Various strands of religious thought distinguish veneration from worship. According to these traditions, believers ought to worship God alone. To worship anything else, they say, is idolatry. And yet many of these same believers also claim to venerate—but not worship—saints, angels, images, relics, tombs, and even each other. But what's the difference? Tim Bayne and Yujin Nagasawa (2006: 302) are correct that “it seems to be extremely difficult to distinguish veneration from worship.” Many have argued throughout history that veneration collapses (...) into worship and that those who venerate saints or icons are guilty of idolatry. In this essay, we distinguish worship from veneration in two stages. First, we give a formal account of their difference. Drawing from St. John of Damascus (c. 675-749 AD), we argue that worship is a determinate of the determinable veneration. Second, we give more substantive accounts of both that explain their differences and similarities. Drawing again from St John, we argue that acts of veneration and worship signify subordination. Their difference, however, lies in the fact that worship alone requires absolute subordination. (shrink)

People of faith, particularly in the Judeo-Christian tradition, worship corporately at least as often, if not more so, than they do individually. Why do they do this? There are, of course, many reasons, some having to do with personal preference and others having to do with the theology of worship. But, in this paper, we explore one reason, a philosophical reason, which, despite recent work on the philosophy of liturgy, has gone underappreciated. In particular, we argue that corporate worship enables (...) a person to come to know God better than they would otherwise know him in individual worship. (shrink)

Although worship has a pivotal place in religious thought and practice, philosophers of religion have had remarkably little to say about it. In this paper we examine some of the many questions surrounding the notion of worship, focusing on the claim that human beings have obligations to worship God. We explore a number of attempts to ground our supposed duty to worship God, and argue that each is problematic. We conclude by examining the implications of this result, and suggest that (...) it might be taken to provide an argument against God's existence, since theists generally regard it is a necessary truth that we ought to worship God. (shrink)

In this article, I consider how recent work on the philosophy of group-agency and shared-agency can help us to understand what it is for a church to act in worship. I argue that to assess a model’s suitability for providing such an account, we must consider how well it handles cases of non-paradigm participants, such as those with autism spectrum disorder and young infants. I suggest that whilst a shared-agency model helps to clarify how individuals coordinate actions in cases of (...) reading or singing liturgy, it does not handle non-paradigm cases well and so cannot be considered a suitable model of group liturgical action. Instead, I suggest that a model of groupagency, in which a plurality of action types can contribute to the actions of a group as a whole, is better suited to explaining a church’s actions in worship. (shrink)

This article examines two arguments that a worship-worthy agent cannot command worship. The first argument is based on the idea that any agent who commands worship is egotistical, and hence not worship-worthy. The second argument is based on Campbell Brown and Yujin Nagasawa's (2005) idea that people cannot comply with the command to worship because if people are offering genuine worship, they cannot be motivated by a command to do so. One might then argue that a worship-worthy agent would have (...) no reason to issue a command to worship. I argue that both these arguments fail. (shrink)

In this article, we review the psychology of hero development and hero worship. We propose that heroes and hero narratives fulfill important cognitive and emotional needs, including the need for wisdom, meaning, hope, inspiration, and growth. We propose a framework called the heroic leadership dynamic to explain how need-based heroism shifts over time, from our initial attraction to heroes to later retention or repudiation of heroes. Central to the HLD is idea that hero narratives fulfill both epistemic and energizing functions. (...) Hero stories provide epistemic benefits by providing scripts for prosocial action, by revealing fundamental truths about human existence, by unpacking life paradoxes, and by cultivating emotional intelligence. To energize us, heroes promote moral elevation, heal psychic wounds, inspire psychological growth, and exude charisma. We discuss the implications of our framework for theory and research on heroism, leadership processes, and positive psychology. (shrink)

In this article, we review the psychology of hero development and hero worship. We propose that heroes and hero narratives fulfill important cognitive and emotional needs, including the need for wisdom, meaning, hope, inspiration, and growth. We propose a framework called the heroic leadership dynamic to explain how need-based heroism shifts over time, from our initial attraction to heroes to later retention or repudiation of heroes. Central to the HLD is idea that hero narratives fulfill both epistemic and energizing functions. (...) Hero stories provide epistemic benefits by providing scripts for prosocial action, by revealing fundamental truths about human existence, by unpacking life paradoxes, and by cultivating emotional intelligence. To energize us, heroes promote moral elevation, heal psychic wounds, inspire psychological growth, and exude charisma. We discuss the implications of our framework for theory and research on heroism, leadership processes, and positive psychology. (shrink)

People of faith, particularly in the Judeo-Christian tradition, worship corporately at least as often, if not more so, than they do individually. Why do they do this? There are, of course, many reasons, some having to do with personal preference and others having to do with the theology of worship. But, in this paper, we explore one reason, a philosophical reason, which, despite recent work on the philosophy of liturgy, has gone underappreciated. In particular, we argue that corporate worship enables (...) a person to come to know God better than they would otherwise know him in individual worship. (shrink)

Use of narrative metaphors in moral theory makes possible an account of public worship as the ground for Christian moral life. By enabling us to picture how our moral agency acknowledges the living God, such worship grounds the principle that Christian moral endeavor takes shape in God's living presence. The community professes that, in its worship, its heritage of images of human life under God-creation, redemption, church, and eternal life-effectively reshapes our lives. Thus worship empowers us to see and to (...) shape our moral agency as a response of praise to God as Creator and Lord. (shrink)

In this unprecedented time, there are many questions and plenty of speculation surrounding what life will be like after the South African nationwide lockdown. There is concern over the effects that the lockdown will have on worship services when churches are in a position to open their doors to the public once more. As a result of recognising the lockdown as a liminal phase, perspectives are shared when considering how the church will gather again in a post-lockdown context and therefore (...) a post-liminal phase. One prevailing perspective in considering this post-liminal phase involves koinonia and how an undiscriminating virus can remind those to further practise inclusivity and ubuntu, by embracing sameness and difference when ‘being church’. In contrast, another important perspective focuses on ritualising certain measures in the worship service to prevent the spread of coronavirus disease 2019, when gathering in church buildings is permissible in a post-lockdown context. This is concluded by echoing the spirit of ubuntu, namely, ‘I am because we are’, in ‘being church’ during and after the crisis of the COVID-19 global pandemic.Contribution: From the perspective of Liturgical and Ritual Studies, this article aims to contribute to the Theological perspectives of COVID-19. (shrink)

We are about to see the emergence of religions devoted to the worship of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Such religions pose acute risks, both to their followers and to the public. We should require their creators, and governments, to acknowledge these risks and to manage them as best they can. However, these new religions cannot be stopped altogether, nor should we try to stop them if we could. We must accept that AI worship will become part of our culture, and we (...) must learn to live with it. Indeed, we should do much more than this. We should value it as a new source of meaning in a rapidly-changing world. AI-based religions deserve respect and recognition alongside other, more established ones, and they should be granted the same level of legal protection. (shrink)

This article examines the experience of online worship among 13 participants ‘attending’ virtual services in Cambridge. We focus upon an online formal Eucharistic service and a more informal Sunday evening non-Eucharistic service. After providing an overview of the literature on online religion, more specifically the possibility of a virtual religious community and the performance of online Eucharist, we present data from semi-structured interviews which were analysed through thematic analysis. The interviews reveal that virtual services, while better than nothing, have significant (...) limitations in terms of participation, belonging, and the kind of religious experience engendered. While only two participants expressed the view that the virtual service was better than the live service, the majority found that the virtual service lacked a sense of connectedness. However, everyone agreed that it was different from a television broadcast in several important ways. The overall view was that celebrating the Eucharist was not possible online, because congregants could not actually partake of the bread and wine blessed by the priest which, for them, was an essential aspect of the ritual. For most people there was neither spiritual communion, nor a belief in consecration at a distance, leaving them feeling they were not really participating in the Eucharist. The participants in the study who engaged with both the Eucharist in the morning and the non-Eucharistic service in the evening generally seem to have preferred the latter. The data from this study are congruent with studies of diverse faiths which reveal the perceived importance of physical presence, contact and connection as being important for ritual effectiveness. (shrink)

A personal reflection on the meaning of worship and the 'worthiness' of God.

David Gauthier and Edward McClennen have claimed that it could be rational to form an intention to A because it maximizes utility to intend to A, and that acting on such an intention could be rational even if it maximizes utility not to A. Michael Bratman has objected to this way of thinking, claiming that it is equivalent to the familiar rule-utilitarian mistake of rule-worship. The purpose of this paper is to argue that, so long as one is aware at (...) the time of forming an intention to A that it maximizes utility not to A, then acting on that intention need not be rule worship, but the result of a rational refusal to reconsider an issue which has already been adequately considered. (shrink)

Eamonn Callan; Faith, Worship and Reason in Religious Upbringing, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 22, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 183–193, https://do.

Eamonn Callan; Faith, Worship and Reason in Religious Upbringing, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 22, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 183–193, https://do.

The Anglican Tradition of Moral Theology Alan M. Suggate Hooker and the via media For the English who experienced the impact of the Reformation on the ...

Introduction The purpose of this study is to characterize a conception of prayer that plays an important role in the religious thought of the medieval ...

CHAPTER I Introduction A. RABBINIC WORSHIP AND HALAKAH Rabbinic worship is personal experience and yet it is governed by Halakah, law. ...

In this reply to Tim Bayne and Yujin Nagasawa, I defend the possibility of a maximal-excellence account of the grounding of the obligation to worship God. I do not offer my own account of the obligation to worship God; rather I argue that the major criticism fails. Thus maximal-excellence can ground an obligation to worship God.

CHAPTER I Introduction A. RABBINIC WORSHIP AND HALAKAH Rabbinic worship is personal experience and yet it is governed by Halakah, law. ...

This article considers the way in which a false performance can invalidate claims of ecclesiology. Examples are taken from Anglican theologians such as Charles Gore( died 1930).

de Luca, John Review of: Catholic worship book II, Australian Catholic Bishops Conference. Full music ed., 2 vols, $295.00; people's ed., $34.95.

Gwen Bradford has plausibly argued that one attains achievement only if one does something one finds difficult. It is also plausible that one must attain achievement to be worthy of “agential” praise, praise that is appropriately directed to someone on the basis of things that redound to their credit. These claims pose a challenge to classical theists who direct agential praise to God, since classical theism arguably entails that none of God’s actions are difficult for God. I consider responses to (...) this challenge and commend a view accord- ing to which God’s loving character is not necessitated by God’s nature but is a contingent and difficult achievement. I argue that this view can still satisfy the explanatory ambitions of natural theology. (shrink)

How does Christian ethics begin? This pioneering study explores the grammar of the Christian life as it is embodied and learned in worship as the formative experience of Christian communities. In a careful analysis of biblical and traditional conceptions of worship, Wannenwetsch demonstrates how worship challenges the deepest antagonisms in political thought and social practice. Particular worship practices are examined and their ethical and political significance is explored.

After the belief in Allah and in the necessities of His religion, the first of our duties towards Him is to learn our responsibilities as an ‘abd [servant] and worshipping according to His will. Worship is to do what Allah commands and not to do what He prohibits. Worship is legislated by Allah and His Prophet. Thus, the unity and solidarity in worship is achieved. Some reasons and causes for worships are known however the main purpose of worshipping is to (...) serve Allah. Not all the worships are bound with a standard reward scale. Allah has put some standard reward scales as a result of His grace and blessings on His servants. The most common of these is ten-to-one. Worships like az-Zakah [obligatory charity] and as-Sadaqa [voluntary charity] are given seven hundreds -to-one or more reward. Iḥyaʾ Laylat al-Qadr (keeping vigil in that night) is equal to worshipping in a thousand months. In addition, there are unlimited and uncounted blessings in this World and in the hereafter. Also the reward of the worships (like prayer, fasting, giving charity and pilgrimage) is determined by Allah and is subjected to special reward scales. He is who determines the worships and their rewards. One of the greatest blessings of Allah to His slaves is Tawbah [repentance from sins] which means a chance for human beings to make themselves forgiven. Also there is ar-Riya’ [showing off, insincerity] which annuls the worship and limits its reward to this World only. (shrink)

At first glance, the properties being omniscient and being worthy of worship might appear to be perfectly co-instantiable. But there are reasons to be worried about this co-instantiability, as it turns out that, depending on our commitments with respect to certain kinds of knowledge and notions of personhood, it might be the case that no being—God included—could instantiate both. In this paper, I lay out and motivate this claim before going on to consider a variety of responses—some more plausible than (...) others—that may be offered by the theist. (shrink)

Purpose. The paper aims at examining the phenomenon of the rebirth of the Goddess in the contemporary world. The author has used the hermeneutic approach and cultural-historical method, as well as the anthropological integrative approach. Theoretical basis. The study is based on the ideas of Carol Christ, Margot Adler, Miriam Simos, and Jean Shinoda Bolen. Originality. The rebirth of the Goddess is not a deconstruction of the God. The face of the Goddess is one side of the binary opposition "Goddess (...) – God". Life on the earthly plane presupposes masculine and feminine dualism. However, these polarities are not mutually exclusive and mutually suppressive, but complementary to each other. The return of the Goddess to the throne and a profound appreciation of Femininity is a necessary step forward in establishing true equality and restoring lost harmony. As humanity returns to the Absolute that transcends duality, as divinity is revealed in feminine and masculine forms, and, finally, as humans get in touch with their true self, the two faces, feminine and masculine, will inevitably merge. Conclusions. Identifying herself with the images of the Goddesses, a woman develops self-awareness and self-acceptance that contribute greatly to her reintegration with a wider spiritual reality. The cult of the Goddess finds practical application in women’s lives. These are magical rituals, work with the archetypes, life-changing tours. Recognizing her right to the fullness of being, a woman overcomes rigid gender roles and stereotypes, ceases to be an object of manipulation and becomes the supreme arbiter of her own life. (shrink)

Wannenwetsch shows how worship challenges the deepest antagonisms in political thought and social practice through careful analysis of biblical and traditional conceptions of worship. Particular worship practices are examined for their ethical and political significance.

Worship is a topic that is rarely considered by philosophers of religion. In a recent paper, Tim Bayne and Yujin Nagasawa challenge this trend by offering an analysis of worship and by considering some difficulties attendant on the claim that worship is obligatory. I argue that their case for there being these difficulties is insufficiently supported. I offer two reasons that a theist might provide for the claim that worship is obligatory: a divine command, and the demands of justice with (...) respect to God's redemption of humanity. I also challenge the soundness of some of the analogies they employ in their argument. (shrink)

Is it possible to worship a non-personal God? According to some, the answer is no: worship necessarily involves addressing the object of one’s worship. Since non-personal gods cannot acknowledge or respond to address, it must be conceptually inappropriate to worship such gods. I object to this argument on two fronts. First, I show that the concept of worship used is too narrow, excluding many cases that obviously count as instances of worship. And, secondly, drawing on recent work on the philosophy (...) of object knowledge, I argue that addressing non-personal gods might not be as conceptually confused as it first appears. Thus, it at least possible to worship a non-personal God. (shrink)

This article analyzes David Hume’s influential critique of worship from a process point of view informed by the thought of Whitehead and Hartshorne.

Worship is a topic that is rarely considered by philosophers of religion. In a recent paper, Tim Bayne and Yujin Nagasawa challenge this trend by offering an analysis of worship and by considering some difficulties attendant on the claim that worship is obligatory. I argue that their case for there being these difficulties is insufficiently supported. I offer two reasons that a theist might provide for the claim that worship is obligatory: (1) a divine command, and (2) the demands of (...) justice with respect to God's redemption of humanity. I also challenge the soundness of some of the analogies they employ in their argument. (shrink)