The recent emergence of machine-manipulated media raises an important societal question: How can we know whether a video that we watch is real or fake? In two online studies with 15,016 participants, we present authentic videos and deepfakes and ask participants to identify which is which. We compare the performance of ordinary human observers with the leading computer vision deepfake detection model and find them similarly accurate, while making different kinds of mistakes. Together, participants with access to the model’s prediction (...) are more accurate than either alone, but inaccurate model predictions often decrease participants’ accuracy. To probe the relative strengths and weaknesses of humans and machines as detectors of deepfakes, we examine human and machine performance across video-level features, and we evaluate the impact of preregistered randomized interventions on deepfake detection. We find that manipulations designed to disrupt visual processing of faces hinder human participants’ performance while mostly not affecting the model’s performance, suggesting a role for specialized cognitive capacities in explaining human deepfake detection performance. -/- . (shrink)

There is currently no consensus regarding what measures are most valid to demonstrate perceptual processing without awareness. Likewise, whether conscious perception and unconscious processing rely on independent mechanisms or lie on a continuum remains a matter of debate. Here, we addressed these issues by comparing the time courses of subjective reports, objective discrimination performance and response priming during meta-contrast masking, under similar attentional demands. We found these to be strikingly similar, suggesting that conscious perception and unconscious processing cannot be dissociated (...) by their time course. Our results also demonstrate that unconscious processing, indexed by response priming, occurs, and that objective discrimination performance indexes the same conscious processes as subjective visibility reports. Finally, our results underscore the role of attention by showing that how much attention the stimulus receives relative to the mask, rather than whether processing is measured by conscious discrimination or by priming, determines the time course of meta-contrast masking. (shrink)

The non‐forking‐instances topology (NFI topology) is a topology on the Stone space of a theory T that depends on a reduct of T. This topology has been used in [6] to describe the set of universal transducers for (invariants sets that translate forking‐open sets in to forking‐open sets in T). In this paper we show that in contrast to the stable case, the NFI topology need not be invariant over parameters in but a weak version of this holds for any (...) simple T. We also note that for the lovely pair expansions, of theories with the weak non‐finite cover property (wnfcp), the topology is invariant over in. (shrink)

Since its 1980s coining by Richard Falk, the ‘Grotian Moment’ concept has garnered popularity in international law discourse, denoting a rapid, paradigm-shifting development in international law. This concept builds upon a prevalent recollection of two past events as such paradigm-shifts. The first is, obviously, the ‘original’ Grotian Moment, anointing Grotius as the Father of International Law, mainly for publishing, in 1625, his ground-breaking treatise, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, which is said to had brought about a momentous paradigm-shift that gave (...) rise to modern (statist and secular), or even the first-ever-effective, international law. The second event is the post-ww2 Nuremberg international trial. Presumably, from its mid-seventeenth-century birth to Nuremberg, international law was starkly statist, and so individuals had generally not been its subjects. This, among other things, meant that international criminal law (icl) was not acceptable. Nuremberg is, therefore, celebrated as the first-ever international criminal tribunal, as icl’s birthplace and even more generally as the turning-point in international law’s attitude towards the individual. Simply put, Nuremberg is considered the prototype of a modern Grotian Moment. However, this paper shows that neither 1625 nor 1945 were truly Grotian Moments (their significance notwithstanding) and present’s likely causes for those myths. The paper further reveals that these myths, as well as the current embrace of the ‘Grotian Moment’ concept, are all manifestations of a larger, understudied phenomenon: that internationalists, evermore obsessed with perceiving themselves as cutting-edge, too often satisfy that fix by erasing the past. (shrink)

We show that in a simple theory T in which the τf-topologies are closed under projections every type analyzable in a supersimple τf-open set has ordinal SU-rank. In particular, if in addition T is unidimensional, the existence of a supersimple unbounded τf-open set implies T is supersimple. We also introduce the notion of a standard τ-metric and show that for simple theories its completeness is equivalent to the compactness of the τ-topology.

The binding group theorem for stable theories is partially extended to the simple context. Some results concerning internality are proved. We also introduce a ‘small’ normal subgroup G0+ of the automorphism group and show that if p is Q-internal then it has a finite exponent and G/G0+ is interpretable.

In a simple theory with elimination of finitary hyperimaginaries if tp(a) is real and analysable over a definable set Q, then there exists a finite sequence ( $a_{i}|i \leq n^{*}$ ) $\subseteq dcl^{eq}$ (a) with $a_{n}*$ = a such that for every $i \leq n*$ , if $p_{i} = tp(a_{i}/{a_{i}|j < i}$ ) then $Aut(p_{i}/Q)$ is type-definable with its action on $p_{i}^{c}$ . A unidimensional simple theory eliminates the quantifier $\exists^{\infty}$ and either interprets (in $C^{eq}$ ) an infinite type-definable group (...) or has the property that ACL(Q) = C for every infinite definable set Q. (shrink)

Let T be a simple L-theory and let \ be a reduct of T to a sublanguage \ of L. For variables x, we call an \-invariant set \\) in \ a universal transducer if for every formula \\in L^-\) and every a, $$\begin{aligned} \phi ^-\ L^-\text{-forks } \text{ over }\ \emptyset \ \text{ iff } \Gamma \wedge \phi ^-\ L\text{-forks } \text{ over }\ \emptyset. \end{aligned}$$We show that there is a greatest universal transducer \ and it is type-definable. In (...) particular, the forking topology on \\) refines the forking topology on \\) for all y. Moreover, we describe the set of universal transducers in terms of certain topology on the Stone space and show that \ is the unique universal transducer that is \-type-definable with parameters. If \ is a theory with the wnfcp and T is the theory of its lovely pairs of models we show that \\) and give a more precise description of the set of universal transducers for the special case where \ has the nfcp. (shrink)

A theoretical platform for a much‐needed change in the provision of healthcare based on restoring the autonomy of doctor–patient relationships.

Since the late 1960s, the legal doctrine of consent has occasionally been subject to severe criticism from within the bioethical discourse. The criticism was often based on observations indicating that consents and refusals, which had been considered valid from legal or institutional points of view, had frequently failed to reflect genuinely autonomous decision making, hence genuinely autonomous choices.This has led several critics to conclude that informed consent is a legal fiction. To clarify the concept, a legal fiction is a supposition (...) of fact taken to be true by the courts of law, irrespective of whether it is true or not, and even though it might not be true .1 What these critics probably meant to say was that the law deems any person who has given a legally valid consent to be genuinely task specifically autonomous, regardless of whether this is true or not and even though it might not be true. In other words, informed consent is a legal fiction, since it presupposes—that is, claims to reflect—genuine task specific autonomy, however baselessly.It was precisely this potentially embarrassing conclusion that prompted Faden and Beauchamp to develop a brilliant and remarkably effective argument in defence of the legal doctrine of consent. In their seminal work, AHistory and Theory of Informed Consent, they indeed acknowledged that effective consent often fails to be compatible with autonomous authorisation . Indeed, they recognised that effective consent does not necessarily entail autonomous authorisation. They argued, however, that the former is not a legal fiction, since it does not presuppose the …. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to evaluate the notion of collective guilt feeling both in the light of research in affectivity and in collective intentionality. The paper is divided into an introduction and three main sections. Section 1) highlights relevant features of guilt‐family emotions such as the relation between feeling guilt and objective guilt, the relation between feeling guilt and its content, and the relation between feeling guilt and the ‘self’. Moreover, the distinction between feeling guilt and feeling (...) regret is given due attention. Section 2) examines Margaret Gilbert's arguments in favor of a collectivist view of collective guilt feeling , according to which groups do genuinely feel guilt. Against the collectivist position I argue for an individualist ‘membership account’ of collective guilt feeling in terms of individual members' we‐feeling of guilt. The membership account of collective guilt feeling is vindicated on grounds of a naturalist and non‐judgmentalist understanding of emotions, as well as on the logic of personal pronouns. It combines individualism regarding the subject of the feeling with collectivism regarding the irreducibility of we‐feelings and provides, as I further argue, the required moral force attributed to collective guilt feeling. The concern of section 3) is the question of the appropriate emotional response to collective wrongdoing. I argue against the view that group members are categorically ‘committed to feel guilt as a body’ for wrongdoings committed by the group. Given that individual members often do not participate in their groups' wrongdoings, it seems unjust to impose a requirement for feeling guilt upon them. I suggest that in a general account of the appropriate assessment of collective wrongdoing, feeling regret is the better candidate than feeling guilt for the role of the minimally required emotional response.For us collectively to feel guilt over our action A is for us to be jointly committed to feeling guilt as a body over our action A. [. . .] The parties [. . .] constitute, as far as possible, a single subject of guilt feelings .[A] collective cannot respond affectively [. . .], only its constitutive members can. The lack of an affective counter‐response is troubling, because the efficacy of responses of accountability partially depends upon affect. The response of shame, guilt, and regret help to register the significance of the harm. (shrink)

We extend the dichotomy between 1-basedness and supersimplicity proved in Shami :309–332, 2011). The generalization we get is to arbitrary language, with no restrictions on the topology [we do not demand type-definabilty of the open set in the definition of essential 1-basedness from Shami :309–332, 2011)]. We conclude that every hypersimple unidimensional theory that is not s-essentially 1-based by means of the forking topology is supersimple. We also obtain a strong version of the above dichotomy in the case where the (...) language is countable. (shrink)

We show that if p is a real type which is almost internal in a formula φ in a simple theory, then there is a type p' interalgebraic with a finite tuple of realizations of p, which is generated over φ. Moreover, the group of elementary permutations of p' over all realizations of φ is type-definable.

The paper defends the thesis that institutional virtue is properly modeled as a ‘‘consensual’’ property, along the lines of the Lehrer–Wagner model of consensus (LWC). In a first step, I argue that institutional virtue is not exhausted by duty-fulfilling, since institutions, contrary to natural individuals, are designed to fulfill duties. To avoid the charge of vacuity, virtue, if attributed to institutions, must be able to motivate supererogatory action. In a second step, I argue against dis- continuity of institutional virtue with (...) individual virtue. Two main arguments for discontinuity of collective properties display serious shortcomings when applied to virtues of institutions. Given that motivation for supererogatory action is neither inferred from statutory duties nor accommodates a right of reprobation, modeling institutional virtue on collective rationality or explaining it in terms of joint com-mitment both prove problematic. In a third step, I argue that LWC has the explanatory potential to account for institutional virtue. Due to its main features,iteration and evaluation, it provides a non-trivial analysis of continuity and thereby satisfies basic constraints on the notion of genuine institutional virtue. (shrink)

We show that a Kueker simple theory eliminates Ǝ∞ and densely interprets weakly minimal formulas. As part of the proof we generalize Hrushovski's dichotomy for almost complete formulas to simple theories. We conclude that in a unidimensional simple theory an almost-complete formula is either weakly minimal or trivially-almost-complete. We also observe that a small unidimensional simple theory is supersimple of finite SU-rank.

The recently published Report of theAHAG on the Operation of NHS Research Ethics Committees advocates major reforms of the NHS research ethics committees system. The main implications of the proposed changes and their probable effects on the major stakeholders are described.The Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the operation of NHS research ethics committees, set up in November 2004 by Lord Warner on behalf of the Department of Health, submitted its report in June 2005.1 The report advocates major reforms of the (...) research ethics committee system. The primary aim of the report is to streamline the processes around the approval of research projects and to pursue conformity of governance across Europe. Implicit in the report is the contention that failure to achieve this objective would be harmful to everyone with vested interests in improving health and social care. Moreover, it is stated that the reforms will enhance the mechanisms that protect the interests of all parties concerned.1Being mindful of two published critiques of the Warner Report, we suggest that its alleged benefits should not be taken at face value.2,3 In fact, the reformed system will give rise to moral failings akin to those of the existing system, but will differ from the existing system in its effect on the stakeholders. Thus, whereas the outgoing system has given each stakeholder a unique mixture of benefit and harm, the incoming system offers benefit only to sponsors and researchers and nothing but detriment to participants in research and consumers of its products.In the light of this conclusion, we finally suggest that the Warner Report be construed not merely as an ill-considered document, but rather as an ideological reflection of a long-established hegemonic contract fine-tuning itself to contemporary global challenges.To avoid …. (shrink)

In this article we examine the association between national welfare regime and the propensity of middle–aged and older individuals with adult children of their own to provide social support to aged parents. Using data from mature adults (50+) in 26 European countries, we examine whether older and younger generations compete for the time resources of the middle “sandwiched” generation, and whether national policy context shapes this competition. Contrary to expectations, we found that sandwich generation members were less likely to provide (...) support to their parents in Conservative–Mediterranean and East European regimes, but more likely to do so in universalistic Social–Democratic regimes. This evidence supports the hypothesis that well–developed welfare states “crowd–in” family support to older individuals. Middle generation members who provided social support to their adult children tended to provide to their older parents as well. This was particularly true in the two regimes where resources and public benefits tend to be more generous and may be interpreted as state benefits that reduce intergenerational competition. Findings are discussed in terms of the capacity of state policies to shape the allocation of family resources to older adults where extended family lineages have become the norm. (shrink)

The contributions gathered in this volume present the state of the art in key areas of current social ontology. They focus on the role of collective intentional states in creating social facts, and on the nature of intentional properties of groups that allow characterizing them as responsible agents, or perhaps even as persons. Many of the essays are inspired by contemporary action theory, emotion theory, and theories of collective intentionality. Another group of essays revisits early phenomenological approaches to social ontology (...) and accounts of sociality that draw on the Hegelian idea of recognition. This volume is organized into three parts. First, the volume discusses themes highlighted in John Searle's work and addresses questions concerning the relation between intentions and the deontic powers of institutions, the role of disagreement, and the nature of collective intentionality. Next, the book focuses on joint and collective emotions and mutual recognition, and then goes on to explore the scope and limits of group agency, or group personhood, especially the capacity for responsible agency. The variety of philosophical traditions mirrored in this collection provides readers with a rich and multifaceted survey of present research in social ontology. It will help readers deepen their understanding of three interrelated and core topics in social ontology: the constitution and structure of institutions, the role of shared evaluative attitudes, and the nature and role of group agents. (shrink)

In 1948, when the State of Israel was founded, 125,000 people were members of credit cooperative societies, which provided over 20 percent of all market financing. For several years this number continued to rise, reaching a total of 250,000 members in more than 100 credit cooperative societies. Credit associations — part of the thriving cooperative movement of early Zionism — symbolized the attempt to create a new and just Jewish society by fusing socialist and capitalist ideals. From the mid-1950s, however, (...) in a rapid process of centralization of Israel’s capital market and financial institutions, almost all credit associations were absorbed into Israel’s commercial banks and dissolved. Today, Israel’s two largest banks control over 63 percent of credit provision, and 90 percent of credit is provided to less than 1 percent of borrowers. The official policy of the Bank of Israel is to rule out the establishment of credit associations, credit unions or other non-bank financial institutions. In the light of current renewed interest in "social businesses," i.e., innovative business models designed to achieve desired social outcomes, this Article traces the waning of credit associations in Israel, and the role law has played in that process. Their disappearance from the capital market marked not only a change in economic policy, but also the final abandonment of the ideals which underlay the provision of cooperative financial services: mutuality, partnership and solidarity. (shrink)

The paper evaluates Christopher Hookway's claim that individual epistemic vice can enhance the value of collective epistemic virtue. I suggest that this claim can be defended on the grounds of a dynamic account of collective intentional properties that is supplemented by an account of a spontaneous ordering mechanism such as the "intangible hand". Both these accounts try to explain how individual traits integrate into collective traits by way of aggregation. In this respect, they are different from normative and summative accounts (...) of plural subjects. I argue that it is the repeatable and self-amplifying nature of character traits that calls for a dynamic account of collective virtues. With regard to epistemic virtues and their role in the acquisition of knowledge I hold that their dynamic and self-amplifying character warrants their reliability, since it is this character that bottoms out in repeated acts of epistemally correct behavior that constitute a 'responsible practice'. The successful appliance of the latter amplifies the attitude it origins from. If epistemic virtues construed along these lines are attributed to collectives, a dynamic aggregate account supplemented by an account of an "intan-gible hand" device might explain how an aggregate of virtuous efforts of individuals can not only absorb a certain amount of vice but be even enhanced by the 'spice' of some non-intentional epistemically vicious side effects of epistemically virtuous en- deavor. (shrink)

This article discusses the legal concept of excessive use of force by analyzing a particular incident that took place in Israel in the summer of 1997: eighty families, faced with dire housing needs, squatted in vacant apartments in an immigrant absorption center in the town of Mevasseret Zion near Jerusalem. After a period of failed attempts to persuade the families to leave the apartments peacefully, the police moved to evacuate the families, and did so by use of massive force. In (...) the article I describe the violent measures used by the State, and analyze the media portrayal of the squatting and the evacuation. I argue that both these forceful measures and the media portrayal of the squatting and evacuation cumulatively took part in constructing the squatters as criminal deviants rather than political protesters. I claim further that we should understand the concept of use of force not only as a means to achieve certain ends by the state, but also as a mechanism through which the state constructs a social problem and presents it in a manner beneficial to its own interests. Excessive use of force, in this sense, is not just a disproportionate response to a real or perceived threat posed by an individual or group, but a means by which the state fosters a belief that the individual or group present some danger, which must be tackled through the use of a certain level of force. By drawing a line between the legitimate and illegitimate use of force, the state affirms its monopoly on violence, which ultimately can be used to suppress political resistance. (shrink)

The book contains contributions by leading figures in philosophy of mind and action, emotion theory, and phenomenology. As the focus of the volume is truly innovative we expect the book to sell well to both philosophers and scholars from neighboring fields such as social and cognitive science. The predominant view in analytic philosophy is that an ability for self-evaluation is constitutive for agency and intentionality. Until now, the debate is limited in two (possibly mutually related) ways: Firstly, self-evaluation is usually (...) discussed in individual terms, and, as such, not sufficiently related to its social dimensions; secondly, self-evaluation is viewed as a matter of belief and desire, neglecting its affective and emotional aspects. The aim of the book is to fill these research lacunas and to investigate the question of how these two shortcomings of the received views are related. (shrink)

The present article focuses on the case of the 2012 hunger-strike of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. We analyze the ethical dilemma involved in the way the Israeli medical community reacted to these hunger-strikes and the question of force feeding within the context of the fundamental dual-loyalty structure inherent in the Israeli Prison Services—system. We argue that the liberal perspective that focuses the discussion on the dilemma between the principle of individual autonomy and the sanctity of life tends to be (...) oblivious to the asymmetrical relation of power that characterizes the prison system and to the socio-political context in which hunger-strikes take place. Emphasizing hunger-strikes as political acts implies that health practitioners’ conducts cannot be analyzed only through the prism of clinical medical ethics. It requires a public health ethics’ approach, an approach that understands health in the context of the complex relationship between society, state, organizations, communities and individuals. The authors are both academics and volunteers in Physicians for Human Rights—Israel thus our analysis is based both on sociological and public health ethics principles and on the continuous work and advocacy for the right to health of prisoners. (shrink)

Medicine has undergone substantial changes in the way medical dilemmas are being dealt with. Here we explore the attitude of Israeli physicians to two debatable dilemmas: disclosing the full truth to patients...

The paper investigates semantic properties of expressions that suggest the possibility that emotions are shared. An example is the saying that a sorrow shared is a sorrow halved. I assume that such expressions on sharing an emotion refer to a specific mode of subjective experience, displayed in first person attributions of the form 'We share E'. Subjective attributions of this form are intrinsically ambiguous on all levels of their semantic elements: 'emotion', 'sharing' and 'We'. One question the paper seeks to (...) answer is whether and in what respect these semantic ambiguities mirror an indeterminacy of emotional experience. Discussing 'aggregate sharing' (of a determinate) in distinction of mere 'distributive sharing' (of a determinable), I argue that there is no sufficient criterion to determine which mode of sharing an emotional experience shaped as 'We feel E' displays. Disambiguation of this intrinsic indeterminacy must recur to situational parameters of individuals' de re relatedness. (shrink)

Die Studie untersucht die systematischen Beziehungen der zentralen Begriffe in Bernard Bolzanos Erkenntnistheorie, die einen logisch-semantischen Realismus mit einer kausalistischen Metaphysik des Geistes verknüpft. Bolzano situiert grundlegende epistemische Aktivitäten wie Vorstellen, Urteilen und Ableiten im Spannungsfeld von logischen Relationen und dem Kausalnexus mentaler Episoden. Die Studie erläutert die Bedeutung der prominenten Begriffe 'Kraft' und 'Wahrscheinlichkeit' im Hinblick auf die erkenntnistheoretischen Belange von Wissen und Rechtfertigung. Der Begriff der Kraft begründet eine kausalistische Metaphysik von Geist und Welt und damit die Bedingungen (...) faktischer Erkenntnisverläufe. Der Begriff der Wahrscheinlichkeit bezeichnet Begründungsrelationen zwischen objektiven Propositionen, die für die rationale Berechtigung von Überzeugungen bestimmend sind. Zusammen konstituieren Faktivität und Normativität von Erkenntnisansprüchen die epistemische Wahrscheinlichkeit der "Zuversicht", die Urteilen einerseits assertive Kraft und andererseits die Berechtigung verleiht, sie als Erkenntnis anzunehmen. (shrink)

We generalize Shelah's analysis of cardinality quantifiers for a superstable theory from Chapter V of Classification Theory and the Number of Nonisomorphic Models. We start with a set of bounds for the cardinality of each formula in some general invariant family of formulas in a superstable theory (in Classification Theory, a uniform family of formulas is considered) and find a set of derived bounds for all formulas. The set of derived bounds is sharp: up to a technical restriction, every model (...) that satisfies the original bounds has a sufficiently saturated elementary extension that satisfies the original bounds and such that for each formula the set of its realizations in the extension has arbitrarily large cardinality below the corresponding derived bound of the formula. (shrink)

Let T be simple, work in Ceq over a boundedly closed set. Let p ∈ S(θ) be internal in a quasi-stably-embedded type-definable set Q (e.g., Q is definable or stably-embedded) and suppose (p, Q) is ACL-embedded in Q (see definitions below). Then Aut(p/Q) with its action on pC is type-definable in Ceq over θ. In particular, if p ∈ S(θ) is internal in a stably-embedded type-definable set Q, and pC υ Q is stably-embedded, then Aut(p/Q) is type-definable with its action (...) on pC. (shrink)

We point out some connections between existence of homogenous sets for certain edge colorings and existence of branches in certain trees. As a consequence, we get that any locally additive coloring (a notion introduced in the paper) of a cardinal κ has a homogeneous set of size κ provided that the number of colors μ satisfies. Another result is that an uncountable cardinal κ is weakly compact if and only if κ is regular, has the tree property, and for each (...) there exists such that every tree of height μ with λ nodes has less than branches. (shrink)

The contributions gathered in this volume present the state of the art in key areas of current social ontology. They focus on the role of collective intentional states in creating social facts, and on the nature of intentional properties of groups that allow characterizing them as responsible agents, or perhaps even as persons. Many of the essays are inspired by contemporary action theory, emotion theory, and theories of collective intentionality. Another group of essays revisits early phenomenological approaches to social ontology (...) and accounts of sociality that draw on the Hegelian idea of recognition. This volume is organized into three parts. First, the volume discusses themes highlighted in John Searle's work and addresses questions concerning the relation between intentions and the deontic powers of institutions, the role of disagreement, and the nature of collective intentionality. Next, the book focuses on joint and collective emotions and mutual recognition, and then goes on to explore the scope and limits of group agency, or group personhood, especially the capacity for responsible agency. The variety of philosophical traditions mirrored in this collection provides readers with a rich and multifaceted survey of present research in social ontology. It will help readers deepen their understanding of three interrelated and core topics in social ontology: the constitution and structure of institutions, the role of shared evaluative attitudes, and the nature and role of group agents. (shrink)

Moral distress has been well reviewed in the literature with established deleterious side effects for all healthcare professionals, including nurses, physicians, and others. Yet, little is known about the quality and effectiveness of interventions directed to address moral distress. The aim of this integrative review is to analyze published intervention studies to determine their efficacy and applicability across hospital settings. Of the initial 1373 articles discovered in October 2020, 18 were appraised as relevant, with 1 study added by hand search (...) and 2 after a repeated search was completed in January and then in May of 2021, for a total of 22 reviewed articles. This review revealed data mostly from nurses, with some studies making efforts to include other healthcare professions who have experienced moral distress. Education-based interventions showed the most success, though many reported limited power and few revealed statistically lowered moral distress post intervention. This may point to the difficulty in adequately addressing moral distress in real time without adequate support systems. Ultimately, these studies suggest potential frameworks which, when bolstered by organization-wide support, may aid in moral distress interventions making a measurable impact. (shrink)