"En dépit d'une reconnaissance du principe moderne de la subjectivité, d'une exaltation de la raison universelle, d'un éloge de la modernité, la philosophie hégélienne de l'esprit reste attachée à une conception vitaliste de l'esprit, à une forme d'organicisme ou de romantisme. Les commentaires de Robert Legros visent à suggérer que la philosophie politique de Hegel, qui prend forme progressivement au cours des années 1800 et s'affirme dans la philosophie du droit parue en 1820, reste irréductiblement écartelée entre une visée (...) rationaliste, qui sous-tend une critique explicite de l'organicisme romantique, et une forme d'organicisme ou de vitalisme, qui anime une critique virulente des Lumières."--Page 4 de la couverture. (shrink)

La 4e de couv. indique : "Quel est le sens d'une expérience de la liberté s'il est vrai qu'elle ne pourrait être empirique? Pour mettre en lumière l'expérience phénoménologique de la liberté, ce livre s'interroge d'une part sur les rapports entre phénoménologie et métaphysique, et d'autre part sur les rapports entre phénoménologie et philosophie politique. Robert Legros, prenant appui sur des textes de Heidegger, Arendt, Levinas, Castoriadis, Lefort, Janicaud et Richir, montre ici qu'en se rapportant à une expérience humaine (...) de la liberté, la phénoménologie peut introduire à une philosophie politique qui met en question le relativisme et le multiculturalisme". (shrink)

Peut-on élucider le sens de la phénoménologie? La première section est consacrée à Husserl, la seconde à Hannah Arendt et la troisième à l’expérience phénoménologique d’autrui. La première partie vise à montrer que la phénoménologie de Husserl porte en elle des thèmes par lesquels elle se soustrait au cadre métaphysique dans lequel elle s’est formée. La deuxième partie prétend que la phénoménologie politique de Hannah Arendt conduit à une mise en question de l’idéologie des droits de l’homme mais aussi à (...) une justification de l’idée des droits de l’homme. Cette section comprend en elle la reproduction d’un débat oral qui avait eu lieu sur France culture entre Claude Lefort, Alain Finkielkraut et Robert Legros. La troisième partie porte sur l’expérience phénoménologique d’autrui. Elle montre que cette expérience prolonge et renouvelle d’une part la conception kantienne de l’expérience du proprement humain, et d’autre part la conception tocquevillienne de l’expérience du semblable. L’examen de l’expérience phénoménologique d’autrui s’achève par une confrontation entre Arendt et Levinas. (shrink)

The author compares the different interpretations by Castoriadis and Lefort of democratic autonomy. For both, autonomy involves questioning all pregiven meaning. Castoriadis, while rejecting any law of historical progress, regards the history of autonomy as the development of a movement which commenced in a limited political domain in ancient Greece and expanded in other domains in Western Europe from the 11th century on. In theory, it has eliminated pregiven meaning, but has remained stuck in a liberal oligarchy, bogged down by (...) a tide of insignificance. It remains to further the project of autonomy to the point where a truly autonomous society will be able to accept as such the “Abyss” (the “Chaos”) it experiences without hiding behind replicas such as those provided by religion. Lefort, on the other hand, while similarly accepting democracy’s desire for autonomy, believes the source of its principles are enigmatic and it will continue to remain open to the authentic human experience of radical transcendence even without God. He believes that the threat of relativism can be avoided as democracy is more just since it allows its members to be more open to this radical transcendence than other forms of society. (shrink)

D’un bout à l’autre de son œuvre, Hegel conçoit l’esprit à partir du schème de la vie entendue comme identité de l’identité et de la différence. Dans ses travaux de jeunesse, il comprend la vie comme union de l’esprit et du sensible, de l’âme et du corps, identifie cette union spirituelle et sensible à la beauté, découvre cette beauté dans la Cité grecque, dans la religion qui anime un peuple. Arrivé à Iéna, il ne conçoit plus la vie de l’esprit (...) sous sa modalité la plus élevée comme une union de l’esprit et du sensible mais comme union de l’esprit avec ses propres manifestations spirituelles. L’État possède la puissance prodigieuse de laisser ses propres moments se développer jusqu’à devenir indépendants, tout en les ramenant en son propre sein, surmontant ainsi sa propre mort. Il accomplit l’union vivante de l’esprit avec lui-même, du moins quand les individus qu’il englobe et transcende, devenus en principe autonomes et indépendants, le veulent comme leur but suprême. From beginning to end of his work, Hegel conceives the Spirit from schema of the life understood as an identity of identity and difference. In his youth’s works, he understands the life as an union of Spirit and Sensible, of soul and body, identifies this spiritual and sensible union with the beauty, discovers this beauty in the Greek City, in the religion that gives life to a people. Arrived at Iena, he doesn’t conceive any more the life of Spirit under its highest modality as an union of Spirit and Sensible but as an union of Spirit with its own spiritual manifestations. The State owns the prodigious power to let its own moments develop until they become independent while bringing them back in its own bosom and like this overcoming its own dead. It achieves the living union of Spirit with itself, at least when the individuals that it includes and transcends, theoretically became autonomous and independent, want it as their supreme goal. (shrink)

La démocratie, d’après Tocqueville, ne définit pas simplement un mode de gouvernement. Elle désigne plus largement un mode du vivre-ensemble. Elle ne caractérise pas seulement la vie politique et l’exercice des pouvoirs. Elle se révèle aussi à travers les rapports que les hommes entretiennent avec le monde et entre eux. L’avènement de la démocratie, c’est la société qui « change de forme », écrivait-il ; et il précisait, en substance : c’est aus...

"To think with Nietzsche against Nietzsche." Thus the editors describe the strategy adopted in this volume to soften the destructive effects of Nietzsche's "philosophy with a hammer" on French philosophy since the 1960s. Frustrated by the infinite inclusiveness of deconstructionism, the contributors to this volume seek to renew the Enlightenment quest for rationality. Though linked by no common dogma, these essays all argue that the "French Nietzsche" transmitted through the deconstructionists must be reexamined in light of the original context in (...) which Nietzsche worked. Each essay questions the viability of Nietzsche's thought in the modern world, variously critiquing his philosophy of history as obsessed with hierarchy, his views on religion and art as myopic and irrational, and his stance on science as hopelessly reactionary. Contending that we must abandon the Nietzsche propped up as patron saint by French deconstructionists in order to return to reason, these essays will stimulate debate not just among Nietzscheans but among all with a stake in modern French philosophy. Contributors are Alain Boyer, André Compte-Sponville, Vincent Descombes, Luc Ferry, Robert Legros, Philippe Raynaud, Alain Renault, and Pierre-André Taguieff. (shrink)

Cet article est une version révisée d’un texte prononcé le 26 novembre 2018 à l’occasion de la journée organisée par l’université de Caen Normandie en hommage à Robert Legros, autour de son nouvel ouvrage intitulé Levinas. Une philosophie de l’altérité. Il mène une lecture critique de l’ouvrage guidée par une question essentielle : l’éthique de Levinas peut-elle prétendre au statut de phénoménologie, ou est-elle irrémédiablement liée à une théologie? En parcourant les chapitres du livre sur le temps, la relation (...) à autrui, le propre de l’homme et la politique, l’article examine la façon dont Robert Legros démontre le caractère universel des descriptions de l’humanité par Levinas – et ce en dépit de la référence nécessaire au langage de la Bible pour dire la responsabilité envers le visage. (shrink)

The impressive variation amongst biological individuals generates many complexities in addressing the simple-sounding question what is a biological individual? A distinction between evolutionary and physiological individuals is useful in thinking about biological individuals, as is attention to the kinds of groups, such as superorganisms and species, that have sometimes been thought of as biological individuals. More fully understanding the conceptual space that biological individuals occupy also involves considering a range of other concepts, such as life, reproduction, and agency. There has (...) been a focus in some recent discussions by both philosophers and biologists on how evolutionary individuals are created and regulated, as well as continuing work on the evolution of individuality. (shrink)

This paper offers an overview of "the species problem", arguing for a view of species as homeostatic property cluster kinds, positioning the resulting form of realism about species as an alternative to the claim that species are individuals and pluralistic views of species. It draws on taxonomic practice in the neurosciences, especially of neural crest cells and retinal ganglion cells, to motivate both the rejection of the species-as-individuals thesis and species pluralism.

This paper explores the relationship between eugenics, disability, and dehumanization, with a focus on forms of eugenics beyond Nazi eugenics.

Are interpersonal comparisons of desire possible? Can we give an account of how facts about desires are grounded, that underpins such comparisons? This paper supposes the answer to the first question is yes, and provides an account of the nature of desire that explains how this is so. The account is a modification of the interpretationist metaphysics of representation that the author has recently been developing. The modification is to allow phenomenological affective valence into the “base facts” on which correct (...) interpretation is grounded. To use this extra resource within that theory to vindicate interpersonal comparisons, we will need to appeal rational connections between level of valence and level of desire, which this paper sets out and examines. (shrink)

Drawing on a passage from Ramsey's Truth and Probability, we formulate a simple, plausible constraint on evaluating the accuracy of credences: the Calibration Test. We show that any additive, continuous accuracy measure that passes the Calibration Test will be strictly proper. Strictly proper accuracy measures are known to support the touchstone results of accuracy-first epistemology, for example vindications of probabilism and conditionalization. We show that our use of Calibration is an improvement on previous such appeals by showing how it answers (...) or sidesteps problems that have been raised for previous work in this area. (shrink)

In the good old days, when general philosophy of science ruled the Earth, a simple division was often invoked to talk about philosophical issues specific to particular kinds of science: that between the natural sciences and the social sciences. Over the last 20 years, philosophical studies shaped around this dichotomy have given way to those organized by more fine-grained categories, corresponding to specific disciplines, as the literatures on the philosophy of physics, biology, economics and psychology--to take the most prominent four (...) examples--have blossomed. In general terms, work in each of these areas has become increasingly enmeshed with that in the corresponding science itself, increasingly naturalistic (in at least one sense of that term), and in my view, increasingly interesting. (shrink)

If the world itself is metaphysically indeterminate in a specified respect, what follows? In this paper, we develop a theory of metaphysical indeterminacy answering this question.

My aim is to propose affectivity as a criterion for personal identity. My proposal is to be taken in its weak version: affectivity as _only one_ of the criteria for personal identity. I start by arguing for affectivity being a better candidate as a criterion for personal identity than thinking. Next, I focus on synchronic vs. diachronic and on ontic vs. epistemic distinctions (my proposal will concern diachronic ontic personal identity) and consider the realm of affectivity in its temporal dimension. (...) In my argument, I rely on the genuineness of affectivity and I exploit chiefly long- or everlasting feelings (or emotions) and those which involve the feeling subject more rather than less. I conclude by stating that genuine long-lasting feelings (or emotions) are constitutive of diachronic ontic personal identity. (shrink)

The paper offers an analysis of Protagoras’ fr. DK 80 B 1 and rejects the traditional reading of Protagoras as relativist. By considering the ipsissima verba that Protagoras makes use of in his passage, it is argued that alternative interpretations are possible, of which epistemological reism and psychological individualism are proposed. On a more general level, it is discussed to what extent Protagoras’ fragment contains descriptive rather than normative claim.