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  1. Stephen Barker (2011). Truth-Bearers and the Unsaid. In Ken Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic. CUP.
    I argue that conventional implicatures embed in logical compounds, and are non-truth-conditional contributors to sentence meaning. This, I argue has significant implications for how we understand truth, truth-conditional content, and truth-bearers.
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  2. Arvid Båve (2010). Deflationism and the Primary Truth Bearer. Synthese 173 (3):281 - 297.
    The paper discusses what kind of truth bearer, or truth-ascription, a deflationist should take as primary. I first present number of arguments against a sententialist view. I then present a deflationary theory which takes propositions as primary, and try to show that it deals neatly with a wide range of linguistic data. Next, I consider both the view that there is no primary truth bearer, and the most common account of sentence truth given by deflationists who take propositions as primary, (...)
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  3. Arvid Båve (2006). Deflationism: A Use-Theoretic Analysis of the Truth-Predicate. Dissertation, Stockholm University
    I here develop a specific version of the deflationary theory of truth. I adopt a terminology on which deflationism holds that an exhaustive account of truth is given by the equivalence between truth-ascriptions and de-nominalised (or disquoted) sentences. An adequate truth-theory, it is argued, must be finite, non-circular, and give a unified account of all occurrences of “true”. I also argue that it must descriptively capture the ordinary meaning of “true”, which is plausibly taken to be unambiguous. Ch. 2 is (...)
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  4. C. A. Baylis (1948). Facts, Propositions, Exemplification and Truth. Mind 57 (228):459-479.
  5. John Bigelow (2009). Truth-Makers and Truth-Bearers. In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge.
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  6. Gary Ebbs (2009). Truth and Words. Oxford University Press.
    Gary Ebbs shows that this appearance is illusory.
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  7. Bryan Frances, An Utterly Brilliant Solution to the Semantic Paradoxes?
    There is a certain approach to the semantic paradoxes that is highly intuitive and for that reason alone never seems to go away. Roughly put, it's the idea that the paradoxical sentences just don't really have any truth conditions at all, no matter how grammatically sound and meaningful they and their parts are. I suppose that just about anyone who spends even a relatively modest amount of time thinking about the paradoxes comes up with this idea eventually. There is a (...)
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  8. Bryan Frances, Introduction to the Semantic Paradoxes.
    In this essay (for undergraduates) I introduce three of the famous semantic paradoxes: the Liar, Grelling’s, and the No-No. Collectively, they seem to show that the notion of truth is highly paradoxical, perhaps even contradictory. They seem to show that the concept of truth is a bit akin to the concept of a married bachelor—it just makes no sense at all. But in order to really understand those paradoxes one needs to be very comfortable thinking about how lots of interesting (...)
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  9. Peter Fristedt (2008). Can Truth Be an Event and Still Be Truth? Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):125-131.
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  10. Haim Gaifman, Pointers to Propositions.
    The semantic paradoxes, whose paradigm is the Liar, played a crucial role at a crucial juncture in the development of modern logic. In his 1908 seminal paper, Russell outlined a system, soon to become that of the Principia Mathematicae, whose main goal was the solution of the logical paradoxes, both semantic and settheoretic. Russell did not distinguish between the two and his theory of types was designed to solve both kinds in the same uniform way. Set theoreticians, however, were content (...)
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  11. Manuel García-Carpintero, Truth-Bearers and Modesty.
    In this paper I discuss Künne’s Modest Theory of truth, and develop a variation on a worry that Field expresses with respect to Horwich’s related view. The worry is not that deflationary accounts are false, but rather that, because they take propositions as truth-bearers, they are not philosophically interesting. Compatibly with the intuitions of ordinary speakers, we can understand proposition so that the proposals do account for a property that such truth-bearers have. Nevertheless, we saliently apply the truth-concept also to (...)
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  12. Richard Gaskin (2008). The Unity of the Proposition. Oxford University Press.
    Truth, falsity, and unity -- Sentences, lists, and collections -- Declarative and other kinds of sentence -- Declarative sentences and propositions -- Sentences, propositions, and truth-values -- Sentences, propositions, and unity -- Unity and complexity -- Reference and supposition -- Reference and signification -- Linguistic idealism and empirical realism -- Russell on truth, falsity, and unity (I) : 1903 -- Russell on truth, falsity, and unity (II) : 1910-13 -- Russell on truth, falsity, and unity (III) : 1918 -- Sense, (...)
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  13. Laurence Goldstein (2001). Truth-Bearers and the Liar – a Reply to Alan Weir. Analysis 61 (2):115–126.
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  14. Jonathan Harrison (2004). The Logical Function of ‘That’, or Truth, Propositions and Sentences. Philosophy 79 (1):67-96.
    (i) It is propositions, not sentences, that are true or false. It is true ‘Dogs bark’ does not make sense. It is true that dogs bark does. (ii) and (iii) Davidson wrong about ‘that’. (iv) The difference between ‘implies’ and ‘if ... then ...’. (v), (vi), (vii) and (viii) Russell, not Quine, right about the subject matter of logic. (ix) The objectual and substitutional interpretations of quantifiers compatible. (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv) and (xvi) Implications for well-known theories of (...)
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  15. Andrea Iacona (2006). True in a Sense. Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (1):141-154.
    The aim of this paper is to show that in order to make sense of the ascription of truth and falsity to the things we say it is essential to acknowledge a divergence between two basic intuitions. According to one of them it is plausible to talk of what is said as what the speaker has in mind. According to the other it is plausible to talk of what is said as the bearer of truth or falsity. The paper presents (...)
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  16. Andrea Iacona (2002). Propositions. Name.
  17. John MacFarlane (2011). Simplicity Made Difficult. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 156 (3):441 - 448.
    Simplicity made difficult Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-8 DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9626-9 Authors John MacFarlane, Department of Philosophy, University of California, 314 Moses Hall #2390, Berkeley, CA 94720-2390, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  18. Per Martin-Löf (1987). Truth of a Proposition, Evidence of a Judgement, Validity of a Proof. Synthese 73 (3):407 - 420.
  19. Friederike Moltmann (forthcoming). 'Truth Predicates' in Natural Language. In Dora Achourioti, Henri Galinon & José Martinez (eds.), Unifying Theories of Truth. Springer.
    This takes a closer look at the actual semantic behavior of apparent truth predicates in English and re-evaluates the way they could motivate particular philosophical views regarding the formal status of 'truth predicates' and their semantics. The paper distinguishes two types of 'truth predicates' and proposes semantic analyses that better reflect the linguistic facts. These analyses match particular independently motivated philosophical views.
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  20. Rita Nolan (1969). Truth and Sentences. Mind 78 (312):501-511.
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  21. Lorenzo Peña (2006). Imperativos, preceptos y normas. Logos 39:111-142.
    The paper goes into the intricate logical relation between imperatives, precepts and norms. It shows that there need not be two senses of "ought", the one descriptive and the other prescriptive, since when the law-giver enacts a fresh statute he is hereby making a tru statement, whose truth is grounded on the statement itself.
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  22. Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe & María Cerezo (forthcoming). Truth and Bivalence in Aristotle. An Investigation Into the Structure of Saying. In N. Öffenberger & A. Vigo (eds.), Iberoamerikanische Beiträge zur modernen Deutung der Aristotelischen Logik. Olms.
    The aim of this paper is rather modest: we do not intend to reconstruct Aristotle’s theory of truth (although we are convinced that there is such a thing), and we will not try to settle the issue concerning Bivalence in Aristotle. We merely want, on the one hand, to argue for the consistency between the main Aristotelian texts on truth and a possible rejection of Bivalence; and on the other hand, to investigate the conditions of a possible counterexample to Bivalence. (...)
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  23. Ernesto Perini-Santos (2008). John Buridan on the Bearer of Logical Relations. Logica Universalis 2 (1):59-70.
    . According to John Buridan, the time for which a statement is true is underdetermined by the grammatical form of the sentence – the intention of the speaker is required. As a consequence, truth-bearers are not sentence types, nor sentence tokens plus facts of the context of utterance, but statements. Statements are also the bearers of logical relations, since the latter can only be established among entities having determined truth-conditions. This role of the intention of the speaker in the determination (...)
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  24. Peter Roeper (2010). Reasoning with Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (3):275 - 306.
    The aim of the paper is to formulate rules of inference for the predicate 'is true' applied to sentences. A distinction is recognised between (ordinary) truth and definite truth and consequently between two notions of validity, depending on whether truth or definite truth is the property preserved in valid arguments. Appropriate sets of rules of inference governing the two predicates are devised. In each case the consequence relation is in harmony with the respective predicate. Particularly appealing is a set of (...)
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  25. Paul Saka (2010). Rarely Pure and Never Simple: Tensions in the Theory of Truth. Topoi 29 (2):125-135.
    Section 1 discerns ambiguity in the word “truth”, observing that the term is used most naturally in reference to truth-bearers rather than truth-makers. Focusing on truths-as-truth-bearers, then, it would appear that alethic realism conflicts with metaphysical realism as naturalistically construed. Section 2 discerns ambiguity in the purporting of truth (as in assertion), conjecturing that all expressions, not just those found in traditionally recognized opaque contexts, can be read intensionally (as well, perhaps, as extensionally). For instance, we would not generally want (...)
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  26. Norman Swartz, The Bearers of Truth-Values.
    Thesis: Such things as beliefs, statements, assertions, remarks, hypotheses, and theories are those things that are true or false . (Example: we do say such things as "Her belief that her mother had phoned was false." Or, "His assertion that Alberta is smaller than British Columbia is true.").
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  27. James F. Thomson (1969). Truth-Bearers and the Trouble About Propositions. Journal of Philosophy 66 (21):737-747.
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  28. Stephan Torre (2009). Truth-Conditions, Truth-Bearers and the New B-Theory of Time. Philosophical Studies 142 (3):325-344.
    In this paper I consider two strategies for providing tenseless truth-conditions for tensed sentences: the token-reflexive theory and the date theory. Both theories have faced a number of objections by prominent A-theorists such as Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. Traditionally, these two theories have been viewed as rival methods for providing truth-conditions for tensed sentences. I argue that the debate over whether the token-reflexive theory or the date theory is true has arisen from a failure to distinguish between conditions (...)
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  29. Jan Wole'nski & Artur Rojszczak (2005). From the Act of Judging to the Sentence: The Problem of Truth Bearers From Bolzano to Tarski. Springer.
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  30. Anthony Wrigley (2006). Abstracting Propositions. Synthese 151 (2):157 - 176.
    This paper examines the potential for abstracting propositions – an as yet untested way of defending the realist thesis that propositions as abstract entities exist. I motivate why we should want to abstract propositions and make clear, by basing an account on the neo-Fregean programme in arithmetic, what ontological and epistemological advantages a realist can gain from this. I then raise a series of problems for the abstraction that ultimately have serious repercussions for realism about propositions in general. I first (...)
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  31. Jeremy Wyatt (2014). Pluralism and the Absence of Truth. Dissertation, University of Connecticut
    In this dissertation, I argue that we should be pluralists about truth and in turn, eliminativists about the property Truth. Traditional deflationists were right to suspect that there is no such property as Truth. Yet there is a plurality of pluralities of properties which enjoy defining features that Truth would have, were it to exist. So although, in this sense, truth is plural, Truth is non-existent. The resulting account of truth is indebted to deflationism as the provenance of the suspicion (...)
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  32. Elia Zardini (2008). Truth and What is Said. Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):545-574.
    A notion of truth as applicable to events of assertoric use ( utterances ) of a sentence token is arguably presupposed and required by our evaluative practices of the use of language. The truth of an utterance seems clearly to depend on what the utterance says . This fundamental dependence seems in turn to be captured by the schema that, if an utterance u says that P , then u is true iff P . Such a schema may thus be (...)
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