Le Malin génie est absent du Discours de la méthode et des Principes de la philosophie. En différenciant les deux figures du Dieu trompeur et du Malin génie, ainsi que leurs fonctions respectives, on se donne les moyens de discerner la spécificité du cogito de la Seconde Méditation, dont l’un des enjeux majeurs est de renverser littéralement le pyrrhonisme conquis grâce à la fiction du Malin génie par l’affirmation d’une certitude première qui n’est autre que celle de mon existence rétorquée (...) à ce même Malin génie! Un tel renversement du pyrrhonisme dans le cogito fait de la première vérité, non le cogito qui n’est qu’une certitude première, mais la réfutation du scepticisme académique qui affirme l’incertitude de toutes choses et se rabat sur la probabilité. (shrink)

Cette enquête sur l’origine et le sens de la doctrine cartésienne de la création des vérités éternelles vise à faire ressortir la distance qui sépare Descartes de Montaigne quand ils traitent l’un et l’autre du lien entre vérité et toute-puissance de Dieu. Tandis que, dans une perspective théologique, Montaigne soutient que la raison humaine ne peut connaître les choses telles qu’elles sont en elles-mêmes , Descartes soutient au contraire, dans une perspective d’articulation de la physique à la métaphysique, que la (...) raison humaine peut connaître les choses telles qu’elles sont en elles-mêmes . Toute la physique de Descartes repose en effet sur une double affirmation : que Dieu peut faire exister ce que lui-même rend possible et que Dieu ne peut faire exister ce que lui-même rend impossible . On entend réfuter par là l’interprétation, issue de Jean-Luc Marion, selon laquelle la doctrine cartésienne de la création des vérités éternelles équivaudrait à un « surcodage » de l’intelligible.The investigation on the origin and meaning of the Cartesian doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths aims at stressing the distance that separates Descartes of Montaigne when they both deal with the tie between truth and God’s omnipotence. Whilst, according to theological perspective, Montaigne insists that the human reason cannot know the things as they are in themselves , Descartes, reversely insists that, within a perspective of articulation between physics and metaphysics, the human reason can know the things as they are in themselves . The whole of Descartes’ physics rests indeed on a double affirmation : that God can make exist what he himself makes possible and that God cannot make what himself makes impossible exist. Hereby, one wishes to refute the interpretation according to Jean-Luc Marion who believes that the Cartesian doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths would be equivalent to an « out coding » of the intelligible. (shrink)

Hélène BOUCHILLOUX. — Apologie et théologie dans les Pensées de Pascal, p. 3. Comment concilier l’entreprise apologétique de Pascal avec sa théologie du péché et de la grâce? L’apologiste peut-il persuader de la vérité du christianisme celui dont le cœur n’a pas été préalablement converti par Dieu? S’il ne le peut, quel sens y a-t-il à prétendre précéder l’action divine en proposant à l’incrédule un discours de la preuve? On montre 1 / que la réflexion pascalienne sur l’art (...) de persuader exclut une persuasion sans conversion, puis 2 / qu’en dissociant efficacité et utilité des preuves, les Pensées ne visent autre chose qu’à faire apercevoir une vérité qu’on ne saurait pourtant recevoir sans une humiliation de la raison et une conversion du cœur. (shrink)

On analyse deux tableaux fameux de Poussin – Paysage avec un homme tué par un serpent (National Gallery) et Apollon amoureux de Daphné (Louvre) – avant de confronter Poussin au Caravage. La thèse défendue est que les deux tableaux analysés illustrent la destitution de Narcisse, et que ce thème a, dans l’œuvre de Poussin, une signification non seulement psychologique et morale, mais encore proprement esthétique. C’est en effectuant une minutieuse et savante enquête qu’on résout de manière inédite l’élément énigmatique contenu (...) dans les deux tableaux et que, en suivant Louis Marin, on approfondit la comparaison de deux conceptions antagonistes de la représentation picturale. (shrink)

Le tableau de Nicolas Poussin, Paysage avec un homme tué par un serpent (ou Les effets de la terreur), demeure énigmatique pour toute une critique qui oscille entre deux pôles : soit le tableau est mythologique, mais on ne sait pas à quelle histoire il renvoie (l’hypothèse de Cadmus n’étant guère soutenable) ; soit le tableau ne représente que les effets de la terreur, sans renvoyer à aucune histoire. La thèse défendue dans cet article est la suivante : tout en (...) représentant les effets de la terreur, le tableau renvoie à une histoire – non celle de Cadmus, mais celle de Narcisse, cet homme qui meurt près de la source qui le captive, prisonnier de l’amour vain qu’il se porte à lui-même. On se propose d’étayer cette thèse par la découverte de remarquables liens entre Narcisse et Python, non seulement à partir de l’œuvre poétique d’Ovide, mais encore à partir de l’œuvre picturale de Poussin. (shrink)

L’examen du différend entre Descartes et Malebranche sur la connaissance que l’esprit a de lui-même sera l’occasion d’éclaircir la doctrine de l’esprit qui s’élabore dans les Méditations, la complexité de celle-ci ayant suscité et continuant de susciter de nombreux malentendus qu’on essaiera, en l’analysant dans toutes ses articulations, de dissiper. Une telle analyse, qui pourra paraître austère en sa technicité, n’intéresse cependant pas exclusivement l’historien de la philosophie, elle intéresse plus largement tout philosophe soucieux de se comprendre lui-même comme l’esprit (...) qu’il est, c’est-à-dire en sa constitutive liberté. (shrink)

C'est tardivement, dans la lettre à Mesland du 2 mai 1644, que Descartes se réclame de saint Augustin pour accréditer non la création des vérités éternelles, mais la coïncidence, en Dieu, du voir, du vouloir et du faire. D'où la question : que doit exactement à saint Augustin la doctrine exposée à Mersenne en 1630? Après avoir montré que saint Augustin ne professe ni la création des vérités éternelles ni la coïncidence, en Dieu, du voir, du vouloir et du faire, (...) on s'interroge sur les enjeux d'une référence qui, replacée dans son contexte, n'est pourtant pas sans raison. It is only rather late that Descartes, in his letter to Mesland dated May 2, 1644, claims his debt to Augustine to acknowledge not the creation of eternal truths but the coincidence within Cod of willing, seeing and doing. Hence the question : what is truly the debt owed to Augustine when one considers the doctrine exposed to Mersenne in 1630? After having shown that Augustine claims neither the creation of eternel truths, nor coincidence within Cod of willing, seeing and doing, the author questions what may be at stake in such a reference which — replaced within its context — is quite reasonably grounded. (shrink)

Dans la lettre XXXII à Oldenburg, Spinoza affirme que l'esprit humain n'est que la puissance de la pensée divine, non en tant qu'elle est infinie et perçoit toute la nature, mais en tant qu'elle est finie et ne perçoit que le corps humain, ce qui fait de l'esprit humain « une partie de quelque entendement infini ». C'est à Pélucidation de ce « quelque entendement infini » qu'on travaille ici en montrant comment s'élaborent, dans l'Éthique, la doctrine de l'infinité des (...) attributs divins, puis la doctrine des modes infinis qui, au plan ontologique sinon au plan éthique, implique qu'on s'interroge sur la manière dont se comporte l'attribut de la pensée par rapport à l'infinité des autres attributs. On suggère enfin l'importance de cette enquête, tant pour la compréhension de la formule spinoziste de la connaissance que pour la compréhension de la formule spinoziste du salut. In letter XXXII to Oldenburg, Spinoza asserts that the human mind is but the power of divine thought, not as being infinite and encompassing nature, but as being finite and encompassing only the human body, which makes the human mind « a part of some infinite understanding ». We labor here for the clarification of this part of « some infinite understanding » by showing how, in Spinoza's Ethics, the doctrine of the infinity of divine attributes, then the doctrine of infinite modes are elaborated. The latter at the ontological level but not at the ethical level, implies that we question the way the attribute of thought functions with regard to the infinity of the other attributes. Lasty we underline the importance of this investigation, both for the understanding of the Spinozan formula for knowledge and for the understanding of his formula for salvation. (shrink)

Le Paysage avec un homme tué par un serpent, peint par Nicolas Poussin en 1648, a donné lieu, depuis celles de Félibien, Fénelon ou Diderot, à de multiples lectures, suggérant telle source poétique ou telle gravure pour rendre compte de l’identité du personnage mort ou de celle du serpent, sans qu’aucune de ces hypothèses paraisse décisive. Celle que propose Hélène Bouchilloux désigne Narcisse pour le personnage mort et Python pour le serpent : Poussin aurait mis en scène la (...) « destitution » de l’amour stérile en même temps que celle de l’idée erronée de la peinture incarnée par le Caravage. Cette hypothèse séduisante présente toutefois des difficultés méthodologiques, tant dans l’interprétation du texte d’Ovide que dans l’approche comparative de plusieurs toiles de Poussin, n’évitant pas le risque d’une surinterprétation. (shrink)

This is an important book precisely because there is none other quite like it.

This article aims to develop new conceptions of the psychosocial dynamics that drive the re-romanticization of domestic femininity in current financialized capitalism. Feminist scholars have described this heightened cultivation of mothering as a reparative move in response to irreconcilable tensions between cultural ideals of the ‘balancing mother’ and ‘lean-in femininity’. This article adds a materialist-psychosocial lens to these conceptions, to enhance understanding of what drives this craving for domestic femininity. Drawing on a free-association narrative interview study with couples in the (...) financial elite in the comparatively gender-egalitarian Norwegian context, I describe a specific emotional mechanism that resists democratization of gender in this specific group. The interviews reveal a felt need to cultivate ‘the human side of things’ at safe distance from the competitiveness of ‘hard-core finance’. The Nordic earner–carer model with its entwinement of care and professional pursuits, cultivated by the more self-fulfilment-oriented parts of the professional middle-class appears not only unwanted but threatening. In my analysis, I retrieve and develop a psychoanalytically inspired historical-materialist feminism, one that perceives of the gendered division of work as a split in modes of focusing human energy. I suggest that the resurgent cultivation of domestic femininity is nurtured by a self-energizing antagonism between competitive and relational practices. I further argue that the cultivation of domestic femininity in these financial couples points to a potential antagonism between the democratization of love and the specific anxiety-driven competitiveness to which this financial-elite group may be particularly susceptible. (shrink)

Les Pensees de Pascal ne posent pas seulement des problemes d'etablissement du texte, de datation et de classement des fragments qui les composent; elles posent au philosophe le probleme de leur sens. cet ouvrage recuse les interpretations qui, reduisant les Penseesa la perspective apologetique, achoppent inevitablement sur le caractere delibere du desordre, l'elargissement du propos, la multiplication des protagonistes. Car on peut resoudre cette triple difficulte sans amputer le texte, pourvu qu'on decele derriere le discours de la preuve, proprement apologetique, (...) un discours sur les conditions et sur les fins de la preuve, qui est d'un tout autre ordre. Conformement aux opuscules De l'esprit geometrique et De l'art de persuader auxquels il faut se reporter pour reflechir sur les mecanismes de la creance et sur son dereglement, Pascal ne vise pas a convaincre le libertin de la verite du christianisme qu'il ne veut pas croire mais, par le biais d'une demonstration de cette verite apparentee a la verification des hypotheses en physique, a le convaincre au moins de son impuissance a croire et a justifier ainsi, avec le contenu de la foi, la forme meme de la foi. Si la metaphysique cartesienne permet a la raison d'eprouver sa finitude en erigeant au-dessus d'elle l'infinite incomprehensible du Dieu qui garantit ses verites, l'apologetique pascalienne, en attestant sa corruption, double son usage demonstratif d'un usage critique qui place la theologie au centre de toutes ses verites. C'est donc a la lumiere du dispositif qui provoque l'eclatement des Pensees qu'il convient de lire l'oeuvre entiere afin d'apercevoir sa rigoureuse systematicite et d'en reconnaitre la portee anticartesienne. (shrink)

In recent years, calls have been made to address the relative dearth of qualitative sociological investigation into the sensory dimensions of embodiment, including within physical cultures. This article contributes to a small, innovative and developing literature utilizing sociological phenomenology to examine sensuous embodiment. Drawing upon data from three research projects, here we explore some of the ‘sensuousities’ of ‘intense embodiment’ experiences as a distance-running-woman and a boxing-woman, respectively. Our analysis addresses the relatively unexplored haptic senses, particularly the ‘touch’ of heat. (...) Heat has been argued to constitute a specific sensory mode, a trans-boundary sense. Our findings suggest that ‘lived’ heat, in our own physical-cultural experiences, has highly proprioceptive elements and is experienced as both a form of touch and as a distinct perceptual mode, dependent upon context. Our analysis coheres around two key themes that emerged as salient: (1) warming up, and (2) thermoregulation, which in lived experience were encountered as strongly interwoven. (shrink)

This paper considers the analogies and disanalogies between a certain sort of argument designed to oppose scepticism about free will and a certain sort of argument designed to oppose scepticism about the external world. In the case of free will, I offer the ancient Lazy Argument and an argument of my own, which I call the Agency Argument, as examples of the relevant genre; and in the case of the external world, I consider Moore’s alleged proof of an external world. (...) I draw attention to analogies and disanalogies between the arguments offered in each case in order to suggest that although the Agency Argument shares with its Moorean relative the unfortunate property of being dialectically ineffective against some of those it is mainly hoping to convince, it will not be dialectically ineffective against all of them. It is also argued that the Agency Argument is less vulnerable than Moore’s proof to worries about its justificatory structure. (shrink)

_Three Steps on the Ladder of Writing_ is a poetic, insightful, and ultimately moving exploration of 'the strange science of writing.' In a magnetic, irresistible narrative, Cixous reflects on the writing process and explores three distinct areas essential for 'great' writing: _The School of the Dead_--the notion that something or someone must die in order for good writing to be born; _The School of Dreams_--the crucial role dreams play in literary inspiration and output; and _The School of Roots_--the importance of (...) depth in the 'nether realms' in all aspects of writing. Cixous's love of language and passion for the written word is evident on every page. Her emotive style draws heavily on the writers she most admires: the Brazilian novelist Clarice Lispector, the Russian poet Marina Tsvetaeva, the Austrian novelists Ingeborg Bachmann and Thomas Bernhard, Dostoyevsky and, most of all, Kafka. (shrink)

The term “value of life” can refer to life’s intrinsic dignity: something nonincremental and time-unaffected in contrast to the fluctuating, incremental “value” of our lives, as they are longer or shorter and more or less flourishing. Human beings are equal in their basic moral importance: the moral indignities we condemn in the treatment of e.g. those with dementia reflect the ongoing human dignity that is being violated. Indignities licensed by the person in advance remain indignities, as when people might volunteer (...) their living, unconscious bodies for surrogacy or training in amputation techniques. Respect for someone’s dignity is significantly impacted by a failure to value that person’s very existence, whatever genuine respect and good will is shown by wanting the person’s life to go well. Valuing and respecting life is not, however, vitalism: there can be good and compelling reasons for eschewing some means of prolonging life. (shrink)

This chapter considers the ways in which whiteness as a skin color and ideology becomes a dominant level that sets the background against which all things, people and relations appear. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, it takes up a series of films by Bruce Nauman and Marlon Riggs to consider ways in which this level is phenomenally challenged providing insights into the embodiment of racialization.

Soren Kierkegaard a publié les Miettes philosophiques ou Une miette de philosophie à l’âge de 31 ans. Cette brochure n’est rien de moins qu’une réplique à l’Encyclopédie des sciences philosophiques de Hegel. C’est à partir de la mise en contraste de deux paradigmes, paradigme socratique et paradigme christique, ou à partir d’une fiction du christianisme, que se déploie cette réplique dont toute l’ampleur apparaît dans l’Interlude intercalé entre les deux derniers chapitres : placé sous la bannière de Leibniz, ce morceau (...) d’une technicité philosophique redoutable contient une éblouissante généalogie des catégories, conduisant le lecteur de la catégorie d’advenir (Tilblivelse) jusqu’à la catégorie de répétition (Gjentagelse) sans laquelle on ne peut penser correctement le devenir-chrétien. (shrink)

Spinoza est-il un adversaire de la religion? Rien n'est moins sûr. Dès la correspondance avec Guillaume de Blyenbergh, il admet l'existence de deux voies de salut hétérogènes : par la philosophie et par la religion, par l'intelligence et par la charité. Y a-t-il là quelque incohérence? Rien n'est moins sûr. Il s'agit dans cet essai de montrer pourquoi et comment coexistent ces deux voies de salut hétérogènes. Par là même, Spinoza s'avérera unique, un hapax dans la constellation des grands philosophes (...) du XVIIe siècle, et s'éclairera l'accusation d'athéisme prononcée de manière récurrente à son encontre. (shrink)

The paper argues that the reconciliation of the Causal Theory of Perception with Disjunctivism requires the rejection of causal particularism – the idea that the ontology of causation is always and everywhere an ontology of particulars (e.g., events). The so-called ‘Humean Principle’ that causes must be distinct from their effects is argued to be a genuine barrier to any purported reconciliation, provided causal particularism is retained; but extensive arguments are provided for the rejection of causal particularism. It is then explained (...) how the reconciliation of the causal theory with disjunctivism can proceed on the basis of an ontology of facts. (shrink)

This volume will be the starting point for future discussion and research.

Helen Steward argues that determinism is incompatible with agency itself--not only the special human variety of agency, but also powers which can be accorded to animal agents. She offers a distinctive, non-dualistic version of libertarianism, rooted in a conception of what biological forms of organisation might make possible in the way of freedom.

Recently several thought experiments have been developed (by John Carroll amongst others) which have been alleged to refute the Ramsey-Lewis view of laws of nature. The paper aims to show that two such thought experiments fail to establish that the Ramsey-Lewis view is false, since they presuppose a conception of laws of nature that is radically at odds with the Humean conception of laws embodied by the Ramsey-Lewis view. In particular, the thought experiments presuppose that laws of nature govern the (...) behavior of objects. The paper argues that the claim that laws govern should not be regarded as a conceptual truth, and shows how the governing conception of laws manifests itself in the thought experiments. Hence the thought experiments do not constitute genuine counter-examples to the Ramsey-Lewis view. since the Humean is free to reject the conception of laws which the thought experiments presuppose. (shrink)

Causation is a central topic in many areas of philosophy. In metaphysics, philosophers want to know what causation is, and how it is related to laws of nature, probability, action, and freedom of the will. In epistemology, philosophers investigate how causal claims can be inferred from statistical data, and how causation is related to perception, knowledge and explanation. In the philosophy of mind, philosophers want to know whether and how the mind can be said to have causal efficacy, and in (...) ethics, whether there is a moral distinction between acts and omissions and whether the moral value of an act can be judged according to its consequences. And causation is a contested concept in other fields of enquiry, such as biology, physics, and the law. This book provides an in-depth and comprehensive overview of these and other topics, as well as the history of the causation debate from the ancient Greeks to the logical empiricists. The chapters provide surveys of contemporary debates, while often also advancing novel and controversial claims; and each includes a comprehensive bibliography and suggestions for further reading. The book is thus the most comprehensive source of information about causation currently available, and will be invaluable for upper-level undergraduates through to professional philosophers. (shrink)

Helen Longino seeks to break the current deadlock in the ongoing wars between philosophers of science and sociologists of science--academic battles founded on disagreement about the role of social forces in constructing scientific knowledge. While many philosophers of science downplay social forces, claiming that scientific knowledge is best considered as a product of cognitive processes, sociologists tend to argue that numerous noncognitive factors influence what scientists learn, how they package it, and how readily it is accepted. Underlying this disagreement, however, (...) is a common assumption that social forces are a source of bias and irrationality. Longino challenges this assumption, arguing that social interaction actually assists us in securing firm, rationally based knowledge. This important insight allows her to develop a durable and novel account of scientific knowledge that integrates the social and cognitive. Longino begins with a detailed discussion of a wide range of contemporary thinkers who write on scientific knowledge, clarifying the philosophical points at issue. She then critically analyzes the dichotomous understanding of the rational and the social that characterizes both sides of the science studies stalemate and the social account that she sees as necessary for an epistemology of science that includes the full spectrum of cognitive processes. Throughout, her account is responsive both to the normative uses of the term knowledge and to the social conditions in which scientific knowledge is produced. Building on ideas first advanced in her influential book Science as Social Knowledge, Longino brings her account into dialogue with current work in social epistemology and science studies and shows how her critical social approach can help solve a variety of stubborn problems. While the book focuses on epistemological concerns related to the sociality of inquiry, Longino also takes up its implications for scientific pluralism. The social approach, she concludes, best allows us to retain a meaningful concept of knowledge in the face of theoretical plurality and uncertainty. (shrink)

Mix & Stir', this book's aim is an endeavour to understand art as being a panhuman phenomenon of all times and cultures; to steer away from the persistent Eurocentric/Western-centric viewpoint towards a transcultural and transnational interconnected model of exchange and processes of interculturalization. Mix & Stir wants to expand this landscape by bringing to the fore new, recalcitrant, queer, idiosyncratic practices and discourses, theories and topics, methods and concerns that open up ways to approach art from a global perspective. Analogous (...) to a cookery book filled with recipes and instruction, Mix & Stir explores new outlooks on contemporary art from global perspectives. It intends to encourage studying art beyond national constraints, cultural dominances, and hierarchies: a voyage similar to that of culinary discovery. The book brings a variety of tastes and flavours to the table, and breaks new ground by allowing innovative, contrary, queer, idiosyncratic practices and discourses, theories and topics, methods, and concerns to access art in its global dimensions. Researchers, curators and artists with a special interest in this topical issue were invited to present, develop, outline, and contemplate compelling frames of reference, both theoretical and artistic, in order to arrive at a true 'world art studies'. Their contributions are structured in seven thematic fields: Undecidability and Spectatorship, Collectives, Circulations, Exhibitions, Artists at Work, Postcolonial Perspectives, and Deep Art History. The reader is invited to explore the vast supply of dishes, to taste and test the aromas and to feast. (shrink)

The book develops the notion of situated ethics and explores how ethical issues are practically handled by educational researchers in the field. Contributors present theoretical models and practical examples of what situated ethics involves in conducting research on specific areas.

According to ‘regularity theories’ of causation, the obtaining of causal relations depends on no more than the obtaining of certain kinds of regularity. Regularity theorists are thus anti-realists about necessary connections in nature. Regularity theories of one form or another have constituted the dominant view in analytic Philosophy for a long time, but have recently come in for some robust criticism, notably from Galen Strawson. Strawson’s criticisms are natural criticisms to make, but have not so far provoked much response from (...) regularity theorists. The paper considers and rebuts Strawson’s objections. For example, Strawson claims that if there were no necessary connections in nature, we ought continually to find the regularity of the Universe surprising. I argue that the fact that the Universe is regular is something we take ourselves (fallibly) to know, and hence, in the light of this knowledge, its continued orderliness is not at all surprising. -/- . (shrink)

Hume is traditionally credited with inventing the ‘regularity theory’ of causation, according to which the causal relation between two events consists merely in the fact that events of the first kind are always followed by events of the second kind. Hume is also traditionally credited with two other, hugely influential positions: the view that the world appears to us as a world of unconnected events, and inductive scepticism: the view that the ‘problem of induction’, the problem of providing a justification (...) for inference from observed to unobserved regularities, is insoluble. Hume on Causation is the first major work dedicated to Hume’s views on causation in over fifteen years, and it argues that Hume does not subscribe to any of these three views. It places Hume’s interest in causation within the context of his theory of the mind and his theory of causal reasoning, arguing that Hume’s conception of causation derives from his conception of the nature of the inference from causes to effects. (shrink)

In this paper Beebee argues that the problem of induction, which she describes as a genuine sceptical problem, is the same for Humeans than for Necessitarians. Neither scientific essentialists nor Armstrong can solve the problem of induction by appealing to IBE, for both arguments take an illicit inductive step.