RESUMEN Dentro de la enorme cantidad de temas reinantes relacionados con el desarrollo científico-tecnológico actual, se encuentra indudablemente el del empleo de la ventilación mecánica no invasiva como medida de soporte vital. Aunque no se trata de una obra especifica que presente un panorama completo y exacto, de todos y cada uno de los problemas relacionados con el empleo de la misma, los autores pretenden con el artículo realizar una breve reflexión del tema desde el enfoque de la ciencia, la (...) tecnología y la sociedad en el momento actual, de manera que constituya un marco útil para el examen de estos temas, su debate, reflexión e intercambio de opiniones en el contexto de los servicios de la salud. ABSTRACT Among the huge number of current issues related to the current scientific-technological development is undoubtedly the use of non-invasive mechanical ventilation as a measure of life support. Although it is not a specific work that presents a complete and accurate picture of each one of the problems related to the use of it. Authors intend with the article to make a brief reflection on the subject from the perspective of science, technology and society at the present time, so that it constitutes a useful framework for the examination of these issues, debate, reflection and exchange of opinions in the context of health services. (shrink)

Research questions and backgroundThis study explores a highly controversial issue of medical care in Germany: the decision to withhold or withdraw mechanical ventilation in critically ill patients. It analyzes difficulties in making these decisions and the physicians’ uncertainty in understanding the German terminology of Sterbehilfe, which is used in the context of treatment limitation. Used in everyday language, the word Sterbehilfe carries connotations such as helping the patient in the dying process or helping the patient to enter the (...) dying process. Yet, in the legal and ethical discourse Sterbehilfe indicates several concepts: (1) treatment limitation, i.e., withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment (passive Sterbehilfe), (2) the use of medication for symptom control while taking into account the risk of hastening the patient’s death (indirekte Sterbehilfe), and (3) measures to deliberately terminate the patient’s life (aktive Sterbehilfe). The terminology of Sterbehilfe has been criticized for being too complex and misleading, particularly for practical purposes. Materials and methods An exploratory study based on qualitative interviews was conducted with 28 physicians from nine medical intensive care units in tertiary care hospitals in the German federal state of Baden-Wuerttemberg. The method of data collection was a problem-centered, semi-structured interview using two authentic clinical case examples. In order to shed light on the relation between the physicians’ concepts and the ethical and legal frames of reference, we analyzed their way of using the terms passive and aktive Sterbehilfe. Results Generally, the physicians were more hesitant in making decisions to withdraw rather than withhold mechanical ventilation. Almost half of them assumed a categorical prohibition to withdraw any mechanical ventilation and more than one third felt that treatment ought not to be withdrawn at all. Physicians showed specific uncertainty about classifying the withdrawal of mechanical ventilation as passive Sterbehilfe, and had difficulties understanding that terminating ventilation is not basically illegal, but the permissibility of withdrawal depends on the situation. Conclusions The physicians’ knowledge and skills in interpreting clinical ethical dilemmas require specific improvement on the one hand; on the other hand, the terms passive and aktive Sterbehilfe are less clear than desirable and not as easy to use in clinical practice. Fear of making unjustified or illegal decisions may motivate physicians to continue (even futile) treatment. Physicians strongly opt for more open discussion about end-of-life care to allow for discontinuation of futile treatment and to reduce conflict. (shrink)

Currently in Japan, discontinuing an invasive mechanical ventilator (IMV) is illegal; therefore IMV-related decision making is a crucial issue. This study examined IMV decision-making factors and psychological conflict in 50 patients with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. The Herth Hope Index was used for the assessment of pre- and post-IMV conflict. Interviews identified some decision-making factors: patient’s decision, patient’s and family’s mutual decision, family’s decision, and emergency-induced without patient’s or family’s consent. Participants who experienced no IMV-related regret received sufficient prior IMV (...) education from physicians and nurses, and time for reflection and family consultation. Their hope was similar to their pre-onset levels. Patients who received no prior IMV education accepted treatment as a natural progression. Their hope levels were lower than pre-onset. Those who received only a brief prior IMV explanation rejected the ventilator, experiencing regret if they were given an emergency IMV. Their hope levels were among the lowest. However, some of these patients managed to overcome their regret through being helped by nurses. Sufficient physician explanation and nursing advocacy for autonomous patient decision making are critical for improving hope in this patient group. (shrink)

Within the caring science paradigm, variations of a method of interpretation inspired by the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur's theory of interpretation are used. This method consists of several levels of interpretation: a naïve reading, a structural analysis, and a critical analysis and discussion. Within this paradigm, the aim of this article is to present and discuss a means of creating distance in the interpretation and the text structure by using narration in a poetic language linked to the meaning of the (...) text. Ricoeur's ‘Hermeneutical function of distanciation’ will be introduced, and this concept of distanciation will be illustrated with reference to narrations from a study of patient's life experiences living with chronic illness and home mechanical ventilation in Denmark. Distanciation in the interpretation objectifies the text, and narration in a poetic language creates a particular kind of mediation in the interpretation. That narration represents an interpreted understanding of the whole, which facilitates an appropriate and evocative presentation of the interpreted data. This way of objectifying the text through narration can contribute yet another perspective to Ricoeur's rich and varied theory of interpretation. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to explore the ethical challenges in home mechanical ventilation based on a secondary analysis of qualitative empirical data. The data included perceptions of healthcare professionals in hospitals and community health services and family members of children and adults using home mechanical ventilation. The findings show that a number of ethical challenges, or dilemmas, arise at all levels in the course of treatment: deciding who should be offered home mechanical (...) class='Hi'>ventilation, respect for patient and family wishes, quality of life, dignity and equal access to home mechanical ventilation. Other challenges were the impacts home mechanical ventilation had on the patient, the family, the healthcare services and the allocation of resources. A better and broader understanding of these issues is crucial in order to improve the quality of care for both patient and family and assist healthcare professionals involved in home mechanical ventilation to make decisions for the good of the patient and his or her family. (shrink)

KARLSSON V, LINDAHL B and BERGBOM I. Nursing Inquiry 2012; 19: 247–258 Patients’ statements and experiences concerning receiving mechanical ventilation: a prospective video‐recorded studyProspective studies using video‐recordings of patients during mechanical ventilator treatment (MVT) while conscious have not previously been published. The aim was to describe patients’ statements, communication and facial expressions during a video‐recorded interview while undergoing MVT. Content analysis and hermeneutics inspired by the philosophy of Gadamer were used. The patients experienced almost constant difficulties in (...) breathing and lost their voice. The most common types of communication techniques patients used were nodding or shaking the head. Their expressions were interpreted as stiffened facial expression, tense body position and feelings of sadness and sorrow. Nursing care for patients’ conscious during MVT is challenging as it creates new demands regarding the content of the care provided. In caring for patients undergoing MVT while conscious, establishing a caring relationship, making patients feel safe and helping them to communicate seem to be most important for alleviating discomfort and instilling hope. (shrink)

Conducting clinical research on subjects admitted to intensive care units is challenging, as they frequently lack the capacity to provide informed consent due to multiple factors including intensive care unit acquired delirium, coma, the need for sedation, or underlying critical illness. However, the presence of one or more of these characteristics does not automatically designate a potential subject as lacking capacity to provide their own informed consent. We review the ethical issues involved in obtaining informed consent for medical research from (...) mechanically ventilated, critically ill patients, in addition to the concerns that may arise when a legally authorized representative is asked to provide informed consent on behalf of these patients. (shrink)

Research questions and backgroundThis study explores a highly controversial issue of medical care in Germany: the decision to withhold or withdraw mechanical ventilation in critically ill patients. It analyzes difficulties in making these decisions and the physicians’ uncertainty in understanding the German terminology of Sterbehilfe, which is used in the context of treatment limitation. Used in everyday language, the word Sterbehilfe carries connotations such as helping the patient in the dying process or helping the patient to enter the (...) dying process. Yet, in the legal and ethical discourse Sterbehilfe indicates several concepts: (1) treatment limitation, i.e., withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment (passive Sterbehilfe), (2) the use of medication for symptom control while taking into account the risk of hastening the patient’s death (indirekte Sterbehilfe), and (3) measures to deliberately terminate the patient’s life (aktive Sterbehilfe). The terminology of Sterbehilfe has been criticized for being too complex and misleading, particularly for practical purposes. Materials and methods An exploratory study based on qualitative interviews was conducted with 28 physicians from nine medical intensive care units in tertiary care hospitals in the German federal state of Baden-Wuerttemberg. The method of data collection was a problem-centered, semi-structured interview using two authentic clinical case examples. In order to shed light on the relation between the physicians’ concepts and the ethical and legal frames of reference, we analyzed their way of using the terms passive and aktive Sterbehilfe. Results Generally, the physicians were more hesitant in making decisions to withdraw rather than withhold mechanical ventilation. Almost half of them assumed a categorical prohibition to withdraw any mechanical ventilation and more than one third felt that treatment ought not to be withdrawn at all. Physicians showed specific uncertainty about classifying the withdrawal of mechanical ventilation as passive Sterbehilfe, and had difficulties understanding that terminating ventilation is not basically illegal, but the permissibility of withdrawal depends on the situation. Conclusions The physicians’ knowledge and skills in interpreting clinical ethical dilemmas require specific improvement on the one hand; on the other hand, the terms passive and aktive Sterbehilfe are less clear than desirable and not as easy to use in clinical practice. Fear of making unjustified or illegal decisions may motivate physicians to continue (even futile) treatment. Physicians strongly opt for more open discussion about end-of-life care to allow for discontinuation of futile treatment and to reduce conflict. (shrink)

Expiratory flow limitation (EFL) can occur in mechanically ventilated patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and other disorders. It leads to dynamic hyperinflation with ensuing deleterious consequences. Detecting EFL is thus clinically relevant. Easily applicable methods however lack this detection being routinely made in intensive care. Using a simple mathematical model, we propose a new method to detect EFL that does not require any intervention or modification of the ongoing therapeutic. The model consists in a monoalveolar representation of the respiratory (...) system, including a collapsible airway that is submitted to periodic changes in pressure at the airway opening: EFL provokes a sharp expiratory increase in the resistance Rc of the collapsible airway. The model parameters were identified via the Levenberg-Marquardt method by fitting simulated data on the airway pressure and the flow signals recorded in 10 mechanically ventilated patients. A sensitivity study demonstrated that only 8/11 parameters needed to be identified, the remaining three being given reasonable physiological values. Flow-volume curves built at different levels of positive expiratory pressure, PEEP, during PEEP trials (stepwise increases in positive end-expiratory pressure to optimize ventilator settings) have shown evidence of EFL in three cases. This was concordant with parameter identification (high Rc during expiration for EFL patients). We conclude from these preliminary results that our model is a potential tool for the non-invasive detection of EFL in mechanically ventilated patients. (shrink)

In a severe influenza pandemic, hospitals will likely experience serious and widespread shortages of patient pulmonary ventilators and of staff qualified to operate them. Deciding who will receive access to mechanical ventilation will often determine who lives and who dies. This prospect raises an important question whether pandemic preparedness plans should include some process by which individuals affected by ventilator rationing would have the opportunity to appeal adverse decisions. However, the issue of appeals processes to ventilator rationing decisions (...) has been largely neglected in state pandemic planning efforts. If we are to devise just and effective plans for coping with a severe influenza pandemic, more attention to the issue of appeals processes for pandemic ventilator rationing decisions is needed. Arguments for and against appeals processes are considered, and some suggestions are offered to help efforts at devising more rational pandemic preparedness plans. (shrink)

A goal of living as well as possible is central to practice and research with young adults living with home mechanical ventilation (HMV). Significant effort has been put into conceptualizing and measuring the quality of life (QOL) as a proxy for living well. Yet, dominant understandings of QOL have been influenced by normative, ableist, and biomedical discourses about what constitutes a good life that, when applied in practice and systems with those living with HMV, can contribute to exclusion (...) and constrain opportunities to live well. Inquiry into what certain understandings of living well can do is critical to opening up possibilities to reimagine living well with HMV. This paper draws on findings from a critical narrative inquiry that explored the experiences of five young adults (ages 18–40 years) living with HMV. Data were co‐constructed virtually through an initial interview and photo‐elicitation using participant‐generated photographs. A critical narrative analysis of participants' stories made visible the ideological effects of ableist, biomedical, and individualist discourses and how the young adults reproduced and resisted these dominant discourses. Their stories further opened up possibilities for nurses and other healthcare providers to see living well and QOL differently. (shrink)

COVID-19 is a highly contagious infection with no proven treatment. Approximately 2.5% of patients need mechanical ventilation while their body fights the infection.1 Once COVID-19 patients reach the point of critical illness where ventilation is necessary, they tend to deteriorate quickly. During the pandemic, patients with other conditions may also present at the hospital needing emergency ventilation. But ventilation of a COVID-19 patient can last for 2–3 weeks. Accordingly, if all ventilators are in use, there (...) will not be time for patients to ‘queue up’ to wait for those who arrived earlier to recover. Those who need a ventilator will die if they do not receive access to one quickly. Many nations now face the prospect that they failed to prepare appropriately for this foreseen risk of pandemic (another issue worthy of legal analysis) and that their populations will need far more ventilators than the health service can supply. For many weeks, the UK has been anticipating a surge of COVID-19 infections that could leave patients queuing in hospitals for ICU care. Luckily, social distancing has ‘flattened the curve’ and this problem might not arise. There is still a degree of risk, however, and other countries will not be so lucky. At some point, during this pandemic or the next, all countries will need to answer hard questions about whether and when scarce ICU resources (such as ventilators, beds and staff) should be either withheld or withdrawn from certain groups of patients solely for the purpose of providing them to others. Attempts to answer these questions can be found in a wide range of ICU triage protocols and ethical guidance documents, many of which embrace the foundational principle of ‘save the most lives’. Unfortunately, this worthwhile goal has generated many suggestions that could violate the law. This article identifies …. (shrink)

The research presented in this work represents reflections in the light of Julia Kristeva's philosophy concerning empirical data drawn from research describing the everyday life of people dependent on ventilators. It also presents a qualitative and narrative methodological approach from a person‐centred perspective. Most research on home ventilator treatment is biomedical. There are a few published studies describing the situation of people living at home on a ventilator but no previous publications have used the thoughts in Kristeva's philosophy applied to (...) this topic from a caring science perspective. The paper also addresses what a life at home on a ventilator may be like and will hopefully add some new aspects to the discussion of philosophical issues in nursing and the very essence of care. Kristeva's philosophy embraces phenomena such as language, abjection, body, and love, allowing her writings to make a fruitful contribution to nursing philosophy in that they strengthen, expand, and deepen a caring perspective. Moreover, her writings about revolt having the power to create hope add an interesting aspect to the work of earlier philosophers and nursing theorists. (shrink)

Lower respiratory tract infections are a leading cause of paediatric morbidity and mortality worldwide. Children in low-income countries are disproportionately affected. This is in large part due to limitations in healthcare resources and medical technologies. Mechanical ventilation can be a life-saving therapy for many children with acute respiratory failure. The scarcity of functioning ventilators in low-income countries results in countless preventable deaths. Some hospitals have attempted to adapt to this scarcity by using hand-bag ventilation, as either a (...) bridge to a mechanical ventilator, or until clinical improvement occurs rendering mechanical ventilation no longer necessary. In instances of hand-bag ventilation, an endotracheal tube is first placed. Family members are then asked to play the role of a ventilator, manually compressing a bag repeatedly to inflate the child’s lungs. This approach is fraught with numerous ethical challenges. A careful examination of the data and a nuanced approach to the ethical considerations are imperative. Ethical arguments in support of and in opposition to allowing parental hand-bag ventilation are explored, including the best interests of the child, the child’s right to an open future, beneficence and parental protection, legitimising substandard care, and finally, contextual concerns. An algorithmic, potentially ethically permissible approach to parental participation in manual ventilation is proposed. (shrink)

This essay examines the management of ventilatory failure in disaster settings where clinical needs overwhelm available resources. An ethically defensible approach in such settings will adopt a “sufficiency of care” perspective that is: (1) adaptive, (2) resource-driven, and (3) responsive to the values of populations being served. Detailed, generic, antecedently written guidelines for “ventilator triage” or other management issues typically are of limited value, and may even impede ethical disaster response if they result in rescuers’ clumsily interpreting events through the (...) lens of the guideline, rather than customizing tactics to the actual context. Especially concerning is the tendency of some expert planners to mistakenly assume that medical treatment of respiratory failure: (1) always requires full-feature mechanical ventilators, (2) will always occur in hospitals, and (3) can be planned in advance without sophisticated public consultation about likely ethical dilemmas. (shrink)

In response to the COVID‐19 pandemic philosophers and governments have proposed scarce resource allocation guidelines. Their purpose is to advise healthcare professionals on how to ethically allocate scarce medical resources. One challenging feature of the pandemic has been the large numbers of patients needing mechanical ventilatory support. Guidelines have paradigmatically focused on the question of what doctors should do if they have fewer ventilators than patients who need respiratory support: which patient should get the ventilator? There is, however, an (...) important higher level allocation problem. Namely, how are we to ethically distribute newly obtained ventilators across hospitals: which hospital should get the ventilator(s)? In this paper, we identify a set of principles for allocating newly obtained ventilators across hospitals. We focus particularly on low and middle income countries, who frequently have limited pre‐existing intensive care capacity, and have needed to source additional ventilators. We first provide some background. Second, we argue that the main population healthcare aim during the COVID‐19 pandemic should be to save the most lives. Next, we assess a series of potential heuristics or principles that could be used to guide allocation: allocation to the most densely populated cities, random allocation, allocation based on the ratio of patients to ICU personnel, prioritisation in terms of intrahospital mortality, prioritisation of younger populations, and prioritisation in terms of population mortality. We conclude by providing a plausible ranking of the principles, while noting a number of epistemological challenges, in terms of how they best further the aim of increasing the probability of saving the most lives. (shrink)

In coal mining industry, the running state of mine ventilators plays an extremely significant role for the safe and reliable operation of various industrial productions. To guarantee the better reliability, safety, and economy of mine ventilators, in view of early detection and effective fault diagnosis of mechanical faults which could prevent unscheduled downtime and minimize maintenance fees, it is imperative to construct some viable mathematical models for mine ventilator fault diagnosis. In this article, we plan to establish a data-based (...) mine ventilator fault diagnosis method to handle situations where engineers are absent or they are incapable of coming to a conclusion from multisource data. In the process of building the mine ventilator fault diagnosis model, considering that probabilistic rough sets could reduce the errors triggered by incompleteness, inconsistency, and inaccuracy without needing any additional assumptions and Pythagorean fuzzy multigranulation rough sets over the two universes’ model could effectively handle data representation, fusion, and analysis issues, we generalize the existing PF MGRSs over the two universes’ model to the PRS setting, as well as to further establish a novel model named Pythagorean fuzzy multigranulation probabilistic rough sets over two universes. In the granular computing paradigm, three types of PF MG-PRSs over two universes based on the risk attitude of engineers are proposed at first. Afterwards, several basic propositions of the newly proposed model are explored. Moreover, a PF multigranulation probabilistic model for mine ventilator fault diagnosis based on PF MG-PRSs over two universes is investigated. At last, a real-world case study of dealing with a mine ventilator fault diagnosis problem is given to illustrate the practicality of the presented model, and a validity test, a sensitivity analysis, and a comparison analysis are further explored to demonstrate the effectiveness of the presented model. (shrink)

One of the societal problems in a new influenza pandemic will be how to use the scarce medical resources that are available for prevention and treatment, and what medical, epidemiological and ethical justifications can be given for the choices that have to be made. Many things may become scarce: personal protective equipment, antiviral drugs, hospital beds, mechanical ventilation, vaccination, etc. In this paper I discuss two general ethical principles for priority setting (utility and equity) and explain how these (...) principles will often point in diverging directions. Moreover, each of these principles can be understood in different, again often competing, ways. Notwithstanding these controversies and conflicts, in the context of pandemic response there are at least some points of convergence: several policies can be justified by appeal to different ethical principles and theories. Convergence may be found with respect to a focus on saving the most lives (instead of other aggregative accounts); giving priority antiviral prophylaxis and therapy for life-saving pandemic responders; and, partly depending on epidemiology of the pandemic, to prioritise vaccination of children. Although decision-making about access to intensive care will involve choices with immediate tragic implications, the ethical complexity of these choices is relatively modest (although decisions will not be easy): there are persuasive moral reasons for giving priority to patients who are expected to benefit most within the shortest time. Finally, in the last section I tentatively argue that constraints on people’s freedom, as necessary for an effective public health approach, may support giving somewhat more weight to saving the most lives, than to concerns of equity. (shrink)

Providing food and water, even by tube, is in principle an ordinary and proportionate means of preserving life. The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith made that clear in its August 1, 2007 statement on the matter. However, a pressing question remains: What about oxygen? Food and water are necessary for life. Is not oxygen equally necessary? So why did the CDF not also declare the use of a mechanical ventilator to be in principle an ordinary and proportionate (...) means of preserving life? Conversely, if the use of a ventilator is extraordinary means, then why is the artificial provision of food and water proportionate means? Is there an inconsistency here? The author argues that there is not. (shrink)

In this paper, a mathematical model of the respiratory mechanics is used to reproduce experimental signal waveforms acquired from three newborn lambs. As the main challenge is to determine specific lamb parameters, a sensitivity analysis has been realized to find the most influent parameters, which are identified using an evolutionary algorithm. Results show a close match between experimental and simulated pressure and flow waveforms obtained during spontaneous ventilation and pleural pressure variations acquired during the application of positive pressure, since (...) root mean square errors equal to 0.0119, 0.0052 and 0.0094. The identified parameters were discussed in light of previous knowledge of respiratory mechanics in the newborn. (shrink)

The COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic raises a host of challenging ethical questions at every level of society. However, some of the most acute questions relate to decision making in intensive care. The problem is that a small but significant proportion of patients develop severe viral pneumonitis and respiratory failure. It now seems likely that the number of critically ill patients will overwhelm the capacity of intensive care units within many health systems, including the National Health Service in the UK. The experience (...) of Northern Italy—a couple of weeks ahead of the UK, suggests that it will simply not be possible to provide mechanical ventilation to every patient who might need it. When the crunch comes, the unpalatable question facing clinicians is which patient to save. There are some obvious strategies to avoid or reduce the problem—through measures to increase intensive care capacity, and via society-level interventions to reduce the spread of the virus. These are vitally important, but unfortunately they are unlikely to prevent the problem of demand outstripping supply from occurring. What, then, should clinicians do? How should they allocate the scarce resource of intensive care—particularly over the coming weeks as the crisis escalates? There are different values at stake in triage decisions, but at a basic level the key values are those of benefit and …. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Incoherence of Determining Death by Neurological Criteria: A Commentary on Controversies in the Determination of Death, A White Paper by the President’s Council on Bioethics*Franklin G. Miller** (bio) and Robert D. Truog (bio)Traditionally the cessation of breathing and heart beat has marked the passage from life to death. Shortly after death was determined, the body became a cold corpse, suitable for burial or cremation. Two technological changes in (...) the second half of the twentieth century prompted calls for a new, or at least expanded, definition of death: the development of intensive care medicine, especially the use of mechanical ventilators, and the advent of successful transplantation of vital organs. Patients with profound neurological damage, leaving them incapable of breathing on their own and in an irreversible coma, could be maintained for some period of time with the aid of mechanical ventilation. The situation of these patients posed two ethical questions. Is it appropriate to stop life-sustaining treatment? If so, is it acceptable to retrieve vital organs for transplantation to save the lives of others before stopping treatment?In 1968, the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death proposed that death could be determined on the basis of neurological criteria, thus providing a positive answer to these two questions (Ad Hoc Committee 1968). According to the position of this committee, patients diagnosed with the cessation of brain function are dead, despite the fact that they breathe and circulate blood with the aid of mechanical ventilation. [End Page 185] Because they are dead, it is appropriate, indeed imperative, to stop mechanical ventilation. And because they are dead, it becomes ethical to procure vital organs for transplantation before stopping what otherwise would be life-sustaining treatment. Remarkably, this innovative neurological determination of death became, with little debate or controversy, the established position in medical ethics and the law throughout the United States.The Harvard Committee articulated the diagnosis of “irreversible coma,” but merely asserted that this condition constituted death. No explanatory rationale was provided. It fell to the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research to provide an authoritative rationale in its 1981 report, Defining Death. The second paragraph of the report set the stage as follows: “The question addressed here is not inherently difficult or complicated. Simply, it is whether the law ought to recognize new means for establishing that the death of a human being has occurred” (President’s Commission 1981, p. 3). The Commission claimed that “death is a unitary phenomenon” (p. 7) and that the determination of death by neurological criteria, in terms of the absence of all brain function, is consistent with the traditional conception of death as the cessation of vital functioning of the organism as a whole. The key issue is the integrative functioning of the human organism, which ceases to exist, according to the Commission, when the whole brain, including higher cortical areas and the brain stem, fails to function. Although “brain-dead” patients do not appear to be dead—i.e., the reality of their death is “masked” by the activity of mechanical ventilation—the patient’s body has irreversibly lost all capacity for integrative functioning. In the words of the Commission: “When artificial means of support mask this loss of integration as measured by the old methods [cessation of respiration and heart beat], brain-oriented criteria and tests provide a new window on the same phenomenon” (p. 33). The President’s Commission was instrumental in developing and establishing “The Uniform Definition of Death Act”: “An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead” (p. 2).Although the question posed by the President’s Commission was easy to articulate, the answer, over time, has proved complicated and controversial. The coherence and cogency of determining death by neurological criteria has been challenged. Various experts have demonstrated that “brain-dead” patients maintained on mechanical ventilation display a range of vital, integrative, functioning, which conflicts with the judgment that they are dead (Truog and... (shrink)

Background According to some medical ethicists and professional guidelines, there is no ethical difference between withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment. However, medical professionals do not always agree with this notion. Patients and their families may also not regard these decisions as equivalent. Perspectives on life-sustaining treatment potentially differ between cultures and countries. This study compares Japanese physicians’ and citizens’ attitudes toward hypothetical cases of withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment.Methods Ten vignette cases were developed. A web-based questionnaire was administered to 457 (...) citizens and 284 physicians to determine whether they supported withholding or withdrawing treatment.Results In a case where a patient had an advance directive refusing ventilation, 77% of the physicians and 68% of the citizens chose to withhold treatment. In a case where there was an advance directive but the patient’s family requested treatment, 55% of the physicians and 45% of the citizens chose to withhold the ventilator. When a family requested withdrawal of the ventilator but patient wishes were unknown, 19% of the physicians and 48% of the citizens chose to withdraw the ventilator. However, when the patient had also indicated their wishes in writing, 49% of the physicians and 66% of the citizens chose to withdraw treatment. More physicians were prepared to withdraw dialysis (84%) and artificial nutrition (81%) at a patient’s request than mechanical ventilation (49%).Conclusions A significant proportion of Japanese physicians and citizens were reluctant to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment, even in cases where the patient had indicated their wishes in writing. They were more likely to withhold than withdraw treatment, and more likely to withdraw artificial nutrition than mechanical ventilation. Japanese physicians gave significant weight to family views about treatment but were less likely to agree to withdraw treatment than citizens, indicating a potential source of conflict in clinical settings. (shrink)

Objective: Pulmonary complications could badly affect the recovery of neurological function and neurological prognosis of neurological critically ill patients. This study evaluated the effect of high-flow nasal cannula therapy on decreasing pulmonary complications in neurologically critically ill patients.Patients and Methods: The patients admitted to the intensive care unit with serious neurological disease and receiving oxygen therapy were retrospectively reviewed. Patients were divided into the HFNC group and the conventional oxygen therapy group. We analyzed the data within these two groups, including (...) patients’ baseline data, short-term outcomes of respiratory complications, general outcomes including hospital stay, ICU stay and mortality, and neurological functions. To analyze the relevant factors, we performed multivariable logistic regression analysis.Results: A total of 283 patients met the criteria, including 164 cases in the HFNC group and 119 cases in the COT group. The HFNC group had remarkably less mechanical ventilation requirement with lower phlegm viscosity. Even more, ICU stay and total hospital stay were significantly shortened in the HNFC group.Conclusion: HFNC decreased pulmonary complications in neurologically critically ill patients and improved recovery of neurological function and neurological prognosis. (shrink)

This paper develops a philosophical account of moral disruption. According to Robert Baker, moral disruption is a process in which technological innovations undermine established moral norms without clearly leading to a new set of norms. Here I analyze this process in terms of moral uncertainty, formulating a philosophical account with two variants. On the harm account, such uncertainty is always harmful because it blocks our knowledge of our own and others’ moral obligations. On the qualified harm account, there is no (...) harm in cases where moral uncertainty is related to innovation that is “for the best” in historical perspective or where uncertainty is the expression of a deliberative virtue. The two accounts are compared by applying them to Baker’s historical case of the introduction of mechanical ventilation and organ transplantation technologies, as well as the present-day case of mass data practices in the health domain. (shrink)

Objectives: to assess physicians’ and patients’ views in Saudi Arabia towards involving the patient versus the family in the process of diagnosis disclosure and decision-making, and to compare them with views from the USA and Japan.Design: A self-completion questionnaire was translated to Arabic and validated.Participants: Physicians from different specialties and ranks and patients in a hospital or attending outpatient clinics from 6 different regions in KSA.Results: In the case of a patient with incurable cancer, 67% of doctors and 51% of (...) patients indicated that they would inform the patient in preference to the family of the diagnosis . Assuming the family already knew, 56% of doctors and 49% of patients would tell the patient even if family objected . However, in the case of HIV infection, 59% of physicians and 81% of patients would inform the family about HIV status without the patient’s consent . With regards to withholding ventilatory support, about 50% of doctors and over 60% of patients supported the use of mechanical ventilation in a patient with advanced cancer, regardless of the wishes of the patient or the family. Finally, the majority of doctors and patients were against assisted suicide.Conclusions: Although there was more recognition for a patient’s autonomy amongst physicians, most patients preferred a family centred model of care. Views towards information disclosure were midway between those of the USA and Japan. Distinctively, however, decisions regarding life prolonging therapy and assisted suicide were not influenced to a great extent by wishes of the patient or family, but more likely by religious beliefs. (shrink)

This paper develops a philosophical account of moral disruption. According to Robert Baker (2013), moral disruption is a process in which technological innovations undermine established moral norms without clearly leading to a new set of norms. Here I analyze this process in terms of moral uncertainty, formulating a philosophical account with two variants. On the Harm Account, such uncertainty is always harmful because it blocks our knowledge of our own and others’ moral obligations. On the Qualified Harm Account, there is (...) no harm in cases where moral uncertainty is related to innovation that is “for the best” in historical perspective, or where uncertainty is the expression of a deliberative virtue. The two accounts are compared by applying them to Baker’s historical case of the introduction of mechanical ventilation and organ transplantation technologies, as well as the present-day case of mass data practices in the health domain. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Stories of Families with Chronically Ill Pediatric Patients during the War in UkraineVita VoloshchukFebruary 24th was a day that has left a mark in the memory and on the lives of every Ukrainian person. My husband and I work together [End Page E5] in a hospital. He had gone into work early to conduct a kidney transplant that had been scheduled for that day. Suddenly, whilst on my way (...) to work that morning, I heard a strange sound—it was an air-raid siren. Before that, I had never heard such a sound. I went through all the possible options of what it could be. Of course, watching the morning news had never been a habit either. The next thing that astonished me was that the taxi I had ordered was taking an unnaturally long time to turn up. When I got into the taxi, I noticed that the taxi driver was really upset and silent for half of the journey. He then said, “A war has begun...”“War? So? The war has been going on since 2014.”“You don’t understand,” he said. “Russia is launching missile attacks all over the territory of Ukraine; Russian troops are coming from the east and north of Ukraine. They want to capture the capital of Ukraine.” (Kyiv).Arriving at the hospital, I saw confused faces everywhere. The morning meeting began with a discussion of how we were to act in any possible situation that may occur. We were to discharge patients from the hospital, as many as possible. The arrangement of a bomb shelter began (although I didn’t even think that such a thing existed in our hospital), along with the strengthening of the hospital’s windows, and the increase of supplies such as medicine and food. Of course, the boy who expected a kidney transplant did not receive it because no one knew what to expect at any second or where a hostile Russian missile might hit, as Russian missiles hit not only military objects but residential buildings, hospitals, and memorials as well.Children who had to continue therapy remained in the hospital. As soon as we heard the sound of an air-raid siren, we had to go down into the bomb shelter. This happened 5-10 times per day. Families with palliative and chronically ill children began to call and ask for advice on how to proceed in such a situation. As many children were on artificial respiration devices, others needed oxygen therapy, and sputum of mucus from the upper respiratory tract. All this required uninterrupted power supplies and appropriate equipment. Later that day, a doctor from Poland called me and asked if our pediatric patients needed help, saying it would be better if they were moved to Poland, where they would be safer and have the correct equipment. We started organizing evacuations for chronically ill and palliative patients.Seven days after the war began, parents from other regions, where the situation was more dangerous, began calling, asking for help evacuating. The hospital began to work intensively round the clock. Some patients moved in, and others were evacuated abroad. Some did not want to go. They continued treatment in the hospital, which turned into a hub for patients who had come from more dangerous, occupied territories; patients who were forced to leave their motherland to continue treatment.Since the beginning of the war, I have been responsible for transferring palliative patients and other patients with gastrointestinal diseases abroad. After the massive invasion, everything changed in our country. It is important to say that during the war, Lviv is safer than any other Ukrainian city, still air-raid sirens often go off, and everyone needs to run immediately to shelters for their safety. Palliative patients need special care. It is very difficult to run with patients several times per day during an air-raid siren or live with these children for a long time (2-3 weeks) in shelters because of the explosions occurring around them.It is impossible to move some patients to safety because they need appropriate medical equipment or mechanical ventilation is necessary. In shelters, there are crowds, and the high risk of... (shrink)

The definition of death is one of the oldest and most enduring problems in biophilosophy and bioethics. Serious controversies over formally defining death began with the invention of the positive-pressure mechanical ventilator in the 1950s. For the first time, physicians could maintain ventilation and, hence, circulation on patients who had sustained what had been previously lethal brain damage. Prior to the development of mechanical ventilators, brain injuries severe enough to induce apnea quickly progressed to cardiac arrest from (...) hypoxemia. Before the 1950s, the loss of spontaneous breathing and heartbeat were perfect predictors of death because the functioning of the brain and of all other organs ceased rapidly and nearly simultaneously thereafter, producing a unitary death phenomenon. In the pretechnological era, physicians and philosophers did not have to consider whether a human being who had lost certain “vital functions” but had retained others was alive, because such cases were technically impossible. (shrink)

Background: Relatively little is known about neonatologists' roles in helping families navigate the difficult decision to attempt or withhold resuscitation for a neonate delivering at the threshold...

McGovern, Kevin In recent years, some speakers at Catholic conferences and a few articles on Catholic websites and in Catholic newspapers have claimed that brain death is not really death. Some Catholics may be confused by this - particularly if they are asked to agree to the removal of mechanical ventilation or the procurement of organs from a relative or friend who has been declared brain dead. At the same time, these claims might damage the reputation of the (...) Church within the scientific and health care communities. This article reviews what brain death is, and then details Catholic investigations and statements about this concept. (shrink)

Huang and colleagues provide some intriguing insights into the attitudes about end of life care of practising Taiwanese neonatal doctors and nurses.1 There are some similarities with surveys from other parts of the world. Most Taiwanese neonatologists and nurses agreed that it was potentially appropriate to withhold or limit treatment for infants who were dying. A very high proportion was opposed to active euthanasia of such infants. But there were also some striking differences. Only 21% of Taiwanese doctors ‘agreed’ with (...) withdrawal of mechanical ventilation for dying newborn infants. This proportion is lower than reported in any European country.2 More than 90% of neonatologists surveyed in the UK, the USA, The Netherlands and Sweden found withdrawal of mechanical ventilation acceptable.2 ,3 Taiwanese doctors also seemed reluctant to give analgesia or sedatives to such infants, with almost 60% disagreeing with their use in dying infants where there was a risk of hastening death.1 In contrast, two-thirds or more of European neonatologists thought this was acceptable .2The results of the survey of Huang et al highlight three beliefs about end-of-life care that are widespread, but all of which are seriously mistaken1. None are new, but …. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Incoherence of Determining Death by Neurological Criteria: A Commentary on Controversies in the Determination of Death, A White Paper by the President’s Council on Bioethics*Franklin G. Miller** (bio) and Robert D. Truog (bio)Traditionally the cessation of breathing and heart beat has marked the passage from life to death. Shortly after death was determined, the body became a cold corpse, suitable for burial or cremation. Two technological changes in (...) the second half of the twentieth century prompted calls for a new, or at least expanded, definition of death: the development of intensive care medicine, especially the use of mechanical ventilators, and the advent of successful transplantation of vital organs. Patients with profound neurological damage, leaving them incapable of breathing on their own and in an irreversible coma, could be maintained for some period of time with the aid of mechanical ventilation. The situation of these patients posed two ethical questions. Is it appropriate to stop life-sustaining treatment? If so, is it acceptable to retrieve vital organs for transplantation to save the lives of others before stopping treatment?In 1968, the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death proposed that death could be determined on the basis of neurological criteria, thus providing a positive answer to these two questions (Ad Hoc Committee 1968). According to the position of this committee, patients diagnosed with the cessation of brain function are dead, despite the fact that they breathe and circulate blood with the aid of mechanical ventilation. [End Page 185] Because they are dead, it is appropriate, indeed imperative, to stop mechanical ventilation. And because they are dead, it becomes ethical to procure vital organs for transplantation before stopping what otherwise would be life-sustaining treatment. Remarkably, this innovative neurological determination of death became, with little debate or controversy, the established position in medical ethics and the law throughout the United States.The Harvard Committee articulated the diagnosis of “irreversible coma,” but merely asserted that this condition constituted death. No explanatory rationale was provided. It fell to the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research to provide an authoritative rationale in its 1981 report, Defining Death. The second paragraph of the report set the stage as follows: “The question addressed here is not inherently difficult or complicated. Simply, it is whether the law ought to recognize new means for establishing that the death of a human being has occurred” (President’s Commission 1981, p. 3). The Commission claimed that “death is a unitary phenomenon” (p. 7) and that the determination of death by neurological criteria, in terms of the absence of all brain function, is consistent with the traditional conception of death as the cessation of vital functioning of the organism as a whole. The key issue is the integrative functioning of the human organism, which ceases to exist, according to the Commission, when the whole brain, including higher cortical areas and the brain stem, fails to function. Although “brain-dead” patients do not appear to be dead—i.e., the reality of their death is “masked” by the activity of mechanical ventilation—the patient’s body has irreversibly lost all capacity for integrative functioning. In the words of the Commission: “When artificial means of support mask this loss of integration as measured by the old methods [cessation of respiration and heart beat], brain-oriented criteria and tests provide a new window on the same phenomenon” (p. 33). The President’s Commission was instrumental in developing and establishing “The Uniform Definition of Death Act”: “An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead” (p. 2).Although the question posed by the President’s Commission was easy to articulate, the answer, over time, has proved complicated and controversial. The coherence and cogency of determining death by neurological criteria has been challenged. Various experts have demonstrated that “brain-dead” patients maintained on mechanical ventilation display a range of vital, integrative, functioning, which conflicts with the judgment that they are dead (Truog and... (shrink)

Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS; also called motor neuron disease) is a devastating medical condition that progressively robs patients of their ability to move, speak and eventually breathe. At present, many physicians are hesitant to propose tracheostomy and respiratory support in the terminal phase of ALS. In accordance with the principle of patient autonomy, physicians should respect the right of the ALS patient to accept or refuse any treatment, including mechanical ventilation. Also, in environments where euthanasia or physician-assisted death (...) is legal, such requests can be acceptable. At least two conditions are necessary for full autonomy. To have a claim on full autonomy, people need to have intact cognitive abilities, and to exercise this right they must be able to communicate. In the past, the first condition was in doubt (indeed, overlap with other neurodegenerative diseases is sometimes suspected and some patients with ALS are thought to have associated frontotemporal dementia) and the second was severely compromised in patients with devastating motor impairment (communication being limited to the twitch of a finger or the blink of an eye). In this issue of J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry, Lakerveld and colleagues1 investigated cognition in 11 patients with late stage ALS (see page 25). They showed preserved cognitive functioning (ie, language, executive function, intelligence, learning and long term memory) compared with healthy controls. Assessments were exclusively based on a ‘‘yes–no’’ response mode. Because of the absence of verbal and motor communication, the neuropsychological assessment of these patients is complicated, and adapted testing is needed. By using a ‘‘yes–no’’ response mode based on the remaining motor abilities of the patient, this study proves the possibility of assessing patients with minimal motor capacities. (shrink)

In the mid 1980s it was apparent that the need for organ donors exceeded those willing to donate. Some University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) physicians initiated discussion of possible new organ donor categories including individuals pronounced dead by traditional cardiac criteria. However, they reached no conclusion and dropped the discussion. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, four cases arose in which dying patients or their families requested organ donation following the elective removal of mechanical ventilation. (...) Controversy surrounding these cases precipitated open discussion of the use of organ donors pronounced dead on the basis of cardiac criteria. Prolonged deliberations by many committees in the absence of precedent ultimately resulted in what is, to our knowledge, the country's first policy for organ donation following elective removal of life support. The policy is intricate and conservative. Care was taken to include as many interested parties as possible in an effort to achieve representative and broad based support. This paper describes the development of the UPMC policy on non-heart-beating organ donation. (shrink)

The 2009 pandemic of influenza A was relatively mild, but a subsequent outbreak of pandemic influenza could be much worse. According to projections from the Department of Health and Human Services, the potential health consequences of a severe influenza pandemic in the United States could be literally overwhelming: up to 1.9 million deaths; 90 million people sick; 45 million people needing outpatient care; 9.9 million people hospitalized, of whom 1.485 million would need treatment in an intensive care unit ; and (...) 742,500 patients needing mechanical ventilators. Even a less cataclysmic, moderate pandemic would result in 209,000 deaths; 90 million people sick; 45 million people needing outpatient care; 865,000 people hospitalized, of whom 128,750 would need treatment in an ICU; and 64,875 patients needing mechanical ventilators. (shrink)

The 2009 pandemic of influenza A (H1N1) was relatively mild, but a subsequent outbreak of pandemic influenza could be much worse. According to projections from the Department of Health and Human Services, the potential health consequences of a severe (1918-like) influenza pandemic in the United States could be literally overwhelming: up to 1.9 million deaths; 90 million people sick; 45 million people needing outpatient care; 9.9 million people hospitalized, of whom 1.485 million would need treatment in an intensive care unit (...) (ICU); and 742,500 patients needing mechanical ventilators. Even a less cataclysmic, moderate pandemic (like 1958 or 1968) would result in 209,000 deaths; 90 million people sick; 45 million people needing outpatient care; 865,000 people hospitalized, of whom 128,750 would need treatment in an ICU; and 64,875 patients needing mechanical ventilators. (shrink)

Research uses of human bodies maintained by mechanical ventilation after being declared dead by neurological criteria, were first published in the early 1980s with a renewed interest in research on the newly or nearly dead occurring in about last decade. While this type of research may take many different forms, recent technologic advances in genomic sequencing along with high hopes for genomic medicine, have inspired interest in genomic research with the newly dead. For example, the Genotype-Tissue Expression program (...) through the National Institutes of Health aims to collect large numbers of diverse human tissues with the eventual goal of elucidating the genetic bases of common diseases through a better understanding of the relationship between genetic variation and gene expression. (shrink)

Since 1968, the irreversible loss of functioning of the whole brain, called brain death, is assimilated to individual’s death. The almost universal acceptance of this neurological criterion of death had decisive consequences for the contemporary medicine, such as the withdrawal of mechanical ventilation in these patients and organ retrieval for transplantation. The new criterion was successfully accepted in part because the assimilation of brain death state to death was presented by medicine --and acritically assumed by most of societies-- (...) as a scientific and objective fact. Nevertheless, many people do not think that the patients suffering brain death are actually dead. We show here that those people are not necessarily wrong. It can be argued that, in fact, the justification of the neurological criterion is not scientific but moral. We outline the thesis that the problem surrounding the vital status of brain dead patients is due to a confusion between factual and normative questions. Furthermore, we claim that the donation of organs and the withdrawal of life-support could be ethically acceptable even if the patients suffering brain death are considered as alive. As an alternative to the dead donor rule, we propose a justification for organ donation of brain-dead patients based on the (moral) concepts of harm and consent : what truly justifies the procurement of organs on those patients is not that they are dead, but that they wish to donate their organs and that, since they have irreversibly lost their brain, they cannot be harmed. (shrink)

We describe and analyze 13 cases handled by our ethics consultation service (ECS) in which families requested continuation of physiological support for loved ones after death by neurological criteria (DNC) had been declared. These ethics consultations took place between 2005 and 2013. Patients’ ages ranged from 14 to 85. Continued mechanical ventilation was the focal intervention sought by all families. The ECS’s advice and recommendations generally promoted “reasonable accommodation” of the requests, balancing compassion for grieving families with other (...) ethical and moral concerns such as stewardship of resources, professional integrity, and moral distress. In cases we characterized as finitegoal accommodation, a “reasonable accommodation” strategy proved effective in balancing stakeholders’ interests and goals, enabling steady progress toward resolution. When a family objected outright to a declaration of DNC and asked for an indefinite accommodation, the “reasonable accommodation” approach offered clinicians little practical direction, and resolution required definitive action by either the family or the clinical team. Based on our analysis and reflections on these 13 cases, we propose ethically justified and practical guidelines to assist healthcare professionals, administrators, and ECSs faced with similar cases. (shrink)

Mr. M. was a 77-year-old decisionally incapacitated long-term nursing home resident with chronic schizophrenia who was admitted to the hospital with a bacterial pneumonia. His past medical history was notable for deteriorating functional status over the past 2-3 years, urinary retention requiring chronic indwelling bladder catheterization, and two recent hospitalizations for urinary tract infections leading to sepsis. He developed respiratory failure soon after admission and was intubated and placed on mechanical ventilation. Follow-up studies suggested worsening pneumonia and acute (...) respiratory distress syndrome, as well as worsening kidney function. (shrink)

Dramatic modern advances in emergency and resuscitation medicine, starting perhaps with the development of effective mechanical ventilators in the mid-20th century, have created a large class of persons who in earlier times would almost certainly have died, but who can now go on existing, suspended at least temporarily in a state somewhere between death and the conscious life they formerly pursued. A very wide range of brain injuries lead first to coma, in which the patient shows no sign of (...) conscious awareness, or even of wakefulness, in which eye openings and closings indicate the presence of a sleep/wake cycle unconsciously mediated by structures in the brain stem. Following emergence from coma, which may take days to months or more if it happens at all, patients typically show signs of wakefulness without conscious awareness – they are then in a so-called vegetative state (VS). For many this state becomes permanent, but some go on to a more recently described condition called the minimally conscious state (MCS), in which signs of conscious awareness can be detected by careful neurological examination (see Laureys & Tononi, 2009, chapter 14). A very few such persons ultimately progress to more or less full recovery, but another and particularly horrifying possible outcome is the “locked-in” state, in which a patient is fully conscious but has extremely little or no capacity for voluntary motor action. A famous modern example is that of Jean-Dominique Bauby, author of The Diving Bell and the Butterfly, who suffered a stroke to his upper brainstem and awakened 20 days later to find himself fully conscious but capable only of blinking his left eye. A tiny fraction of surgical patients find themselves in similarly terrifying conditions caused by the combination of muscle relaxants with insufficient levels of anesthetic agents (Kelly et al., 2007, p. 387 n. 18). (shrink)

Muraskas et al. and Hefferman and Heilig present the painfully elusive ethical questions regarding decisionmaking in the care of the extremely low birth weight infants in the intensive care nursery. At what gestation or size do we resuscitate? Can we stop resuscitation after we have started? How much money is too much to spend? Is the distress of the parents of the ELBW infant, the anguish of their caregivers, and the moral and ethical uncertainty of the approach to these infants (...) too much to pay? Who speaks for the neonate: the parent, nurse, attorney, or physician? Ideally these questions should have been answered 30 years ago when modern neonatology embarked on a journey from where it could not return. A new breed of physician, called “neonatologist,” seduced by the high-tech lure and the promise of saving lives previously unsavable pioneered a lucrative and life-saving technological revolution in the care of premature newborns. This rapid advancement in neonatology occurred a few years after the death of a premature infant named Patrick Kennedy in 1963. While the country mourned, medical scientists vowed that this would not happen again. First continuous positive airway pressure, then mechanical ventilation, changed medical care of premature newborns forever. It began an era of euphoria and excitement. Neonatologists raced to push to the edge of newborn viability. What was the youngest salvageable gestational age? What was the smallest that could be saved? Yes, we dreamed, and still do dream of artificial placentas. Ethical questions took a back seat in the search for the edge because the waters were uncharted and the tough questions could not be answered without experience. What was to be the cost in dollars and in anguish to save the Patrick Kennedys of the world? Triumphs led to grave concerns as we approached the edge. However, no advancement in neonatology has ever changed the ultimate questions. (shrink)

Although established in the law and current practice, the determination of death according to neurological criteria continues to be controversial. Some scholars have advocated return to the traditional circulatory and respiratory criteria for determining death because individuals diagnosed as ‘brain dead’ display an extensive range of integrated biological functioning with the aid of mechanical ventilation. Others have attempted to refute this stance by appealing to the analogy between decapitation and brain death. Since a decapitated animal is obviously dead, (...) and ‘brain death’ represents physiological decapitation, brain dead individuals must be dead. In this article we refute this ‘decapitation gambit.’ We argue that decapitated animals are not necessarily dead, and that, moreover, the analogy between decapitation and the clinical syndrome of brain death is flawed. (shrink)

The determination of death by neurological criteria remains controversial scientifically, culturally, and legally, worldwide. In the United Kingdom, although the determination of death by neurological criteria is not legally codified, the Code of Practice of the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges is customarily used for neurological death determination and treatment withdrawal. Unlike some states in the US, however, there are no provisions under the law requiring accommodation of and respect for residents' religious rights and commitments when secular conceptions of death (...) based on medical codes and practices conflict with a traditional concept well-grounded in religious and cultural values and practices. In this article, we analyse the medical, ethical, and legal issues that were generated by the recent judgement of the High Court of England and Wales in Re: A [2015] EWHC 443. Mechanical ventilation was withdrawn in this case despite parental religious objection to a determination of death based on the code of practice. We outline contemporary evidence that has refuted the reliability of tests of brainstem function to ascertain the two conjunctive clinical criteria for the determination of death that are stipulated in the code of practice: irreversible loss of capacity for consciousness and somatic integration of bodily biological functions. We argue that: the tests of brainstem function were not properly undertaken in this case; the two conjunctive clinical criteria set forth in the code of practice cannot be reliably confirmed by these tests in any event; and absent authentication of the clinical criteria of death, the code of practice wrongly invokes a secular definition of death based on the loss of personhood. Consequently, the moral obligation of a pluralistic society to honor and respect diverse religious convictions to the greatest extent possible is being violated. Re A is contrasted with the US case of Jahi McMath in which the court accommodated parental religious objection to the determination of neurological death codified in the Uniform Determination of Death Act. We conclude that the legal system in the United Kingdom should not favour a secular definition of death over a definition of death that is respectful of religious values about the inviolability and sanctity of life. We recommend the legal recognition of religious accommodation in death determination to facilitate cultural sensitivity and compassionate care to patients and families in a pluralistic society. (shrink)