Arguments for Theism

Our overarching concern is mapping out the ramifications of the Wittgensteinian conception of hinge commitments to the religious case. More specifically, our aim is to use this conception to understand certain core features of fundamental religious commitment. Drawing on two important literary depictions of religious conviction – Anthony Burgess’s Earthly Powers, Shusaku Endo’s Silence – it is argued that a common phenomenon emerges, that of religious vertigo. This arises out of the recognition that one’s religious commitment, in its most fundamental (...) form, is not like a regular belief at all, but rather plays a fulcrum, arational role in one’s worldview. Moreover, this recognition is usually occluded in everyday life. Fundamental religious commitment is thus revealed to be in a sense uncanny. It is argued that religious vertigo is a form of the more general epistemic vertigo that I have claimed is akey element of the later Wittgenstein’s conception of the structure of rational evaluations. (shrink)

Enhanced agency theodicy is a new afterlife-centred solution to the problem of evil which I show has greater explanatory power than two influential rivals, the soul-making and redemptive suffering theodicies of John Hick and Eleanore Stump. Derived solely from the concept of an omniperfect God, enhanced agency theodicy is also potentially compatible with concepts of God, human nature and the afterlife in Islam. I suggest that a formulation of Islamic theism that incorporates the theodicy might be a good candidate for (...) a Graham Oppy-type inference to the best explanation evaluation of naturalism and theism as worldviews. -/- Central to this solution is a good-maximising view of God’s purpose and an analysis of the kind of ideal world such a God might be expected to create: a realm of enhanced agency that fully realises the scope for agency of self-aware embodied beings with freedom and goodness of will. An earthly life with the freedom to set our wills towards good or evil is created to test our capacity to flourish in this dynamic afterlife where neuro-physical flexibility and a durably good will is needed to thrive. A human nature that is innately good yet potentially bad depending on how we use free will and an ungovernable natural order that constrains the power of organised human evil to corrupt this nature are two features of earthly life that contribute to bringing as many as possible into a realm of enhanced agency, and so maximise its goodness. This account of human nature and our freedom to preserve or corrupt its essential goodness combines a neuroscientific theory of free will with dualistic holism, where the immaterial dimension of being is the source of our goodness of will, moral sense and desire for truth. -/- Enhanced agency theodicy is contrasted with the solutions of Hick and Stump with respect to four main difficulties concerning the role of the afterlife in explanations of evil: 1) the normatively relativised logical argument from evil challenges how a heavenly divine-human union could be supremely good as a personal relationship when God both contrives the conditions of our earthly suffering and rescues us from these conditions by means of and for the sake of personal relationship with God; 2) the problem of heavenly freedom argues that free will theodicies that rely on a good afterlife to outweigh or defeat earthly evils are inconsistent when they claim that freedom with respect to good and evil choices is a great good while also maintaining that a heaven with no freedom or opportunities to make such choices is supremely valuable; 3) problems of hell and post-mortem suffering focus on whether belief in a perfectly good God is compatible with the continuation of suffering in forms of afterlife outside of heaven; 4) the fate of creatures without free will concerns the post-mortem existence of young children, the severely cognitively disabled and animals in theodicies that make free will central to achieving a good afterlife. Hick and Stump fail to evade these problems due to their reliance on Christian concepts of divine love, human fallenness and heavenly redemption through union with God, while enhanced agency theodicy’s construction outside this framework of ideas provides for coherent answers to each of these challenges. -/- The study endorses Graham Oppy’s proposal to progress the debate on God and evil within an inference to the best explanation comparison of naturalism and theism as rival worldviews. To minimise epistemic bias Oppy’s methodology is amended to ensure no particular worldview is presupposed when explanations are evaluated. To prepare future work to incorporate enhanced agency theodicy into a wider formulation of theism for comparison with naturalism, further research is needed to investigate its potential compatibility with Islamic conceptions of divinity, human nature and the afterlife. (shrink)

Free will theodicies that rely on a good afterlife to explain how earthly evils are ultimately outweighed or defeated are challenged by what Simon Kittle has termed the lack of value problem concerning heavenly freedom: that a heaven with no freedom to make good and evil choices is not a supreme good that could justify God’s creation of evil. I take up Kittle’s suggestion that this problem can be addressed by a choice-based account of heavenly freedom which gives some idea (...) of how the types and number of choices an agent might face in heaven add up to a level of freedom that it would be desirable to have. While Christian notions of a loving God’s desire for divine-human union typically prioritise non-choice-based accounts of how heavenly existence perfects our wills for union with God, I argue that a good-maximising view of an omniperfect God’s creative purpose provides for an account of heaven as a realm of enhanced agency that answers Kittle’s challenge by outlining the types of goods that might exist in this afterlife and how choices between them could be supremely valuable. (shrink)

Este trabalho apresenta, em linhas gerais, uma visão esquemática da arquitetura filosófica de um novo Sistema fundada sobre três pilares principais: (1) a formulação de uma condição lógico-metafísica absolutamente necessária — S(Ⓣ(φ)) — que estabelece o Ser como condição universal e intranscendível de toda proposição e fato verdadeiros; (2) a demonstração metafísica, por via de um argumento alético-modal, da impossibilidade do nada absoluto e, por conseguinte, da necessidade de um Ser absoluto, identificado como Deus em sentido estritamente filosófico; (3) a (...) construção de uma ontologia estrutural estratificada unida a uma teoria da verdade, em que Deus é concebido como ultraestrutura da Verdade Transcendente (Verdade Absoluta ⇄ Vida Absoluta ⇄ Vontade Absoluta), fundamento superior da hiperestrutura axial imanente (Verdadeiridade ⇄ Belezidade ⇄ Bonidade), por sua vez fundamento da superestrutura fático-proposicional (T(p) ⇄ F). A tridimensão é unificada por um princípio dialético-ontoeinailógico radical — o da identidade autocontraditada —, pelo qual o sistema propõe uma filosofia do Ser como Verdade, em que o pensamento reencontra a possibilidade de afirmar o absoluto por meio da razão. Trata-se de uma proposta original que reabilita a ambição sistemática e restitui à filosofia a tarefa fundamental de pensar, de forma rigorosa e afirmativa, aquilo que “necessariamente é”, o objeto próprio da einailogia. (shrink)

This work presents, in general terms, a schematic view of the philosophical architecture of a new System based on three main pillars: (1) the formulation of an absolutely necessary logical-metaphysical condition — S((T)(φ)) — which establishes Being as a universal and untranscendable condition of every true proposition and fact; (2) the metaphysical demonstration, by means of an alethical-modal argument, of the impossibility of absolute nothingness and, consequently, of the need for an absolute Being, identified as God in a strictly philosophical (...) sense; (3) the construction of a stratified structural ontology united to a theory of truth, in which God is conceived as the ultrastructure of Transcendent Truth (Absolute Truth ⇄ Absolute Life ⇄ Absolute Will), the superior foundation of the immanent axial hyperstructure (Truthfulness ⇄ Beauty ⇄ Goodness), in turn the foundation of the factual-propositional superstructure (T(p) ⇄ F). The three-dimension is unified by a radical dialectical-ontoeinailogical principle — that of self-contradicted identity — by which the system proposes a philosophy of Being as Truth, in which thought rediscovers the possibility of affirming the absolute by means of reason. It is an original proposal that rehabilitates systematic ambition and restores to philosophy the fundamental task of thinking, in a rigorous and affirmative way, what "necessarily is", the proper object of einailogy. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue that the Trinity is part of natural theology although it is a contradictory doctrine because, even if all the “solutions” for the Trinity’s aporias are unsatisfactory, anyone wondering about the nature of God comes to think in a trinitarian way. Given this theoretical impasse (our reason should state both that God must be Triune and cannot be Triune) a “Kantian-inspired argument” allows us to still believe in the Trinity. This Argument is based on the (...) assumption that we and antinomic situations in the ontological realm of fundamental entities and in the realm of God’s nature. This is our common way of knowing and, thus, the Trinity is a plausible metaphysical option. The Argument implies a rethinking of our metaphysics and of our religious epistemology, but it could also inspire new interesting research agendas in contemporary Philosophy of Religion. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta o argumento alético-modal como uma demonstração filosófico-conceitual rigorosa da necessidade do Ser Absoluto. Argumenta-se que, se tudo fosse contingente, o nada absoluto seria possível; no entanto, tal hipótese revela-se logicamente e metafisicamente incoerente, pois contradiz as condições de inteligibilidade e de verdade. Conclui-se, portanto, que uma necessidade absoluta deve ser afirmada. O argumento defende que a necessidade, enquanto modalidade alética, pressupõe um fundamento no Ser e não pode ser reduzida à pura formalidade lógica. Assim, a necessidade afirmada (...) não é meramente epistêmica ou formal, mas metafísica - o que justifica a identificação de Deus como o Ser Absoluto e Necessário no passo final decisivo. (shrink)

This paper presents the alethic-modal argument as a rigorous philosophicalconceptual demonstration of the necessity of the Absolute Being. It is argued that if everything were contingent, absolute nothingness would be possible; however, such a hypothesis proves to be logically and metaphysically incoherent, as it contradicts the conditions of intelligibility and truth. It is concluded, therefore, that an absolute necessity must be affirmed. The argument maintains that necessity, as an alethic modality, presupposes a foundation in Being and cannot be reduced to (...) mere logical formality. Thus, the affirmed necessity is not merely epistemic or formal, but metaphysicalwhich justifies identifying God as the Absolute and Necessary Being in the final decisive step. (shrink)

In 1973, the Taylor family of 222 Longmeanygate on the outskirts of Leyland joined the Saint Pius V Association under the Superiorship of Father Peter Morgan and funded by Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre. Mr Derrick Taylor and Mrs Irene Mary Taylor defied their bishop by hosting priests of the Saint Pius V Association at their home called the Leyland Mass Centre from 1974 to 1978 due to their belief that the Tridentine Rite of the Mass was the true Mass and must (...) be celebrated in Latin despite changes implemented following the Second Vatican Council that allowed for the Mass to be celebrated in the vernacular and with the Mass streamlined under Pope Paul VI. However, their actions in the 1970s were preceded by a long series of events that steam from Mr and Mrs Taylor's childhoods which this book details and in many ways celebrates. This short book provides a timeline of the lives of Mr and Mrs Taylor, using illustrations wherever possible to explain and visualise the significant events (some of which were supernatural) that shaped their beliefs. Each of the illustrations included in this work were commissioned by Mr and Mrs Taylor's grandson Cometan and created by British artist David Young who has been explaining the Taylor's story in the form of illustrations over the last five years. This work is a testament to Mr and Mrs Taylor's dedication to the Latin Mass despite the ridicule they faced and using intimate details about their lives helps to explain why they made their decisions and took controversial action at different stages of their lives. (shrink)

The Compendium of the Life and Genealogy of Cometan is a compilation of years of family history research conducted by Cometan on his maternal and paternal ancestry. The book is formatted as an index of individual family members with key biographical details, photographs and extracts from various sources collected over the years. The book has over 300 pages of life stories of members of the Cottam, Moon, Prescott, Taylor and Warbrick families. The life stories include religious conversions, tragic deaths, details (...) of married life, the births of children, burials, poetry, interviews, extracts of newspaper articles, paintings, wartime stories, emigration, illustrations of key events, religious tracts, details of people’s careers, pictures of gravestones and letters. This book embodies an ethnography of the lives of several families in Lancashire using a methodology of family history. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary edited collection addresses issues at the intersection of indigenous psychology, market ideology, values, and technology. The aims of this book arise from the recognition that whereas the unfolding of the agricultural revolution over thousands of years allowed for the gradual co-evolution of values and technology to blossom, the post-industrial technological revolution is so accelerated that there has been little time for the co-evolution of values. To address this, the chapters collected here seek to initiate a conversation that will (...) provide the conceptual space for the evolution of values that can keep pace with contemporary developments in the machine and the market. In this conversation, they argue, indigenous psychologies will necessarily play a central role for two reasons: firstly, as alternative systems of thought they enable a productive interrogation of the rationality of machine and the market; and second, examples of the impact of technology and the market on traditional societies hold lessons for potential future impacts on the society as a whole. This timely work offers fresh insights that will appeal to students and scholars of psychology, cultural and religious studies, anthropology, business and economics, and science and technology studies. (shrink)

Translation of the book "Gott denken: Ein Versuch über rationale Theologie" by Holm Tetens published in Reclam Verlag.

El tema “Dios y la filosofía” ha sido central en la historia del pensamiento, modelando no solo la evolución de la filosofía misma sino también influyendo profundamente en el desarrollo cultural, científico y moral de las civilizaciones. Desde los primeros filósofos que se cuestionaban sobre el origen y la naturaleza del cosmos, pasando por la síntesis de razón y fe en la Edad Media, hasta los debates de la modernidad, la noción de Dios ha sido una constante fuente de reflexión, (...) discusión y controversia. La exploración filosófica de lo divino no solo trata de la existencia de un ser supremo, sino que también aborda cuestiones esenciales sobre la naturaleza del ser humano, su moralidad, su propósito en esta vida y el conocimiento de la realidad que es él mismo y del mundo. (shrink)

This article explores the divergent views between and the possible consequences of various cosmocentric understandings including that of Astronism and the geocentric/biocentric concerns of contemporary pagan spirituality. These contrasting religious positions are discussed using the sociological measuring tool of the ideal-type. In actuality, no religion conforms fully to its ideal conception. Instead, the device is employed as an analytic. Vis-à-vis humanity itself, however, the question turns to whether we attempt ultimately to escape our earthly confines or rectify and restore our (...) terrestrial conditions. (shrink)

From a Quantum Cosmic perspective, a new theology is developed based on the doctrine that humans have an energy code and a biological code that allow us to achieve direct contact with the cosmic energies permeating the universe and flow in with the Alpha Energy, namely, the energy of the Creator or God. The energy codes of human beings transcend physical death as energy never ceases to exist, only to transform. Moreover, our ‘energy body network’ produces new energy through biophotons (...) which allow beings to be in total command of their existence and communicate with the cosmos through a cosmic language. Patient and consistent practice of cosmic meditation and mental physics will lead to an awakening and evolution to a Cosmic Quantum Consciousness that resembles the ultimate connection with the Alpha Energy. This article will explore the perennial approach of Quantum Cosmic Theology which suggests that all people can be united under one fundamental creed while concurrently respecting relatively minor differences in religious belief and practice. (shrink)

The term ‘natural theology’ provokes a variety of reactions, spanning from whole-hearted endorsement to passionate rejection. Charged as it is with polemical and pejorative undertones, this debate begs for an intervention. If the scholarly community is to engage constructively with the concept and practice of natural theology — either by way of acceptance, rejection, or something in between — clarity in its definition and identification is imperative. The aim of this paper, then, is to try to shed some light on (...) three of the most common definitions of ‘natural theology’ in contemporary scholarship, to provide clarity about the ways in which they differ, and to propose some conceptual refinements in the hope that, if adopted, more fruitful discourse may take place in relation to this much-debated and interdisciplinary phrase. (shrink)

When it comes to what many of us think of as the deepest questions of existence, the answers can seem difficult to make out. This difficulty, or ambiguity, is the topic of this book. The book begins by offering a general account of what evidential ambiguity consists in and uses it to try to make sense of the idea that our world is religiously ambiguous in some sense. It goes on to consider the questions of how we ought to investigate (...) the nature of ultimate reality and whether evidential ambiguity is itself a significant piece of evidence in the quest. (shrink)

Significant attention as been devoted to the problem of ‘divine hiddenness’ proposed by JL Shellenberg. I propose a novel response that involves denying part of the empirical premise in divine hiddenness arguments, which holds that nonresistant nonbelievers are capable of relationship with God. While Plantinga and others in ‘reformed’ epistemology have at times appealed to original sin as an explanation for divine hiddenness, such responses might seem outlandish to many, given the way that many find nonbelievers to be no more (...) or less epistemically or morally blameworthy than believers. Further, such appeals to original sin seem to give a ‘just-so’ story that at least leaves the situation dialectically balanced. I show that a classically Augustinian notion of original sin can provide a sufficient response to those objections, and that appeal to original sin can form an empirically grounded response to the divine hiddenness problem, beyond a simple defense. If the possibility of original sin-type scenarios is compatible with God’s perfect love, then the phenomenon of apparently nonresistant nonbelievers would push us toward considering the possibility that humans have lost those capacities for relationship with God by a Fall-like event in the past. (shrink)

A review of Tsvi Bisk's 2024 work Cosmodeism: A Worldview for the Space-Age: How an Evolutionary Cosmos is Creating God featured in the Journal of Astronist Studies and reviewed by Cometan.

This manuscript is about how to start from relying on science to be more certain about Christianity. This is because science is so pervasive in our everyday life that we expect that it works almost every time. However, when it comes to Christianity, we need to have faith because most of the time God does not appear to respond to us. Therefore, we feel uncertain about beliefs in Christianity. Instead of being uncertain, this manuscript tries to find a way so (...) that we are more certain about our beliefs in Christianity. We borrow our method to be certain from science. Science faces a similar situation as in believing in Christianity because its knowledge is fallible. Scientists themselves cannot be certain that the scientific knowledge is true all the time. So, they rely on a method called hypothesis testing to make their decisions to believe or not in scientific knowledge. We borrow this method to believe in Christianity. Therefore, we need evidence to make our decision of belief. We mention some evidence from past miracles to help us to make decisions. These include Eucharistic miracles, Marian apparitions, incorruptible corpses, etc. After we decide to believe in Christianity, we work out a theory of Christianity based on the salvation plan of God. We try to substantiate the principles in the theory by referencing testimonies from the Bible and from evidence of miracles that happened. We show that these principles are related to models and experiments that we formulate based on our beliefs in Christianity. Having obtained an understanding of Christianity like a (historical) science, we formulate our practice as a Christian. (shrink)

Throughout the history, whenever humans encounter a phenomenon for which there was no explanation, a theory was proposed for it. Of course, not necessarily all the theories were purely scientific and many of them were non-scientific, pseudo- scientific, or at best were only slightly influenced by science. But one thing was in common among them: they all were trying to provide as deeper as possible explanations about how the universe works. Although today and in the modern era the exact meaning (...) of theory has changed comparatively, still they must be such that can be tested through scientific procedures in order to confirm or reject. Nevertheless, still sometimes in a common belief, the meaning of "theory" is unprovable or at least unproven conjecture, and surprisingly sometimes confused with hypothesis. Scientific laws are descriptive reports - or theories - that express and predict a range of natural phenomena and explain how they work. Any scientific discourse is carried out in three levels: hypothesis, theory, and law. A hypothesis, is a testable logical conjecture to explain the phenomena we observe in the universe. A hypothesis usually comes with no practical support, or at least not been proven yet. The hypothesis can only be tested through trial and error and tries to offer explanation that provides a reasonable platform for further studies and usually it is the first step in solving a problem or describing a phenomenon. A theory however, is a logical statement about a phenomenon that is derived from rational thinking and is often associated with processes such as observation, study or research and provides standards in such a way that scientific tests can confirm - or reject. A theory used in describing what is usually to happen with the implication that it doesn’t still a fact. Yet a scientific law is a descriptive reports - or theory - that previses a range of natural phenomena and explains how they function. Scientific laws are descriptive summaries of a large set of facts that are tested by scientific evidences and after fact-checking based on their potential ability for measuring future experiences. So it can be said that every theory was first a hypothesis and has the potential to become a law to come. It can also be said that any theory is valid as long as it is not violated by a more conclusive one. (shrink)

A premise of the Leibnizian cosmological argument from contingency says that no contingent fact can explain why there are any contingent facts at all. David Hume and Paul Edwards famously denied this premise, arguing that if every fact has an explanation in terms of further facts ad infinitum, then they all do. This is known as the Hume–Edwards Principle (HEP). In this paper, I examine the cosmological argument from contingency within a framework of metaphysical explanation or ground and defend a (...) ground-theoretic version of HEP which says, roughly, that the plurality of contingent facts is grounded in its members. (shrink)

GENETIC UNIVERSE GLOSSARY expands upon The Genetic Universe, offering additional metaphysical definitions for advanced students or for individuals who are well versed in metaphysics or philosophy of mind. The 53 reference entries in this companion volume—including such terms as semantic faculty, force surface, and object of awareness—provide a better understanding of the larger picture behind absolute realization. This text is ideal for advanced students and professors, because it does not offer a step-by-step guide on how a given student should approach (...) the book or its glossary or how to properly connect the glossary’s additional definitions to the main theme of the book; rather, all those considerations are trusted to be handled by advanced students’ personal abilities. (shrink)

THE GENETIC UNIVERSE brings to light a host of enlightening arguments giving the concept of intelligent design a new level of unprecedented respectability in surpassing of previous promotion efforts that usually end up defeated with ease by the influential global reach of the biological evolution lobby. Rather than defending intelligent design as “scientific” or making references to design with no proper explanation of consequences, the work goes on to elaborate on the “indirect creation basis” of human origins and what the (...) future holds. The universe is invisible and silent and there is no independent existence without express intervention of the supernaturally created structure of mind which acts by means of programmed genetic instructions. Therefore “existence” is up for an update that impacts intentionality directly and personal demeanor indirectly. The facts of the matter as argued in The Genetic Universe warn about the imposing nature of intelligent design suggesting both the possible gains of prudent compliance and the unavoidable pitfalls of a shortsighted attitude towards what “is” by virtue of design, agency, and plain—deliberate intent. (shrink)

Is skeptical theism tenable once one acknowledges, as proponents of that view do, one's cognitive limitations vis-à-vis religious matters? In this article, I aim to answer that question both by examining the apparent radical skeptical implications of the skeptical component of skeptical theism and by comparing this view with fideism and Pyrrhonism, which also lay emphasis on our cognitive limitations. My ultimate purpose is to determine which of the three stances it makes more sense to adopt once the limitations of (...) human cognitive powers are recognized. (shrink)

We argue that the evil-god challenge is not an additional challenge for theists above and beyond the (much older) gap problem. One version of the evil-god challenge is merely a specific instance of the gap problem, and another is dependent on that specific instance of the gap problem. Therefore, the various solutions to the gap problem that theists have developed double as responses to the evil-god challenge, placing the evil-god challenge in a more vulnerable position than has been supposed.

This work is the transcript of a theological dialogue I had with ChatGPT that spanned a couple of days. I began it merely out of curiosity over how ChatGPT might respond to questions and challenges I posed. As it progressed, I became increasingly impressed with the nuance, depth, and relevance of its responses. The dialogue became, for me, something of a contemplative exercise. I still don’t know quite how to understand the ability of generative A.I. to respond with such (apparent) (...) understanding and even insight. -/- I’ve decided to post this dialogue, not only because of the puzzle it poses concerning A.I, but even more, because I believe that the theological conclusions ‘we’ arrived at have real merit. -/- In the end, the theological views expressed here echo those that I’ve expressed in other works of mine, but the expression of these views are enhanced by the way ChatGPT picks up on them, rephrases them, elaborates upon them, and often places them in the context of the classical theological tradition. -/- I might add that I have been an A.I. skeptic for some time now, concerned over the potential dangers of A.I. in general. But this dialogue, anyway, reveals its potential use as a vehicle for reflection, even profound reflection. -/- . (shrink)

Convocado inicialmente por los miembros del Semillero de Investigación «Hermenéutica y Padres de la Iglesia» de la Pontificia Universidad Javeriana de Bogotá, el Coloquio Interinstitucional de Estudiantes de Patrología se erige en 2018 como un espacio académico de reflexión sobre el pensamiento de los autores de los primeros siglos de la era cristiana. Hasta el día de hoy, el Coloquio se ha convertido en una importante iniciativa en Colombia para la visibilización de los trabajos de estudiantes que se han destacado (...) en el interés y dedicación por profundizar en torno a los Estudios Patrísticos. (shrink)

“Doğal din” terimi, bazen doğanın kendisinin ilahi olduğu bir panteistik doktrine atıfta bulunur. “Doğal teoloji” terimi ise aksine, başlangıçta gözlemlenen doğal gerçekler temelinde (ve bazen) Tanrı’nın varlığını savunmaya yönelik projeye atıfta bulunur. Bununla birlikte çağdaş felsefede, hem “doğal din” hem de “doğal teoloji” genel olarak, dinî veya teolojik konuları araştırmak için insana, “doğal” olan bilişsel yetilerini – akıl, algı, içgözlem- kullanma projesini ifade eder. Doğal din veya teoloji, mevcut anlayış üzerine, doğayla ilgili ampirik araştırmalarla sınırlı olmamakla birlikte ayrıca panteistik bir (...) sonuçla da bağlantılı değildir. Bununla birlikte o, özel doğal olmayan yetilere (ESP, telepati, mistik deneyim) veya doğaüstü bilgi kaynaklarına (kutsal metinler, vahiy teolojisi, inanç otoriteleri, doğrudan doğaüstü iletişim) hitap etmekten kaçınır. Genel olarak, doğal din veya teoloji (bundan böyle “doğal teoloji” olarak anılacaktır), diğer felsefi ve bilimsel girişimlerle aynı rasyonel inceleme standartlarına uymayı amaçlamaktadır ve aynı değerlendirme ve eleştiri yöntemlerine tabidir. (shrink)

The main question of this study is whether God has a personality. We show what the question means, why it matters, and that good sense can be made of an affirmative answer to it. A God with personality — complete with particular, sometimes peculiar, and even seemingly unexplainable druthers — is not at war with maximal perfection, nor is the idea irredeemably anthropomorphic. And the hypothesis of divine personality is fruitful, with substantive consequences that span philosophical theology. But problems arise (...) here too, and new perspectives on inquiry itself. Our cosmos is blessed with weirdness aplenty. To come to know it is nothing less than to encounter a strange and untamed God. (shrink)

Many philosophers of theistic religions claim (1) that there are powerful a posteriori arguments for God’s existence that make it rational to believe that He exists and at the same time maintain (2) that God always has the freedom to do otherwise. In this article, I argue that these two positions are inconsistent because the empirical evidence on which the a posteriori arguments for God’s existence rest can be explained better by positing the existence of a God-like being without the (...) freedom to do otherwise. (shrink)

Collin (2022) attempts to break the symmetry between the modal ontological argument for the existence of God and the reverse modal ontological argument against the existence of God by drawing on some Kripkean lessons about a posteriori necessity. He argues that there is an undercutting defeater for taking God’s non-existence to be possible. In this paper, I reply that taking the Kripkean considerations about a posteriori necessity into account does not help break the symmetry. For we can argue in a (...) similar way that there is an undercutting defeater for taking God’s existence to be possible. (shrink)

It is no exaggeration to say that there has been an explosion of activity in the field of philosophical enquiry that is known as natural theology. Having been smothered in the early part of the twentieth century due to the dominance of the anti-metaphysical doctrine of logical positivism, natural theology began to make a comeback in the late 1950s as logical positivism collapsed and analytic philosophers took a newfound interest in metaphysical topics such as possibility and necessity, causation, time, the (...) mind-body problem, and God. This chapter begins by considering how we might characterise natural theology as a field of enquiry. It then proceeds to survey the landscape of contemporary natural theology, which has spawned a large and at times highly technical body of literature. Finally, consideration is given to two epistemological issues confronting the theist who wishes to appeal to natural theology, which could be termed the problem of the gap(s) and the problem of accessibility. (shrink)

In this dialogue a sceptic meets one that convinces him that he is safe from the void of Nothingness although it exists.

Dudgeon, William (1705/6–1743), freethinker and philosopher, is of unknown origins. A tenant farmer who resided at Lennel Hill Farm, near Coldstream, Berwickshire, he was one of several philosophers active in the borders area of Scotland during this period. Other figures in this group include Andrew Baxter, Henry Home (Lord Kames), and most importantly David Hume.....

I argue that the creation and freely chosen salvation and everlasting bliss of even just one person is a greater good than any finite amount of evil and suffering. Since it is extremely likely (if not certain) that, out of all possible individuals that could exist, some (or at least one) would only be freely saved through the contemplation and experience of evil and suffering, then God would be justified in creating a world with evil and suffering to allow for (...) the salvation of such individuals, so long as no one else freely lost their salvation who otherwise would not have lost it because of the evil and suffering. Thus, the problem of evil dissipates, as a world with evil and suffering, even seemingly gratuitous evil and suffering, would be entirely expected given theism. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss an abductive argument for the existence of God from the experience of awe at natural beauty. If God's creative work is a viable explanation for why we experience awe at natural beauty, and there is no satisfactory naturalistic explanation for the origins of such experiences, then we have defeasible evidence that God exists. To evaluate the argument's tenability, we assess the merits of the two main theocentric frameworks that can be marshaled to answer the question (...) of why human beings experience awe at natural beauty: (1) taking the experience of natural beauty as resulting from God's design intentions and (2) conceiving experiences of natural beauty as religious experiences in themselves. We argue that the presence of phenomenological content the fine-grainedness of which exceeds our descriptive and conceptual capacities is better accounted for by the latter hypothesis: experiencing natural beauty amounts to experiencing divine attributes. We conclude that the argument's theological premise is tenable and, having previously argued for the empirical premise (Porcher & De Luca-Noronha, 2021), we conclude that awe at natural beauty is best explained by the existence of God. (shrink)

Bu bildirinin amacı, insanlığın varoluşu ile başlayan ilahî dinlerden (Allah tarafından gönderilmiş dinler) pagan dönemlere ve özellikle Eski Batı anlayışına aktarılan yaratılış kavramını ele almak, varsa benzerlik ve farklılıklarını ortaya koymaktır.

What is the highest good actually good for in Kant’s third Critique? While there are well-worked out answers to this question in the literature that focus on the highest good’s practical importance, this paper argues that there is an important function for the highest good that has to do exclusively with contemplation. This important function becomes clear once one notices that coherent [konsequent] thinking, for Kant, was synonymous with "bündiges" thinking, and that both are connected with the highest good in (...) the third Critique’s moral proof for God’s existence. I show that the original meaning of "bündig," which is from the carpentry trade and has been forgotten, illuminates the stakes of the highest good in Kant’s system. For us, as proverbial carpenters of reason, coherence is essential for the intellectual activity of constructing a philosophical worldview in his transcendental idealism. I motivate the reading further by showing how this function can neatly reconstruct Kant’s proof for God’s existence in the third Critique. I conclude by sketching Kant’s reasons for why the project of creating a coherent worldview grounded in the highest good is worth the labor costs. (shrink)

In this article, I seek to assess the extent to which a ‘trope-theoretic’ version of Theism is a better theory than that of a theory of Atheism, as posited by Graham Oppy. This end will be achieved by utilising the systemisation of the theoretical virtues proposed by Michael Keas (as further modified by an application of the work of Jonathan Schaffer), the notion of a trope, introduced by D.C. Williams, and an aspect, proposed by Donald L.M. Baxter, which will establish (...) the basis of the trope-theoretic account of Theism that will be at the centre of our analysis. This assessment will ultimately show that Theism, rather than that of Atheism (Naturalism), can successfully achieve the trade-off between minimising theoretical commitments and maximising explanatory power. And thus, given this, the best theory of Theism—namely, that of ‘trope-theoretic Theism’—is to be privileged over that of the best theory of Atheism—namely, that of ‘Oppyian Naturalism’—and is able to provide grounds for a decisive reassessment of the cogency of Agnosticism. (shrink)

A new religion was founded in 2013 that goes by the name of Astronism while its community of followers are known as Astronists. This article gives a rigorous account of the eschatology, soteriology and worldview of this new space religion while contextualizing its emergence as part of a broader Astronic religious tradition. This proposed tradition may itself possess prehistoric roots in the Upper Palaeolithic in the earliest human observations of the night sky. Human beings in turn came to establish a (...) relationship with celestial phenomena, one of both spiritual and secular utility that has since produced systems of astrotheism and astrology. In the contemporary, the projection of the Astronist theory of history onto the Astronic tradition has meant that Astronism’s salvific doctrine of transcension is established as a grand narrative and universal ethic that unites the Astronic tradition. In essence, this article considers how Astronism, as a new religious movement, is working to revive astronomical religion, albeit in ways relevant in an age of space exploration and appropriate to modern scientific knowledge about humanity’s true place in the universe. (shrink)

This paper develops an internal critique of Graham Oppy’s metaphilosophy of religion – his theories of argumentation, worldview comparison, and epistemic justification. First, it presents Oppy’s views and his main reasons in their favor. Second, it argues that Oppy is committed to two claims – that only truth-conducive reasons can justify philosophical belief and that such justification depends entirely on one’s judgments about the theoretical virtues of comprehensive worldviews – that jointly entail the unacceptable conclusion that philosophical beliefs cannot be (...) justified. Third, it briefly argues that of his two claims, it is his thoroughgoing coherentism that should be rejected. (shrink)

Metaphysical foundationalists argue that without fundamental facts, we cannot explain why there exist any dependent facts at all. Thus, metaphysical infinitism, the view that chains of ground can descend indefinitely without ever terminating in a level of fundamental facts, allegedly exhibits a kind of explanatory failure. I examine this argument and conclude that foundationalists have failed to show that infinitism exhibits explanatory failure. I argue that explaining the existence of dependent facts in terms of further dependent facts ad infinitum is (...) unproblematic by arguing for the plausibility of a ground-theoretic version of the Hume-Edwards Principle, which states that if each fact in a plurality of facts has a ground, then the plurality itself has a ground. (shrink)

Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy is a collection of essays that are all concerned with major figures and topics in the early modern philosophy. Most of the essays are concerned, more specifically, with the philosophy of David Hume (1711-1776). The sixteen essays included in this collection are divided into five parts. These parts are arranged under the headings of: (1) Metaphysics and Epistemology; (2) Free Will and Moral Luck; (3) Ethics, Virtue and Optimism; (4) Skepticism, Religion and Atheism; and (...) (5) Irreligion and the Unity of Hume’s Thought. A particularly important theme running through many of these essays is the subject of Hume’s irreligious aims and intentions. The fifth and final part of the collection is devoted to an articulation and defence of this specific understanding of Hume’s philosophical thought. (shrink)

This is an earlier version of the argument presented as the appendix to the author's final book, Peri Physeos.

I argue that, all else being equal, theism is more probable than naturalism on the assumption that human beings are able to arrive at a body of moral knowledge that is largely accurate and complete. I put forth this thesis on grounds that, if naturalism is true, the explanation of the content of our moral intuitions terminates either in biological-evolutionary processes or in social conventions adopted for pragmatic reasons; that, if this is so, our moral intuitions were selected for their (...) utility, not their truth; and that, if our moral intuitions were so selected, they are probably false. I defend the argument against three objections: first, that the argument amounts to a generic skeptical challenge; second, that ethical naturalism explains how our moral intuitions could have been selected for their truth; and third, that there is a pre-established harmony between the utility of moral beliefs and their truth-values. (shrink)