This article addresses the power of human technologies to wreak destruction on a planetary scale, such as genetic manipulation and weapons of mass destruction. It proposes the need for a new ethic that would be planetary in scale. Its central aim would be to include the great historical and contemporary diversity of human cognitive and epistemological experience. An "ethic of complexity" can weave together the threads of our common heritage. Although humanity's evolutionary past has been shown to be quite diverse, (...) recent genetic and anthropological research has shown it also to be surprisingly unified. New images and metaphors are providing humanity with a vision that transcends familiar ethnic hatreds and so-called clashes of civilizations. The new planetary culture can be a shining example of unity-in-diversity, or unitas multiplex. It will be robustly diverse, intermixed to the core, and filled with awe at the rich lineages of our common past. (shrink)

This article looks at the prevalent view of time in the history of Western philosophy and science and then contrasts it with the emerging new vision of time as ontologically constructive. Throughout Western history, philosophers and scientists attempted to marginalize and anesthetize the role of time by prioritizing being over becoming. But beginning with the Darwinian revolution in biology, the West could no longer deny the constructive role of time in bringing forth new ontological orders. While the 20th century witnessed (...) the split between the reversible time of physics and the developmental time of biology, the time has now come for this divide to be reconciled. Twenty-first century science is already revealing the constructive role of time in cosmology with the likelihood of multiple universes. In conclusion, the authors speculate that our moment in human cultural development is ripe for a complex, multidimensional, and transdisciplinary understanding of time. (shrink)

Tra le avventure del pensiero che la nostra epoca può consegnare con orgoglio alla storia della scienza, una delle più intense e affascinanti è senz’altro l’evento della genesi e dello sviluppo dell’approccio scientifico ai tradizionali problemi della conoscenza. Si è trattato innanzitutto del difficile superamento di un confine disciplinare antico, quel limite che Descartes ha tracciato agli albori della tradizione scientifica moderna e che nel tempo si è trasformato in un vuoto concettuale...

Après des siècles de développement parallèle, l’histoire des communautés humaines a connu un tournant majeur en 1492, l’expansion vers d’autres continents rendant les sociétés de plus en plus interdépendantes. Parvenue à l’ère planétaire, l’humanité mondialisée doit opérer une nouvelle évolution en instaurant une relation non destructrice avec la nature, afin de garantir sa propre survie.After centuries of parallel development, the history of human communities was a major turning point in 1492, expanding to other continents making companies increasingly interdependent. Reached in (...) the global era, humanity must make a global change by introducing a new non-destructive relationship with nature to ensure its own survival. (shrink)

The paper argues against the growing tendency to interpret Brentano’s conception of inner consciousness in self-representational terms. This trend has received support from the tendency to see Brentano as a forerunner of contemporary same-order theories of consciousness and from the view that Brentano models intransitive consciousness on transitive consciousness, such that a mental state is conscious insofar as it is aware of itself as an object. However, this reading fails to take into account the Brentanian concept of object, which is (...) ultimately derived from ancient and medieval philosophy, as well as the secondary, elusive character that Brentano attributes to inner perception. According to Brentano, we have an aspectual but transparent consciousness of transcendent objects, whereas our awareness of our own mental acts is always complete but incidental, and ultimately opaque. Reversing the relationship between intentionality and consciousness faces difficulties at the textual interpretative level, but also raises theoretical problems, for it risks treating Brentano’s theory of mind as a form of subjectivism and idealism. (shrink)

Between December 2020 and March 2021, the US Food and Drug Administration and the European Medicines Agency issued Emergency Use Authorizations and Conditional Marketing Authorizations for the distribution of the first COVID-19 vaccines. Although these vaccines were thoroughly assessed before their approval, regulators required companies to continue ongoing placebo-controlled clinical trials in order to gather further reliable scientific information on their safety and efficacy, as well as to start new studies to evaluate additional candidates. The aim of this paper is (...) to present and discuss the ethical issues raised by the tension between the need to continue these types of clinical trials and the obligations related to the protection of the rights and well-being of research participants. Specifically, we question whether—how, and to what extent—fundamental principles governing research involving human beings can be applied to the current pandemic situation. We argue that continuing ongoing placebo-controlled clinical trials can be considered ethically justifiable only if all participants are adequately informed of any developments that may affect their willingness to remain enrolled, including the current situation of resource scarcity and the prioritization criteria established for vaccination. However, we also argue that currently approved vaccines, which are considered safe and effective enough to be administered to millions of people as part of the vaccination campaign, necessarily represent the “best proven intervention” currently available and, therefore, should be used as comparators in future studies instead of placebo. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the debate between the so-called “presentists” – according to whom only the present is real – and the “eternalists”, according to whom past present and future are equally real, has no ontological significance. In particular, once we carefully distinguish between a tensed and a tenseless sense of existence, it is difficult to find a single ontological claim on which the two parties could disagree. Since the choice of using a tense or a tenseless language (...) is dictated by purely pragmatic reasons, we should abstain from bringing to bear pseudo-debates generated by the “tensed” or the “tenseless theories” of time on the question of understanding the philosophical implications of contemporary spacetime theories, or notions like becoming, change and persistence in time. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the role of dispositional properties in the most frequently discussed interpretations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. After offering some motivation for this project, I briefly characterize the distinction between non-dispositional and dispositional properties in the context of quantum mechanics by suggesting a necessary condition for dispositionality – namely contextuality – and, consequently, a sufficient condition for non-dispositionality, namely non-contextuality. Having made sure that the distinction is conceptually sound, I then analyze the plausibility of the widespread, monistic (...) ontological thesis about the reducibility of dispositional properties to categorical properties in the context of the philosophy of quantum mechanics. I conclude that with the exception of Bohmian mechanics, the other “minimally realist” views of quantum mechanics require essential dispositions, i.e., dispositions of a non-reducible kind. Interestingly, seen behind the lenses of dispositionalism, Bohr’s and Bohm’s interpretations of quantum mechanics are much closer than it is usually recognized, a fact that could teach us something about the way the quantum world is. (shrink)

La thèse de l’« inexistence intentionnelle » formulée par Brentano a été traditionnellement interprétée comme une théorie de la « relation intentionnelle », autrement dit de la relation entre l’acte mental et son « objet immanent » ou « intentionnel », c’est-à-dire interne à la conscience. Se fondant sur la lecture du fameux passage sur l’intentionnalité de la Psychologie du point de vue empirique , le présent article démontre que l’interprétation ontologique de la théorie de l’intentionnalité du premier Brentano est (...) insoutenable, toute dominante qu’elle est. Pour ce faire, nous partirons des sources de la pensée de Brentano, en particulier de la théorie de la perception et des relatifs d’Aristote, pour rejeter la conception de l’objet immanent ou intentionnel comme entité immanente à la conscience et mettre en évidence la continuité qui existe entre la première conception de Brentano de l’intentionnalité et la seconde, consécutive à ce qu’on définit comme le tournant réiste de sa pensée.Brentano’s thesis of “intentional inexistence” has been traditionally interpreted as a theory of “intentional relationships”, i.e., of the relation between a mental act and its “immanent” or “intentional object”, within consciousness. Starting from the famous passage on intentionality in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint , the present paper shows that the dominant ontological interpretation of Brentano’s former theory of intentionality is untenable. Proceeding from the sources of Brentano’s thought, in particular from Aristotle’s theory of perception and of relatives, the conception of the immanent or intentional object as an immanent entity to consciousness is rejected. Instead, the continuity between Brentano’s former conception of intentionality and the subsequent one, following the so-called reistic turning-point in his thought, is highlighted. (shrink)

399 a.C.: la città di Atene condanna a morte uno dei suoi figli più autorevoli, Socrate. Cosa è successo davvero nei mesi in cui si è svolta la vicenda giudiziaria? Si ripete spesso che si trattò di un processo politico mascherato, per colpire le simpatie oligarchiche dell'anziano filosofo. Ma forse il vero oggetto del contendere in questa vicenda fu proprio il pensiero di Socrate. Fino a che punto una comunità--ieri come oggi--può tollerare che i principi e i valori su cui (...) si fonda siano messi radicalmente in discussione? E davvero le ragioni della filosofia e quelle della città non sono compatibili? Una lettura originale di uno dei più celebri processi della storia. (shrink)

Franz Brentano was a leading philosopher and psychologist of the nineteenth century. Indeed, the impact of his scholarship was so great that he became synonymous with a school of thought and a new approach in scientific philosophy. The Brentano School stood against the Idealistic and post-Kantian German tradition and Brentano played a crucial role in the founding of Austrian philosophy. He had an enormous impact on the work of Husserl and Heidegger, as well as on Moore’s _Ethics_ and Stout and (...) Russell’s analysis of mind. In particular, situated between the phenomenology movement and the analytic tradition, the concept of intentionality was redefined by Brentano and has been—and remains—a key concept of twentieth- and twentieth-first century philosophy of mind. But Brentano not only reshaped philosophy of mind; he was also a remarkable and innovative thinker in several other fields of philosophy, and recent debate in metaethics, metaphysics, and the history of analytic philosophy shows a strong resurgence of interest in Brentano’s thought. Published to coincide with the centenary of Brentano’s death, this four-volume collection, a new title from Routledge Major Works, provides an essential intellectual tool for the exegetical evaluation of all aspects of Brentano’s work. Bringing together early reviews and reactions from his contemporaries—many of which have never before been translated into English—as well as the best critical assessments of Brentano’s work, this ‘mini library’ provides Brentano scholars, historians of philosophy and psychology, and phenomenologists, with a rigorous historical appraisal of Brentano’s thought and influence. Brentano’s relationships with Husserl, Heidegger, and the phenomenological tradition are examined in depth, alongside investigations of key themes from his work on Aristotle, medieval and modern philosophy, philosophy of mind, logic, ontology, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of history. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn is mostly known for his contributions to the philosophy of science. However, it was chiefly to investigations in philosophy of language that he dedicated the last part of his career. The aim of this paper is to present a systematic view of Kuhn’s main ideas on this subject. I start by describing his theory of concept, in particular what he says about kind terms. Such terms, acquired in blocks that form contrast sets or “taxonomies,” are learned through ostensible (...) definitions. Next, I analyze Kuhn’s concepts of “meaning” and “truth.” Finally, I discuss a second type of kinds terms, not fully investigated by him, which is learned together with scientific laws. Resumo Thomas Kuhn é conhecido principalmente por suas contribuições para a filosofia da ciência. No entanto, foi em grande medida à filosofia da linguagem que ele dedicou a última parte de sua carreira. O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar uma visão sistemática das principais ideias de Kuhn sobre esse assunto. Começo descrevendo sua teoria do conceito, em particular o que ele diz sobre termos para espécie. Tais termos, aprendidos em blocos que formam conjuntos de contraste ou “taxonomias”, são aprendidos através de definições ostensivas. Em seguida, analiso as concepções de Kuhn de “significado” e “verdade”. Finalmente, discuto um segundo tipo de termo para espécies, não totalmente investigado por ele, que é aprendido junto com as leis científicas. (shrink)

This paper argues that Deonna and Teroni's attitudinal theory of emotions faces two serious problems. The first is that their master argument fails to establish the central tenet of the theory, namely, that the formal objects of emotions do not feature in the content of emotions. The second is that the attitudinal theory itself is vulnerable to a dilemma. By pointing out these problems, our paper provides indirect support to the main competitor of the attitudinal theory, namely, the perceptual theory (...) of emotions. (shrink)

This book covers the basic guidelines of Vittorio Benussi’s research during the period at Graz and at Padua. It does so in the light of a thorough study of his Nachlass. The book re-evaluates Benussi’s work as a historical piece, and shows how his work is still relevant today, especially in the areas of cognitive psychology and cognitive science. The volume deals with this original and ingenious - though largely ignored - scholar and discusses his work as a leading experimental (...) psychologist. Benussi’s contributions as discussed in this book were particularly relevant in the fields of visual and tactile perception, time perception, forensic psychology, hypnosis and suggestion, unconscious, and emotions. His classical papers are impressive in their originality, energy, range of approaches, experimental skill, the wealth of findings, and the quality of theoretical discussions. This book demonstrates that Benussi was ahead of his time and that his themes, experiments and research programmes are highly relevant to contemporary cognitive psychology. (shrink)

Research integrity (RI) is defined as adherence to ethical principles, deontological duties, and professional standards necessary for responsible conduct of scientific research. Early training on RI, especially for early-career researchers, could be useful to help develop good standards of conduct and prevent research misconduct (RM).The aim of this study is to assess the effectiveness of a training course on RI, by mapping the attitudes of early-career researchers on this topic through a questionnaire built upon the revised version of the Scientific (...) Misconduct Questionnaire and administered to all participants at the beginning and at the end of the course.Results show that after the course, participants reporting a high understanding of the rules and procedures related to RM significantly increased (pre-course: 38.5%, post-course: 61.5%), together with the percentage of those reporting a lack of awareness on the extent of misconduct (pre-course: 46.2%, post-course: 69.2%), and of those who believe that the lack of research ethics consultation services strongly affects RM (pre-course: 15.4%, post-course: 61.5%). Early-career researchers agree on the importance to share with peers and superiors any ethical concern that may arise in research, and to create a work environment that fosters RI awareness.As a whole, results suggest the effectiveness of the course. Institutions should introduce RI training for early-career researchers, together with research methodology, integrity and ethics consultation services to support them. Senior scientists should promote RI into their research practices, and should stimulate engagement in peer-to-peer dialogue to develop good practices based on RI principles. (shrink)

Summary The paper celebrates the person and work of Vittorio Benussi, a forgotten genius of psychology. In particular, it addresses the two most important scientific projects that Benussi developed during his time in Graz and Padua, respectively: the psychology of perception and the psychology of emotions and the unconscious. It highlights the originality and topicality of Benussi’s work and emphasizes its proximity to the latest trends in these research fields.

This essay intends to identify intentionalism (infinity given by rules, not by extensions) and the idea of multiple complete mathematical systems (several “mathematics”) as the central characteristics of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics. We intend to roughly show how these ideas come up, interact to each other, how they develop and, in the end, how they are abandoned in the late period. According to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, infinities can only be given by rules and there is a single numerical system (the (...) number’s essence is the general idea of ordering). Intentionalism is up to at least 1933, but the idea of a single system is abandoned in 1929-30 (already in the Philosophische Bemerkungen). In its place one finds the idea of multiple, independent and complete numerical systems. This idea will engender some key moves in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of Mathematics. The notion of “seeing an aspect” from the Big Typescript, of instance, comes up so as to explain such systems. From 1934 onwards, Wittgenstein gradually abandons intentionalism and the idea of multiple, independent and complete systems. In his late philosophy, both ideas are used only as instruments to dissolve philosophical prose regarding mathematics. (shrink)

Neste artigo começo por argumentar que devemos ver o Big Typescript como algo muito diferente de um livro planejado para a publicação. Ele deve ser tomado meramente como uma coleção de observações, que expressam a concepção de Wittgenstein de “gramática” por volta de 1932-33, quando as observações foram reunidas. Em seguida, explico a concepção substancial de “gramática” do BT. Espero tornar claro, nesta segunda parte, que o BT e o Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus são próximos no sentido de que partilham a idéia (...) de que a linguagem tem uma estrutura que opera de acordo com regras fixas de sentido (um cálculo). (shrink)