Syftet med artikeln är att diskutera organiseringen av svensk nanoteknik och varför denna skiljer sig från de länder inom vilka det sker en mer sammanhållen aktörsmobilisering kring nanoteknik, och där tillväxtfokus i högre grad än i Sverige integreras med fokus på miljö och samhällsmässiga aspekter. Utvecklingen av svensk nanoteknik visar att vetenskaplig effektivitet inte nödvändigtvis betyder att frågor om innovation eller effekter av denna innovation också hanteras effektivt. Stora vetenskapsprogram drivs utan samordnande hantering av nanoteknik som innovationsobjekt. Forskning om miljö (...) och samhälleliga aspekter sker i liten skala och utan tydlig koppling till nanoteknikens innovationssystem. Förklaringar söks i den svenska modellens implikation för FoU i allmänhet och nanoteknik i synnerhet. Modellen är centrerad kring storindustrins behov och har sitt fokus på expertis. Sammantaget har Sverige haft svårt både att hantera nanoteknik som utvecklingsprojekt och att bredda diskussionen kring nanoteknik som samhällsprojekt. (shrink)

Graham Priest has influentially claimed that the Sorites paradox is an Inclosure paradox, concluding that his favored dialetheic solution to the Inclosure paradoxes should be extended to the Sorites paradox. We argue that, given Priest’s dialetheic solution to the Sorites paradox, the argument purporting to show that that paradox is an Inclosure is unsound, and discuss some issues surrounding this fact.

In this paper I introduce Horwich’s deflationary theory of truth, called ‘Minimalism’, and I present his proposal of how to cope with the Liar Paradox. The proposal proceeds by restricting the T-schema and, as a consequence of that, it needs a constructive specification of which instances of the T-schema are to be excluded from Minimalism. Horwich has presented, in an informal way, one construction that specifies the Minimalist theory. The main aim of the paper is to present and scrutinize some (...) formal versions of Horwich’s construction. (shrink)

After more than a century in which social learning was blackboxed by evolutionary biologists, psychologists and economists, there is now a thriving industry in cognitive neuroscience producing computational models of learning from and about other agents. This is a hugely positive development. The tools of computational cognitive neuroscience are rigorous and precise. They have the potential to prise open the black box. However, we argue that, from the perspective of a scientific realist, these tools are not yet being applied in (...) an optimal way. To fulfil their potential, the shiny new methods of cognitive neuroscience need to be better coordinated with old-fashioned, contrastive experimental designs. Inferences from model complexity to cognitive complexity, of the kind made by those who favour lean interpretations of behaviour (‘associationists’), require social learning to be tested in challenging task environments. Inferences from cognitive complexity to social specificity, made by those who favour rich interpretations (‘mentalists’), call for non-social control experiments. A parsimonious model that fits current data is a good start, but carefully designed experiments are needed to distinguish models that tell us how social learning _could_ be done from those that tell us how it is _really_ done. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a (propositionaI) modal-Iogic approximation to Quantum Mechanics from a reduced and characteristic number of “crucial experiments” and so independently of the lattice of subspaces of Hilbert space. Kripke’s semantics, which determinates this system, allows to define, from a new point of view, the notions of “measurement process” and “virtual world” and admits a natural interpretation which in turn can help us to understand the measurement problem. In this way, we can attempt a “many-worlds” interpretation of (...) Quantum Mechanics, in the way of Everett. (shrink)

This paper argues that the traditional characterization of the notion of paradox — an apparently valid argument with apparently true premises and an apparently false conclusion — is too narrow; there are paradoxes that do not satisfy it. After discussing, and discarding, some alternatives, an outline of a new characterization of the notion of paradox is presented. A paradox is found to be an apparently valid argument such that, apparently, it does not present the kind of commitment to the conclusion (...) that should be implied by an acceptance of the truth of the premises and the validity of the argument. (shrink)

We investigate whether female board representation and firms’ financial performance are related and whether the relationship differs for firms located in more prejudicial environments. As a proxy for prejudicial environment, we use two geographical indicators: whether a firm is headquartered in a conservative “red” state or in a liberal “blue” state and whether the firm is located in regions where residents possess more stereotypical attitudes about gender equality. We find that both financial performance and female board representation are lower for (...) firms headquartered in red states when compared to those in blue states, and we find similar results for firms located in regions where residents hold more gender-stereotypical views. However, financial performance improves when female directors are present regardless of the firm’s location. Evidence also shows that the incremental improvement in performance measured by Tobin’s q is greater in red-state than in blue-state companies and in regions where residents hold more gender-stereotypical views. The overall results imply that gender stereotyping holds back financial performance and that female directors help improve financial performance. (shrink)

One of the main problems that Paul Horwich’s Minimalist theory of truth must face is the generalization problem, which shows that Minimalism is too weak to have the fundamental explanatory role Horwich claims it has. In this paper, I defend Horwich’s response to the generalization problem from an objection raised by Bradley Armour-Garb. I also argue that, given my response to Armour-Garb, Horwich’s proposal to cope with the generalization problem can be simplified. -/- L’un des principaux problèmes auxquels la théorie (...) minimaliste de la vérité de Paul Horwich doit faire face est le problème de la généralisation. Horwich soutient que le minimalisme a un rôle explicatif fondamental, mais le problème de la généralisation montre que cette théorie est trop faible pour tenir ce rôle. Dans cet article, je défends la réponse d’Horwich au problème de la généralisation à partir d’une objection soulevée par Bradley Armour-Garb. Je prétends également que ma réponse à Armour-Grab nous permet de formuler d’une manière plus simple la réponse d’Horwich au problème de la généralisation. (shrink)

Handbook for Buddhist ethical aspects for Bhutanese youngsters.

Selected writings, including those of Gʹyu-thog Yon-tan-mgon-po, 1126 to 1202, on the morality of Tibetan medicine.

For centuries, the Sorites Paradox has spurred philosophers to think and argue about the problem of vagueness. This volume offers a guide to the paradox which is both an accessible survey and an exposition of the state of the art, with a chapter-by-chapter presentation of all of the main solutions to the paradox and of all its main areas of influence. Each chapter offers a gentle introduction to its topic, gradually building up to a final discussion of some open problems. (...) Students will find a comprehensive guide to the fundamentals of the paradox, together with lucid explanations of the challenges it continues to raise. Researchers will find exciting new ideas and debates on the paradox. (shrink)

Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel Klara and the Sun (2021) philosophizes on how in the current technologically saturated culture, the gradual evolution of the empathetic humanoids has, on one hand, problematized our normative notions of cognitive and affective categories, and on the other, has triggered an order of emotional uncanniness due to our reliance on hyperreal real objects for receiving solace and companionship. The novel may be conceived to be a commentary on the emerging discourse in the domain of cognitive and emotional (...) computing that aspires to transform the inner life and social relationships of the human community. The novelty of the paper lies in its ability to showcase how Kazuo Ishiguro’s Klara and the Sun (2021) creates a rupture in the existing research and literary narrative by critiquing the theoretical underpinnings of emotional computing that optimistically foresees a future where simulated empathetic minds will be able to decode the complexities of the human emotions. It discusses how literature turns into an apt tool to reflect on the limitations of the programmed machines to decode the elusiveness of the human mind that defies the one-to-one correlation between words, multiple connotations, and their underlying emotions. Through the lenses of the fictional narrative, the paper foregrounds how the concept of the social robot designed to offer empathy, care, and companionship turns into a failed project. The paper draws on critical perspectives from disposability theory, posthuman affect, and immaterial bodies to foreground the noncodified feature of affective experientialities that emerge as a result of the interface between humans and nonanimate beings. (shrink)

In this study, we examined the role of culture on early adolescents’ social reasoning about peer exclusion. A total of 80 U.S. and 149 Taiwanese early adolescents independently completed a social reasoning essay about peer exclusion. Analyses of the essays based on social-moral theories showed that U.S. students tended to reason about peer exclusion based on social conventional thinking whereas Taiwanese students were more attentive to personal and moral issues. Despite this difference, both groups of students referred to some common (...) social-moral concepts while reasoning about peer exclusion, including consideration of personal benefit, harming others’ welfare, personal concern, and punishment. The use of social reasoning strategies was similar across the two groups of students except that Taiwanese students relied more on judgment whereas U.S. students generated more alternative hypotheses. (shrink)

In recent years, some authors have proposed quantitative measures of the coherence of sets of propositions. Such probabilistic measures of coherence (PMCs) are, in general terms, functions that take as their argument a set of propositions (along with some probability distribution) and yield as their value a number that is supposed to represent the degree of coherence of the set. In this paper, I introduce a minimal constraint on PMC theories, the weak stability principle, and show that any correct, coherent, (...) and complete PMC cannot satisfy it. As a matter of fact, the argument offered in this paper can be applied to any coherence theory that uses a priori procedures. I briefly explore some consequences of this fact. (shrink)

Bruineberg et al. provide compelling clarity on the roles Markov blankets could (and perhaps should) play in the study of life and mind. However, here we draw attention to a further role blankets might play: as a hypothesis about cognition itself. People and other animals may use blanket-like representations to model the boundary between themselves and their worlds.

Filant la métaphore du « bestiaire », cet article retrace les différents gestes du processus créateur de l’historien. Bien sûr, il ne s’agit pas ici d’emprunter des concepts aux travaux sur le symbolisme animal dont j’avoue très volontiers que je ne les ai pas consultés . Les figures animales convoquées dans ce court article correspondent à l’image que j’en ai, de façon spontanée et non savante. Quatre animaux peuvent être cités : le lion, la fourmi, le renard et le castor. (...) À eux quatre, ils symbolisent les diverses attitudes que j’ai pu prendre au cours de la préparation et de la rédaction de ma biographie d’Offenbach. (shrink)

Jamie Tappenden was one of the first authors to entertain the possibility of a common treatment for the Liar and the Sorites paradoxes. In order to deal with these two paradoxes he proposed using the Strong Kleene semantic scheme. This strategy left unexplained our tendency to regard as true certain sentences which, according to this semantic scheme, should lack truth value. Tappenden tried to solve this problem by using a new speech act, articulation. Unlike assertion, which implies truth, articulation only (...) implies non-falsity. In this paper I argue that Tappenden’s strategy cannot be successfully applied to truth and the Liar. (shrink)