This paper defends a realist interpretation of theories and a modest realism concerning the existence of quantities as providing the best account both of the logic of quantity concepts and of scientific measurement practices. Various operationist analyses of measurement are shown to be inadequate accounts of measurement practices used by scientists. We argue, furthermore, that appeals to implicit definitions to provide meaning for theoretical terms over and above operational definitions fail because implicit definitions cannot generate the requisite descriptive content. The (...) special case of establishing a temperature scale is examined to show that nonrealist accounts fail to provide insight into the theoretical connections that scientific laws postulate to hold among quantities. (shrink)

I characterize a notion of causal agency that is the causitive component of many transitive verbs. The agency of what I call substantial causes relates objects physically to systems with which they interact. Such agent causation does not reduce to conditionship relations, nor does it cease to play a role in scientific discourse. I argue, contrary to regularity theories, that causal claims do not in general depend for their sense on generalities nor do they entail the existence of laws. Clarification (...) of the relationships among substantial causes, causal processes, and explanatory conditions separates the analysis of causal connection from that of nomological connection. This clarification is then applied to a variety of issues in the analysis of causality. (shrink)

1. Introduction. Professor Nagel's account of the “cognitive status” of scientific theories has been attacked by P. K. Feyerabend [5] and M. B. Hesse [8] in terms of his alledgedly misguided distinction between experimental laws and theories. The difficulty lies, these critics agree, in Nagel's attempt to find a stable basis for scientific theories in an observational basis of experimental laws. Both Feyerabend and Hesse note the vacillation in Nagel's account of the stability of the meaning of experimental terms and (...) in his discussion of the status of observational as opposed to theoretical terms. They find Nagel too “positivistic” and see as a first step toward a more adequate account of scientific theories the abandonment of the theoretical-observational dichotomy as having more than a pragmatic significance. Nagel's discussion of the theoretical-observational dichotomy is, I agree, inadequate in certain respects. I shall, however, suggest a quite different remedy from those of Feyerabend and Hesse, one that depends neither on a phenomenalistic reduction of theoretical entities nor on a blurring of the theoretical-observational dichotomy. (shrink)

How are causes and laws related? Some attempt to analyze causal relations in terms of laws, others view causal explanation as quite distinct from explanation using laws. My analysis of the relations between causes and laws focuses on cases such as the simple pendulum law where asymmetries in causal relations between quantities are not reflected in the functional dependencies in the law equations. The asymmetry puzzle has elicited a variety of accounts which reflect quite different views on the relation between (...) causes and laws and their roles in scientific explanation. Finding none of the usual accounts satisfying, I offer an explication based on some distinctions in the analysis of the relevant causes that are not commonly heeded. I criticize the very notion of causal law and examine some implications of my account for ceteris paribus problems which arise in attempts to give realist interpretations of scientific theories. (shrink)

Recent attempts to clarify the fitness in evolutionary theory as a propensity (Brandon 1978; Brandon and Beatty 1984; Burian 1983; Mills and Beatty 1979; Sober 1984a, 1984b) or as a primitive theoretical term (Rosenberg 1983, 1985; Williams 1970, Williams and Rosenberg 1985) all miss the mark in clarifying the empirical content and explanatory power of natural selection theory.I shall argue that the crucial distinction missing in these accounts is between the sense of fitness common in population genetics as actual relative (...) rate of increase of genotypes and fitness in the more ordinary sense--and Darwin’s--of adaptedness of organisms. The relation between these senses of ‘fitness’ is that fitness as actual reproduction success depends on, is a function of, variables representing adaptive capacities and environmental properties. (shrink)

For many laws causal asymmetries in dependencies among the variables are not reflected in functional relations of the law equation. In the case of the simple pendulum law, why can we cite the length to explain the period but not the period to explain the length? After surveying attempts to explain the asymmetries, I propose a new account based on an analysis of the relation of causes and laws. This analysis is used to criticize the very notion of causal laws (...) and to clarify the role of ceteris paribus clauses in interpreting scientific laws. (shrink)

Fitness in the sense of actual rate of increase of genotypes, commonly used in population genetics, is contrasted with fitness in the ordinary sense (and Darwin's) of adaptedness of organisms. Fitness as actual reproductive success is interpreted as a function of variables representing intrinsic adaptive capacities and environmental properties. Adaptive capacities causally contribute to fitness as actual reproductive success which in turn, as relative increase of genotypes, determines evolutionary change. The propensity interpretation of fitness is shown not to play a (...) role in evolutionary explanation. (shrink)

Central to many issues surrounding reduction in science is the relation between a physical system and its components. In this article we examine how thermodynamic theory relates properties of whole systems to properties of their components. In order to keep the analysis general, we focus our study on universal properties like volume, heat capacity, energy and temperature. In the cases examined we find that scientific explanation requires appeal to properties of components that are spatially as extensive as the whole system. (...) We discuss some implications of our study for the purported paradigmatic reductions of heat and temperature to molecular motion. We conclude that while macro systems reduce ontologically to micro components, epistemologically the reduction of theoretical concepts in general fails. (shrink)

Recent philosophical discussions have failed to clarify the roles of the concept fitness in evolutionary theory. Neither the propensity interpretation of fitness nor the construal of fitness as a primitive theoretical term succeed in explicating the empirical content and explanatory power of the theory of natural selection. By appealing to the structure of simple mathematical models of natural selection, we separate out different contrasts which have tended to confuse discussions of fitness: the distinction between what fitness is defined as versus (...) what fitness is a function of, the contrast between adaptedness as an overall property of organisms and specific adaptive capacities, the distinction between actual and potential reproductive success, the role of chance versus systematic causal relations, fitness as applied to organisms as opposed to fitness applied to genotype classes, heritable adaptive capacities of genotypes as opposed to relations between genotypes and the environment. We show how failure to distinguish and properly interrelate these different aspects of “fitness” adds confusion to a number of already complex issues concerning evolutionary theory. On the basis of our discussion of these different aspects of “fitness”, we propose a terminology which makes the necessary distinctions. A central result of our analysis is that the concept of fitness as the overall adaptedness of organisms does not enter into the causal structure of evolutionary explanation, at least to the extent that this structure is represented in the mathematical models of natural selection. (shrink)

Intended both for undergraduate students and for general readers, this introduction to the philosophy of science uses case studies, anecdotes and personal comment to portray many heroes and villains from the field of science through the ages.

There is more to science than Aristotle’s natural desire to know. The major achievement of this book lies in presenting this idea through the study of the lives of various scientists.

"L'oeuvre d'art est une tentative vers l'unique, elle s'affirme comme un tout, comme un absolu et, en même temps, elle appartient à un système de relations complexes [...]. Elle est matière et elle est esprit, elle est forme et elle est contenu [...]. Elle est créatrice de l'homme, créatrice du monde et elle installe dans l'histoire un ordre qui ne se réduit à rien d'autre." Un Eloge de la main complète ce texte. "La main arrache le toucher à sa passivité (...) réceptive, elle l'organise pour l'expérience et pour l'action [...]. Elle se mesure avec la matière qu'elle métamorphose, avec la forme qu'elle transfigure. Educatrice de l'homme, elle le multiplie dans l'espace et dans le temps." [Source : 4e de couv.]. (shrink)

Augustine made a significant contribution to the history of philosophical accounts of affectivity which scholars have not yet noticed. He resolved a problem with the Stoic theory as it was known to him: the question of the cognitive cause of "preliminary passions" ( propatheiai ), reflex-like affective reactions which must be immediately controlled if a morally bad emotion is to be avoided. He identified this cognitive cause as momentary doubt, as I demonstrate by citing passages from sermons spanning twenty-seven years (...) in which Augustine consistently used a particular set of scriptural images and phrases as precise analogies for mental and affective states. (shrink)

There is more than one way to think. Most people are familiar with the systematic, rule-based thinking that one finds in a mathematical proof or a computer program. But such thinking does not produce breakthroughs in mathematics and science nor is it the kind of thinking that results in significant learning. Deep thinking is a different and more basic way of using the mind. It results in the discontinuous "aha!" experience, which is the essence of creativity. It is at the (...) heart of every paradigm shift or reframing of a problematic situation. The identification of deep thinking as the default state of the mind has the potential to reframe our current approach to technological change, education, and the nature of mathematics and science. For example, there is an unbridgeable gap between deep thinking and computer simulations of thinking. Many people suspect that such a gap exists, but find it difficult to make this intuition precise. This book identifies the way in which the authentic intelligence of deep thinking differs from the artificial intelligence of "big data" and "analytics." Deep thinking is the essential ingredient in every significant learning experience, which leads to a new way to think about education. It is also essential to the construction of conceptual systems that are at the heart of mathematics and science, and of the technologies that shape the modern world. Deep thinking can be found whenever one conceptual system morphs into another. The sources of this study include the cognitive development of numbers in children, neuropsychology, the study of creativity, and the historical development of mathematics and science. The approach is unusual and original. It comes out of the author's lengthy experience as a mathematician, teacher, and writer of books about mathematics and science, such as How Mathematicians Think: Using Ambiguity, Contradiction, and Paradox to Create Mathematics and The Blind Spot: Science and the Crisis of Uncertainty. (shrink)

Paradise Understood: New Philosophical Essays about Heaven systematically investigates heaven, or paradise, as conceived within theistic religious traditions such as Rabbinic Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. It considers a variety of topics concerning what life in paradise would, could, or will be like for human persons. The collection offers novel approaches to questions about heaven of perennial philosophical interest, and breaks new ground by expanding the range of questions about heaven that philosophers have considered. The contributors wrestle with questions about human (...) life in paradise that span the spectrum of the major subfields of philosophical enquiry. By employing both historical and contemporary philosophical resources, the volume makes a pioneering contribution toward answering pressing questions about human life in paradise. It will serve as a platform for future research, reinvigorating philosophical investigation into these neglected topics within philosophy of religion. (shrink)

This Hackett edition, first published in 1981, is an unabridged and unaltered republication of the seventh edition as published by Macmillan and Company, Limited. From the forward by John Rawls: In the utilitarian tradition Henry Sidgwick has an important place. His fundamental work, The Methods of Ethics, is the clearest and most accessible formulation of what we may call 'the classical utilitarian doctorine.' This classical doctrine holds that the ultimate moral end of social and individual action is the greatest (...) net sum of the happiness of all sentient beings. Happinesss is specified by the net balance of pleasure over pain, or, as Sidgwick preferred to say, as the net balance of agreeable over disagreeable consciousness.... (shrink)

The University of Pittsburgh policy for procuring organs from non-heart-beating cadaver donors recognizes the potential for conflicts of interest between caring for a "hopelessly ill" patient who has forgone life-sustaining treatment and caring for a potential organ donor. The policy calls for a separation between those medical personnel who care for the gravely ill patient and those involved with the care of transplant recipients. While such a separation is possible in theory, it is difficult or impossible to attain in practice. (...) However, such a separation of duties would be unnecessary if an arbitrator were appointed to monitor the proceedings as they take place on a case-by-case basis. In this way, the biases—real or potential—of the individuals involved could be identified, and the harmful effects of the unavoidable conflicts of interest could be minimized. (shrink)

One of the major works of an important modem philosopher, Matter and Memory investigates the autonomous yet interconnected planes formed by matter and perception on the one hand and memory and time on the other. Henry Bergson (1859-1941) was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1927. His works include Time and Free Will, An Introduction to Metaphysics, Creative Evolution, and The Creative Mind.

"With its signal distinction between 'intuition' and 'analysis' and its exploration of the different levels of Duration, _An Introduction to Metaphysics_ has had a significant impact on subsequent twentieth century thought. The arts, from post-impressionist painting to the stream of consciousness novel, and philosophies as diverse as pragmatism, process philosophy, and existentialism bear its imprint. Consigned for a while to the margins of philosophy, Bergson’s thought is making its way back to the mainstream. The reissue of this important work comes (...) at an opportune time, and will be welcomed by teachers and scholars alike." --Peter A. Y. Gunter, University of North Texas. (shrink)

Explanationism holds that a person's evidence supports a proposition just in case that proposition is part of the best available explanation for the person's evidence. I argue that explanationism faces a serious difficulty when it comes to justified beliefs about the future. Often, one's evidence supports some proposition about the future but that proposition is not part of the best available explanation for one's evidence. Attempts to defend explanationism against this charge are unattractive. Moving to a modified better contrastive explanation (...) account will help with these cases, but it will face other difficulties. (shrink)

This paper articulates a conception of organizational justice based on the promise of a mode of organizing that does not violate the particularity of each and every other person. It argues that the decisive condition for such a form of justice resides in the realities of the cultural practices of an organization as they are apparent in the conduct of people in relation to multiple others. These are practices that can only seek justification in the primary right of each person (...) to be regarded with absolute alterity. It also argues that a degree of violence is unavoidable within any practical ordering of justice and that any consideration of ethics and justice in organizations must account for such violence and seek to negotiate its existence on ethical terms. The organizational justice that is referred to is one sensitive to the exercise of its own power and authority in the context of its unavoidable violation of its basis in ethics. This is a justice that is ethically necessary, but is never sure of itself. (shrink)

This paper articulates a conception of organizational justice based on the promise of a mode of organizing that does not violate the particularity of each and every other person. It argues that the decisive condition for such a form of justice resides in the realities of the cultural practices of an organization as they are apparent in the conduct of people in relation to multiple others. These are practices that can only seek justification in the primary right of each person (...) to be regarded with absolute alterity. It also argues that a degree of violence is unavoidable within any practical ordering of justice and that any consideration of ethics and justice in organizations must account for such violence and seek to negotiate its existence on ethical terms. The organizational justice that is referred to is one sensitive to the exercise of its own power and authority in the context of its unavoidable violation of its basis in ethics. This is a justice that is ethically necessary, but is never sure of itself. (shrink)

Giroux argues that challenge gives new meaning to the importance of resistance, the relevance of pedagogy, and the significance of political agency.

This paper pursues a value-based evaluation of a variety of character traits which philosophers have identified with humility, and it proposes a novel account of a character trait not implausibly identified with humility which has a unique kind of value. I begin by explaining why a value-based evaluation of various traits identified with virtues is preferable to the more common contemporary counterexample-based evaluation of these traits. I then undertake a value-based evaluation of various traits which have been identified with humility, (...) showing that thus far none of these traits have a particular kind of value that humility might reasonably be thought to have—a nonameliorative value not based in epistemic, affective, or behavioral accuracy. I conclude by developing an account of a character trait not implausibly identified with humility which does have this kind of value. The trait in question is a disposition to prefer promoting the good of others to one’s own good when these goods are equal or incommensurable. (shrink)

Introduction -- Ethics and politics -- Ethical judgments -- Pleasure and desire -- Free will -- Ethical principles and methods -- Egoism and self-love -- Chapter viii-intuitionism -- Good -- Book II: Egoism -- The principle and method of egoism -- Empirical hedonism -- Empirical hedonism (continued) -- Objective hedonism and common sense -- Happiness and duty -- Deductive hedonism -- Book III: Intuitionism -- Intuitionism -- Virtue and duty -- The intellectual virtues -- Benevolence -- Justice -- Laws and (...) promises -- Classification of duties. truth -- Other social duties and virtues -- Self-regarding virtues -- Courage, humility, etc. -- Review of the morality of common sense -- Motives or springs of action as subjects of moral judgment -- Philosophical intuitionism -- Ultimate good -- Book IV: Utilitarianism -- The meaning of utilitarianism -- The proof of utilitarianism -- The relation of utilitarianism to the morality of common sense -- The method of utilitarianism -- The method of utilitarianism (continued) -- Concluding chapter: The mutual relations of the three methods. (shrink)

Proposes and defends a novel account of the mechanics of divine foreknowledge and providence, arguing that this account is consistent with libertarian freedom.

"--David Ruelle, author of "Chance and Chaos" "This is an important book, one that should cause an epoch-making change in the way we think about mathematics.

" Vivid . . . immense clarity . . . the product of a brilliant and extremely forceful intellect." — Journal of the Royal Naval Scientific Service "Still a sheer joy to read." — Mathematical Gazette "Should be read by any student, teacher or researcher in mathematics." — Mathematics Teacher The originator of algebraic topology and of the theory of analytic functions of several complex variables, Henri Poincare (1854–1912) excelled at explaining the complexities of scientific and mathematical ideas to lay (...) readers. Science and Method, written in 1908, has been appreciated by a wide audience of nonprofessionals and translated into many languages. It defines the basic methodology and psychology of scientific discovery, particularly in regard to mathematics and mathematical physics. Drawing on examples from many fields, it explains how scientists analyze and choose their working facts, and it explores the nature of experimentation, theory, and the mind. 1914 edition. Translated by Francis Maitland. (shrink)

Philosophers have long held that epistemic self-reliance has a special value. But, this view has recently been challenged by prominent epistemologist Linda Zagzebski. Zagzebski argues that potential sources of support for the claim that epistemic self-reliance has a special value fail. Here I provide a novel defense of the special value of epistemic self-reliance. Self-reliance has a special value because it is required for attaining certain valuable cognitive achievements. Further, practicing self-reliance may be all-things-considered worthwhile even when doing so is (...) a less reliable way of getting to the truth than relying on others and even when doing so is flatly unreliable in getting to the truth. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This book argues that Augustine assimilated the Stoic theory of perception and mental language (lekta/dicibilia), and that this epistemology underlies his accounts of motivation, affectivity, therapy for the passions, and moral progress. Byers elucidates seminal passages which have long puzzled commentators, such as Confessions 8, City of God 9 and 14, Replies to Simplicianus 1, and obscure sections of the later ‘anti-Pelagian’ works. Tracking the Stoic terminology, Byers analyzes Augustine’s engagement with Cicero, Seneca, Ambrose, Jerome, Origen, and Philo of Alexandria, (...) demonstrating that Augustine appropriated Stoicism with greater sophistication than other religious writers. She also shows how he moved beyond the Stoics by enriching Stoic cognitivism with Platonic motivational theory, arguing that Augustine created a coherent synthesis. This newly discovered Augustinian moral psychology has elements that contemporary philosophers and psychologists have identified as important. (shrink)