- Truth, Pretense and the Liar Paradox.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2015 - In T. Achourioti, H. Galinon, J. Martínez Fernández & K. Fujimoto (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Dordrecht: Imprint: Springer. pp. 339-354.details
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Alethic Deflationism and Normativity: A Critique.Massimo Dell'Utri - 2018 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 63 (1):292-303.details
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Kantian Humility and Ontological Categories.Sam Cowling - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):659-665.details
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Truth As, At Most, One.Niall Connolly - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):135-147.details
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What philosophical disagreement and philosophical skepticism hinge on.Annalisa Coliva & Louis Doulas - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-14.details
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Why logical pluralism?Colin R. Caret - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4947-4968.details
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Belief without credence.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2323-2351.details
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A Common-Sense Pragmatic Theory of Truth.John Capps - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):463-481.details
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Propositions are not representational.Thomas D. Brown - 2021 - Synthese (1-2):1-16.details
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The Explanatory Power of Deflationary Truth.Darren Bradley - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (8):3439-3456.details
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Tracking Eudaimonia.Paul Bloomfield - 2018 - Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 10 (2).details
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The objectivity of truth, a core truism?Robert Barnard & Joseph Ulatowski - 2017 - Synthese 198 (2):717-733.details
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Alethic Pluralism and the Role of Reference in the Metaphysics of Truth.Brian Ball - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):116-135.details
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Three Paradigms of Scientific Realism: A Truthmaking Account.Jamin Asay - 2013 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):1-21.details
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Something is true.Jamin Asay - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):687-705.details
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Truth : a concept unlike any other.Jamin Asay - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Supplement issue 2):S605-S630.details
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Putting Pluralism in its Place.Jamin Asay - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):175–191.details
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Arne Næss’s experiments in truth.Jamin Asay - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (2):545-566.details
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Against Truth.Jamin Asay - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):147-164.details
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The Alethic Platitudes, Deflationism, and Adverbial Quantification.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):323-345.details
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On Alethic Disjunctivism.Douglas Edwards - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):200-214.details
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Truth, Ramsification, and the Pluralist's Revenge.Cory Wright - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):265–283.details
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The Dual Aspects Theory of Truth.Benjamin Jarvis - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3-4):209-233.details
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Pluralism about Knowledge.Robin McKenna - 2017 - In Coliva Annalisa & Pedersen Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding (eds.), Epistemic Pluralism. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 171-198.details
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Reasons and Causes in Psychiatry: Ideas from Donald Davidson’s Work.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2018 - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave. pp. 281-296.details
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A Referential Theory of Truth and Falsity.İlhan İnan - 2022 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge.details
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Unifying the Philosophy of Truth.Theodora Achourioti, Henri Galinon, José Martínez Fernández & Kentaro Fujimoto (eds.) - 2015 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
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Primitivism about Truth.Jamin Asay - 2021 - In Michael Lynch, Nathan Kellen, Junyeol Kim & Jeremy Wyatt (eds.), The Nature of Truth (2nd Edition). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 525-538.details
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Determinism and Judgment. A Critique of the Indirect Epistemic Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Luca Zanetti - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):33-54.details
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Editorial introduction to ‘truth: concept meets property’.Jeremy Wyatt - 2020 - Synthese 198 (2):591-603.details
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Domains, plural truth, and mixed atomic propositions.Jeremy Wyatt - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):225-236.details
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Alethic pluralism and truth-attributions.Chase Wrenn - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (4):311-324.details
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Kierkegaard on Truth: One or Many?Daniel Watts - 2016 - Mind:fzw010.details
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Kierkegaard on Truth: One or Many?Daniel Watts - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):197-223.details
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Extended Rationality: Some Queries about Warrant, Epistemic Closure, Truth and Scepticism.Giorgio Volpe - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (4):258-271.details
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Deflationism, Truth-Aptness and Non-Factualism.Massimiliano Vignolo - 2008 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (1):84-103.details
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Parfit’s and Scanlon’s Non-Metaphysical Moral Realism as Alethic Pluralism.Herman Veluwenkamp - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):751-761.details
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Inferentialist Truth Pluralism.Herman Veluwenkamp - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):107-121.details
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A Dilemma for Determination Pluralism (or Dualism).Ragnar van der Merwe - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (4):507-523.details
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Review of Joshua Rasmussen's Defending the Correspondence Theory of Truth. [REVIEW]Joseph Ulatowski - 2015 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):83-89.details
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The non-trivial concept of truth in Richard Kirkham’s Theories of truth: a critical introduction.Artyom E. Ukhov, Eleonora G. Simonyan & Eduard L. Kovrov - 2022 - South African Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):116-118.details
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The Question of Transcendence and Constraint in a Panartifactual Account of Being, Knowing and Making.Büke Temizler & Murat Baç - 2022 - Metaphysica 23 (2):409-425.details
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Modeling Truth.Paul Teller - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):143-161.details
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Quine’s conflicts with truth deflationism.Teemu Tauriainen - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (46):1-25.details
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Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truth and Objectivity.Jussi Suikkanen - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (2):193-212.details
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Contractualism as Restricted Constructivism.Jussi Suikkanen - 2018 - Topoi 37 (4):571-579.details
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Can Truth Pluralism Preserve Substantive Truth?真理の多元主義は実質性を保てるか.Yuki Suda - 2020 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 53 (1):1-24.details
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Truth Pluralism and Many-Valued Logic: Lesson from Suszko’s Thesis.Andrea Strollo - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):155-176.details
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The force of alethic pluralism.Andrea Strollo - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (4):325-336.details
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A Simple Notion of Validity for Alethic Pluralism.Andrea Strollo - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1529-1546.details
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