories in physics and numerous fields of mathematics. Dualities often lie at those fruitful intersections at which mathematics and physics are especially strongly intertwined. In this paper I describe some of these dualities and (...) unpack some of their philosophical conse- quences, focusing primarily on string-theoretic dualities. I argue that dualities fall uncomfortably between symmetries and gauge redundancies, but that they differ in that they point to genuinely new deeper structures. (shrink)

Philosophy, science, and history -- Logic and philosophy of science -- Demarcation and the scientific method -- The nature of scientific theories.

In their modern classic ``What Price Substantivalism? The Hole Story'' Earman and Norton argued that substantivalism about spacetime points implies that general relativity is indeterministic and, for that reason, must be rejected as a candidate ontology for the theory. More recently, Earman has cottoned on to a related argument (in fact, related to a \emph{response} to the hole argument) that arises in the context of canonical general relativity, according to which the enforcing of determinism along standard lines---using the machinery of (...) gauge theory---leads to a `frozen universe' picture (grounded in an absence of changes in values of general relativity's observables). \emph{Prima facie} this would seem to land the anti-substantivalist in waters at least as deep as those that Earman and Norton argued troubled substantivalism. In this paper I introduce the argument in what I think are clearer terms than Earman's, and assess his treatment of the problem. For the most part I agree with Earman about the nature of the problem, but I find aspects of his discussion wanting, especially as regards his proposed ontology. I argue that ontological sense can be made of the changelessness if a structuralist stance is adopted with respect to a natural class of observables. (shrink)

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein wrote: “Skepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical when it tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked.” In this paper I show how Wittgenstein developed this insight in On Certainty. My principal aim is to show that this is a logical insight, that it is bound up with the distinction between saying and showing, and that one misses the point of On Certainty if one reads it, as some commentators have, in epistemological terms. (...) Throughout all of this I pay special attention to why Wittgenstein thought that skepticism is nonsensical, and what it might mean to say that philosophy is a logical investigation. (shrink)

This work provides a thorough index of terms found in Ludwig Wittgenstein's On Certainty. The index includes not only every philosophical term found in Wittgenstein's text, but also many non-philosophical terms when they are used in highly charged philosophical contexts. In all, there are some 575 main entries. Moreover, a concerted effort is made to indicate in what connections a given term is used by adding subordinate qualifying phrases to the main entries. For crucial terms (e.g., 'know,' 'proposition,' 'doubt,' etc.) (...) the sub-entries indicating context are quite extensive. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Byzantinische Zeitschrift Jahrgang: 108 Heft: 1 Seiten: 169-178.

Given that worlds are defined compositionally as maximally spatiotemporally interrelated sums of possible objects, or as recombinations of actual states of affairs: what of empty worlds? It seems that such theories cannot admit such worlds, for nothing cannot come from the fusion or recombination of something. This is generally supposed to rule out metaphysical nihilism, the claim that there might have been nothing. In this brief note, I argue that the two positions can be made compatible by modifying the relationship (...) between possibilities and possible worlds. (shrink)

Public health involves the application of a wide variety of scientific and non-scientific disciplines to the very practical problems of improving population health and preventing disease. Public health has received surprisingly little attention from philosophers of science. In this chapter we consider some neglected but important philosophical aspects of the science of public health.

This (somewhat polemical) paper focuses on the ontological nature of money and draws comparisons to the ontological status of gauge freedom in physics. The parallels allow us to move beyond the social constructivist theories of Searle et al., and thereby avoid some pitfalls with such views. Since we have a reasonably good grasp of the ontological features in the physics context, we can pull back lessons from there onto the economic domain. In general, we find that this approach offers a (...) nice lens through which to view the ontological peculiarities of money. (shrink)