Jean-Louis Gardies, professeur émérite de l’Université de Nantes, s’est éteint le 29 août dernier, à l’âge de 79 ans. Il fut, dans les années 1960, l’un des fondateurs du Département nantais de philosophie avec Jeanne Russier et Eugène Leblanc qui nous ont également quittés.Ancien élève de l’École normale supérieure, après avoir dirigé l’Institut français de Hambourg,..

En este artículo se presentan algunos aspectos sobre el problema de existencia en matemáticas, tomando como referencia el infinito actual. En primer lugar se describe las concepciones de los antiguos sobre el infinito y los argumentos aristotélicos para negar la existencia del infinito actual. En seguida se describe la incorporación del infinito actual a las matemáticas establecido por Georg Cantor entre 1880 y 1896. A continuación se aborda el problema de la existencia en matemáticas planteado por los matemáticos franceses Borel, (...) Baire y Lebesgue. A partir del problema de la existencia efectiva en cada uno de los niveles de Baire, se describen las cuatro categorías existenciales, planteadas por el matemático ruso Nicolás Lusin; luego se analiza la posición de Lusin en términos de la teoría de la “tematización”, introducida por Jean Cavaillès y Jean-Louis Gardies. Al final se argumenta la necesidad de establecer una filosofía de las matemáticas desde el interior mismo de las matemáticas. (shrink)

Presenting a fascinating analysis of the idea of what can't be said, this book ascertains whether the notion of there being a truth, or a state of affairs, or knowledge that can't be expressed linguistically is a coherent notion. The author distinguishes different senses in which it might be said that something can't be said. The first part looks at the question of whether ineffability is a coherent idea. Part two evaluates two families of arguments regarding whether ineffable states of (...) affairs actually exist: the argument from mysticism and the argument from epistemic boundedness. Part three looks more closely at the relation between mystic and non-mystic stances. In the fourth and final part the author distinguishes five qualitatively different types of ineffability. _Ineffability and Philosophy_ is a significant contribution to this area of research and will be essential reading for philosophers and those researching and studying the philosophy of language. (shrink)

Experiences of absence are common in everyday life, but have received little philosophical attention until recently, when two positions regarding the nature of such experiences surfaced in the literature. According to the Perceptual View, experiences of absence are perceptual in nature. This is denied by the Surprise-Based View, according to which experiences of absence belong together with cases of surprise. In this paper, I show that there is a kind of experience of absence—which I call frustrating absences—that has been overlooked (...) by the Perceptual View and by the Surprise Based-View and that cannot be adequately explained by them. I offer an alternative account to deal with frustrating absences, one according to which experiencing frustrating absences is a matter of subjects having desires for something to be present frustrated by the world. Finally, I argue that there may well be different kinds of experiences of absence. (shrink)

This book presents a comprehensive and detailed exploration of the relationship between the thought of G.W.F. Hegel and that of John McDowell, the latter of whom is widely considered to be one of the most influential living analytic philosophers. It serves as a point of entry in McDowell’s and Hegel’s philosophy, and a substantial contribution to ongoing debates on perceptual experience and perceptual justification, naturalism, human freedom and action. The chapters gathered in this volume, as well as McDowell’s responses, make (...) it clear that McDowell’s work paves the way for an original reading of Hegel’s texts. His conceptual framework allows for new interpretive possibilities in Hegel’s philosophy which, until now, have remained largely unexplored. Moreover, these interpretations shed light on various aspects of continuity and discontinuity between the philosophies of these two authors, thus defining more clearly their positions on specific issues. In addition, they allow us to see Hegel’s thought as containing a number of conceptual tools that might be useful for advancing McDowell’s own philosophy and contemporary philosophy in general. (shrink)

Emerging genomic technologies promise more efficient infectious disease control. Whole genome sequencing is increasingly being used in tuberculosis diagnosis, surveillance, and epidemiology. However, while the use of WGS by public health agencies may raise ethical, legal, and socio-political concerns, these challenges are poorly understood. Between November 2017 and April 2018, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 22 key stakeholders across the fields of governance and policy, public health, and laboratory sciences representing the major jurisdictions currently using WGS in national TB programs. (...) Thematic analysis of the interviews was conducted using NVivo 11. Respondents identified several ethical and practical challenges associated with WGS in TB care and surveillance, all related to issues of trust, including: 1) the power of public health; 2) data sharing and profits derived from surveillance efforts; and 3) concerns regarding who has access to, and can benefit from, the technology. Additional challenges included: the potential utility that WGS adds to a public health program, the risks associated with linking necessary epidemiological metadata to the genomic data, and challenges associated with jurisdictional capacity to implement the technology. Successful implementation of WGS is dependent on fostering relationships of trust between those working with genomics technology and those directly impacted by it, including clinicians. Building trust between the public and the public health agencies and within public health agencies themselves is critical due to the inherent complexity of WGS and its implementation for communicable disease control purposes. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce que la 'déconstruction'? Quelles sont les origines philosophiques de ce mot magique, brandi par tous ceux dont le but, déclaré ou non, est de criminaliser l'Occident en le réduisant à une expression du racisme, de l'esclavagisme, de l' 'hétéro-patriarcat' et de l'impérialisme colonial? Cette civilisation redoutable dont les proies seraient les peuples dominés, racisés, opprimés, et les minorités essentialisées en tant que victimes systémiques? Ainsi la civilisation occidentale se trouve-t-elle convoquée devant un nouveau grand Tribunal de l'Histoire pour répondre (...) de ses crimes, imaginaires ou réels, et, surtout, elle est la seule civilisation à être mise au banc des accusés. Au croisement de la recherche universitaire et du militantisme politique, le décolonialisme, l'intersectionnalité, la 'théorie critique de la race', la 'théorie queer', la 'théorie du genre', mais aussi le 'wokisme', né d'une corruption idéologique de l'antiracisme et du féminisme importée des campus étatsuniens, se sont peu à peu diffusés dans les médias et dans la société tout entière grâce à une propagande violente et culpabilisante puisant dans un imaginaire victimaire. Dans ce livre incisif et documenté, qui part d'une réflexion sur la pensée de Nietzsche et sur ses mésusages par les disciples français de Heidegger, Pierre-André Taguieff analyse ces théories aussi foisonnantes qu'inconsistantes et dénonce l'émergence de ce nouvel esprit totalitaire qu'il faut se garder de réduire à ses effets les plus médiatisés, comme ces 'déboulonnages' spectaculaires illustrant la violence purificatrice de la 'cancel culture'. De fait, ce néo-puritanisme obscurantiste, inquisitorial et punitif représente, dans les démocraties occidentales, un défi majeur pour les défenseurs de la liberté d'expression, de pensée et de création."--Back cover. (shrink)

We consider logical expressions built on the single binary connector of implication and a finite number of literals . We prove that asymptotically, when the number of variables becomes large, all tautologies have the following simple structure: either a premise equal to the goal, or two premises which are opposite literals.

Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabela normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} Podemos ver na ausência de luz, e ouvir na ausência de som? Em seu livro Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows (2008), Roy Sorensen defende que sim, que podemos ver a escuridão na ausência de luz, e ouvir o silêncio na ausência de som. Neste artigo, defendo que (...) na escuridão nada vemos, no silêncio nada ouvimos, e que experienciar a ausência de luz e som é uma questão afetiva, e não perceptual. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a position that I call erotetic amelioration, according to which we must evaluate and, eventually, improve our answers to questions of the form “What is x?”. My focus will be on cases where x stands for a strongly social kind, such as marriage. Such a position is offered as an alternative to the idea-sometimes called conceptual engineering-according to which we should evaluate and, eventually, seek to improve our concepts. After introducing the idea of erotetic amelioration, (...) I will show how it can be put into work to deal with what I call the topic preservation challenge, and what advantages it has in relation to a similar position available in the literature, namely, Cappelen’s (2018) Austerity Framework. (shrink)

It is widely believed by philosophers that we human beings are capable of stepping back from inclinations to act in a certain way and consider whether we should do so. If we judge that there are enough reasons in favour of following our initial inclination, we are definitely motivated, and, if all goes well, we act. This view of human agency naturally leads to the idea that our actions are self-determined, or controlled by ourselves. Some go one step further to (...) the point of saying that we should extend the fundamental aspects of this view of human agency to the epistemic realm. This we call ‘the control-view”. Here we will make a strong case against the control-view. While we have a substantial control over our practical lives, it is very unlikely that this extends to our epistemic lives. Our discussion will proceed in three stages. We will present two asymmetries between our practical and epistemic lives which are followed by a general argument against the control-view. (shrink)

The existence of causal explanations in science has been an issue of interest in Western philosophy from its very beginnings. That is the reason this work, following an idea of Mario Bunge, makes a historical review of this matter. The modern treatment of this subject takes place since the postulation by Popper and Hempel of the D-N model of scientific explanation, whose viability is scrutinized here from different points of view in the current philosophy of science. The main object of (...) this paper is to present two arguments against the possibility of causal explanations in theoretical physics. The first one concerns the existence, in certain cases, of inter-theoretical incompatibilities, and the second refers to the need to resort, in other cases, to concatenations of laws of different theories and disciplines. The final conclusion will be the defence of a form of theoretical explanation, which follows the Popper-Hempel model, but devoid of any ontological and metaphysical connotations. (shrink)

But what are functions? Here, 15 leading scholars of philosophy of psychology and philosophy of biology present new essays on functions.

IN the last decade deliberative democracy has developed rapidly from a “theoretical statement” into a “working theory.”1 Scholars and practitioners have launched numerous initiatives designed to put deliberative democracy into practice, ranging from deliberative polling to citizen summits.2 Some even advocate deliberation as a new “revolutionary now.”3 Deliberative democracy has also experienced the beginning of an empirical turn, making significant gains as an empirical (or positive) political science. This includes a small, but growing body of literature tackling the connection between (...) the normative standards of deliberation, how well they are met, and the empirical consequences of meeting them.4 This trend has, for instance, included the use of methods and frameworks borrowed from other fields, such as political and social psychology. Such studies suggest that cases approaching ideal deliberation are rare, but that group interaction sometimes works surprisingly well according to such ideals.5. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the rationality of law and legal decision making would be enhanced by a systematic attempt to recognize and respond to the implications of empirical uncertainty for policy making and decision making. Admission of uncertainty about the accuracy of facts and the validity of assumptions relied on to make inferences of fact is commonly avoided in law because it raises the spectre of paralysis of the capacity to decide issues authoritatively. The roots of this short-sighted (...) view are found in primitive mechanical models of relationships in the empirical and social world – those of objective causality and determinism. Insofar as it is believed that if we had sufficient data a clear and unequivocal answer would be available to each question, admission of uncertainty is seen as a sign of insufficiency, incompetence, impotence, and is avoided whenever a decision that must be seen to be based on valid reasons, cannot be avoided. Avoidance of some decisions, duplicity in others, is the result. -/- Decision-making must be restructured to recognize the provisional and context-bound validity and relevance of the models we use to conceptualize and order our understanding of phenomena, and to utilize this awareness as an instrument in the production of legal policies and decisions that will be authoritative precisely because they are honestly accurate and socially responsible. The paper makes a start on such a re-structuring of the legal process by exploring the implications of the observation that if law is to be “just”: 1) legal policy must be based on accurate information and rationally related to social goals; and 2) decisions applying policy to individual fact situations must be based on assumptions that are both relevant and accurate. -/- Reasons for determinations of fact must be given, otherwise the presumption that the trier of fact is “reasonable” is an unconditional licence to use private modes of logic and theories of social and natural science. What is not disclosed cannot be challenged on grounds of invalidity or irrelevance. -/- Use of “objective validity” as a standard to evaluate conclusions made by the trier of fact in contentious cases would only serve to beg all important questions by concealing: 1) fundamental normative conflict, and 2) the limited nature and applicability of many validity claims. -/- Our use of the phrases “undue risk,” “public interest,” “reasonable,” and “necessary,” reflects the weight we choose to give conflicting social values and goals when we must make decisions in relative ignorance of all the consequences. “Objective criteria” are of limited utility in legal decision-making because their social meaning is derivative. Policy generation in the absence of any coherent conceptual-normative framework, use of vague terminology in legislation stating policy, and the absence of rational means to distinguish between individual cases to which decision-makers are required by law to apply policy, make it inevitable that many legal “decisions” made in the guise of determinations of objective fact, are charades, an arbitrary, capricious, intuitive, subjective (and thus private) use of public decision-making power. -/- Law must alter its aspirations and recognize that rational decision-making is a process that can occur only within parameters set by present knowledge and societal preference structures. Only by working with the constraints imposed by these parameters is it possible to achieve “just” decisions. Where no rational basis for differentiating cases exists, “individualized justice” must be avoided and public policy articulated in law applied uniformly to all cases in a class. The terms “reasonable” and “necessary,” used to describe policy and its consequences for specific cases, must be understood to represent provisional societal assessments, attempts to implement societal preference structures in the face of limited knowledge. Heightened awareness of the limited nature of our knowledge can only result in legal policies that have a more explicit normative basis. -/- The volume is is published with an introduction by Michael D. Bayles. It is available in hardback, paperback, and as an ebook. (shrink)

"Proceedings of the 11th IVR World Congress on Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy... held on August 14-20, 1983 in Helsinki"--Introd.

The first purpose of this article is to present a new theory of libertarian free will—the boundary theory of libertarian free will—which provides a new framework by means of employing boundaries as a “conceptual scheme” for understanding libertarian free will. This theory consists of two parts. One part suggests that the agent’s will should be viewed as the intermediate boundary between an agent’s reasons and his alternative choices. The second part is a model where the agent’s will is a faculty (...) that solely operates by permitting or resisting reasons (that are potential causes) to become actual causes for the agent’s choices. The second purpose of the paper is to argue that the boundary theory of libertarian free will has several advantages, the most important of which are: (a) it defeats the charge that libertarian free will is a mystery; (b) it defeats the standard objections against the compatibility of libertarian free will and indeterminism (that is, the luck argument, the roll-back argument, the difference argument, the assimilation argument, etc.); and (c) it is simultaneously an argument for indeterminism as such (that is, that determinism is false). (shrink)

Why I thought it useful to offer an explanation of Hegel’s doctrine on the Incarnation was so that the reader may be empowered to identify Hegel’s influence in modern accounts of this mystery. Even if, in my view, Hegel’s interpretation of revealed religion differs greatly from Catholic Doctrine, it is not surprising to find the presence of some of his concepts in modern theology. In truth, what matters is not the theologian’s self-identification as Hegelian or as non-Hegelian, but whether or (...) not the theologian adopts Hegel’s concepts. This paper offers an explanation of the internal dynamism of Hegelian concepts and their relation to Christian doctrine in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. This research may help to show in what way it is possible to explain Christian religious doctrine with a philosophy other than the Thomistic one and how, at least in Hegel’s case, religious doctrine is changed and reduced to an erroneous philosophical content. Also, an attempt is made to show the internal “coherence” of this Hegelian re-reading of Christianity so that theologians may become more cautious about accepting an explanation of Christian doctrine simply because the Christian language is preserved in that explanation. (shrink)

The following is a paper presented for the Course Rahner and Lonergan at the University of Toronto (Winter, 2014), revised and edited Winter, 2018. Our purpose is to defend the possibility of “perceptualism,” that is to say, the position maintaining that the intelligible content of consciousness is given in perception and not posited by the activity of the subject. Assisted by the insights of Cornelio Fabro, this defense contrasts perceptualism with Bernard Lonergan’s “critical realism”. This paper focuses on the notion (...) of experience, seemingly the basis of the opposition between perceptualism and critical realism. (shrink)

Current work in language models (LMs) helps us speed up or even skip thinking by accelerating and automating cognitive work. But can LMs help us with critical thinking -- thinking in deeper, more reflective ways which challenge assumptions, clarify ideas, and engineer new concepts? We treat philosophy as a case study in critical thinking, and interview 21 professional philosophers about how they engage in critical thinking and on their experiences with LMs. We find that philosophers do not find LMs to (...) be useful because they lack a sense of selfhood (memory, beliefs, consistency) and initiative (curiosity, proactivity). We propose the selfhood-initiative model for critical thinking tools to characterize this gap. Using the model, we formulate three roles LMs could play as critical thinking tools: the Interlocutor, the Monitor, and the Respondent. We hope that our work inspires LM researchers to further develop LMs as critical thinking tools and philosophers and other 'critical thinkers' to imagine intellectually substantive uses of LMs. (shrink)

Andre Breton discusses the meaning, aims, and political position of the Surrealist movement.

Time is a traditional theme in philosophy and a fundamental theme in psychoanalysis. The wealth of studies devoted to the former contrasts strikingly with their scarcity in the latter.

Si la philosophie se laisse assez bien circonscrire a une pretention de rationaliser le monde et de proposer un canevas d'explication auquel puise les autres disciplines, la question de son application reste entiere. Comment en effet pretendre offrir des reponses concretes a ceux qui s'interrogent sur la maniere de mener leur vie, d'intervenir dans l'espace public et d'organiser cet espace dans des societes traversees par un individualisme profond? Comment offrir un cadre de reflexion acceptable pour developper des applications concretes alors (...) que les cadres de reference traditionnels et usuels s'estompent? Comment repondre a des questions si singulieres alors que la philosophie se veut, par essence, universelle? Voila ce dont les auteurs discutent en proposant un etat des lieux et des pistes de reflexion pour ramener la philosophie sur le terrain de l'application. (shrink)

Covering the basics as well as recent research results, this book provides a very readable introduction to the exciting interface of computability and ...

What is meant by "the philosophy of librarianship" -- The lack of a coherent philosophy of librarianship -- The nature of librarianship -- The ultimate aims of libraries.

Loin de pouvoir être réduit à son acception contemporaine, notamment heideggérienne, le concept de finitude est un concept traditionnel. Tel est le constat qui anime cette recherche dont l'objectif est de mettre au jour certaines de ses figures dans l'histoire de la pensée. Il s'agit, en évitant toute interprétation préconçue, d'étudier, sans prétendre à l'exhaustivité, comment ce concept, d'abord présent de façon explicite dans la pensée chrétienne des premiers siècles, se renouvelle ensuite tout au long de l'histoire de la pensée. (...) Le concept de finitude apparaît inauguralement chez Grégoire de Nysse, le théologien fondamental de l'infinité divine, pour qui " le fini " - to peratoumenon - est marqué par l'imperfection radicale de ne pas être Dieu. L'essence du fini est alors pensée grâce à la liaison platonicienne entre être et non-être. Appartenant au domaine général du fini, l'homme est en effet séparé de l'être véritable, mais il possède aussi un être propre : cette double caractéristique est une constante de l'approche chrétienne du fini, que Thomas d'Aquin exprime dans le concept d'ens finitum " participant " de l'être sans restriction dans sa restriction même. Refusant la discontinuité médiévale entre l'étant fini et son créateur, encore à leurs yeux présente chez Descartes, Leibniz et Spinoza renouvellent le concept de fini par leur ambition commune d'une rationalité infinie du fini, le premier au travers de la notion de " substance finie " dérivée de l'infini, le second par celle de " mode fini ", affection de la substance infinie. C'est contre de telles approches de la finitude que la philosophie critique réagit : " l'être raisonnable fini " de Kant est un sujet originaire et ne peut donc trouver aucun appui dans une rationalité infinie. L'idéalisme allemand entreprend de dépasser cette finitude kantienne à partir de Kant lui-même, en repensant la subjectivité transcendantale. La question du statut à accorder à la finitude - Endlichkeit - est au cœur des controverses qui l'animent. Heidegger reprendra d'abord, non sans hésitation, ce concept d'Endlichkeit, ancré dans la tradition occidentale, en parlant d'une " finitude du Dasein ", puis d'une " finitude de l'Être ", mais le poids historique d'un tel concept lui apparaîtra rapidement incompatible avec la nouveauté de sa pensée. Il ressort de cette étude que la question de la finitude consiste moins à se demander si l'homme est ou non un être fini que de déterminer de quelle finitude il est fini. Cette détermination est historiquement et philosophiquement décisive car elle concerne l'essence de l'homme, qui peut et doit " se connaître lui-même ". (shrink)

Il n'existe pas d'humanité sans musique. Celle-ci vient à chacun en le précédant, en lui ouvrant son mode d'existence et en lui donnant forme et rythme. Nos affects, nos désirs et nos pensées sont musicaux. L'existence est musicale. La musique constitue donc notre condition, si bien qu'elle est plus antérieure et plus intérieure à nous que nous-mêmes. Toutefois, comme nous, elle est sans origine assignable et sans commencement. Ceci n'est donc pas un livre de musicologie. Pour le lire, nulle expertise (...) n'est requise, seulement l'expérience d'exister. Nous sommes par ailleurs nécessairement pris dans l'Histoire faite de catastrophes mais aussi de marques d'espérance. Que dit alors très concrètement la musique de nous, de nos existences actuelles et du présent? Et comment dans ces conditions recevons et entendons-nous notre être-musical?"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Cette etude suppose un releve exhaustif des occurences d'aporia, et de douze autres mots etymologiquement apparentes, dans la litterature philosophique des Grecs, depuis les debuts jusqu'a Aristote. Les divers textes, que se sont repartis les collaborateurs du volume, sont etudies du point de vue de la grammaire et de la semantique. Chaque chapitre s'acheve sur des conclusions d'ordre philosophique, comme font aussi les trois grandes parties de l'ouvrage: philosophes preclassiques, Platon, Aristote. On trouvera en outre a la fin du volume (...) des etudes relatives au vocabulaire de l'aporia aussi bien dans la tradition arabe que chez les latins. Bibliographie et index des mots grecs etudies. (shrink)

Ce manifeste pour une reflexion sur l'Histoire et une Histoire de la relexion est un premier jalon pour sortir la philosophie du cercle ou les vicissitudes d'une perennite, qui vieillit outrancierement, et les turpitudes d'une nescience, qui n'a meme plus de jeunesse, ensevelissent son enseignement. Si toutefois on ne dresse pas d'insurmontables barrieres entre les siecles et si on veut bien respecter les eclatements instantanes de l'Histoire, on s'apercevra des roles que peut jouer la Raison humaine dans la genese des (...) discours qu'elle prononce ou enonce pour prendre langue sur son destin. Le principe de raison suffisante aurait-il raison contre ses detracteurs? Ou nous conduit sa reduction a la necessite sinon a la condamnation des techno-sciences dont on s'empresse de jouir et a l'abandon programme de toute justice dans les conduites privees ou publiques? Au fond, on condamne le principe de raison suffisante leibnizien parce qu'il permet d'exprimer la verite de la justice par sa philosophie du droit, par sa metaphysique, par sa logique, par sa psycho-somatique, par sa religion naturelle. Sans doute est-ce pourquoi on s'eleve contre toutes les tentatives d'instaurer des science de l'homme. Cette reponse de Leibniz a Der Satz vom Grund couvait depuis longtemps dans les dossiers de l'auteur. Ce qui reste a souhaiter c'est que nos Socrate du neant se mettent a redonner un contenu essentiel et existentiel a la communication philosophique. Essentiel en revenant aux textes, existentiel en eprouvant l'actualite. (shrink)

The interplay between computability and randomness has been an active area of research in recent years, reflected by ample funding in the USA, numerous workshops, and publications on the subject. The complexity and the randomness aspect of a set of natural numbers are closely related. Traditionally, computability theory is concerned with the complexity aspect. However, computability theoretic tools can also be used to introduce mathematical counterparts for the intuitive notion of randomness of a set. Recent research shows that, conversely, concepts (...) and methods originating from randomness enrich computability theory.The book covers topics such as lowness and highness properties, Kolmogorov complexity, betting strategies and higher computability. Both the basics and recent research results are desribed, providing a very readable introduction to the exciting interface of computability and randomness for graduates and researchers in computability theory, theoretical computer science, and measure theory. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: In this essay I characterize arguments by analogy, which have an impor- tant role both in philosophical and everyday reasoning. Arguments by analogy are dif- ferent from ordinary inductive or deductive arguments and have their own distinct features. I try to characterize the structure and function of these arguments. It is further discussed that some arguments, which are not explicit arguments by analogy, nevertheless should be interpreted as such and not as inductive or deductive arguments. The result is that (...) a presumed outcome of a philosophical dispute will have to be reconsidered. (shrink)

Epistemic impairment has been the decisive yardstick when excluding infants from political agency. One of the suggestions to bypass the epistemic requirement of political agency and to encourage the inclusion of infants in representative democracies is to resort to proxies or surrogates who share or advocate interests which may be coincidental with their interests. However, this solution is far from desirable, given that it privileges the political agency of parents, guardians and trustees over other adult citizens. This article offers an (...) alternative to this conceptual frame of reference by making a case for the political agency of infants. Firstly, it maintains that political agency can be understood in terms of the several facets involved in political representation. Secondly, it claims that the all-affected principle can be reformulated as an ‘infant-affected-interests principle’ in light of which infants are members of the class of the represented. Thirdly, it explores the ways through which this political agency can occur without having to resort to alternative conceptions of representation. The conclusion ascertains that infant enfranchisement is highly undesirable and that there are more viable forms to promote infant political agency, such as virtual representation, infant-beneficial principles of political action and ombudspersons for infants. (shrink)

Labour and employment law no longer has a monopoly on regulating labour relations and is facing a crisis as its effectiveness is questioned. Codes of conduct adopted by companies to recognise their social responsibility for the global supply chain are instruments that can usefully complement labour and employment law. The aim of this paper is to analyse in depth the legal nature of codes of conduct and their impact on labour and employment law. Will the use of codes of conduct (...) reinforce the crisis of labour and employment law in the era of globalisation or will these codes be part of a solution to this crisis? Do we have to consider codes of conduct as competitors to labour and employment law or as an opportunity for rethinking the way that labour and employment law norms should be produced and applied? (shrink)

More and more organisations formulate a code of conduct in order to stimulate responsible behaviour among their members. Much time and energy is usually spent fixing the content of the code but many organisations get stuck in the challenge of implementing and maintaining the code. The code then turns into nothing else than the notorious "paper in the drawer", without achieving its aims. The challenge of implementation is to utilize the dynamics which have emerged from the formulation of the code. (...) This will support a continuous process of reflection on the central values and standards contained in the code. This paper presents an assessment method, based on the EFQM model, which intends to support this implementation process. (shrink)

Labour and employment law no longer has a monopoly on regulating labour relations and is facing a crisis as its effectiveness is questioned. Codes of conduct adopted by companies to recognise their social responsibility for the global supply chain are instruments that can usefully complement labour and employment law. The aim of this paper is to analyse in depth the legal nature of codes of conduct and their impact on labour and employment law. Will the use of codes of conduct (...) reinforce the crisis of labour and employment law in the era of globalisation or will these codes be part of a solution to this crisis? Do we have to consider codes of conduct as competitors to labour and employment law or as an opportunity for rethinking the way that labour and employment law norms should be produced and applied? (shrink)